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RUDYCH v. UKRAINE - 48874/06 [2011] ECHR 248 (10 February 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/248.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 248
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF RUDYCH v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 48874/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10
February 2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Rudych v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
President,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Julia Laffranque,
judges,
and Stephen Phillips,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 18 January 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 48874/06) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian
national, Mr Mykola Vasylyovych Rudych (“the applicant”),
on 25 November 2006.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Yuriy Zaytsev.
On
24 June 2009 the
Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In
accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated to a
Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Byshiv.
On
an unspecified date in April 1998 he lodged an action against a
collective farm B., seeking damages for a discrepancy in the
calculation of compensation for his professional illness that had
been paid since 1982. On 9 April 1998 the Makariv District Court
(“the District Court”) opened proceedings.
In
a judgment of 28 December 1998 it dismissed the applicant's
action. On 6 April 1999 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the
Court of Appeal”) quashed that judgment and ordered a fresh
hearing.
On
20 April 2000 the District Court ordered an accounting expert
examination. It held the next hearing on 2 June 2003.
On
4 July 2003 the Makariv Department of State Insurance Fund for
Industrial Accidents and Diseases (“the Fund”) joined the
proceedings as a second respondent and B. was replaced by its legal
successor, private company L.
On
21 October 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant's
claim for damages that after a modification amounted to UAH 16,018
(EUR 2,563).
On 9 January 2004 the Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. On
9 February 2004 the applicant appealed in cassation.
On
17 May 2006 the Supreme Court rejected his appeal in cassation.
According
to the Government, in the course of the proceedings, the
applicant filed one procedural request and three appeals, one of
which did not meet procedural requirements. Out of the sixteen
hearings scheduled between April 1998 and May 2006, six were
adjourned for unknown reasons, two were adjourned either at the
applicant's request or due to his failure to attend, one was
adjourned due to one of the respondents' failure to attend, one was
adjourned for the parties to reach a friendly settlement, and two
were adjourned for other reasons beyond parties' control.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 9 April 1998 and
ended on 17 May 2006. It thus lasted more than eight years and
one month for three level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government maintained that the parties to the proceedings had
protracted the length of the proceedings by having filed their
procedural requests and appeals. In particular, the applicant had
requested an expert examination that had extended the consideration
of the case for three years. According to the Government, the
domestic courts had regularly scheduled the hearings and had caused
no substantial delays attributable to the State.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, e.g., Frydlender
v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
Turning
to the facts of the present case, the Court
notes that the applicant claimed damages for the discrepancy
in the calculation of compensation that had been paid for his
professional illness. The proceedings were therefore of some
importance for him. Nonetheless, the Court does not find any ground
for the domestic courts to deal with this case with particular
urgency vis-à-vis other cases pending before them.
It
further considers that the subject matter of the litigation was not
complex.
With
regard to the applicant's conduct, the Court admits that there were
certain delays attributable to him (see paragraph 11 above): he
requested the adjournment or failed to appear at two hearings and
lodged one appeal that did not meet procedural requirements, which
resulted in a delay of about four months. However, in respect of his
procedural requests and properly filed appeals, the Court notes that
he merely exercised his procedural rights and cannot be blamed for
using the avenues available to him under the domestic law in order to
protect his interests (see, Silin v. Ukraine, no.
23926/02, § 29, 13 July 2006).
As to the conduct of the
national courts, the Court notes that
the main delay in the proceedings took place after the expert
examination was ordered. During that time, the
first-instance court remained completely inactive for more than three
years (see paragraph 7 above).
The Court does not accept the Government's argument that the
applicant was responsible for the delay. It
further finds unusual and lacking due diligence the fact that the
examination of the applicant's appeal in cassation lasted two years
and three months, while one-month delay is attributable to the
applicant (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above).
The Court reiterates that it is the role of the domestic courts to
manage their proceedings so that they are expeditious and effective.
It also finds that a remittal of the applicant's case for
re-examination (see paragraph 6 above)
significantly affected the length of the proceedings.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above). Having examined all the
material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government
have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to
reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to
its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant
case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet
the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER COMPLAINTS
The
applicant further complained under Article 2 of
the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on
account of lack of compensation for his disability. He also
alleged a violation of Articles 6 § 1
and 13 of the Convention in respect of the courts' assessment of
evidence and interpretation of the national law and challenged the
outcome of the proceedings.
Having
carefully examined the applicant's submissions in the light of all
the material in its possession and in so far as the matters
complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article
35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicant submitted a claim for just satisfaction outside the
time-limit fixed for this purpose. Accordingly, the Court considers
that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the length of the
proceedings;
Holds that there is no call to award the
applicant any sum by way of just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 February 2011,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
Deputy
Registrar President
