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VISLOGUZOV v. UKRAINE - 32362/02 [2010] ECHR 710 (20 May 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/710.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 710
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
VISLOGUZOV v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 32362/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 May
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Visloguzov v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer
Lorenzen,
President,
Renate
Jaeger,
Karel
Jungwiert,
Rait
Maruste,
Mirjana
Lazarova Trajkovska,
Zdravka
Kalaydjieva,
judges,
Mykhaylo
Buromenskiy, ad
hoc judge,
and
Claudia Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 April 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 32362/02) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Sergey Nikolayevich
Visloguzov (“the applicant”), on 31 July 2002.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
On
6 March 2007 the Court declared the application
partly inadmissible and decided to communicate the applicant’s
complaints concerning the conditions of his detention and lack
of effective remedies in this respect (Articles 3 and 13 of the
Convention); the alleged interference with the applicant’s
correspondence and with the right of individual petition to the Court
(Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention). It also decided to examine the
merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Frunze, in
the Kherson region.
On 13 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to
Pivnichna Correctional Colony no. 90 (“Colony no. 90”)
to serve a prison sentence. The applicant was held in Colony no. 90
for the duration of his post-conviction detention except for several
periods during which he was placed in prison hospitals and the
Simferopol Pre-Trial Detention Centre (“the Simferopol SIZO”),
as specified below.
On
7 December 2005 the applicant was released.
A. Medical assistance to the applicant during
post-conviction detention
At
the time of his arrival at Colony no. 90 the applicant was suffering
from tuberculosis, weight loss, and chronic hepatitis.
Following
a medical examination in Colony no. 90, the applicant was prescribed
a special diet in view of the weight loss. According to the
applicant, the diet was unsatisfactory.
In
May and August 2001 and February 2002 the applicant was medically
examined, X-rayed, and diagnosed with a dormant form of tuberculosis.
On
11 May 2002, in response to complaints by the applicant, he was
transferred to the hospital at Correctional Colony no. 10, where he
was treated for chronic hepatitis for one month.
In
October 2002 and February and March 2003 the applicant was X-rayed
but, apparently, no treatment followed.
According
to the Government, following complaints made by the applicant on 2
and 19 January and 17 September 2003, the medical department of
Colony no. 90 diagnosed him with a neurological disorder and provided
him with ambulatory treatment. According to the applicant, on several
occasions during that period of time he was administered a
psychotropic agent by force, which was detrimental to his health. The
applicant did not complain to the domestic authorities on this
account.
Between
2 and 23 April 2003 the applicant was held in the hospital at Colony
no. 10 and provided with medical treatment for weight loss.
In
October 2003 and May 2004 the applicant was again X-rayed without any
further specific treatment being provided.
Between
September and November 2004 the applicant was held in the hospital at
Colony no. 7 and treated for tuberculosis.
According
to the applicant, the medical treatment provided to him while in
post-conviction detention did not improve his health in any manner.
B. Physical conditions of the applicant’s
post-conviction detention
1. Detention in Colony no. 90
According
to the Government, while in detention in Colony no. 90 the
applicant was held with 15 other detainees in a unit measuring
60.1 m2. The unit was supplied with the required
number of bunks and other furniture. The applicant had sufficient
access to daylight, fresh air, and washing facilities. The nutrition
was appropriate and complied with the domestic requirements.
According
to the applicant, in Colony no. 90 he was primarily held in a
unit measuring 150 m2 with a total number of 200
detainees. Subsequently he was transferred to a unit measuring 50 m2
and was held there with 15 other detainees. He had to sleep on a
worn-out mattress and pillow; the water supply and catering were
inadequate. Overall, the hygienic and sanitary conditions were
unsatisfactory.
2. Detention in the Simferopol SIZO
Between
4 November 2003 and 26 February 2004 the applicant was held in the
Simferopol SIZO.
According
to the Government, in that facility the applicant was held in cells
measuring:
- 28.5
m2, in which the number of detainees varied from 10 to 14;
- 27.5
m2, in which the number of detainees varied from 8 to 13;
- 20.1
m2, in which the number of detainees varied from 3 to 5;
- 15
m2, in which the number of detainees varied from 2 to 3;
- 26.8
m2, in which the number of detainees varied from 8 to 14;
- 26.5 m2,
in which the number of detainees varied from 10 to 13;
- 30
m2, in which the number of detainees varied from 11 to 14.
All
the cells were supplied with a sufficient number of bunks. The
ventilation system was in good working order.
According
to the applicant, during his detention in the Simferopol SIZO he was
placed in a cell measuring 30 m2, while the number of
detainees amounted at least to 40. They had to take it in turns to
sleep owing to the lack of bunks. Because the cell was overcrowded
there was always a lack of fresh air.
C. The applicant’s correspondence
1. Complaints to domestic authorities
According
to the applicant, while he was in post-conviction detention he filed
complaints with State authorities on various issues. He did not send
some of these letters through the prison administration, as required
by the domestic law, but passed them to his wife who then posted them
to the addressees. The applicant did so allegedly in order to avoid
interception of the letters by the prison officials.
On
25 February 2003 he was allegedly punished with fifteen days’
confinement in a disciplinary cell for breaching the procedure for
sending letters.
2. Correspondence with the Court
On
31 July 2002 the applicant’s wife sent a letter to the Court
expressing intention to submit a formal application with the Court on
behalf of the applicant. She indicated her home address only.
On
4 September 2002 the Registry of the Court provided her with a copy
of the Convention, application and authority forms as well as
explanatory notes.
On
21 October 2002 when visiting the applicant his wife handed the
Court’s letter to him. Shortly after that the prison officials
seized the letter from the applicant on the ground that it had been
obtained unlawfully.
According
to the Government, on the same day the letter was seized the prison
officials examined all the documents contained therein and invited
the applicant to take the seized items back, which he refused to do.
In support of their contention, the Government provided a report
drawn up by the prison officials documenting the applicant’s
refusal to collect the seized items. The report was signed by the
applicant who added a comment that the facts described therein had
been distorted.
According
to the applicant, the prison officials never attempted to return the
letter despite his requests to that effect.
By
letter of 22 November 2002 the applicant’s wife
complained to the Court of the seizure and asked for assistance. The
Court sent a new set of documents necessary for lodging an
application.
On
15 October 2003 the applicant submitted a completed application form
and a letter authorising his wife to act on his behalf (dated 7
October 2003), and supporting materials.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Correctional Labour Code of 23 December 1970 (in
force at the material time)
In accordance with Article 28 and 44 of the Code
prisoners’ correspondence was subject to monitoring by prison
officials. Prison officials were not allowed to review only those of
the prisoners’ letters which were addressed to the prosecutor
or the Ombudsman.
B. Combating Tuberculosis Act of 5 July 2001
Section 17
of the Act provides that persons suffering from tuberculosis detained
in prisons should be treated in specialised prison hospitals.
C. Prison Internal Rules approved by the Order of the
State Department for the Enforcement of Sentences of 5 June 2000 (in
force at the material time)
According
to paragraph 31.2 of the Rules prisoners were allowed to send letters
through the prison administration only.
Under paragraph 35.7 of the Rules prisoners were
forbidden to receive any documents, notes, drafts etc. from visitors
during meetings.
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL
The relevant international reports and other materials
concerning treatment of tuberculosis in Ukraine are summarised in the
judgment in the case of Melnik v. Ukraine
(no. 72286/01, §§ 47-53, 28 March 2006).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained (a) that on several occasions during his
post-conviction detention he had been administered a psychotropic
agent by force; (b) that in Colony no. 90 there had been
overcrowding, lack of adequate nutrition, and inadequate sanitary and
hygienic conditions; (c) that the physical conditions of his
detention in the Simferopol SIZO had been inadequate on account of
overcrowding and lack of ventilation; (d) that during the whole
period of his post-conviction detention he had been denied
appropriate medial assistance.
The
applicant relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Forced psychotropic medication
Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies in respect of this complaint since he should have
raised it before a prosecutor’s office and courts.
The
applicant disagreed with the Government.
The
Court notes that the applicant did not contest the Government’s
submissions that at the relevant time he had been diagnosed with and
treated for a neurological disorder and that that medical assistance
was provided to him following complaints he had made himself. The
Court further considers that the applicant, as the victim of alleged
physical and therapeutic abuse by medical officers, should have
primarily brought this matter before the domestic authorities,
requesting an investigation and seeking redress. Nothing in the case
file suggests that he was deprived of such a possibility.
Accordingly, given that the applicant failed to raise this issue at
the domestic level, this part of the application must be rejected for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1
and 4 of the Convention.
B. Overcrowding, lack of adequate nutrition, inadequate
sanitary and hygienic conditions in Colony no. 90
Admissibility
The
Government maintained that this part of application was inadmissible
for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They contended that the
applicant should have complained to a prosecutor’s office and a
court.
The
applicant insisted that this complaint was admissible.
The Court notes that on a number of occasions it has
rejected similar objections by respondent governments as to
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of complaints about
conditions of detention, when it found that such complaints pointed
to problems of a structural nature in the domestic penitentiary
system in question (see, for example, Kalashnikov v. Russia
(dec.), no. 47095/99, 18 September 2001; Melnik, cited
above, §§ 69-71; Koktysh v. Ukraine,
no. 43707/07, § 86, 10 December 2009).
In the present case the Court considers that the
matters raised by the applicant under this head are also of a
structural nature. Therefore, it cannot reproach the applicant for
having failed to use the domestic remedies suggested by the
Government and dismisses their objection to this effect.
The
Court reiterates, however, that allegations of ill-treatment which
fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention must be
supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court
adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”
but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar
unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Enea v. Italy [GC], no.
74912/01, § 55, ECHR 2009 ...). The distribution of
the burden of proof is intrinsically linked to the specificity of the
facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at
stake (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos.
43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR 2005 VII).
The
Court notes that information about the physical conditions of
detention falls within the knowledge of the domestic authorities.
Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in
procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection.
Still, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at
least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide –
to the greatest possible extent – some evidence in support of
their complaints. In similar situations the Court has considered, for
example, written statements by fellow inmates provided by applicants
in support of their allegations (see Khudobin v. Russia, no.
59696/00, § 87, ECHR 2006-... (extracts); Seleznev v. Russia,
no. 15591/03, §§ 14 and 42, 26 June 2008; and
Polufakin and Chernyshev v. Russia, no. 30997/02,
§ 152, 25 September 2008).
The
Court further observes that complaints of overcrowding should be
viewed with regard to the various types of detention facilities and
the internal regimes operating therein. In particular, with respect
to certain correctional colonies the Court has viewed such complaints
in the context of the wide freedom of movement enjoyed by detainees
during the daytime, which ensured that they had unobstructed access
to natural light and air (see Valašinas
v. Lithuania,
no. 44558/98, §§ 103 and 107, ECHR 2001-VIII;
Nurmagomedov v.
Russia (dec.),
no. 30138/02, 16 September 2004; Solovyev
v. Russia (dec.), no. 76114/01,
27 September 2007; and Pitalev
v. Russia, no. 34393/03, §§ 38
and 39, 30 July 2009). Accordingly, when
assessing a complaint of overcrowding in a correctional colony it is
important to take due account not only of the private space in the
sleeping area but also of the space which may be available to the
detainees in the communal areas of the colony during the
daytime.
In
the instant case the Court notes that the parties submitted
contradictory and insufficient information as to the actual space per
detainee in Colony no. 90. In particular, the Government did not
specify whether their estimate included both sleeping and communal
areas or referred exclusively to the sleeping area. The applicant,
having provided his own estimates, also failed to clarify the issue.
In these circumstances the Court cannot make any inferences on the
matter.
As
to the remaining issues of allegedly inadequate nutrition and
sanitary and hygienic conditions, the applicant failed to submit any
evidence in support of his allegations. Furthermore, he did not even
provide a detailed account concerning those issues.
In
view of the above, the Court considers that this part of the
application has not been properly substantiated and developed by the
applicant (see Golubev v. Russia (dec.) no. 26260/02, 9
November 2006, and Shkurenko v. Russia (dec.) no. 15010/07,
10 September 2009). Therefore it should be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
C. Overcrowding and lack of ventilation in the
Simferopol SIZO
1. Admissibility
The
Government insisted that the applicant should have raised this
complaint before a prosecutor’s office and a court.
The
applicant argued that the complaint was admissible.
The Court refers to its considerations above (see
paragraphs 42 and 43) and finds that this complaint reveals a problem
of a structural nature. The applicant was therefore dispensed from
the obligation to pursue the remedies referred to by the Government.
Accordingly, the respective objection of the Government falls to be
dismissed.
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
The
Government maintained that the conditions of the applicant’s
detention in the Simferopol SIZO had been adequate.
The
applicant insisted that conditions of his detention in the Simferopol
SIZO had been inadequate because of severe overcrowding and
insufficient ventilation.
The
Court observes that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must
attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope
of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum
level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of
the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health
of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 162, Series A no. 25).
Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is “degrading”
within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to
whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned
and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it has
adversely affected his or her personality in a manner
incompatible with Article 3. Even the absence of such a purpose
cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of this
provision (see Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, §§
67-68 and 74, ECHR 2001-III, and Valašinas, cited
above, § 101).
The Court has consistently stressed that the suffering
and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable
element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of
legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of
his liberty may often involve such an element. In accordance with
this provision the State must ensure that a person is detained in
conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity,
that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not
subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the
unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given
the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are
adequately secured (see Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99,
§ 95, ECHR 2002 VI).
In
the present case the parties submitted various figures as to the
living space per detainee during the applicant’s detention in
the Simferopol SIZO. The figures submitted by the Government suggest
that in most of the applicant’s cells there was on average from
2.35 to 5.36 m2 of living space per each detainee. Only
one cell offered – at certain point in time – 7.5 m2
of living space per detainee. However, the Government failed to
specify the length of the applicant’s detention in that
particular cell. On the other hand, the applicant’s submissions
suggest that he had only had 0.75 m2 of living space in
that facility.
The
Court notes that the Government failed to adduce any evidence in
support of their estimate of the living space per detainee in the
Simferopol SIZO despite the fact that the relevant information and
evidence was at their disposal. In any event, in the light of the
Court’s established case-law on this issue and the relevant
standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (which are quoted, for
example, in Kalashnikov, cited above, § 97 and
Melnik, cited above, § 47), even the figures of the
Government suggest that most of the time the applicant was held in
overcrowded cells.
The
Court further notes that the Government failed to substantiate in any
manner their submissions as to sufficiency of the number of bunks and
the adequacy of the ventilation system. In these circumstances the
Court is inclined to give weight to the applicant’s submissions
on this matter (see Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey,
no. 21689/93, § 426, 6 April 2004). The Court
therefore finds that the applicant’s detention in overcrowded
conditions, which lasted for three months and twenty-two days, was
further aggravated by inadequate ventilation and the lack of bunks
which meant that he and the other detainees had to take it in turns
to sleep. These findings are further corroborated by the general
conclusions of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights
concerning the physical conditions of detention in the penitentiary
institutions in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (referred to by the
Court in Koktysh, cited above, §§ 41 and 42).
The
foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude
that the physical conditions of detention of the applicant in the
Simferopol SIZO amounted to degrading treatment in breach of Article
3 of the Convention.
D. Lack of medical assistance to the applicant
1. Admissibility
The
Government maintained that this complaint was inadmissible for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies since the applicant should have
raised this issue before a prosecutor’s office and a court.
The
applicant disagreed.
The Court, having regard to its findings above (see
paragraphs 42 and 43), considers that this complaint refers to a
problem of a structural nature either (see, for example, Koval v.
Ukraine, no. 65550/01, §§ 96 and 97, 19 October
2006) and that the remedies in question would be of no assistance to
the applicant. The Court therefore holds that the applicant complied
with the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies.
It
further notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
The
Government submitted that while he had been in post-conviction
detention the applicant had been provided with appropriate medical
assistance. In particular, for certain periods the applicant had been
transferred to prison hospitals for treatment for weight loss,
chronic hepatitis, and tuberculosis. On a number of occasions the
applicant had been examined and X-rayed on account of tuberculosis.
The
applicant contended that such medical assistance had amounted only to
examinations and X-rays and that there had been no real further
treatment. He admitted that he had been transferred to prison
hospitals a few times but argued that these transferrals had only
been formal measures and in fact had not resulted in any improvement
to his health.
The
Court notes that Article 3 imposes an obligation on the States to
protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty.
The Court accepts that the medical assistance available in prison
hospitals may not always be of the same level as in the best medical
institutions for the general public. Nevertheless, the State must
ensure that the health and well-being of detainees are adequately
secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite
medical assistance (see Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000-XI, and Hurtado v.
Switzerland, 28 January 1994, Series A no. 280-A). Where the
authorities decide to place and maintain in detention a person who is
seriously ill, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing
such conditions as correspond to his special needs resulting from his
disability (see Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394/96,
§ 30, ECHR 2001 VII, and Farbtuhs v. Latvia,
no. 4672/02, § 56, 2 December 2004).
The
mere fact that a detainee was seen by a doctor and
prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to
the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate (see Hummatov
v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04, § 116,
29 November 2007). The authorities must also
ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the
detainee’s state of health and the treatment he underwent while
in detention (see, for example, Khudobin, cited above, § 83),
that the diagnoses and care are prompt and
accurate (see Hummatov,
cited above, § 115, and Melnik, cited above,
§§ 104-106), and that where
necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is
regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic
strategy aimed at curing the detainee’s diseases or preventing
their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis
(see Hummatov,
cited above, §§ 109, 114; Sarban v. Moldova,
no. 3456/05, § 79, 4 October 2005;
and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 211,
13 July 2006). The authorities must also show that the
necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be
actually followed through (see Hummatov,
cited above, § 116, and Holomiov,
cited above, § 117).
In
the present case the Court considers that the applicant’s poor
health, in particular his suffering from tuberculosis, weight loss
and chronic hepatitis, called for special medical care on a regular,
systematic and comprehensive basis.
As
regards treatment for tuberculosis, the Court notes that on many
occasions the applicant was medically examined and X-rayed, and that
in the course of those examinations the doctors reconfirmed the
applicant’s diagnosis. It appears, however, that following
those examinations, the applicant was not offered any further
substantial treatment. It was only between September and November
2004 that he was treated specifically for tuberculosis in a prison
hospital. As to the treatment for weight loss and chronic
hepatitis, the Court notes that the applicant was transferred to a
prison hospital on account of these illnesses twice. Still, having
regard to the seriousness of the applicant’s illnesses and also
to the domestic law requirement providing that the prisoners
suffering from tuberculosis should be held in specialised prison
hospitals (see paragraph 32 above), the Court considers that the
measures taken by the domestic authorities had not been sufficient.
In
the light of the above considerations, the Court holds that the
medical care dispensed to the applicant during his post-conviction
detention was inadequate and amounted to a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that he had had no effective remedies in respect
of his complaints about the conditions of his detention. He relied on
Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
In
so far as the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the
Convention refers to the lack of effective remedies in respect of
inadequate physical conditions of detention in the Simferopol SIZO
and inadequate medical assistance, the Court finds that this aspect
of the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is
not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
As
to the lack of effective remedies in respect of the other issues of
conditions of detention raised by the applicant, the Court, having
declared the relevant issues under Article 3 of the Convention
inadmissible, concludes that the applicant has no arguable claim for
the purpose of Article 13 of the Convention (see Rodić
and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no.
22893/05, § 82, 27 May 2008). It follows that this
aspect of the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of
the Convention should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
B. Merits
The
Government contended that the applicant had had effective remedies at
his disposal as required by Article 13 of the Convention and referred
to their submissions as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
concerning the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the
Convention.
The
applicant disagreed with the Government.
The
Court, having regard to its conclusions as to the exhaustion of
domestic remedies (see paragraphs 52 and 64 above), considers that
the applicant had no effective remedy in respect of his allegations
of inadequate physical conditions of detention in the Simferopol SIZO
and inadequate medical assistance while in post-conviction detention.
Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 13 of the
Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
Relying
on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant complained that
the officials of Colony no. 90 had monitored his letters. He further
complained that those officials had seized and retained the Court’s
letter containing the documents necessary for lodging a formal
application with it.
The
Court considers that these matters fall within
the scope of Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Monitoring of correspondence
Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies in respect of that complaint because he had not
applied to a prosecutor’s office or a court alleging a
violation. They further contended that this part of application had
been submitted outside the six-month time-limit.
The
applicant did not make any particular submissions in this regard.
The
Court observes that the applicant did not provide sufficient details
as to the complaint concerning monitoring of his letters by prison
staff. In particular, he failed to specify when he sent the letters,
who the addressees were, or when the prison staff allegedly reviewed
those letters. In the absence of this information, the Court cannot
make any conclusions as to the applicant’s compliance with the
admissibility criteria laid down in Article 35 § 1
of the Convention. It finds therefore that this complaint has not
been sufficiently developed and should be dismissed as manifestly
ill-founded in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
B. Seizure and retention of the
Court’s letter
1. Admissibility
The
Government maintained that the applicant should have raised this
issue before a prosecutor’s office and a court. They further
contended that the submissions to the Court made by the applicant’s
wife before 7 October 2003 could not be taken into account
because before that date she had not been duly empowered to act on
the applicant’s behalf given that no authority form had been
signed. They therefore insisted that the applicant had missed the
six-month time-limit.
The
applicant claimed that he had complied with the admissibility rules.
He asserted in particular that he had not been able to send the first
authority form as it had been seized together with other documents by
the prison officials. As soon as the Court had sent him a new form,
he had signed and sent it back to the Court.
As to the plea of non-exhaustion, the Court observes
that the applicant’s wife, having decided to correspond with
the Court via her home address, further opted – for a certain
reason – to pass the Court’s letter to the applicant in
prison. She transmitted that letter to the applicant at the meeting
with him even though this was forbidden by domestic law (see
paragraph 34 above). The lawful way to transmit the letter to the
applicant would have been to pass it through the official channels of
the prison administration. The applicant did not choose that option
however and accepted the letter in breach of domestic rules. It
appears therefore that the subsequent seizure and
retention of the letter had a basis in domestic law.
In
these circumstances it is doubtful that challenging this measure
could have had any prospect of success. In particular, it is unclear
how the remedies referred to by the Government could have resulted in
the acknowledgment of the seizure and retention
as unlawful and the offering of any redress on this account.
The Government failed to clarify this issue and did not adduce any
practical examples in this respect. It follows that the Government’s
objection should be dismissed.
As
regards the six-month issue, the Court observes that there is nothing
to suggest that the initial submissions of the applicant’s wife
did not reflect the will of the applicant concerning the factual and
legal points of his case, as presented in the latter course of the
proceedings before the Court. Having regard to the circumstances of
the case, the Court considers that the initial letters of the
applicant’s wife should be regarded as validly introduced on
the applicant’s behalf. The Government’s objection as to
the applicant’s non-compliance with the six-month rule should
therefore be dismissed.
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
a. The Parties’ submissions
The
Government admitted that the seizure and
retention of the Court’s letter had constituted an
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his
correspondence as provided by Article 8 of the Convention. They
however insisted that the interference had been justified.
The
applicant disagreed with the Government.
b. The Court’s assessment
i. Existence of interference
It
is not disputed by the parties, and the Court agrees, that the
seizure and retention of the Court’s
letter constituted interference with the applicant’s
right to respect for his correspondence guaranteed by Article 8
of the Convention.
ii. Whether the interference was in
accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim
The
Court refers to its findings in paragraph 86 above and accepts that
the impugned measure was carried out in accordance with the law. It
further accepts that the measure pursued the legitimate aim of
preventing disorder and crime.
iii. Whether the interference was
necessary in a democratic society
The
Court notes that it has found violations of Article 8 of the
Convention in cases where prison authorities opened letters that had
been sent to detainees by the Convention bodies (see, for example,
Peers, cited above, § 84 and Matwiejczuk v.
Poland, no. 37641/97, § 102, 2 December 2003).
In
the present case the applicant did not receive the Court’s
letter by post but from his wife, who had been communicating with the
Court. As noted above, the applicant received the letter from his
wife in breach of domestic rules, while there had been lawful way to
get it. The legal prohibition on exchanging objects during meetings
between prisoners and visitors does not appear to be unreasonable in
itself, given the necessity to uphold the prison regime. The ensuing
reaction of the authorities was also appropriate, since they had to
verify the contents of the items transferred.
The
Court however notes that after the examination of the seized letter,
the prison officials must have assured themselves that the documents
contained therein were safe and would not constitute any danger to
the prison regime. It is obvious that after that examination there
had been no need to hold the seized items any longer. In this regard
there is disagreement between the parties as to whether the applicant
could get the letter back. The applicant submitted that his requests
to have the documents returned to him had been ignored and that that
was why he had asked the Court for a new set of documents. On the
other hand, the Government contended that the prison officials,
having examined the seized documents, had attempted to return them
and that it had been the applicant who had refused to collect them.
In support of their position the Government submitted a report drawn
up by the prison officials documenting the applicant’s refusal
to collect the seized items. The Court notes, however, that when the
applicant signed the report he added a comment to the effect that the
facts described therein had been distorted. Accordingly, this piece
of evidence is contradictory and cannot persuade the Court to accept
the Government’s version. In sum, assessing the materials of
the case file, the Court considers that there was no reason for the
domestic authorities to retain the applicant’s letter after its
examination.
That being so, the Court considers that the
authorities overstepped their margin of appreciation in the present
case, and that the interference was not proportionate and necessary
in a democratic society. It follows that Article 8 of the Convention
has been violated.
IV. DISCIPLINARY PUNISHMENT FOR SENDING LETTERS
In
his initial submissions the applicant seemed to complain under
Article 8 of the Convention that he had been punished for having sent
letters bypassing the prison’s official channels.
The
Court however notes that the applicant did not pursue this complaint
further. In particular, he made no submissions to this effect at the
stage of communicating the application to the Government. It appears
that this issue did not constitute a matter of concern for him.
In
these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant may not
be regarded as wishing to pursue the complaint under Article 8 of the
Convention, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the
Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in
fine, the Court finds no special
circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the
Convention and its Protocols which require the continued
consideration of the complaint. In view of the above, the Court finds
it appropriate to discontinue the examination of this part of the
application.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the seizure and retention by the prison
officials of the documents necessary for lodging a formal application
with the Court had also hindered his right of application to the
Court.
The
complaint falls under Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“The Court may receive applications from any
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the
Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to
hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”
The Court reiterates that a complaint under Article
34 of the Convention is of a procedural nature and does not give rise
to any issue of admissibility under the Convention (see Cooke v.
Austria, no. 25878/94, § 46, 8 February 2000, and
Ergi v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports
1998-IV, § 105).
The
Court reiterates that Article 34 of the Convention imposes an
obligation on a Contracting State not to hinder the right of
individual petition. While the obligation imposed is of a procedural
nature, distinguishable from the substantive rights set out in the
Convention and Protocols, it flows from the very essence of this
procedural right that it is open to individuals to complain of its
alleged infringements in Convention proceedings (see Manoussos
v. the Czech Republic and Germany (dec.), no. 46468/99,
9 July 2002). The Court also underlines that the undertaking not
to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual
application precludes any interference with the individual’s
right to present and pursue his complaint before the Court
effectively (see, among other authorities and mutatis mutandis,
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, Reports
1996-IV, § 105; Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998,
Reports 1998-III, § 159; Tanrikulu v. Turkey
[GC], no. 23763/94, ECHR 1999-IV; Şarlı v. Turkey,
no. 24490/94, §§ 85-86, 22 May 2001; and
Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, 18 June 2002).
The
Court further reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the
effective operation of the system of individual petition, guaranteed
by Article 34 of the Convention, that applicants or potential
applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court
without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities
to withdraw or modify their complaints (see the above-cited
paragraphs of the judgments of Akdivar and Others and
Kurt). In this context, “pressure” includes not
only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation, but also
other improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or
discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention complaint (see the
above-mentioned Kurt and Şarlı cases, §§ 160
and 164, and §§ 85-86 respectively).
The
Court has paid specific attention to the issue of the effective
exercise of the right of application by detainees. It has held that
the detainees are in a particularly vulnerable position, as they are
dependent in their communication with the Court and the rest of the
outside world on the prison administration (see, for example, Cotleţ
v. Romania, no. 38565/97, § 71,
3 June 2003). Withholding of enclosures from the
correspondence addressed to the detainees from the Court may in
itself disclose a violation of Article 34 of the Convention (see
Ponushkov v. Russia, no. 30209/04, § 85, 6 November
2008).
Turning
to the present case, the Court notes that the prison officials seized
the Court’s letter of 4 September 2002, which contained an
application form and other documents necessary for the applicant to
duly prepare his application to the Court. Because of that seizure
the applicant had to request a new set of documents and it was only
after he received it that he successfully lodged the application with
the Court. The delay in the lodging of the application was caused by
the prison authorities and amounted to about one year. The Court
considers that such conduct on the part of State authorities is
incompatible with the safeguards of Article 34 of the Convention.
In
these circumstances the Court concludes that Ukraine has failed to
comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for damage.
The
Government maintained that the claims should be rejected, as the
applicant had not quantified the damage properly.
The
Court notes that the applicant failed to substantiate the pecuniary
damage incurred. It therefore makes no award in this respect. As to
non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that
the applicant must have suffered distress and anxiety on account of
the violations found. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required by
Article 41 of the Convention, it awards the applicant EUR 8,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not submit any claim under this head; the Court
therefore makes no award for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Decides to discontinue the examination of the
applicant’s complaint of an alleged violation of Article 8 of
the Convention on account of his disciplinary punishment by the
prison officials;
Declares the complaints under Articles 3
and 13 of the Convention (concerning the physical conditions of
detention in the Simferopol SIZO; lack of appropriate medical
assistance during detention; and a lack of effective remedies for
those complaints), and Articles 8 of the Convention (concerning
the seizure and retention of the Court’s letter) admissible and
the reminder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention on account of the physical
conditions of detention in the Simferopol SIZO;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention on account of the lack of
appropriate medical assistance provided to the applicant while in
post-conviction detention;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention on account of the seizure and
retention of the Court’s letter by the prison officials;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention;
Holds that Ukraine has failed to comply with its
obligations under Article 34 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Ukrainian hryvnias at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 May 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President