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MAKEDONSKI v. BULGARIA - 36036/04 [2011] ECHR 81 (20 January 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/81.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 81
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
MAKEDONSKI v. BULGARIA
(Application
no. 36036/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 January
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Makedonski v. Bulgaria,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Renate
Jaeger,
Karel Jungwiert,
Rait Maruste,
Mark
Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
judges,
Pavlina Panova, ad hoc judge,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 December 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 6036/04) against the
Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Bulgarian national, Mr Georgi
Mihailov Makedonski (“the applicant”), on 8 October 2004.
The
applicant was represented by Mrs Z. Stefanova, a lawyer practising in
Sofia. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Dimova, of the Ministry of
Justice.
On
6 November 2008 the
President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 of the Convention).
Judge
Kalaydjieva, the judge elected in respect of Bulgaria, withdrew from
sitting in the case. The President of the Chamber accordingly
appointed Ms Pavlina Panova to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article
26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Sofia.
A. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
On
an unspecified date in 1992 the Sofia district public prosecutor’s
office opened criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges
of large-scale embezzlement from the trade union where he worked as a
financial assistant.
On
an unspecified date the fact that criminal proceedings had been
opened against the applicant was publicised in the local press. The
applicant contends that he was dismissed from his job as a result and
subsequently had difficulties finding employment as a specialist in
the field of finance.
On
22 March 1993 the charges against the applicant were amended to
embezzlement.
Thereafter
the case was apparently transferred several times back and forth
between the public prosecutor’s office and the investigation
authorities, the last such remittal being on 6 February 1996.
On
an unspecified date it was discovered that the applicant’s case
file was missing. On 9 July 2003 the district public prosecutor’s
office ordered that the applicant’s case file be restored.
Between
October 2003 and May 2004 the applicant submitted several requests to
the Sofia District Court for a procedure to be initiated under
Article 239a of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1974 (CCP) to have
his case examined by a court. In order to deal with the requests the
District Court repeatedly requested the district public prosecutor’s
office to send it the applicant’s case file, which apparently
they failed to do.
On
11 March 2004 the District Court remitted the case to the prosecution
authorities with instructions to file an indictment against the
applicant within two months or discontinue the criminal proceedings
against him.
On
8 April 2004 the district public prosecutor’s office
discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant on the
grounds that no evidence had been gathered that he had committed an
offence.
On
2 June 2004 the Sofia Regional Court confirmed the discontinuation of
the proceedings.
B. The prohibition on leaving the country
In
an order of 20 January 1994 the district public prosecutor’s
office imposed a prohibition on the applicant’s leaving
Bulgaria, under section 7 of the Foreign Travel Passports Act. The
prohibition remained in force throughout the criminal proceedings.
On
an unspecified date in 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the
Sofia regional public prosecutor’s office, seeking that the
prohibition on leaving the country be lifted so that he could make a
trip to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On 27 December
2002 the request was transmitted to the district public prosecutor’s
office.
In
an order of 14 July 2003 the district public prosecutor’s
office refused to completely lift the prohibition on leaving the
country, as more investigative actions had to be carried out. She
suspended it however for a period of one month from 1 August 2003 in
order to allow the applicant to make the desired trip. The applicant
did not appeal against the order to the higher-level prosecutor’s
office.
On
an unspecified date in August 2003 the applicant obtained a foreign
travel passport. He attempted to leave the country on 5 September
2003 but was not allowed and his passport was seized at the border
because his temporary right to travel abroad had expired.
The
applicant asserts that on an unspecified date thereafter he requested
the lifting of the prohibition to leave the country but received no
reply.
On
8 April 2004 the district public prosecutor’s office lifted the
prohibition on the applicant’s leaving the country at the same
time as the criminal proceedings against him were discontinued.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Article 239a of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1974
An
amendment of June 2003 introduced the new Article 239a of the CCP,
which provided for the opportunity for a person who has been charged
to have his case examined by a court if the investigation has not
been completed within the statutory time-limit (two years in
investigations concerning serious offences and one year in all other
investigations). This possibility was kept in the new CCP of 29 April
2006 (Articles 368-369) but revoked with effect from 28 May 2010.
B. State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage
Act
The
relevant part of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for
Damage Act of 1988 (the “SMRDA”: title changed in 2006)
provided that the State was liable for damage caused to private
persons by organs of the investigation, the prosecution and the
courts for, inter alia, unlawfully charging a private person
with an offence if the criminal proceedings initiated were terminated
because the deed was not perpetrated by the said person or the
perpetrated deed was not an offence (section 2 (2)). The Act does not
mention excessive length of proceedings or prohibition on leaving the
country as a ground for an action for damages.
C. Prohibition to leave the country
Prior
to 1999 the imposition of a prohibition on leaving the country was
regulated by the Foreign Travel Passports Act (FTPA), which in
section 7 (b) provided that a foreign travel passport could be
refused to persons against whom a criminal investigation was pending
and by Article 147 § 3 of the CCP, as in force between 14
October 1994 and 1 January 2000, which provided that a person
charged with a criminal offence punishable by more than three years’
imprisonment was prohibited from leaving the country without
authorisation by a prosecutor or a court.
In
April 1999 the FTPA was replaced by the Bulgarian Identity Documents
Act, which in section 75 (3) provided that persons against whom a
criminal investigation was pending would not be allowed to leave
Bulgaria, their passports would be seized and their requests for new
passports would be refused.
The
regime was further changed on 1 January 2000 with the new Article
153a of the CCP (from 29 April 2006 replaced by Article 68 of the new
CCP) which stated that while criminal proceedings were pending at the
investigation stage for serious criminal offences, the public
prosecutor’s office could impose on the person charged a
prohibition on leaving the country. Where such a prohibition had been
imposed, the public prosecutor’s office could grant temporary
authorisation for specific trips abroad. Refusal by the public
prosecutor’s office to grant such an authorisation could be
challenged before the relevant court of first instance. When the case
was pending before the courts, they would exercise the aforesaid
powers granted to the prosecution authorities.
The
new CCP of 2006 provides in Article 68 § 5 the opportunity for
the person charged and his or her lawyer to request from the court
the complete revocation of the prohibition on the grounds that there
is no longer a danger of absconding.
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTION OF INADMISSIBILITY
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the
available domestic remedies because he had not initiated an action
for damages under section 2 (2) of the SMRDA and referred to the
existing possibility therein to obtain redress for being unlawfully
charged with an offence. The applicant replied that an action under
the SMRDA did not represent a remedy to be exhausted as regards his
complaints.
The
Court notes that the applicant complains about the length of the
criminal proceedings and the prohibition on travelling abroad.
Section 2 (2) of the SMRDA, meanwhile, provides for redress in
several exhaustively listed situations, among which there is no
mention of excessive length of criminal proceedings or measures taken
against a person who has been charged in the course of criminal
proceedings, such as a prohibition on leaving the country. Thus, the
Government did not indicate how an action under section 2 (2) of the
SMRDA would have remedied the complaints currently before this Court
in respect of the allegedly excessive length of the criminal
proceedings and the prohibition on leaving the country. Moreover,
they failed to present copies of domestic court judgments where
awards had been made under the SMRDA providing redress for excessive
length of criminal proceedings or for a prohibition on leaving the
country. Furthermore, the Court notes that a similar objection in
respect of complaints about length of proceedings has been rejected
in earlier cases (see Nalbantova v. Bulgaria, no. 38106/02, §
35, 27 September 2007; Doinov v. Bulgaria, no. 68356/01, §§
31-37, 27 September 2007; and Mirchev and Others v. Bulgaria,
no. 71605/01, §§ 16-18, 27 November 2008) and sees no
reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
In
view of the aforesaid, the Court does not find it proven by the
Government that in the circumstances of the present case an action
under the SMRDA would have provided for an enforceable right to
compensation which could be considered an effective, sufficient and
accessible remedy in respect of the applicant’s complaints
about the length of the criminal proceedings and the prohibition on
leaving the country. Furthermore, it does not appear that such a
right is secured under any other provision of Bulgarian law (see
paragraphs 21-26 above).
Considering
the above, the Court rejects the Government’s objection about
failure to exhaust available domestic remedies.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 4
The
applicant complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 that the
prohibition on leaving the country imposed on him in 1994 had been
unjustified and disproportionate.
The
relevant part of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 provides:
“2. Everyone shall be free to leave any
country, including his own.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the
exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre
public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court observes that the ban was imposed on the applicant in 1994 and
was lifted in April 2004. It is, however, competent ratione
temporis to examine the period after 4 November 2000, the date on
which Protocol No. 4 came into force in respect of Bulgaria. After
that date and until the ban was lifted on 8 April 2004 the
applicant’s freedom of movement was restricted for a period of
three years, five months and four days.
The Court further finds that this complaint is not
manifestly ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
(a) of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
The
applicant claimed that at the time when the prohibition on leaving
the country was imposed on him the relevant legislation provided for
its imposition automatically and without any assessment of the
balance between the individual’s rights and the public
interests at stake. This measure had not been necessary in his
situation and it had been imposed by the prosecution, which could not
be considered an independent body. Moreover, even after the entry
into force of Article 153a of the CCP in 2000, there were no
provisions in the domestic law allowing for the complete revocation
of the prohibition. This Article only enabled the public prosecutor’s
office to grant temporary permission to the restricted individual to
leave the country for specific trips. He further argued that after
the entry into force of Article 153a no assessment had been made as
to whether the prohibition imposed on him was still necessary and in
accordance with the purposes of this Article.
The
Government argued that the applicant’s right to freedom of
movement had not been violated, as the main purpose of the ban was to
ensure his participation in the criminal proceedings against him, the
prohibition was not absolute and after 2000 it could be reviewed by a
court. They also contended that after 2000 the ban was not imposed
automatically against all persons against whom criminal proceedings
had been opened, but only against those who were being prosecuted for
serious offences and not even against all those, as the prosecutor
had the right to decide whether to impose a ban or not. Moreover, in
2003 the applicant had been allowed to leave the country in order to
go to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
2. The Court’s assessment
The
Court reiterates that Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 guarantees to any
person the right to freedom of movement, including the right to leave
any country for another country to which he or she may be admitted.
Any measure restricting that right must be lawful, pursue one of the
legitimate aims referred to in the third paragraph of the
above-mentioned Convention provision and strike a fair balance
between the public interest and the individual’s rights (see
Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 61, ECHR 2001-V).
The
Court notes that the ban imposed on the applicant constituted an
interference with his right to leave the country.
With
regard to the lawfulness and the legitimate aim of this interference,
the Court is satisfied that the ban was based on the provisions of
the relevant legislation (see paragraphs 15 and 23-26 above) and
pursued the legitimate aim of prevention of crime. Thus it was
covered by Article 2 § 3 of Protocol No. 4 (see Fedorov and
Fedorova v. Russia, no. 31008/02, § 37, 13 October
2005).
With
regard to the proportionality of the interference, the Court observes
that the applicant was charged with an offence punishable with
imprisonment and that the State may apply various preventive measures
restricting the liberty of an accused in order to ensure the
efficient conduct of a criminal prosecution (see Fedorov and
Fedorova, cited above, § 41), including prohibition on
leaving the country.
In
that connection the Court notes that the ban imposed on the applicant
was not absolute - he could request its temporary removal, which, in
fact he did, and could leave the country, provided that he received
prior authorisation by a prosecutor.
In
previous cases against Bulgaria, where the applicants had not
requested permission to leave the country and consequently no refusal
to grant authorisation was ever made, the Court has rejected similar
complaints as manifestly ill-founded (see Hristov v. Bulgaria
(dec.), no. 32461/02, 3 April 2006 and, more recently, Iordan
Iordanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 23530/02,
§ 75, 2 July 2009). Unlike these cases, in the present
case the applicant availed himself of this opportunity and in 2003
obtained permission to leave the country for one month. It is true
that the relevant legislation at the time did not explicitly provide
for the complete revocation of a prohibition. However, in 2003 a
prosecutor from the district public prosecutor’s office which
had imposed the restriction on the applicant examined the
justification given for the extension of the prohibition and
concluded that it could not be completely removed, as further
investigative actions were necessary. The Court sees no reason to
believe that, had the prosecutor decided that no further
investigative actions were necessary, the prohibition would not have
been completely removed.
Nevertheless,
in view of the fact that the criminal proceedings against the
applicant never moved beyond the preliminary investigation stage,
where for almost nine years, up to 2003, almost no investigative
actions with the participation of the applicant were carried out and
that after July 2003 no such actions took place whatsoever, the Court
is not convinced that the extension of the prohibition was justified.
Therefore, the prolongation disturbed the fair balance between the
applicant’s right of freedom of movement and the public
interest of preventing and combating crime.
Furthermore,
the Court observes that the applicant’s request to leave the
country, although submitted at the end of 2002, was examined only in
July 2003. In view of the circumstances of the case, this period of
about six months which the authorities took to reply to the
applicant’s request cannot be considered reasonable. Thus, the
Court considers that the authorities did not act with the necessary
diligence when examining the applicant’s request.
It
must also be noted that the prohibition remained unchanged for more
than nine years, more than two of which were within the Court’s
jurisdiction ratione temporis and that the reassessment of the
applicant’s situation of July 2003 was the only reassessment
ever carried out. The applicant apparently received no reply to his
subsequent request for the prohibition to be removed (see paragraph
19 above). While the Court notes the Government’s argument that
after 1 January 2000, when the new Article 153a entered into
force, the imposition of the restriction was not automatic, it
observes that they failed to present any documents indicating that at
that time an assessment of whether the extension of the restriction
was justified had been made.
The
Court reiterates that even where a restriction on the individual’s
freedom of movement was initially warranted, maintaining it
automatically over a lengthy period of time may become a
disproportionate measure, violating the individual’s rights
(see, among others, Riener v. Bulgaria,
no. 46343/99, § 121, 23 May 2006; Luordo v.
Italy, no. 32190/96, ECHR 2003-IX; Földes and Földesné
Hajlik v. Hungary, no. 41463/02, §§ 30-36, ECHR
2006 XII; and Bessenyei v. Hungary, no. 37509/06,
§§ 21-24, 21 October 2008). In the Court’s view,
the authorities are not entitled to maintain restrictions on an
individual’s freedom of movement over lengthy periods without
periodic reassessments of their justification (see Riener,
cited above, § 124).
In
view of the above, the Court considers that the authorities’
conduct in the present case ran counter to their duty under Article 2
of Protocol No. 4 to take appropriate care to ensure that any
interference with the right to leave one’s country remains
justified and proportionate throughout its duration, in the
individual circumstances of the case. It follows that there has been
a violation of the applicant’s right to leave his country, as
guaranteed by Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF
THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings
against him had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and
that he did not have effective remedies in that respect as provided
by Article 13.
The
relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 13 of the Convention provides as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
Court notes that the period to be taken into consideration began on
an unspecified date in 1992, when the criminal proceedings against
the applicant were opened. However, given that the Convention entered
into force in respect of Bulgaria on 7 September 1992, this is the
earliest date that can be considered as the beginning of the relevant
period. The proceedings ended on 2 June 2004 when the District Court
confirmed their discontinuation. They thus lasted approximately
twelve years.
A. Admissibility
The Court finds that the complaints are not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention and are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Alleged violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the length of the
criminal proceedings
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case
and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see,
among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France
[GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Pélissier and Sassi, cited above; and
Balabanov v. Bulgaria, no. 70843/01, 3 July 2008).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
The proceedings remained at the pre-trial stage for more than eleven
years. The case does not appear to have been complex. It is clear
from the facts that the delays in the proceedings were caused by the
conduct of the authorities and are attributable to them. In
particular, delays resulted from the fact that there were several
remittals of the case between the prosecutor’s office and the
investigating authorities (see paragraph 9 above), from the loss of
the case file and the efforts to reconstruct it (see paragraph 10
above) and from the failure of the prosecution authorities to send
the case file promptly to Sofia District Court (see paragraph 11
above). There is, on the other hand, no indication that the applicant
was responsible for any substantial delay.
Having
regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in
the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
2. Alleged violation of
Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy
before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement
under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR
2000-XI). A remedy is effective if it prevents the alleged violation
or its continuation or provides adequate redress for any breach that
has already occurred (ibid., § 158; and Mifsud v. France
(dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, ECHR 2002 VIII).
The
Court must, therefore, determine whether, in the particular
circumstances of the present case, there existed in Bulgarian law
effective remedies in respect of the length of the proceedings.
As
regards the speeding up of the proceedings, the Court notes that in
June 2003 an amendment to the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure,
the new Article 239a, introduced the possibility for an accused
person to have his case brought before a trial court if the
investigation has not been completed within a certain time-limit (see
paragraph 21 above). The applicant made use of this remedy, which led
to the discontinuation of the proceedings. This however did not make
up for the excessive delay already accumulated. As regards the time
prior to this date the Court notes that in similar cases against
Bulgaria it has found that at the relevant time there was no formal
remedy under Bulgarian law that could have expedited the
determination of the criminal charges against the applicant (see
Osmanov and Yuseinov v. Bulgaria, nos. 54178/00 and
59901/00, §§ 38-42, 23 September 2004; and Sidjimov v.
Bulgaria, no. 55057/00, § 41, 27 January 2005). The
Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present
case.
In
respect of the possibility of obtaining compensation, the Court
refers to its finding that, in the particular circumstances of the
present case, an action under the SMRDA did not represent a remedy to
be exhausted in respect of length of proceedings (see paragraphs 29
and 30 above). It follows that it cannot be considered an effective
remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. In
addition, the Government has not shown that Bulgarian law provides
other means for a litigant to obtain compensation or other redress
for excessively lengthy proceedings.
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in that
the applicant had no domestic remedy whereby he could enforce his
right to a “hearing within a reasonable time”, as
guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention or adequate
compensation in respect thereto.
IV. THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICANT’S COMPLAINTS
The
applicant also complained that his private and family life were
adversely affected by the criminal proceedings against him and that
as a result of the publicity in the local press he had been dismissed
from his job and had then had difficulties finding employment as a
specialist in the field of finance.
The
Court has examined the remainder of the applicant’s complaints
as submitted by him. However, in the light of all the material in its
possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its
competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance
of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention
or its Protocols.
It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and
4 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
In
respect of non-pecuniary damage the applicant claimed 20,000 euros
(EUR), for the length of the criminal proceedings and the lack of
effective remedies in that regard, EUR 30,000 for the prohibition on
leaving the country and the lack of effective remedies in that regard
and a further EUR 37,000 for the alleged violation of Article 8.
The
Government contested these claims.
The
Court observes that the applicant must have sustained non pecuniary
damage as a result of the above established violations. Ruling on an
equitable basis and taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, it awards him EUR 7,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 in lawyers’
fees for the proceedings before the Court. In
support of his claim he presented an agreement with his
lawyer, stating that the legal fees in connection with his
application would be covered by the Bulgarian Lawyers for Human
Rights Foundation at a rate of EUR 50 per hour. He further claimed
EUR 101 in costs for the translation of his observations, postage and
office materials. He submitted postage receipts for the amount of 85
Bulgarian levs (BGN, EUR 43.46) two of which were on the account
of the Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights Foundation. He further
presented two receipts for a total amount of BGN 1,732.63 (EUR
885.90) for payments made to his lawyer by the Bulgarian Lawyers for
Human Rights Foundation for the legal work on the applicant’s
case before the Court. The applicant requested
that the amount awarded for costs and expenses under this head be
paid to the Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights Foundation.
The
Government contested these claims as excessive.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000, covering costs
and expenses under all heads, to be paid directly to the Bulgarian
Lawyers for Human Rights Foundation.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the
prohibition on leaving the country, the excessive length of the
proceedings and lack of effective remedies in that respect admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of
the proceedings;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on
account of the lack of an effective remedy for the excessive length
of the proceedings;
Holds
a) that
the respondent State is to pay to the applicant, within three months
of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be
converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement:
(i) EUR
7,000 (seven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to
the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, which to be paid
directly to the Bulgarian Lawyers for Human
Rights Foundation;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 January 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
