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SHULGIN v. UKRAINE - 29912/05 [2011] ECHR 2058 (8 December 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/2058.html
Cite as:
[2011] ECHR 2058
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF SHULGIN v. UKRAINE
(Application no. 29912/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 December
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Shulgin v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Dean Spielmann,
President,
Elisabet Fura,
Karel Jungwiert,
Mark
Villiger,
Ann Power-Forde,
Ganna
Yudkivska,
André Potocki, judges,
and
Claudia Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 15 November 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 29912/05) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Ruslan Vyacheslavovich
Shulgin (“the applicant”), on 5 August 2005.
The
applicant was represented by Mr A.L. Dovbush, a lawyer practising in
Vinnytsya. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent Mr Yuriy Zaytsev, succeeded by
Ms Valeria Lutkovska.
The applicant alleged, in particular, that the State
had failed to compensate him for his two-year detention resulting
from a conviction recognised as unlawful after the sentence had been
served in full.
On
29 June 2010 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same
time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Vinnytsya.
A. The applicant’s conviction and related events
In
November 1995 criminal investigations were launched in respect of the
applicant on suspicion of fraud and extortion.
On
17 December 1996 a first-instance court (presumably the Leninskyy
District Court of Vinnytsya – “the Leninskyy Court”)
delivered a judgment on the case. In its reasoning it held that the
applicant was to be acquitted of the extortion charge as not
corroborated by any evidence. The court did not however mention
anything about the acquittal in the operative part of the judgment.
On
29 January 1997 a court of cassation (the name is not specified)
upheld, in substance, the applicant’s acquittal as regards the
charge of extortion. It noted that, even though the first-instance
court had failed to indicate the acquittal in the operative part of
the judgment, it had correctly assessed the evidence regarding that
part of the accusation and had reached the well grounded conclusion
about the lack of any proof of the applicant’s guilt. The court
of cassation made the aforementioned finding in the reasoning of its
ruling. By its operative part, it however quashed the above judgment
in its entirety for some procedural shortcomings and remitted the
case for additional investigation.
The
additional investigation resumed both the fraud and the extortion
charges against the applicant and added some other episodes, such as
theft coupled with burglary and causing damage to others’
property.
From
17 (or 18) December 1996 to 1 June 1999 the applicant was detained in
Vinnytsya SIZO-1.
By
a judgment of the Leninskyy Court of 8 April 1999, upheld by a ruling
of the Vinnytsya Regional Court of 12 May 1999, the applicant was
found guilty of: theft coupled with burglary (with a sentence of five
years’ imprisonment with confiscation of property); fraud
(ditto); extortion that led to particularly grave consequences (seven
years’ imprisonment and confiscation of property); and causing
damage to others’ property (two years’ imprisonment). As
a final penalty defined by absorption of less severe punishment by
more severe, the court sentenced the applicant to seven years’
imprisonment with confiscation of property. He was considered to have
started serving his sentence from 18 December 1996. The applicant
pleaded guilty to all the charges, except for extortion of which he
considered himself to have already been acquitted.
On
28 December 1999 the applicant introduced an application with the
Court registered under no. 57065/00, in which he complained, in
particular, of the unfairness of the criminal proceedings completed
with the aforementioned ruling of 12 May 1999.
On
13 June 2000 the Court, sitting as a Committee of three judges,
declared application no. 57065/00 inadmissible for the applicant’s
failure to comply with the six-month time-limit.
On
18 December 2003 the applicant was released, having served his
sentence in full.
B. Partial quashing of the applicant’s conviction
On
12 November 2004 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s
request for review of the decisions of 8 April and 12 May 1999 under
exceptional circumstances. It quashed them in the part concerning the
applicant’s conviction for extortion and discontinued the
proceedings in that part for lack of proof of his guilt. As a result,
the total penalty was reduced from seven to five years, without
confiscation of property.
The
Supreme Court noted, in particular, that on 17 December 1996 the
applicant had been acquitted of extortion by the first-instance court
which had however failed to indicate that in the operative part of
the judgment. It next observed that while the cassation court had
upheld that acquittal in the ruling of 29 January 1997, it had
wrongly quashed the judgment in its entirety and had remitted the
case for additional investigation without having specified the
omission of the first-instance court nor indicated ways of its
remedying.
The
Supreme Court further criticised the subsequent investigation and the
applicant’s retrial for their failure to give due regard to the
substance of the aforementioned judicial decisions.
In
sum, it recognised the decisions of 8 April and 12 May 1999, by which
the applicant had been convicted, as unlawful and unfounded in the
part pertaining to the extortion charge.
C. Civil compensation proceedings instituted by the
applicant
In
February 2005 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Pecherskyy
District Court of Kyiv against the State Treasury, seeking
compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused to him by
the allegedly unlawful actions of the prosecution and judicial
authorities that had resulted in his deprivation of liberty for two
years and one day (the applicant alleged that he had been arrested
one day earlier than officially reported). He relied on the
aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court of 12 November 2004,
which had recognised the miscarriage of justice.
On
15 March 2005, following a hearing with the participation of the
applicant’s father as his representative, the court rejected
the claim as unsubstantiated. Relying on Section 1176 of the Civil
Code and Sections 1 3 of the Compensation Act (see
paragraphs 32-33 below), it found that the applicant’s
situation did not satisfy the eligibility criteria for compensation
to be awarded, as his conviction had been quashed not fully, but only
in the part regarding the charge of extortion, while he had been
lawfully convicted of some other offences.
The
applicant appealed.
On
19 April 2005 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal notified the parties that
a hearing had been scheduled for 10 May 2005. The
applicant’s representative did not attend, expecting it to be
postponed because of a public holiday declared on that date.
On 10 May
2005 the appellate court upheld the findings and the reasoning of the
first-instance court’s judgment.
The
applicant appealed in cassation. He submitted that none of the legal
acts, on which the lower courts had relied for rejecting him claim,
required quashing of a verdict in its entirety in order to be
eligible for compensation in respect of unlawful conviction and the
ensuing imprisonment. The applicant assumed that the courts might
have been guided by the 1996 Regulation on Application of the
Compensation Act, which provided for “a complete
rehabilitation” as a prerequisite for compensation in respect
of unlawful conviction. He contended that it was an obsolete by-law
narrowing the safeguards of the primary legislation and running
contrary to the Convention, while having been adopted prior to its
ratification by Ukraine on 11 September 1997.
On
16 August 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a
cassation instance, rejected the applicant’s cassation appeal
with succinct reasoning that the lower courts had acted in compliance
with law and that there were no grounds for reviewing their
decisions.
D. Other facts
On
13 November 2003 the Shepetivka Town Court ordered that applicant be
supervised by the police for one and a half years following his
release, the date of which was approaching. It referred to
submissions of the prison administration criticising the applicant’s
behaviour during his sentence. The court considered this an
indication that the applicant was reluctant to improve and remained a
danger to society.
It
was noted in the above ruling that it could be challenged on appeal
before the Khmelnytsky Regional Court of Appeal.
After
his release on 18 December 2003, the applicant was placed under
police supervision as ordered.
At
some point he unsuccessfully asked the police to lift that measure.
According
to the applicant, the police continued to visit his house after the
expiry of the supervision order, of which he complained to the local
police station on several occasions.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Constitution of Ukraine (1996)
Articles
56 and 62 of the Constitution, which are relevant to the case, read
as follows:
Article 56
“Everyone shall be entitled to compensation,
payable by the State or local self-government bodies, for pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damage inflicted by unlawful decisions, actions or
omissions of State authorities and local self-government bodies, as
well as their officials and officers, committed in the course of
their exercise of duty.”
Article 62
“... If a verdict is quashed as wrongful, the
State shall pay compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damage inflicted by the groundless conviction.”
B. Civil Code (2003), as worded at the material time
Section
1176 read as follows in its relevant part:
Compensation for damage caused by unlawful decisions,
actions or omissions of bodies of the inquiry, pre-trial
investigation, prosecution or judiciary
“1. The State shall fully compensate an
individual for the damage caused to him or her by unlawful
conviction, unlawful imposition of criminal liability ... regardless
of the guilt of officials of the bodies of inquiry, pre-trial
investigation, prosecution or courts.
2. The right to compensation for damage
caused to an individual by unlawful actions of a body of the inquiry,
pre-trial investigation, prosecution or judiciary shall arise in case
of the person’s acquittal by the court, quashing of an unlawful
verdict, or discontinuation of a criminal case by a pre-trial
investigation authority ....”
C. Act “On the Procedure for the Compensation of
Damage Caused by Unlawful Actions of Bodies of the Inquiry, Pre-Trial
Investigation, Prosecution and Courts” of 1 December 1994, as
worded following the amendments of 11 July 2003 (“the
Compensation Act”)
The
relevant provisions read as follows:
Section 1
“Under the provisions of this Law a person is
entitled to compensation for damage caused by:
1) unlawful conviction, unlawful advancement
of criminal charges, unlawful placement and holding in detention ...
In the cases referred to in subsection 1 of this
section, the damage caused shall be compensated fully regardless of
the guilt of officials of the bodies of inquiry, pre-trial
investigation, prosecution and courts.”
Section 2
“The right to compensation for damage in the
amount of and in accordance with the procedure established by this
Law shall arise in cases of:
acquittal by a court;
the termination of a criminal case on grounds of the
absence of proof of the committal of a crime, the absence of corpus
delicti or a lack of evidence of the involvement of the accused
in the committal of the crime;
the refusal to initiate criminal proceedings or the
termination of criminal proceedings on the grounds stipulated in
paragraph 2 of subsection 1 of this section ...”
Section 3
“In the cases referred to in section 1 of this Act
the applicant shall be compensated for:
1) earnings and other income lost as a result
of the unlawful actions; ... and
5) moral damage.”
D. Regulation “On Application of the
[Compensation Act]” approved by the Ministry of Justice, the
General Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of the Finance on
4 March 1996 (with the only amendment of 3 April 1998)
Paragraph
3 reads as follows:
“A person who was unlawfully convicted by a court
shall have the right to compensation of damages only in case of his
or her complete rehabilitation”.
There
is no definition of the “rehabilitation” term in the
Ukrainian legislation.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 5 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that he had not been compensated for his
unlawful two years’ detention in breach of Article 3 of
Protocol No. 7.
It
is a common rule in the Court’s practice that the Court is
master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the
case, and is not bound by the characterisation given by the applicant
or the Government (see Sutyagin v. Russia, no. 30024/02, §
206, 3 May 2011). A complaint is characterised by the facts alleged
in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on (see
Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], no. 3976/05, § 52,
ECHR 2010-...). Having regard to the essence of the applicant’s
complaint in the present case, the Court finds it appropriate to
examine it under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, which
reads, together with its other relevant parts, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court; ...
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest
or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant submitted that he had been imprisoned for two years through
the fault of the State and was therefore entitled to compensation in
that regard.
He
noted that this period of his detention had ensued from his
conviction for extortion, which was found to be unlawful by the
Supreme Court after he had already served his sentence in full.
The
applicant considered that he did not have an enforceable right to
compensation for his unlawful detention given the formalistic
approach of the domestic courts, according to which he could claim
such compensation only if the verdict had been quashed as unlawful in
its entirety, but not in part, as in his case.
(b) The Government
The
Government maintained that Article 5 § 5 of the Convention was
not applicable to the applicant’s situation, for his detention
had resulted from the conviction by a competent court in compliance
with the procedure prescribed by law.
In
their view, the domestic courts had made a mistake in convicting the
applicant of extortion, this fact alone did not render the ensuing
detention unlawful ab initio.
The
Government further noted that the applicant had never alleged any bad
faith on the part of the courts convicting him. Accordingly, there
were no grounds to consider his detention arbitrary.
In
sum, the Government contended that the applicant’s detention
had been lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a) and
did not give rise to any issues under Article 5 § 5 of the
Convention.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Applicability of Article 5 § 5
The
Court notes that the right to compensation under Article 5 § 5
of the Convention arises only if a breach of one of its other four
paragraphs – Article 5 § 1 (a) in the present case –
has been established, directly or in substance, by the Court or by
the domestic courts (see, for example, Svetoslav Dimitrov v.
Bulgaria, no. 55861/00, § 76, 7 February 2008, and Çağdaş
Şahin v. Turkey, no. 28137/02, § 34, 11 April 2006).
Given
the time frame of the events in question, as well as the scope of the
present case, the Court will not undertake to give its own assessment
of the compliance of the applicant’s detention with Article 5 §
1 (a) of the Convention.
It
remains to be seen whether a violation of this provision has been
found by the domestic courts for Article 5 § 5 to come into
play.
The
Court notes that in the present case it was established by the
Supreme Court in its ruling of 12 November 2004 that the applicant
had unlawfully been convicted for extortion which had resulted for
him in additional two years’ imprisonment, already served by
that time.
The
Court will examine whether this finding can be regarded as
recognition of the unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention
following his conviction. In doing so, it will look at the substance
of the Supreme Court’s conclusions which might reveal
unlawfulness of detention even without an explicit reference to any
of the provisions of Article 5 itself (see, mutatis mutandis,
Danev v. Bulgaria, no. 9411/05, § 30, 2 September
2010).
The
Court observes that the Supreme Court identified a number of
omissions undermining, in its view, the lawfulness of the applicant’s
conviction for extortion. It established that while having acquitted
the applicant, as regards the extortion charge, in the reasoning of
the judgment of 17 December 1996, the first-instance court had
erroneously failed to reflect that finding in the operative part of
its judgment. The cassation court pointed out the aforementioned
mistake, but committed a similar one. Namely, it upheld the
applicant’s acquittal in the reasoning part of its ruling of 29
January 1997, but failed to make that clear in the operative part,
having quashed the verdict in its entirety and having remitted the
case for additional investigation (see paragraphs 7-8 and 16 above).
The
Court does not lose sight of the fact that, after those flawed
decisions, the applicant had a re-trial, during which the mentioned
mistakes could still be remedied. Neither did the Supreme Court
overlook that. Even more, it was the lawfulness of the applicant’s
conviction resulting from his re-trial that it was assessing. Having
noted that the applicant’s actual acquittal by the courts of
two levels of jurisdiction remained ignored by the subsequent
additional investigation and the re-trial, the Supreme Court held
that his conviction in respect of the extortion charge by the
judicial decisions of 8 April and 12 May 1999 could not be regarded
as lawful or founded, quashed them in that part and terminated the
criminal proceedings for want of proof of the applicant’s guilt
(see paragraphs 15-18 above).
As
argued by the Government in their observations and admitted by the
Court in its case-law, it may well happen that a Contracting State’s
agents conduct themselves unlawfully but in good faith. In such
cases, a subsequent finding by the courts that there has been a
failure to comply with domestic law may not necessarily
retrospectively affect the validity, under domestic law, of any
implementing measures taken in the meantime (see Bozano v. France,
18 December 1986, § 55, Series A no. 111).
Thus,
flaws in the detention order do not necessarily render the underlying
period of detention unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1
of the Convention (see Ječius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97,
§ 68, ECHR 2000 IX). Similarly, a conviction which has been
imposed by judgment following a breach of substantive provisions of
domestic law in the criminal proceedings does not automatically
render the detention by virtue of that judgment unlawful (see Gruber
v. Germany (dec.), no. 45198/04, 20 November 2007).
At
the same time, it is a fundamental principle that no detention which
is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention (Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 77, 9
July 2009).
In
this connection, mere mistakes are to be distinguished from a
flagrant denial of justice undermining not only the fairness of a
person’s trial, but also the lawfulness of the ensuing
detention. According to the Court’s case-law, detention
following a conviction imposed in manifestly unfair proceedings
amounting to a flagrant denial of justice is unlawful and
automatically implies a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention (see Gruber, cited above; Ilaşcu and
Others v. Moldova [GC], no. 48787/99, § 461, ECHR
2004-VII; and Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, no. 9808/02, §§
51 and 58-59, 24 March 2005).
Turning
back to the present case, the Court considers that all the mistakes
and omissions established by the Supreme Court as having led to the
unlawful conviction of the applicant for extortion, which cost him
two years of liberty, can only be regarded as a flagrant denial of
justice automatically undermining the lawfulness of the ensuing
detention.
The
Court emphasises in this connection that the ruling of the Supreme
Court in question was not a part of the ordinary criminal
proceedings, but was delivered under the extraordinary review
procedure. By that time not only had the applicant’s trial been
a fait accompli, but he had already served his sentence in
full. Accordingly, this situation is not comparable to a verdict’s
reversal by an appellate court, where any unlawfulness found to have
existed at first instance would be beyond the Court’s scrutiny
(see, in substance, Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June
1996, § 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 III).
In
the light of all the foregoing, bearing in mind that the Convention
is intended to guarantee rights that are “practical and
effective”, looking beyond appearances and investigating the
realities of the situation complained of, the Court considers that
there was a sufficient finding by the domestic courts of unlawfulness
of the applicant’s two years’ detention ensuing from his
conviction for extortion.
The
Court therefore concludes that Article 5 § 5 of the Convention
is applicable in the present case.
(b) Compliance with Article 5 § 5
The
Court reiterates that the effective enjoyment of the right to
compensation guaranteed by Article 5 § 5 must be ensured with a
sufficient degree of certainty (see Lobanov v. Russia, no.
16159/03, § 54, 16 October 2008, with further references).
In
the present case the Court observes that the Ukrainian legislation
provided for the possibility to claim compensation for anyone who
became a victim of unlawful criminal prosecution, detention and/or
conviction (see paragraphs 31-33 above). The applicable legal
provisions specified that the right to such compensation arose when
the person had been acquitted or when his criminal prosecution had
been terminated for lack of proof of his guilt. In these
circumstances, the compensation the applicant claimed for his
unlawful conviction for extortion was legally and factually
indissociable from the one he could claim under Article 5 § 5 of
the Convention in respect of his ensuing detention (see and compare
with N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 57, ECHR
2002 X).
The
Court further notes that while the relevant Ukrainian laws provided
that the quashing of a verdict as being unlawful was among the
grounds for claiming compensation for damages, they did not specify
whether the quashing of an unlawful part of the verdict would bear
the same effect. The only indication to the contrary flowed from the
rather ambiguous “complete rehabilitation” clause in the
bylaw of 1996, which was in any event not relied on by the courts in
the present case (see paragraph 34 above).
While
in itself this is not an issue to be analysed by the Court
in abstracto, the manner in which this legislation was
applied by domestic courts and affected the applicant calls for
consideration.
The
Court notes that the domestic courts rejected the applicant’s
compensation claim on the ground that his conviction had been quashed
as unlawful only in part, but not in its entirety. Namely, they held
that, while his conviction for extortion had been found to be
unlawful, he had been lawfully convicted of some other criminal
offences (see paragraphs 20, 23 and 25 above). No consideration was
given to the fact that it was the conviction for extortion which had
resulted in the applicant’s detention for two years in addition
to the penalty for the lawful parts of his sentence.
The
Court considers such approach to be excessively formalistic. It
therefore concludes that, having rejected the applicant’s
compensation claim in respect of the two years of his detention found
by the Supreme Court to be unlawful, the Ukrainian courts did not
interpret and apply the domestic law in the spirit of Article 5 of
the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Houtman and Meeus v.
Belgium, no. 22945/07, §§ 45-47, 17 March 2009).
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the
Convention.
II. REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION
The
applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that
he had been detained in Vinnytsya SIZO-1 for an unreasonably long
period and in poor conditions. Relying on Article 5 §§ 1
and 5, he complained that following his release from prison, after he
had served his sentence, his liberty continued to be restrained by
his placement under police supervision. He further complained of an
interference by the police with his private life both during and
after the expiry of the aforementioned period of supervision. The
applicant also complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d)
that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair and
unreasonably long. Lastly, he complained about the civil compensation
proceedings, referring to the fact that the hearing of the Kyiv City
Court of Appeal had taken place in the absence of his representative.
In
the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that
they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that
this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly
ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 16,680 and 796,584 Ukrainian hryvnias in respect of
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage respectively.
The
Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated and, in any
event, excessive.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicant 16,000 euros (EUR) in respect
of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not submit any claims for legal costs and expenses.
Accordingly, the Court makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the failure of
the State to compensate the applicant for his unlawful detention
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 5 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 16,000 (sixteen
thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Ukrainian hryvnias at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 December 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia
Westerdiek Dean Spielmann Registrar President
