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CAMINSKI v. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA - 1194/04 [2011] ECHR 363 (24 February 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/363.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 363
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF ČAMINSKI v.
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
(Application
no. 1194/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24
February 2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision
In the case of Čaminski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
President,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia
Laffranque, judges,
and Stephen Phillips,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 31 January 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 1194/04) against the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Macedonian national, Mr
Aleksandar Caminski (“the applicant”), on 8 December
2003.
The
applicant was represented by Mr T. Fidovski, a lawyer practising in
Skopje. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs R. Lazareska Gerovska.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that the proceedings had been
unreasonably lengthy and that he had been denied the right of access
to court.
On
2 February 2009 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. In
accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated
to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Slovenj Gradec, Slovenia.
In
June 1992 criminal charges were brought against five people (“the
defendants”) on suspicion of having caused grievous bodily harm
to the applicant. On 16 September 1992 an investigating judge of the
Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) opened
an investigation against the defendants. According to statements
taken on 25 September 1992 as part of the pre-trial proceedings, the
applicant sought damages for loss of income and injuries sustained.
He stated that he would subsequently specify his claim.
During
the proceedings, the trial court fixed about forty hearings. Most of
them were postponed because it could not secure the attendance of the
defendants, their representative or witnesses. No adjournment of any
of the hearings was ordered on the applicant’s request. The
trial court also obtained several expert opinions during the
proceedings.
On
4 July 2003 the trial court found three of the defendants guilty of
grievous bodily harm and sentenced them to a suspended prison term.
It further advised the applicant to pursue a compensation claim by
means of a separate civil action. In this connection it observed that
the applicant had hitherto sought compensation only for non-pecuniary
damage.
On
11 December 2003 the public prosecutor appealed against the
above-mentioned decision. At a public hearing held on 27 January
2005, the Skopje Court of Appeal overturned the decision in respect
of the sentence and confirmed the remainder. The three defendants
were sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. According to the
Government, on 10 November 2005 the Supreme Court confirmed this
decision by dismissing the defendants’ appeal on points of law
(барање за
вонредно
преиспитување
на правосилна
пресуда).
On
6 December 2005 the applicant brought a civil action against the
defendants and their employer, claiming compensation for the
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss he had sustained as a result of his
injuries.
On
26 June 2008 the trial court ruled partly in favour of the applicant
and ordered the defendants and their employer jointly to pay him
1,200,000 Macedonian denars (equivalent to 19,500 euros) in respect
of non-pecuniary damage. On 4 September 2008 the defendants appealed.
The case is pending before the Skopje Court of Appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
statutory provisions relevant for the present case were described in
the Boris Stojanovski case (see Boris
Stojanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, no. 41196/06, §§ 16-31, 6
May 2010).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained of the length of the criminal proceedings and of
the lack of a decision in respect of his compensation claim. The
Court considers that this latter complaint should be analysed as an
“access to court” complaint. He relied on Article 6 §
1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled
to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a]
... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
1. Compatibility
(a) The parties’ submissions
The
Government objected that the application fell outside of the Court’s
competence ratione materiae and ratione
temporis. In support of this contention, they submitted
the same arguments as those raised in the Boris Stojanovski
case (see Boris Stojanovski, cited
above, §§ 33, 34 and 41).
The
applicant did not comment.
(b) The Court’s assessment
The
Court notes that the criminal proceedings started in June 1992 when
the criminal charges were brought against the defendants. On
25 September 1992 the applicant made a claim for financial
reparation of the loss he had sustained as a result of the assault.
It was at that point in time that he acquired the status of a civil
party to the criminal proceedings, even though there had been no
formal decision admitting him to the proceedings in that capacity.
The proceedings ended with the Supreme Court’s decision of 10
November 2005.
In
such circumstances and for the reasons described in the Boris
Stojanovski judgment (see Boris
Stojanovski, cited above, §§
40 and 43) which likewise apply to this case, the Court
considers that the application is compatible ratione materiae
with the provisions of the Convention and that the Court has temporal
jurisdiction to examine the criminal proceedings in so far as they
concern the applicant, at least from 10 April 1997 when the
respondent State ratified the Convention. Accordingly the
Government’s objections must be rejected.
2. Access to court complaint
(a) The parties’ submissions
The
Government stated that the trial court had correctly advised the
applicant to pursue his compensation claim by means of a separate
civil action, given that he had not submitted his claim as part of
the criminal proceedings and in accordance with the applicable rules,
namely that the claim had not been specified or supported by any
evidence. As the applicant had been successful in the subsequent
civil proceedings, there were no grounds for finding of a violation
of his right of access to court.
The
applicant did not comment.
(b) The Court’s assessment
The
Court notes that the applicant was granted
compensation in the civil proceedings which he instituted on the
trial court’s instruction. It is true that the proceedings are
still pending, but the complaint before the Court is one of access to
court, and the applicant has now had access to court.
The
Court, thus, considers that it is no longer justified to continue the
examination of this part of the application (Article 37 § 1(c))
(see, mutatis mutandis, SAS Arcalia v. France (déc.),
no 33088/08, 31 August 2010). In addition, there are no
particular reasons relating to respect for human rights as defined in
the Convention which would require the Court to continue its
examination under Article 37 § 1 in fine.
Accordingly,
this part of the application should be struck out of the Court’s
list of cases.
3. Length of proceedings
The
Government did not raise any objection as to the admissibility of
this complaint.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
The
Government conceded that the overall length of the criminal
proceedings had been excessive. The trial court’s failure to
secure the defendants’ attendance had affected their length.
The
applicant did not comment.
2. The Court’s assessment
In
view of the findings described in paragraph 16 above, the Court
considers that the period to be taken into consideration in respect
of Article 6 of the Convention started to run on 25 September
1992, the date upon which the applicant acquired the status of a
civil complainant within the criminal proceedings (see Atanasova
v. Bulgaria, no. 72001/01, § 52, 2 October 2008). The
proceedings ended on 10 November 2005 with the Supreme Court’s
decision. The relevant period therefore lasted over thirteen years at
three levels of jurisdiction, of which eight years and seven months
fall within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction (after 10 April
1997, the date when the respondent State ratified the Convention).
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case;
and the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities (see
Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR
2000-VII).
The
Court does not consider that the case was complex or that any delays
were attributable to the applicant.
On the other hand, the Court considers that the main
problem that affected the length of the proceedings was the trial
court’s inability to secure the attendance of the defendants,
their representative or the witnesses. This deficiency was also
acknowledged by the respondent Government (see paragraph 27 above).
For that reason it took eleven years for the trial court to decide
the case. This period was, without doubt, excessive and cannot be
compensated for by the fact that the Appeal and Supreme Courts
decided the case with reasonable expediency.
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in
respect of the “reasonable time” requirement.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly,
the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on
that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Decides to strike the application out of its
list of cases in so far as it relates to the alleged lack of a
decision in respect of the applicant’s compensation claim;
Declares the complaint in relation to the length
of the criminal proceedings admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the length of the criminal
proceedings;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 February 2011,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Zdravka Kalaydjieva Deputy Registrar President