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MUKHUTDINOV v. RUSSIA - 13173/02 [2010] ECHR 891 (10 June 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/891.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 891
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF MUKHUTDINOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 13173/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 June
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Mukhutdinov v.
Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik
Jebens,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 May 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 13173/02) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Albert Narikhmanovich
Mukhutdinov (“the applicant”), on 26 June 2000.
The
applicant was represented by Ms O.A. Sadovskaya, a lawyer practising
in the town of Nizhniy Novgorod. The Russian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr P.
Laptev, former Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
The
applicant complained about the outcome of the criminal case against
him and his inability to take part in the supervisory-review hearing.
The applicant alleged that the conditions of his detention in various
detention facilities pending criminal proceedings from September 1998
to January 2002 had been appalling. He also alleged that the prison
authorities had restricted his communication with the Court and that
the domestic authorities had denied him an opportunity to participate
in the civil proceedings brought against him by the victims. In his
letter of 25 April 2006 the applicant also complained about the
allegedly unlawful composition of the trial court
On
4 November 2005 the President of the First Section decided to
communicate to the
Government the complaints concerning the conditions of the
applicant’s detention, his inability to take part in the
proceedings before the Supreme Court on 24 October 2001 and the
alleged unfairness of the civil proceedings for damages brought
against him by the victims. It was also decided to examine the merits
of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29
§ 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1969 and lived in the town of Kazan of the
Republic of Tatarstan.
The
applicant is currently serving his sentence of imprisonment in
penitentiary facility ZhKh-385/5 in the Republic of Mordoviya.
A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
On
29 August 1998 the applicant was detained on suspicion of having
committed a number of serious crimes.
By
a judgment of 11 June 1999 the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Tatarstan, consisting of two lay assessors and a professional judge,
convicted the applicant of murder, affray, abuse of office, a traffic
offence and illegal use of firearms. The court sentenced the
applicant to twenty-one years of imprisonment. The conviction was
based on various items of evidence including testimony from a number
of witnesses and expert examinations. It does not appear that the
applicant challenged the participation of the two lay assessors
sitting in the trial court in his case.
The
applicant appealed against the judgment, having maintained that the
proceedings had been unfair and that he had not been guilty of the
crimes in question. The applicant did not challenge the participation
of the lay assessors.
On
18 January 2000 the Supreme Court of Russia examined and rejected
appeals lodged by the applicant and his counsel against the judgment
of 11 June 1999. On the same day the judgment came into force.
On
21 September 2001 the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged a special
appeal with the Presidium of the Supreme Court. In the appeal he
argued that the lower courts had erred in the application of the
domestic law and invited the Presidium of the Supreme Court to reduce
the applicant’s overall sentence of imprisonment.
On 24 October 2001 the Presidium of the Supreme Court
of Russia examined the Deputy Prosecutor’s special appeal and
reopened the applicant’s criminal case by way of supervisory
review. Having examined the case, the Supreme Court on the same date
upheld the conviction, but reduced the applicant’s sentence by
one year.
The applicant was not notified of that hearing or
given an opportunity to participate.
The applicant was notified about the decision of 24
October 2001 by letter of 1 November 2001.
B. Conditions of the applicant’s detention
In
his application form the applicant submitted that he had been
detained in pre-trial detention facilities IZ-16/1 and IZ-16/2 in the
town of Kazan. Thereafter he was transferred to remand prison IZ-77/3
in Moscow and remained there until February 2000. After his criminal
case had been heard on appeal by the Supreme Court, the applicant was
transferred through prisons situated in Kazan, Ekaterinburg, and
Krasnoyarsk to penitentiary establishment UK-272/3 in Irkutsk.
The
applicant submitted in respect of the above-mentioned detention
facilities that the conditions had been appalling, that cells had
been overcrowded and that there had been a lack of fresh air and
sleeping space.
The
Government submitted that from 9 to 24 September 1998, 5 October
to 29 November 1998, 29 January to 5 September 1999, as well as from
8 to 16 February 2000, the applicant had been held in pre-trial
detention centre IZ-16/2 situated in the town of Kazan. From 28
December 1998 to 29 January 1999 he was detained in pre-trial
detention centre IZ16/1, also located in the town of Kazan.
Between 7 September 1999 and 7 February 2000, the applicant was held
in IZ-77/3 in the city of Moscow. From 18 February to 1 March 2000
the applicant was detained in pre-trial detention centre IZ-66/1 in
the town of Ekaterinburg. On 5 March 2000 the applicant was held in
pre-trial detention centre IZ-24/1 in the town of Krasnoyarsk.
Between 14 March 2000 and 16 January 2002 the applicant was detained
in penitentiary establishment UK-272/3 located in the town of
Irkutsk. Since 16 January 2002 the applicant has been serving his
sentence of imprisonment in penitentiary establishment ZhKh-385/5 in
the Republic of Mordoviya.
The
applicant essentially did not contest these dates and locations.
1. Pre-trial detention centre IZ-16/2
The
Government submitted the following information in respect of
pre-trial detention centre IZ-16/2 in the Republic of Tatarstan. The
applicant was held in cell no. 60 measuring 23 square metres and
containing six sleeping places; cell no. 4/3 measuring 7.8
square metres and containing two sleeping places; cell no. 13
measuring 19.9 square metres and containing six sleeping places; cell
no. 2/4 measuring 7.8 square metres and having two sleeping places;
cell no. 52 measuring 24.9 square metres and containing six places.
The Government did not specify the dates on which the applicant had
been held in these cells.
The
applicant did not contest this description, but submitted that the
facility was heavily overcrowded.
2. Pre-trial detention centre IZ-16/1
As
regards pre-trial detention centre IZ-16/1 located in the Republic of
Tatarstan, the Government submitted that the applicant had been held
in cell no. 125 measuring 39.6 square metres and containing ten
sleeping places.
According
to the applicant, the cell had twenty sleeping places for thirty-five
inmates.
3. Pre-trial detention centre IZ-77/3
As
to pre-trial detention centre IZ-77/3 in the city of Moscow, the
Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in cells
no. 508 and 525, each measuring 32 square metres and designed to
contain thirtytwo sleeping places.
The
applicant agreed with this description, having argued that it only
confirmed his allegations.
4. Pre-trial detention centre IZ-66/1
The
Government submitted in respect of pre-trial detention centre IZ-66/1
in the town of Sverdlovsk that the applicant was held in cell no. 152
measuring 29 square metres and containing twelve sleeping places;
cell no. 704 measuring 16.6 square metres and containing four
sleeping places; cell no. 711 measuring 19 square metres and
containing six sleeping places; and cell no. 710 measuring 17 square
metres and containing four sleeping places.
According
to the applicant, the Government’s data relating to the number
of inmates in the cells was wrong in that the cells had usually
contained three to four times more people than there were sleeping
places.
5. Pre-trial detention centre IZ-24/1
The
Government submitted that in IZ-24/1 in the town of Krasnoyarsk the
applicant had been held in cell no. 22 designed to contain 28
sleeping places.
The
applicant submitted that in cell no. 22 there had been 40 inmates.
6. Penitentiary establishment UK-272/3
The
Government submitted that in UK-272/3 in the town of Irkutsk the
applicant had been part of team no. 10 and had been held in a cell
measuring 46 square metres and containing up to thirteen persons.
The Government submitted a certificate dated 23
September 2000 and issued by the prison administration, according to
which the housing capacity of the facility amounted to 1,252 inmates.
At the same time, the certificate stated that there were 1,375
inmates in the prison grouped into ten teams on that date.
The
applicant disagreed with the Government’s calculations and
submitted that the cell had contained at least twenty-eight persons.
He further argued that the overcrowding of the cell in question had
been obvious, since the documents submitted by the Government
indicated ten teams in UK-272/3 for an overall number of 1,357
inmates. In the applicant’s view, on the assumption that all
teams were of the same size, the figure showed that there had been
around 137 persons per team.
7. General comments of the parties
The
Government argued that the conditions of the applicant’s
detention had been satisfactory and that the applicant, as a former
lawenforcement officer, had been kept in special cells
throughout his detention on remand. At the same time, they submitted
that the original documentation in this connection had been destroyed
owing to the expiry of time-limits for storage in August 2004.
The Government relied on the statements of prison
officials P, B, Pe and K in respect of IZ-16/2, prison officials Sh
and T in respect of IZ-16/1 and prison officials B, Ya, O, G, Ba and
Yash in respect of IZ-66/1, confirming that the applicant’s
cells during his stay there had not been overcrowded.
The
applicant disagreed and submitted that all the facilities mentioned
had been seriously overcrowded during his stay there. He also
disagreed with the Government’s allegation that he had been
kept in special cells for former law-enforcement officials throughout
his detention on remand. He provided the Court with the supporting
handwritten statements of the following persons who had been
detained along with him.
On 3 April 2006 Mr S.N. gave a statement, in which he
confirmed that prisons in Irkutsk (in particular, UK-272/3 in
NovemberDecember 1998), Astrakhan, Volgograd, Perm, Vologda,
Ekaterinburg (IZ-66/1) and Novosibirsk were all overcrowded.
On 3 April 2006 Mr U.K. gave a statement, in which he
confirmed that the pre-trial detention centre in Ekaterinburg
(IZ-66/1) had been overcrowded and that the inmates had to sleep
taking turns.
The
applicant also submitted that the following persons could confirm his
submissions about UK-272/3: Mr I.S., Mr D.T., Mr A.S., Mr M.M.,
Mr S.K., Mr V.Kh., Mr N.B. and Mr N.R.
C. Civil case of the victims against the applicant
It
appears that on 14 December 2000 S. and Kh., the victims in the
applicant’s criminal case, sued the applicant for damages in
connection with the murder charge.
1. First-instance proceedings
By
letter of 19 December 2000 judge S. informed the head of the prison
administration of UK-272/3 (“the prison authority”) about
these claims, forwarded a copy of the plaintiffs’ statement of
claim to the applicant for information and requested the head of the
prison administration to seek the applicant’s comments on the
plaintiffs’ claims.
It
does not appear that the statement of claim forwarded to the
applicant was accompanied by copies of supporting documents.
According
to the Government, between 3 and 5 January 2001 the prison authority
apprised the applicant of the content of the claims.
According
to the applicant, he was allowed to read the claims, but was not
allowed to have prolonged access to the document or to have a copy.
The
applicant submitted that the authority had asked him to indicate his
agreement to answer in writing. It appears that the statement of
claim was put into the applicant’s personal prison file to
which he had no free access.
The
applicant submitted that he had drafted a response to the claims on
5 January 2001. He disagreed with the list of items lost and
destroyed as a result of his criminal activity and also disagreed
with the plaintiffs’ assessment of their value. In his
response, the applicant also specifically requested the civil court
to provide him with copies of the documents in its case file.
According
to the Government, this response was dispatched on 11 January
2001.
On
5 February 2001 the Soviet District Court of the town of Kazan,
having heard representations from the plaintiffs’ counsel, gave
a judgment in respect of the civil claims of the applicant’s
victims. The court decided to order the applicant and the co-accused
jointly to pay the three plaintiffs 2,900, 135,899 and 85,809 roubles
respectively (around 108, 5,087 and 3,212 euros respectively), in
damages and for legal costs and expenses.
The
court reiterated that as a result of the applicant’s criminal
actions the son of one of the plaintiffs had been kidnapped and
killed. The court listed the clothes worn by the victim on that day
as well as the funeral expenses, and made an assessment of the
non-pecuniary damage inflicted by the applicant. The list of personal
belongings and clothes was taken entirely from the applicant’s
criminal case file. The court carried out its own assessment of the
value of these items on the basis of the certificates submitted to
the court by the plaintiffs. It does not appear that the applicant
was sent a copy of this evidence for comment.
On the same date the court also turned down the
applicant’s request for personal appearance and for the
appointment of a lawyer. The court explained the refusal by reference
to the domestic law, which did not provide for mandatory legal
representation of a party in civil proceedings.
2. Appeal proceedings
On
12 February 2001 Judge S. forwarded a copy of the judgment of 5
February 2001 to the applicant for information.
On 2 and 3 April 2001 the prison authorities notified
the applicant of the judgment of 5 February 2001. It does not appear
that they provided him with a copy of the judgment or that he was in
a position to use a copy of the judgment of 5 February 2001 to draft
appeal arguments.
On
9 April 2001 he lodged an appeal in which he referred to his
inability effectively to take part in the first-instance proceedings
and requested to be summoned to the appeal hearing.
On
10 May 2001 the applicant learned through the prison administration
that his appeal had been disallowed as time-barred on 24 April
2001.
The
applicant then applied to the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Tatarstan, which instructed the Soviet District Court of the town of
Kazan to accept the appeal statement and to forward it for
examination to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan.
According
to the Government, by decision of 12 July 2001 the Supreme Court of
the Republic of Tatarstan rejected the applicant’s appeal
against the judgment of 5 February 2001. It does not appear that the
applicant knew about the hearing before the appeal court, was present
or represented.
Thereafter
the applicant was unsuccessful in challenging the decisions of the
lower courts by way of supervisory-review proceedings.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Provisions regulating conditions of detention
pending criminal proceedings
Section 22 of the Detention of Suspects Act (Federal
Law no. 103FZ of 15 July 1995) and the Internal Rules for
Remand Centres of the Ministry of the Interior (Order no. 486 of
20 December 1995, in force until 12 May 2000) provided that detainees
were to be given free food sufficient to maintain them in good health
according to the standards established by the Government of the
Russian Federation. Section 23 provided that detainees were to be
kept in conditions which satisfy sanitary and hygienic requirements.
They should be provided with an individual sleeping place and given
bedding, tableware and toiletries. Each inmate should have had no
less than four square metres of personal space in his or her cell.
B. Order no. 7 of the
Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences dated 31
January 2005
Order no. 7 of the Federal Service for the Execution
of Sentences of 31 January 2005 deals with implementation of the
“Pre-trial detention centres 2006” programme.
The
programme is aimed at improving the functioning of pre-trial
detention centres so as to ensure their compliance with the
requirements of Russian legislation. It expressly acknowledges the
issue of overcrowding in pre-trial detention centres and seeks to
reduce and stabilise the number of detainees in order to resolve the
problem.
The programme mentions pre-trial detention centres
IZ-16/1, IZ16/2, IZ-77/3 and IZ-66/1 among those affected with a
number of detainees seriously exceeding the housing capacity (up to
140%).
C. Legal provisions on
participation of prisoners in supervisoryreview proceedings in
their criminal cases
Section
VI, Chapter 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960
(Уголовно-процессуальный
кодекс
РСФСР),
in force at the material time, allowed certain officials to challenge
a judgment which had become effective and to have the case reviewed.
Pursuant
to Article 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960, a judgment
became effective and enforceable as of the day when the appellate
court gave its decision or, if the judgment had not been appealed
against, when the time-limit for appeal expired.
Article 379
Grounds for setting aside judgments which have become
effective
“The grounds for quashing or changing a judgment
[on supervisory review] are the same as [those for setting aside
judgments which have not become effective on cassation appeals].”
Article 342
Grounds for quashing or changing judgments [on
cassation appeal]
“The grounds for quashing or changing a judgment
on appeal are as follows:
(i) prejudicial or incomplete inquiry,
investigation or court examination;
(ii) inconsistency between the facts of the
case and the conclusions reached by the court;
(iii) serious violation of procedural law;
(iv) misapplication of [substantive] law;
(v) inappropriate sentence considering the
gravity of the offence and the convict’s personality.”
Article
371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 provided that the power
to lodge a request for supervisory review could be exercised by the
Prosecutor General, the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation and their respective Deputies in relation to any judgment
other than those of the Presidium of the Supreme Court, and by the
Presidents of the regional courts in respect of any judgment of a
regional or subordinate court. A party to criminal or civil
proceedings could solicit the intervention of such officials for a
review.
Under Articles 374, 378 and 380 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1960, the request for supervisory review was to
be considered by the judicial panel (“the Presidium”) of
the competent court. The court could examine the case on the merits,
and was not bound by the scope and grounds of the extraordinary
appeal. The Presidium could dismiss or uphold the request. If the
request was dismissed, the earlier judgment remained in force. If it
upheld the request, the Presidium could decide whether to quash the
judgment and terminate the criminal proceedings, to remit the case
for a new investigation, or for fresh judicial examination at any
instance, to uphold a first-instance judgment reversed on appeal, or
to amend or uphold any of the earlier judgments.
Article
380 §§ 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960
provided that the Presidium could in the same proceedings reduce a
sentence or amend the legal classification of a conviction or
sentence to the defendant’s advantage. If it found a sentence
or legal classification too lenient, it had to remit the case for
fresh examination.
Under
Article 377 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960, a
public prosecutor took part in a hearing before a supervisory-review
body. The convicted person and his or her counsel could be summoned
if the supervisory-review court found it necessary. If summoned, they
were to be given an opportunity to examine the application for
supervisory review and to make oral submissions at the hearing. On 14
February 2000 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
ruled that the convicted person’s presence was not optional but
mandatory if the grounds for initiating the supervisory-review
proceedings could worsen his personal situation.
Under
Article 407 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2001, which
entered into force on 1 July 2002, the convicted person and his
counsel are notified of the date, time and place of hearings before
the supervisory-review court. They may participate in the hearing
provided they have made a specific request to do so.
D. Legal
provisions on attendance of prisoners who are parties to civil
proceedings
Under sections 73 and 76 of the Penitentiary Code,
sentences of imprisonment are served in penitentiary establishments
and throughout their detention inmates are transported under convoy.
Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code of the RSFSR of
1964, as in force at the relevant time, provided that everyone was
entitled to participate in court proceedings personally or through a
representative.
Under sections 157-161 of the Civil Procedure Code, in
cases where a party was properly informed of the date of the hearing
but failed to appear or excuse himself for a good reason, a court
could either adjourn the proceedings, leave the claim without
examination (in the event of the plaintiff’s repeated failure
to appear after notification) or examine the claim in the party’s
absence.
The Penitentiary Code provides that convicted persons
may be transferred from a correctional colony to an investigative
unit if their participation is required as witness, victim or suspect
in connection with certain investigative measures (Article 77 §
1). The Code does not mention any possibility for a convicted person
to take part in civil proceedings, whether as plaintiff or defendant.
On several occasions the Constitutional Court has
examined complaints by convicted persons whose requests for leave to
appear in civil proceedings were refused by the courts. It has
consistently declared the complaints inadmissible, finding that the
impugned provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
Penitentiary Code did not, as such, restrict the convicted person’s
access to court. It has emphasised, nonetheless, that the convicted
person should be able to make submissions to the civil court, either
through a representative or in any other manner provided for by law.
If necessary, the hearing may be held at the location where the
convicted person is serving his or her sentence, or the court hearing
the case may instruct the court with territorial jurisdiction for the
correctional colony to obtain the applicant’s submissions or
take any other procedural steps (decisions no. 478-O of 16 October
2003, no. 335-O of 14 October 2004 and no. 94-O of 21 February 2008).
III. Relevant Council
of Europe documents
The
relevant extracts from the General Reports of the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“the CPT”) read as follows:
Extracts from the 2nd General Report [CPT/Inf (92) 3]
“46. Overcrowding is an issue of direct
relevance to the CPT’s mandate. All the services and activities
within a prison will be adversely affected if it is required to cater
for more prisoners than it was designed to accommodate; the overall
quality of life in the establishment will be lowered, perhaps
significantly. Moreover, the level of overcrowding in a prison, or in
a particular part of it, might be such as to be in itself inhuman or
degrading from a physical standpoint.
47. A satisfactory programme of activities
(work, education, sport, etc.) is of crucial importance for the
well-being of prisoners ... [P]risoners cannot simply be left to
languish for weeks, possibly months, locked up in their cells, and
this regardless of how good material conditions might be within the
cells. The CPT considers that one should aim at ensuring that
prisoners in remand establishments are able to spend a reasonable
part of the day (8 hours or more) outside their cells, engaged in
purposeful activity of a varied nature ...
48. Specific mention should be made of
outdoor exercise. The requirement that prisoners be allowed at least
one hour of exercise in the open air every day is widely accepted as
a basic safeguard ... It is also axiomatic that outdoor exercise
facilities should be reasonably spacious ...
49. Ready access to proper toilet facilities
and the maintenance of good standards of hygiene are essential
components of a humane environment ...
50. The CPT would add that it is particularly
concerned when it finds a combination of overcrowding, poor regime
activities and inadequate access to toilet/washing facilities in the
same establishment. The cumulative effect of such conditions can
prove extremely detrimental to prisoners.
51. It is also very important for prisoners
to maintain reasonably good contact with the outside world. Above
all, a prisoner must be given the means of safeguarding his
relationships with his family and close friends. The guiding
principle should be the promotion of contact with the outside world;
any limitations upon such contact should be based exclusively on
security concerns of an appreciable nature or resource considerations
...”
Extracts from the 7th General Report [CPT/Inf (97)
10]
“13. As the CPT pointed out in its 2nd
General Report, prison overcrowding is an issue of direct
relevance to the Committee’s mandate (cf. CPT/Inf (92) 3,
paragraph 46). An overcrowded prison entails cramped and
unhygienic accommodation; a constant lack of privacy (even when
performing such basic tasks as using a sanitary facility); reduced
out-of-cell activities, due to demand outstripping the staff and
facilities available; overburdened health-care services; increased
tension and hence more violence between prisoners and between
prisoners and staff. This list is far from exhaustive.
The CPT has been led to conclude on more than one
occasion that the adverse effects of overcrowding have resulted in
inhuman and degrading conditions of detention ...”
Extracts from the 11th General Report [CPT/Inf (2001)
16]
“28. The phenomenon of prison
overcrowding continues to blight penitentiary systems across Europe
and seriously undermines attempts to improve conditions of detention.
The negative effects of prison overcrowding have already been
highlighted in previous General Reports ...
29. In a number of countries visited by the
CPT, particularly in central and eastern Europe, inmate accommodation
often consists of large capacity dormitories which contain all or
most of the facilities used by prisoners on a daily basis, such as
sleeping and living areas as well as sanitary facilities. The CPT has
objections to the very principle of such accommodation arrangements
in closed prisons and those objections are reinforced when, as is
frequently the case, the dormitories in question are found to hold
prisoners under extremely cramped and insalubrious conditions ...
Largecapacity dormitories inevitably imply a lack of privacy for
prisoners in their everyday lives ... All these problems are
exacerbated when the numbers held go beyond a reasonable occupancy
level; further, in such a situation the excessive burden on communal
facilities such as washbasins or lavatories and the insufficient
ventilation for so many persons will often lead to deplorable
conditions.
30. The CPT frequently encounters devices,
such as metal shutters, slats, or plates fitted to cell windows,
which deprive prisoners of access to natural light and prevent fresh
air from entering the accommodation. They are a particularly common
feature of establishments holding pre-trial prisoners. The CPT fully
accepts that specific security measures designed to prevent the risk
of collusion and/or criminal activities may well be required in
respect of certain prisoners ... [E]ven when such measures are
required, they should never involve depriving the prisoners concerned
of natural light and fresh air. The latter are basic elements of life
which every prisoner is entitled to enjoy ...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
Under
Article 3 of the Convention the applicant complained that the
conditions of his detention in pre-trial detention centres IZ-16/1,
IZ-16/2, IZ-77/3, IZ-66/1, IZ-24/1 from 9 September 1998 to 5 March
2000 and penitentiary establishment UK-272/3 from 14 March 2000 to 16
January 2002 had been deplorable. Article 3 provides as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust
available domestic remedies. According to them, he could have applied
to the domestic courts with claims for compensation in respect of any
nonpecuniary damage allegedly resulting from the conditions of
his detention.
The applicant disagreed and maintained his complaints.
At
the outset the Court finds it necessary to determine the applicant’s
compliance with the six-month rule, laid out in Article 35 § 1
of the Convention in so far as his grievances about IZ-16/2 and
IZ-16/1 are concerned.
In
this connection, the Court first notes the continuous character of
the applicant’s detention from 9 September 1998 to 1 March 2000
covering his detention in the mentioned facilities and also in
IZ-77/3 and IZ-66/1. It further notes that his grievances about the
mentioned detention facilities all concern the same problem of
overcrowding and the general lack of living space. The Court also
takes account of the Government’s failure to provide the Court
with copies of original prison records with detailed information
about the number of inmates in respect of each and every day of the
applicant’s stay in the prisons in question. Lastly, the Court
would underline that the Government did not raise a six-month
argument and did not argue that the conditions of detention in those
facilities had been dissimilar. In view of these considerations, the
Court finds that the interval stretching from 9
September 1998 and 5 March 2002 should be regarded as a
“continuing situation” for the purposes of calculation of
the six-month timelimit. It thus finds that the applicant lodged
his complaints about the conditions of detention in IZ-16/2 (from
9 to 24 September and from 5 October to 19 November 1998
and from 29 January to 5 September 1999) and in IZ-16/1 (between 28
December to 29 January 1999) in good time.
In as much as the Government
claim that the applicant has not complied with the rule on exhaustion
of domestic remedies, the Court finds that the Government did not
specify with sufficient clarity the type of action which would have
been an effective remedy in their view, nor did they provide any
further information as to how such action could have prevented the
alleged violation or its continuation or provided the applicant with
adequate redress. Even if the applicant had been successful, it is
unclear how the claim for damages could have afforded him immediate
and effective redress. In the absence of such evidence and having
regard to the above-mentioned principles, the Court finds that the
Government did not substantiate their claim that the remedy or
remedies the applicant had allegedly failed to exhaust were effective
ones (see, among other authorities, Kranz
v. Poland, no. 6214/02, § 23,
17 February 2004, and Skawinska
v. Poland (dec.), no. 42096/98,
4 March 2003). For the above reasons, the Court finds that
this part of the application cannot be rejected for nonexhaustion
of domestic remedies (see also Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04,
§§ 204-06, 13 July 2006; Mamedova v. Russia, no.
7064/05, §§ 55-58, 1 June 2006; and Kalashnikov v.
Russia (dec.), no. 47095/99, ECHR 2001 XI (extracts)).
In the light of the parties’ submissions, the
Court finds that the applicant’s complaints raise serious
issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of
which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes that
these complaints are not manifestly illfounded within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds
for declaring them inadmissible have been established.
B. Merits
The
Government did not accept that any of the facilities referred to by
the applicant had been overcrowded and also argued that the applicant
had been allowed to take a shower once a week for at least fifteen
minutes and that the cells in those facilities had both artificial
and natural ventilation systems. The windows in all of the
applicant’s cells were double-glazed and had a window leaf for
ventilation. Furthermore, the heating systems in the prisons were
fully operational and the temperature in the cells was within the
permissible range (20o
C in winter and 24o C in summer).
The
applicant disagreed and maintained his complaints. He argued that the
data and figures provided by the Government were inaccurate and
incomplete.
The
parties disagreed as to the specific conditions of the applicant’s
detention in IZ-16/1, 16/2, IZ-77/3, IZ-66/1, IZ-24/1 and UK-272/3.
However, there is no need for the Court to establish the veracity of
each and every allegation, as it has sufficient documentary evidence
in its possession to confirm the applicant’s allegations of
severe overcrowding in these facilities, and this in itself is
sufficient to conclude that Article 3 of the Convention has been
breached.
Firstly,
the Court would note that the Government’s allegation that the
applicant was kept in cells specifically designated for former
lawenforcement officials has been contested by the applicant and
remains unsupported by any of the documents submitted by the
Government.
The
Court would further note that as regards the detention centres
IZ-16/1, 16/2, IZ-77/3 and IZ-66/1 the existence of a deplorable
state of affairs may be inferred from the information contained in
Order no. 7 of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences of
31 January 2005 (see paragraphs 57-59 above), which expressly
acknowledges the issue of overcrowding in these detention centres.
The
Court also recalls that in its judgments in the cases of Belevitskiy
v. Russia, no. 72967/01, §§ 73-79, 1 March 2007, and
Novinskiy v. Russia, no. 11982/02, §§
106-108, 10 February 2009, it has previously examined the conditions
of detention in facility IZ-77/3 in 2001 and 2002 and found them to
have been incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the
Convention on account of severe overcrowding.
Also,
the Court has previously examined the conditions of detention in
facility IZ-24/1 in the town of Krasnoyarsk and found them to have
been incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the
Convention on account of severe overcrowding. In the case of Grishin
v. Russia (no. 30983/02, §§ 85-97, 15 November
2007), the complaints related to the period of time between 23
September 1999 and 26 October 2000, that is to say at around the same
time as the period in the present case.
The
overcrowding of the detention facility IZ-66/1 is further confirmed
by the statements of the applicant’s cellmates, Mr S.N. and
Mr U.K. (see paragraphs 35 and 36 above). Since the Government
did not contest the veracity of these statements and furthermore did
not support its own submissions by referring to any original
documentation, the Court is prepared to accept the above statements
as sufficient confirmation of the applicant’s point that the
overcrowding of cells was a problem in pre-trial detention centre
IZ-66/1 for a number of years before, during and after the
applicant’s detention there.
Finally,
as regards penitentiary establishment UK-272/3 in the town of
Irkutsk, the Court would refer to the prison certificate of 23
September 2000, which indirectly acknowledged the issue of
overcrowding by giving the figure of 1,252 inmates as the housing
capacity and the figure of 1,375 as the actual number of inmates in
the prison in September 2000. Further, the Court would again refer to
the uncontested statements of the applicant’s cellmate Mr S.N.,
who also submitted that the prison was overcrowded in
November-December 1998. Since the Government did not contest the
veracity of these statements and furthermore did not support its own
submissions by referring to any original documentation, the Court is
prepared to accept the above indications as sufficient confirmation
of the applicant’s point that the overcrowding of cells was a
problem in establishment UK-272/3 for some time before, during and
after his detention there.
In
view of the above and having regard also to the evidence submitted by
the parties, the Court observes that the case file contains
sufficient indication that the prisons in question were experiencing
severe overcrowding of their premises during the applicant’s
time there. In this respect, the Court cannot accept the statements
made by various prison officials (see paragraph 33) as sufficiently
conclusive, as they lack any reference to the original prison
documentation and are apparently based on personal recollections and
not on any objective data (see Igor Ivanov v. Russia,
no. 34000/02, § 34, 7 June 2007, and Belashev v. Russia,
no. 28617/03, § 52, 13 November 2007).
The
Court has frequently found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
on account of a lack of personal space afforded to detainees (see
Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, §§ 104 et seq.,
ECHR 2005-X (extracts); Labzov v. Russia, no. 62208/00, §§
44 et seq., 16 June 2005; Novoselov v. Russia, no. 66460/01,
§§ 41 et seq., 2 June 2005; Mayzit v. Russia,
no. 63378/00, §§ 39 et seq., 20 January 2005; Kalashnikov
v. Russia, no. 47095/99, §§ 97 et seq., ECHR
2002-VI; and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, §§
69 et seq., ECHR 2001-III).
Having regard to its case-law on the subject and the
material submitted by the parties, the Court notes that the
Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Although in the present case there is no indication that there was a
positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant, the Court
finds that the fact that the applicant had to spend 3 years, 2
months and 5 days in overcrowded cells of those prison facilities was
itself sufficient to cause distress or hardship of an intensity
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.
There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention, as the Court finds the applicant’s detention to
have been inhuman and degrading within the meaning of this provision.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AS
REGARDS THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT
The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the
outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he
complained that his inability to take part in the supervisory-review
proceedings before the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia had
rendered those proceedings unfair. The Court is of the view that this
complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, which provides:
“In the determination of ...
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ...
hearing ... by [a] tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
In so far as the applicant
complained about the outcome of the main set of the criminal
proceedings against him which ended on 18 January 2000, the Court
notes that it is not called upon to examine alleged errors of fact
and law committed by the domestic judicial authorities, provided
there is no indication of unfairness in the proceedings concerned and
provided the decisions reached cannot be considered arbitrary. On the
basis of the materials submitted by the applicant, the Court notes
that he, personally and through his defence counsel, was fully able
to present his case and contest the evidence that he considered
false. Having regard to the facts as submitted by the applicant the
Court has not found any reason to believe that the proceedings did
not comply with the fairness requirement of Article 6 of the
Convention.
Turning
to his grievances about the subsequent supervisory review
proceedings, the Court notes that the Supreme Court examined
the request for supervisory review lodged by the Deputy Prosecutor
General, reopened the proceedings in the case and amended the lower
courts’ decisions. It upheld the conviction, having slightly
reduced the applicant’s sentence. The Court is of the view
that, in so far as the Supreme Court reopened the proceedings in the
applicant’s case and amended the decisions of the lower courts,
the supervisory-review proceedings concerned the determination of a
criminal charge against the applicant. Accordingly, it finds that
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its criminal head applies
to those proceedings (see, among other authorities, Vanyan v.
Russia, no. 53203/99, §§ 56-58, 15 December
2005).
The
Court observes that this part of the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that no fresh charge had been brought against
the applicant in the supervisory-review procedure, in which the
initial conviction had merely been re-characterised as the less
serious offence.
The
Government further stated, with reference to Article 377 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure as amended by a Decision of the Constitutional
Court of 14 February 2000, that the summoning of parties to a
supervisoryreview hearing remained at the discretion of the
relevant court, provided the review procedure was not triggered by an
application that would be to the applicant’s detriment. The
Government noted that the application for supervisory review, like
the prosecutor’s pleadings at the hearing, was not to the
applicant’s detriment. Given that the supervisoryreview
procedure had benefited the applicant by entailing a shorter term of
imprisonment as a result of a new legal classification of his acts,
the Government were of the view that the Supreme Court’s
failure to secure the attendance of the applicant and his counsel had
not breached Article 6 of the Convention.
The
applicant contended that he had not had a fair trial in the
proceedings before the supervisory-review court. The applicant stated
that he had been deprived of an opportunity to appear in person and
to submit arguments. In view of the above and having regard to the
fact that the prosecution had participated in the hearing, the
applicant considered that there had been a breach of Article 6 of the
Convention.
The
Court reiterates that
it flows from the notion of a fair trial that a person charged with a
criminal offence should, as a general principle, be entitled to be
present and participate effectively in the first-instance hearing
(see Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, §§ 27 and
29, Series A no. 89).
The
personal attendance of the defendant does not necessarily take on the
same significance for an appeal hearing, even where the appellate
court has full jurisdiction to review the case on questions of both
fact and law. Regard must be had in assessing this question to, among
other things, the special features of the proceedings involved and
the manner in which the defence’s interests are presented and
protected before the appellate court, particularly in the light of
the issues to be decided by it and their importance for the appellant
(see Belziuk v. Poland, 25 March 1998, § 37, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998 II).
It
is also of crucial importance for the fairness of the criminal
justice system that the accused be adequately defended, both at first
instance and on appeal (see Lala v. the Netherlands, 22
September 1994, § 33, Series A no. 297 A).
The
principle of equality of arms is only one feature of the wider
concept of a fair trial, which also includes the fundamental right
that criminal proceedings should be adversarial. The latter means, in
a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the
opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations
filed and the evidence adduced by the other party (see Brandstetter
v. Austria, 28 August 1991, §§ 66 and 67, Series A
no. 211).
The
Court observes that the supervisory-review proceedings under the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1960 were different from “ordinary”
appeal proceedings in that, among other things, the power to initiate
them was vested with certain senior judicial and prosecution
officers, and not with the parties.
The
fact remains, however, that the supervisory-review court was not
bound by the scope of the request for supervisory review but had the
power to carry out a full-scale judicial review of the decisions in
the case by quashing or amending them, remitting the case to lower
courts or an investigator, or terminating the criminal proceedings
partly or altogether (see paragraph 63). The Supreme Court did
exercise its power by amending the conviction and the applicant’s
sentence, thereby determining a criminal charge against him (see
paragraph 12).
Having
regard to the above, the Court considers that in order to satisfy the
principle of fairness enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention the
Supreme Court should have notified the applicant or his defence
lawyer of the content of the prosecution’s supervisory-review
request and the date and place of the hearing. In such circumstances,
the Court rejects as irrelevant the Government’s reference to
the fact that the absence of the applicant and his counsel from the
hearing was not unlawful under domestic law. On the facts, the Court
notes that the applicant was denied a proper opportunity to
familiarise himself with the content of the Deputy Prosecutor’s
supervisoryreview request, to comment on the points raised in
this request and was not notified of the date and location of the
supervisory-review hearing (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above).
In
such circumstances, the Court finds that the supervisory-review
proceedings before the Supreme Court did not comply with the
requirements of fairness.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AS
REGARDS THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the courts had refused to secure his
effective participation in the civil case brought by the victims. He
relied on Article 6 § 1, which provides, in so far as relevant,
as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public ... hearing
... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court considers that the applicant’s complaints are not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other
grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government argued that the applicant’s absence had been
objectively justified by the fact that he had been serving his prison
sentence in a correctional colony and that it had been impossible to
transport him to the hearings owing to the absence of an established
legal procedure for the transfer of detainees to hearings in civil
cases.
The
applicant averred that he had not been brought to the hearings
because Russian law on civil procedure did not guarantee such a
right. He further stated that he had been unable to appoint counsel
because he had limited financial resources. At the same time, Russian
law did not provide for free legal aid in similar cases.
The
Court reiterates that the principle of adversarial proceedings and
equality of arms, which is one of the elements of the broader concept
of a fair hearing, requires that each party be given a reasonable
opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations made
or evidence adduced by the other party and to present his case under
conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage
vis-à-vis his or her opponent (see Krčmář
and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 35376/97, § 39,
3 March 2000, and Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27
October 1993, § 33, Series A no. 274).
The
Court has previously found a violation of the right to a “public
and fair hearing” in a case where a Russian court, after
refusing the imprisoned applicants leave to appear when they had
sought to make oral submissions on their defamation claim, failed to
consider other legal possibilities for securing their effective
participation in the proceedings (see Khuzhin
and Others v. Russia, no. 13470/02,
§§ 53 et seq., 23 October 2008). It also found
a violation of Article 6 in a case where a Russian court refused an
imprisoned applicant leave to appear when he had sought to make oral
submissions on his claim that he had been ill-treated by the police.
Despite the fact that the applicant in that case was represented by
his wife, the Court considered it relevant that his claim had been
largely based on his personal experience and that his submissions
would therefore have been “an important part of the plaintiff’s
presentation of the case and virtually the only way to ensure
adversarial proceedings” (see Kovalev v. Russia,
no. 7814/01, § 37, 10 May 2007).
The
Court observes that neither the Code of Civil Procedure nor the
Penitentiary Code makes special provision for the exercise by
individuals who are in custody, whether in pre-trial detention or
serving a sentence, of a right to attend hearings in civil cases to
which they are parties. In the present case the applicant’s
requests for leave to appear were denied precisely on the ground that
the domestic law did not make provision for convicted persons to be
brought from correctional colonies to the place where a civil claim
concerning them was being heard. The Court reiterates that Article 6
of the Convention does not guarantee the right to personal presence
before a civil court but rather a more general right to present one’s
case effectively before the court and to enjoy equality of arms with
the opposing side. Article 6 § 1 leaves to the State a free
choice of the means to be used in guaranteeing litigants these rights
(see Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01,
§§ 59-60, ECHR 2005-II).
The issue of the exercise of procedural rights by
detainees in civil proceedings has been examined on several occasions
by the Russian Constitutional Court, which has identified several
ways in which their rights can be secured (see paragraph 71 above).
It has consistently emphasised representation as an appropriate
solution in cases where a party cannot appear in person before a
civil court. Given the obvious difficulties involved in transporting
convicted persons from one location to another, the Court can in
principle accept that in cases where the claim is not based on the
plaintiff’s personal experiences, as in the above-mentioned
Kovalev case, representation of the detainee by counsel would
not be in breach of the principle of equality of arms.
In
the instant case, the claims brought against him by the victims of
his criminal activity involved by their nature an assessment of the
amount of damage he had inflicted and, as such, arguably may not have
required the applicant’s personal participation in the
hearings. Since the option of legal aid was not open to the applicant
(see paragraphs 67-71 above), the only possibility for him was to
appoint a relative, friend or acquaintance to represent him in the
proceedings. However, as is clear from the domestic courts’
decisions, the court did not even consider the issue of the
applicant’s effective participation in the proceedings. They
did not enquire whether the applicant was able to designate a
representative and in particular whether, having regard to the time
which he had already spent in detention, there was still someone
willing to represent him before the domestic courts and, if so,
whether he had been able to contact that person and give him or her
authority to act. Moreover, the applicant did not learn that he had
been refused leave to attend the hearing until he found out about the
judgment in which the civil claims against him were examined on the
merits and accepted (see paragraphs 48-50 above). Thus, the applicant
was obviously unable to decide on a further course of action for the
defence of his rights until such time as the decision refusing him
leave to appear was communicated to him (see Khuzhin
and Others v. Russia, no. 13470/02,
§ 107, 23 October 2008) and the appellate court did
nothing to remedy that situation.
The
Court therefore concludes that the fact that the applicant’s
civil claims were heard without his being present or represented
deprived him of the opportunity to present his case effectively
before the courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Yakovlev v.
Russia, no. 72701/01, §§ 19 et seq., 15 March
2005; Groshev v. Russia, no. 69889/01, §§ 27 et
seq., 20 October 2005; and Mokrushina v. Russia, no.
23377/02, § 22, 5 October 2006).
In
conclusion, the Court finds that the principle of equality of arms
was not observed in the civil proceedings under consideration, owing
to the domestic courts’ failure to ensure the effective
representation of the applicant’s interests in those
proceedings.
There
has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The Court has also examined the applicant’s
complaint about interference with his correspondence with the Court.
However, having regard to the materials in its possession, it finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Lastly, as
to the applicant’s complaint about the trial court’s
allegedly unlawful composition, the Court notes that the grievance
was brought out of time, as the last decision in the applicant’s
criminal case was taken on 24 October 2001, and the applicant
complained about it in his letter of 25 April 2006.
It
follows that this part of the application should be rejected pursuant
to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicant claimed compensation of 500,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage as well as legal costs.
The
Government submitted that these claims were unfounded and excessive.
A. Non-pecuniary damage
The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained stress and
frustration as a result of the violations found. Making an assessment
on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 26,500 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to
reimbursement of the costs
and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been
actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum.
Regard being had to the fact that the applicant failed to submit any
documents in support of his claims or even specify the exact amounts
spent by him in this connection, the Court rejects the applicant’s
claims under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Declares unanimously the complaints about the
conditions of the applicant’s detention between 9 September
1998 and 16 January 2002, his inability to participate in the
supervisoryreview proceedings in his criminal case and his
inability to participate in the civil proceedings brought by the
victims, admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds unanimously that there has been a
violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions
of the applicant’s detention;
Holds unanimously that there has been a
violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the
applicant’s inability to participate in the supervisory-review
examination of his criminal case;
Holds unanimously that there has been a
violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of the
applicant’s inability to participate in the civil proceedings
brought by the victims;
Holds, by six votes to one,
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 26,500
(twenty six thousand five hundred euros), in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into
Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the
applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 June 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos
Rozakis
Registrar President