European Court of Human Rights
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URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/1500.html
Cite as: [2011] ECHR 1500
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FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no.
47997/10
by Richard Q. HAYES
against the
United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 20 September 2011 as a Chamber composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Nicolas
Bratza,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Zdravka
Kalaydjieva,
Nebojša
Vučinić, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 August 2010 ,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Richard Q. Hayes, is a British national who was born in 1943 and lives in Harrow. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mr M. Kuzmicki of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant, who is tetraplegic, has been confined to a wheelchair since 1966. He lives alone and relies on home care to get out of bed and into his wheelchair in the morning, to get out of his wheelchair and into bed in the evening, and to take care of any housework.
Prior to May 2008, the applicant was not charged for homecare services as he was assessed as falling within the “nil contribution” band. Although he was employed, his income from employment was subject to a disregard because the Government’s policy was to encourage disabled persons who were able to take up employment to do so.
In 2008 the applicant retired. He started to receive an occupational pension, but the income from this pension (GBP 120.39 per week) was less than half of what his income from employment had been. However, unlike his earnings, the income from his occupational pension was not subject to a disregard. Consequently, on 22 May 2008 he was informed by the local authority that he would have to make a contribution of the maximum charge of GBP 62.75 per week towards the home care services. That amount has since increased to GBP 74.39 per week.
On 7 June 2008 the applicant asked the local authority to review their decision to require a contribution. However, on 21 July 2008 the local authority upheld their earlier decision and advised the applicant to direct any further complaints to the Local Government Ombudsman. On 24 January 2009 the applicant wrote to the Local Government Ombudsman to complain about the way he had been treated, but he was notified on 28 May 2009 that as there had been no maladministration in the decision-making process, the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to investigate the complaint.
The applicant then appointed a solicitor, who sought a further review of the local authority’s decision. However, on 27 October 2009 the local authority again upheld their earlier decision. The solicitors then obtained Counsel’s advice, which indicated that the inclusion of the applicant’s occupational pension in the assessment of home care charges was lawful as it was in accordance with national guidance. Counsel further indicated that the Human Rights Act 1998 would not assist the applicant as national governments were afforded a wide margin of appreciation in the field of social policy and the distribution of resources. On 26 February 2010 the solicitor wrote to the applicant enclosing Counsel’s opinion. On 26 June 2010 they wrote again to the applicant, confirming that there was no merit in taking the case any further.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 14 of the Convention that he has been discriminated against in respect of his access to home care services on account of his age and/or on account of the fact that he was retired.
THE LAW
By letter dated 8 November 2010 the applicant was informed that the Vice-President of the Section had decided that notice of the application should be given to the Government. He was also advised that pursuant to Rule 36 §§ 2 and 4 of the Rules of Court he was required to be represented by an “advocate” before the Court. He was therefore invited to appoint an advocate and complete and return a form of authority by 6 December 2010.
In a fax received by the Court on 29 November 2010 the applicant informed the Court that he did not have sufficient funds to pay privately for a solicitor and inquired about the availability of legal aid. On 3 December 2010 the Registry of the Court sent the applicant information about eligibility for legal aid.
On 18 and 25 February 2010 the Registry wrote again to the applicant asking him to appoint a representative immediately and to submit a completed form of authority to the Court by 21 March 2011.
On 15 March 2011 the applicant notified the Court that he would not be eligible for legal aid because his disposible income and capital were above the limit for legal aid in proceedings before the domestic courts. He submitted a Certificate of Indigence which confirmed that this was the case. By letter dated 16 March 2011 the Registry again informed the applicant that he was required to appoint a representative and extended the deadline for submission of a form of authority to 18 April 2011.
On 31 March 2011 the Government’s observations were sent to the applicant, who was requested to submit any observations together with any claims for just satisfaction in reply by 30 May 2011. The applicant was again reminded of the 18 April 2011 deadline for appointing a representative and submitting a completed form of authority.
On 11 April 2011 the applicant asked for leave to present his own case to the Court as he did not want to pay privately for a solicitor. On 18 April 2011 the Vice-President of the Section refused his application for leave and asked him to appoint a representative by 16 May 2011.
On 10 May 2011 the applicant wrote to the Court, commenting briefly on the Government’s observations. On 27 May 2011 the Registry of the Court replied, reminding him that he had been refused leave to represent himself and granting a final extension of the deadline for appointing a representative to 24 June 2011. He was informed that should he fail to appoint a representative by this date, the Court might strike his application out of the list of cases.
On 18 May 2011 the applicant wrote to the Registry setting out a proposal for a friendly settlement. On 1 June 2011 the Registry informed the applicant that his proposal had been sent to the Government for comment. However, he was advised that he was still required to appoint a representative by 24 June 2011 and failure to do so could result in his application being struck out of the list of cases. He was also informed that the Vice-President of the Section had granted a final extension to the deadline for submission of his observations to 24 June 2011.
On 21 June 2011 the Government rejected the applicant’s proposal for a friendly settlement and invited the Court to strike the application out of its list of cases if the applicant failed to comply with the deadline of 24 June 2011.
On 21 June 2011 the applicant advised the Court that he had contacted the AIRE Centre and was awaiting its decision on whether or not it would represent him. On 3 August 2011 the AIRE Centre notified the Court that it would not be representing the applicant, but indicated that the Equality and Human Rights Commission was looking into the matter. On 25 August 2011 the Equality and Human Rights Commission notified the Court that they would not be representing the applicant.
No further correspondence has been received from the applicant.
The Court considers that, in these circumstances, the applicant may be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue his application, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of the case.
In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.
Lawrence Early Lech
Garlicki
Registrar President