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PAVLIV v. UKRAINE - 35176/08 [2011] ECHR 91 (20 January 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/91.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 91
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
PAVLIV v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 35176/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 January
2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Pavliv v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Rait
Maruste,
President,
Mirjana
Lazarova Trajkovska,
Zdravka
Kalaydjieva,
judges
and Stephen Phillips,
Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 December 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 35176/08) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian
national, Mr Volodymyr Volodymyrovych Pavliv (“the applicant”),
on 27 June 2008.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev, of the Ministry of Justice.
On
24 November 2009 the
President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. In accordance
with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of
three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Piddubne, the Lviv Region.
On
20 October 1999 the applicant lodged a claim with the Chervonohrad
Court against his former employer for re-calculation of monthly
allowance for a work-related disease.
On
27 March 2001 the court scheduled its first hearing for 2 April 2001
which was subsequently adjourned because of the applicant’s
failure to appear.
On
5 June 2001 the Chervonohrad Court left the applicant’s claim
without examination for his repeated failure to appear before the
court.
On
28 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of 5 June
2001. He submitted that he had not been summoned to appear before the
court and that he had become aware of that decision in January 2003.
On
28 July 2003 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal found that there was
no evidence in the case that the applicant had been duly informed of
the time and date of the court hearings scheduled for 2 April and 5
June 2001. It quashed the decision of 5 June 2001 and remitted the
case for a consideration by the first-instance court.
On
1 December 2003 the Chervonohrad Court allowed the respondent’s
request for transferring the case to a court of different territorial
jurisdiction, the Sokal Court.
On
9 January 2004 the Sokal Court received the case. On 25 February
2005 it scheduled its first hearing for 10 March 2005.
On
30 December 2005 the Sokal Court rejected the applicant’s
claims as unsubstantiated. On 24 January 2006 the applicant appealed
against the judgment.
On
21 August 2006 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment
of 30 December 2005.
On
18 October 2006 the applicant lodged his appeal in cassation.
On
27 December 2007 the Khmelnytsk Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as
a court of cassation, dismissed the applicant’s appeal in
cassation and upheld the decisions of the lower courts.
In
the course of the proceedings the hearings were adjourned five times
because of either the applicant’s or his representative’s
failure to appear or his requests for documents or adjournment of the
case.
THE LAW
I. THE COMPLAINT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far
as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
excessive.
The
Government submitted that the applicant had contributed to the
protracted length of the proceedings by lodging appeals and requests
for adjournment and by failing to appear before the first-instant
court.
The
Court notes that the period to be taken into consideration began on
20 October 1999 and ended on 27 December 2007. It thus lasted eight
years and two months at three levels of jurisdiction.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
Turning
to the facts of the case, the Court notes that the first decision on
the merits of the case was given six years and two months after the
applicant had lodged his claims with the first-instance court. Such a
substantial delay was caused, to a decisive extent if not
exclusively, by the courts’ unjustified protraction of the
proceedings, despite the obvious importance of their outcome for the
applicant.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above; Pysatyuk v.Ukraine,
no. 21979/04, §§ 24, 30-34, 16 April 2009; and Popilin
v. Ukraine, no. 12470/04, §§ 24-31, 16 April 2009).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER COMPLAINTS
The
applicant complained of a violation of Articles 1, 6, 13 and 18 of
the Convention on account of the outcome of the proceedings.
In the light of the materials in
its possession, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaints
do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction when requested
by the Court. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call
to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention of excessive length of the proceedings admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 January 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Rait Maruste Deputy Registrar President
