British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
RYAZANTSEV v. RUSSIA - 21774/06 [2011] ECHR 440 (10 March 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/440.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 440
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF RYAZANTSEV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 21774/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 March
2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ryazantsev v.
Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
committee composed of:
George Nicolaou,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska, judges,
and André Wampach,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 17 February 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 21774/06) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Valeriy Mitrofanovich
Ryazantsev (“the applicant”), on 27 April 2006.
The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
On
15 June 2009 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Tver.
A. Proceedings against a private company
On
4 November 2002 the applicant brought proceedings against a private
housing construction company in the Zavolzhskiy District Court of
Tver (“the District Court”), seeking conclusion of a
co-investment agreement and registration of his property title to a
flat.
The
court scheduled the first hearing for 4 January 2003.
On
18 March 2003 the respondent filed its objections to the claim.
The
hearing of 2 April 2003 did not take place following the respondent’s
failure to appear.
On
8 July 2003 the applicant informed the court that he would be out of
town until September 2003.
It
appears that the next hearing was scheduled by the court for
13 October 2004. The applicant did not appear at this hearing,
following which it was adjourned. According to the applicant, he had
not been notified of the hearing. The parties did not supply any
evidence to support their accounts of the event.
The
hearing of 27 December 2004 did not take place as the judge was ill.
On
29 April 2005 the case was handed over to a different judge.
On
26 May 2005 the court adjourned the hearing in view of the
insufficiency of evidence. According to the applicant, at the same
hearing he learned that the respondent had filed objections to his
claim on 18 March 2003.
On
30 May 2005 the applicant requested a certified copy of the
respondent’s objections.
On
4 July 2005 the respondent supplemented its observations on the
claim. The applicant received a copy of the supplementary
observations on 20 October 2005.
On
9 August 2005 the applicant replied to the objections of 18 March
2003.
The
hearing of 12 August 2005 did not take place as the judge was on
vacation.
The
hearing of 11 October 2005 had to be postponed following the
respondent’s failure to appear.
On
2 and 21 December 2005 the applicant specified and supplemented his
claim. The hearing of 21 December 2005 could not proceed as the
respondent’s representative produced an expired power of
attorney.
On
27 January and 21 March 2006 the applicant effectively requested that
the hearings be adjourned due to his failure to obtain certain
evidence from a municipal agency.
On
3 May 2006 the court adjourned examination of the case till September
2006 having required the applicant to supply the documents concerning
registration of his property title to the disputed flat.
The
hearing of 3 September 2006 was adjourned to enable the court to make
an inquiry for some additional evidence on behalf of the applicant.
The
hearings of 13 and 14 September 2006 took place as scheduled.
On
18 September 2006 the court sent an inquiry seeking to obtain the
materials of the applicant’s another civil action.
The
hearings of 19 and 21 September 2006 had to be adjourned as the
sought materials had not arrived to the court.
The
hearing of 16 October 2006 did not take place as the applicant was
ill.
On
23 November 2006 the District Court disallowed the claims. At the
time only the operative part of the judgment was read out.
On
1 December 2006 the applicant filed an appeal.
On
4 and 8 December and 9 January 2007 the applicant requested a copy of
the reasoned judgment.
At
the appeal hearing of 23 January 2007 the applicant filed a
supplement to his appeal challenging the reasoning of the
first-instance judgment in a detailed manner, following which the
court returned the case to the first instance for extension of the
time-limit for the supplementary appeal.
On
1 and 14 March 2007 the trial court sent the applicant a copy of the
reasoned judgment of 23 November 2006.
On
16 March 2007 the time-limit for the supplementary appeal was
extended. In its decision the District Court cited the applicant as
saying that he had read the reasoned judgment at the appeal court on
12 January 2007.
The
appeal hearing of 24 April 2007 could not proceed as the respondent
had not received a copy of the applicant’s supplementary
appeal.
The
next hearing of 15 May 2007 was adjourned to enable the parties to
conclude a friendly settlement. However, on 22 May 2007 the applicant
informed the court that the respondent was not undertaking any steps
to reach such settlement.
On
29 May 2007 the Tver Regional Court upheld the judgment of
23 November 2006 on appeal.
B. Other proceedings
In
separate proceedings, the applicant sued the Tver town administration
seeking a housing certificate. By a judgment of 26 March 2004, the
Tsentralniy District Court of Tver granted his claim. On 27 April
2004 the Tver Regional Court quashed the judgment and issued a new
judgment rejecting the claim.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF UNDUE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his case
had been in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement
as provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant
part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government stated that the applicant had not complained about the
length of the proceedings to the Judicial Qualifications Board or to
the president of the court. They further alleged that the length of
the proceedings was the result of the applicant’s own actions
including requests for adjournment, defaults in appearance and
procedural motions.
The
applicant maintained his complaint.
The
Court observes that the proceedings in the applicant’s case
commenced on 4 November 2002 and ended on 29 May 2007. Their
approximate length thus amounts to four years and six months, during
which period the domestic courts examined the claims at two levels of
jurisdiction.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court considers that the present case was not particularly difficult
to determine.
Turning
to the applicant’s behaviour in the proceedings, it notes that
no hearings could be held between January and September 2006 due to
the applicant’s failure to obtain certain evidence. The Court
is also cognisant of the applicant’s unavailability for
hearings during two summer months in 2003, an absence at a hearing
linked to his illness and his failure to appear at the hearing of 13
October 2004. However, it is of the opinion that the delay that
resulted from the above circumstances, apart from the nine-month gap
in 2006, was negligible.
Having
regard to the conduct of the authorities, the Court firstly observes
that the proceedings lasted for over four years at the first instance
and, in particular, that the trial court held only one hearing in
both 2003 and 2005 and no hearings in 2004. It further notes a
particularly substantial gap between the scheduled hearings that
occurred between September 2003 and October 2004. In addition, it
takes into account that an appeal hearing had to be adjourned
following the courts’ failure to timely serve the applicant’s
supplementary appeal on the respondent, and the judges’ absence
on two occasions.
Regard
being had to the infrequency of the hearings scheduled by the trial
court in the course of the proceedings, the significant overall
length of the proceedings and the applicant’s negligible
contribution to it, the Court considers that the “reasonable
time” requirement has been breached in the present case.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention on this account.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT TO ACCESS TO COURT
The
applicant complained that the trial court had delayed giving him
access to the reasoned judgment of 23 November 2006, which allegedly
interfered with his right to appeal. He relied on Article 6 of the
Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
The
Government argued that the applicant had had access to the full text
of the reasoned judgment at the appeal hearing of 23 January 2007
which considered admissibility of the appeal and supplement to it.
They further noted that in any event the applicant had received the
full judgment shortly thereafter.
The
applicant maintained his complaint.
The
Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the
right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations
brought before a court or tribunal. In this way it embodies the
“right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is
the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters,
constitutes one aspect (see Golder v. the United Kingdom,
21 February 1975, §§ 35-36, Series A no. 18).
The
Court further reiterates that, whilst the Convention does not provide
any right to an appeal in civil cases, if a right of appeal is
provided in domestic law, Article 6 § 1 applies to such
appellate procedures (see Delcourt v. Belgium, 17 January
1970, § 25, Series A no. 11). The right of access to an appeal
court is not absolute and the State, which is permitted to place
limitations on the right of appeal, enjoys a certain margin of
appreciation in relation to such limitations (see Brualla Gomez de
la Torre v. Spain, 19 December 1997, § 33, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, and De Ponte Nascimento
v. the United Kingdom, (dec.), no. 55331/00, 31
January 2002). The Court reiterates, however, that the limitations in
question must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the
aim sought to be achieved (see Levages Prestations Services v.
France, 23 October 1996, § 40, Reports 1996-V).
In
addition, the right to the effective protection of the courts entails
that the parties to civil proceedings must be able to avail
themselves of the right to lodge an appeal from the moment they can
effectively apprise themselves of court decisions which may infringe
their legitimate rights or interests (see Miragall Escolano and
Others v. Spain, nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98,
41015/98, 41400/98, 41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98, §
37, ECHR 2000-I).
Turning
to the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the
applicant did not have access to a reasoned judgment within the
ten-day time-limit envisaged by the domestic law and lodged his
appeal without seeing it. At the same time, it is cognisant of the
applicant’s admission that he read the text of the reasoned
judgment on 12 January 2007 while studying the case at the Tver
Regional Court (see paragraph 32 above) and takes into account the
fact that the applicant’s supplementary appeal was written
after he had read the reasoned judgment. The Court also recalls that
the appeal court admitted the supplementary appeal for consideration.
In
these circumstances the Court takes the view that the applicant was
able to effectively appeal the first-instance judgment and his right
of access to court was not impaired.
Therefore,
this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected in
accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF VIOLATION OF A RIGHT TO AN ADVERSARIAL TRIAL
The
applicant further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that
he had not been provided with a copy of the respondent’s
objections to his claim, as well as other various submissions made by
the respondent in the course of the proceedings.
The
Government stated that the complaint had no merit as the fact that
the applicant had replied to the respondent’s objections of 18
March 2003 in August 2005 was sufficient evidence that he had read
them by that moment. They further noted that the applicant had also
confirmed receipt of the observations of 4 July 2005.
The
applicant maintained his complaint.
According to the Court’s case-law, the principle
of equality of arms requires that each party must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do
not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis
his opponent (see, among other authorities, De Haes and Gijsels v.
Belgium, 24 February
1997, § 53, Reports
1997-I).
In
the circumstances of the present case, the evidence presented by the
parties demonstrates that on 9 August 2005 the applicant indeed made
a detailed reply to the respondent’s objections filed on 18
March 2003. The applicant did not essentially challenge this
assertion put forward by the Government, nor did he dispute receipt
of the respondent’s observations of 4 July 2005. In so far as
he may be understood to complain that the trial court had not
provided him with a certified hard copy of the observations of 18
March 2003, even if this allegation was true, the applicant did not
explain how this had impaired his right to an adversarial trial.
It
follows, accordingly, that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded
and should be rejected under Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant also complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the
trial judge sitting in the first set of proceedings had been biased.
He also complained under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
about the outcome of both sets of proceedings.
Having
regard to all the materials in its possession, and in so far as this
complaint falls within its competence, the Court finds that there is
no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in
these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part of the
application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 166,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government rejected the claimed amount as excessive and unsupported
by any evidence.
Referring
to its established case-law, the Court accepts that the applicant
suffered some distress and frustration caused by the unreasonable
length of the proceedings. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court
awards EUR 1,500.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed 8963.67 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately
EUR 211) for the costs and expenses incurred both before the domestic
courts and in Strasbourg proceedings. In particular, the claimed
amount was designed to cover the cost of photocopying and information
services, the court fees and other State fees, postal expenses and
travel costs.
The
Government accepted the amount of RUB 3,018 (approximately EUR 71)
incurred as postal expenses to Strasbourg as justified and rejected
the rest of the claim either because it was not supported by
documents or because it was not connected to Strasbourg proceedings.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum.
Regard
being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the
Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 71 covering the
costs incurred in the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning unreasonable
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,
the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
71 (seventy-one euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 March 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach George Nicolaou
Deputy Registrar President
