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ANUSCA v. MOLDOVA - 24034/07 [2010] ECHR 673 (18 May 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/673.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 673
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF ANUSCA v. MOLDOVA
(Application
no. 24034/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 May
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Anusca v. Moldova,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 April 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 24034/07) against the Republic
of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Moldovan national, Ms Liuba Anuşca (“the
applicant”), on 21 May 2007.
The
applicant was represented by Mr I. Turcanu, a lawyer practising in
Edinet. The Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr V. Grosu.
The
applicant alleged that the authorities’ investigation into the
death of her son failed to meet Convention standards.
On
22 October 2008 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Lopatnic.
She
is the mother of Ion Anuşca, who was born in 1985 and who died
on 5 October 2004, during his military service.
The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as
follows.
The
applicant’s son commenced his mandatory military service in
November 2003, assigned to the Guard Regiment within the Basic Air
Forces, where he performed farm work. The following August he was
transferred to other duties. According to the Government, this was
because of certain behavioural problems, including intoxication and
aggressiveness.
On
3 October 2004 the applicant’s son was absent from his unit for
two-three hours without permission. Two days later, he was ordered to
provide a written explanation for this absence. He explained orally
that he had visited an acquaintance in the nearby village, to whom he
had entrusted a number of his personal objects for safe-keeping. One
of his superiors who was acquainted with both the applicant and her
son spoke sharply to him. At approximately 8.10 p.m., following
the evening meal, the applicant’s son asked another soldier for
a pen. A few minutes later he returned the pen along with a piece of
paper and a bullet. He told the soldier not to read what was written
on the paper and left the room. The soldier nevertheless read the
paper, which contained a few words including a farewell addressed to
a person by the name of Olesea. He informed his commander of the
situation, who immediately gave the order to fall in. When the
applicant’s son failed to respond, the other soldiers were sent
to search for him. He was found some minutes later lying dead under a
tree behind the barracks with a broken cord around his neck, the
other end of which was tied to a branch overhead.
The
commander-in-chief of the regiment contacted the Bălţi
military prosecutor’s office, which sent a prosecutor, V.M., to
the scene to investigate. The investigation commenced shortly before
midnight. A number of details were verified and recorded in the
official report: presence of a military cap near the body; the length
of each piece of cord; the diameter of the branch to which it was
tied. The investigator took possession of the piece of paper and the
bullet referred to above.
An
external examination of the body was made later that night by a
forensic doctor, who commenced his examination at 1.56 a.m. He noted
that the only sign of injury on the body was to the neck. As pointed
out by the applicant, the temperature of the body was not recorded,
making it impossible to establish the exact time of death.
According
to the Government, the investigator interviewed 15 soldiers and
commanders about Ion Anuşca’s time in the regiment and the
circumstances of his death. Nothing that was said gave grounds to
suspect foul play. The person named on the piece of paper was also
interviewed, as was the applicant herself. She told the investigation
that her son had not had any difficulties in entering into military
service, nor had he ever complained to her about military life. He
had even been contemplating a career in the military, and had plans
to rent a house close to the base.
The
investigation also included a post-mortem psychiatric assessment of
the deceased performed by a panel of three psychiatrists. In their
first report, dated 19 November 2004, they stated that on the basis
of the elements before them it was not possible to state whether Ion
Anuşca had been influenced by another person to commit suicide.
In their second report, dated 17 December 2004, and following an
interview with “Olesea”, they concluded that there was
nothing about Ion Anuşca’s behaviour during his military
service or shortly before his death that suggested he suffered from
psychological problems. Nor did it appear that any person had induced
him to commit suicide.
The
investigator also requested a forensic examination of the body, which
took place on 7 December 2004. This confirmed that death had been due
to asphyxia caused by strangulation. It also established the presence
of alcohol at the time of death (1.1 mg).
On
23 December 2004, the military prosecutor issued an ordinance closing
the investigation, finding that the death had been caused by suicide,
and that no crime had been committed.
On
1 April 2005, the Prosecutor General’s deputy annulled this
ordinance on the ground that the death of Ion Anuşca had not
been sufficiently investigated. He specified several steps to be
taken, including a handwriting analysis and further interviews with
the soldiers and officers of the regiment with a view to establishing
the reasons for the suicide, and to obtaining more information on the
deceased’s behaviour, attitude and personal situation.
The
handwriting analysis was obtained on 29 April 2005. During that same
month, the investigator interviewed more of the colleagues of
Ion Anuşca. These witnesses referred to relational
difficulties within the Anuşca family and tension in the home.
They recalled that Ion Anuşca’s behaviour had changed
radically when he returned to the barracks from a visit to his home
in the summer of 2004, becoming shy, drinking heavily and not being
able to recall his actions later on. According to these witnesses, he
behaved at times in a violent manner towards other soldiers, and
inflicted physical harm on himself as well by beating his head
against walls. It was for this reason that he had been transferred to
a new unit in August 2004. These interviews also provided the name of
the person that Ion Anuşca used go to see in the nearby village,
P.S.. The military prosecutor closed the investigation for the second
time on 3 May 2005, again concluding that no crime had been
committed.
In
November 2006 the applicant applied to the Balţi municipal court
to annul the closure of the investigation. She complained that she
had not received a copy of the military prosecutor’s decision,
nor had she seen the investigation file. She was therefore unaware
whether an autopsy had been performed. Her request that certain
persons be interviewed had been rejected by the military prosecutor.
Her lawyer requested exhumation of the body in order to establish
whether any injuries had been inflicted before death.
On
20 November 2006 the court ruled that the applicant’s rights
under Articles 77, 78 and 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had
been seriously violated. These included the right to submit documents
and evidence for inclusion in the investigation file, the right to
challenge the decisions of the investigator, the right to make
requests, and the right to become acquainted with the contents of the
file. Because these rights had not been respected, the applicant
still did not know the cause of her son’s death. The court also
noted that while the forensic examination referred to the taking of
photographs of the body, there were no photos in the file, although
these might have led to the discovery of new facts. However, since
the applicant had not observed the procedure set out at Article 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, her complaints had to be rejected.
The
applicant sought the assistance of a Member of Parliament, who made
representations to the Prosecutor General. On 31 May 2007 the
Prosecutor General’s deputy annulled the military prosecutor’s
ordinance of 3 May 2005. He ruled that the applicant had to be
recognised as the injured party, thereby granting her the rights set
out in Article 60 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He directed that
information be obtained from the town hall of the applicant’s
village concerning her son’s character, his relations with his
family and about the applicant herself. He further indicated that the
reasons for Ion Anuşca’s absences from the military base
and whereabouts at such times should be established.
The
military prosecutor closed the investigation for the third time on
28 August 2007. The applicant was informed of this by letter of
20 September 2007, to which was appended a copy of the decision.
That
decision was cancelled by the Prosecutor General’s deputy on
16 January 2008, who noted that neither the photographs taken
during the forensic examination of the body nor the camera film had
been added to the investigation file. Nor had any more information
been retrieved about Ion Anuşca’s absences. He called for
P.S. to be interviewed to see whether there was any link between the
inhabitants of the village and Ion Anuşca’s death.
The
following day, 17 January 2008, the Prosecutor General’s office
wrote a letter to the military prosecutor of Balţi strongly
criticising the manner in which the case had been handled. The
investigation had been incomplete and there had been unjustified
delay. Steps that had been ordered had not been taken, which was a
failure to fulfil official duties and showed a lack of proper control
on the part of the military prosecutor. He was ordered to provide a
written explanation for the situation, take sufficient measures of
redress and avoid such faults in future.
The
investigation was closed for the fourth and last time on 21 May
2008, it having been concluded that no criminal offence had been
committed. The applicant was informed of this by a latter dated
27 May 2008, which enclosed a copy of the military prosecutor’s
decision.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Article 59
of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines “the injured party”
as any person who, as a result of a crime, has sustained moral,
physical or material damage. Article 60 details the many specific
procedural rights associated with such status. Article 81 provides
for a close relative to assume this role where the injured party is
deceased. The relevant parts of that provision read as follows:
“Article 81.
The successor of the injured party or of the civil party
(1) In
criminal proceedings, the recognised successor of the injured party
or of the civil party shall be a close relative who has expressed
his/her wish to exercise the rights and obligations of the injured
party who is deceased or who, on account of the crime committed
against them, has lost the capacity to consciously express his/her
wish. ...
(2) The
decision to recognise a close relative as the successor of the
injured party or of the civil party is made by the prosecutor
conducting the criminal prosecution, or, where appropriate, by the
court, if the close relative so requests....
...
(4) The
successor of the injured party or of the civil party participates in
the criminal proceeding in the place of the injured party or the
civil party.
...
THE LAW
The
applicant originally complained under Article 6 about the
investigation into the death of her son. However, the Court, being
master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the
case, is not bound by the characterisation given by the parties. By
virtue of the jura novit curia principle, it has, for example,
considered of its own motion complaints under Articles or paragraphs
not relied on by the parties. A complaint is characterised by the
facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments
relied on (see Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom,
21 February 1990, § 29, Series A no. 172, and Guerra
and Others, cited above, § 44). The Court considers it
appropriate to examine her complaint under Article 2, and it is
on this basis that the parties made have their submissions. The
relevant part of Article 2 reads as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life
shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.”
I. ADMISSIBILITY
The
Government argued that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic
remedies, since she had not sought to challenge the final decision in
this case, i.e. the closure of the investigation on 21 May 2008,
although such a challenge was provided for by the relevant provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Government further submitted
that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded, for
while she refused to accept the conclusion reached by the military
prosecutor, she was unable to point to any evidence that could cast
doubt on it, let alone suggest that her son had been the victim of a
criminal act. In this respect the Government refer to the Court’s
judgment in Grădinar v. Moldova, no. 7170/02, 8 April
2008, in which the complaint under Article 2 was found to be
unsubstantiated.
The
applicant argued that she had made use of an appropriate remedy
through her application to the Balţi municipal court, which had
recognised the validity of her complaints, even though it had
ultimately denied her request for procedural reasons. That decision
being final, she was then entitled to bring the matter before the
Court. She added that the military prosecutor had failed to heed any
of the criticisms contained in the judgment of the municipal court.
The
Court notes that the applicant did endeavour to assert her procedural
rights under domestic law although, as explained above, her action
was rejected on procedural grounds. Even so, the validity of her
complaint was recognised by the Prosecutor General when ordering the
continuation of the investigation on 31 May 2007. It cannot therefore
be said that she remained passive during the period of the
investigation. Moreover, the Court is not convinced that a challenge
to the last decision of the military prosecutor could have
effectively dealt with the Convention issues at stake, which concern
the adequacy of the investigation, its duration and the applicant’s
involvement in it. Re-opening the investigation a fifth time, nearly
four years after the event, cannot be seen as an effective remedy in
these circumstances. The Court accordingly dismisses this preliminary
objection.
The
Court also rejects the Government’s objection that the
complaint is manifestly ill-founded. The Government’s reference
to the Grădinar is inapposite, since in that case the
applicant’s complaint was that the authorities had failed in
their positive obligation to protect her husband from a fatal attack.
The Court found that she had failed to substantiate this claim, and
had also failed to submit evidence to show that the investigations
were superficial or inefficient. In the present case, the applicant
has not alleged a substantive violation of her son’s right to
life, confining her complaint to the manner in which his death was
investigated. The Court considers that this complaint raises
questions of law which are sufficiently serious that its
determination should depend on an examination of the merits. As the
application is not inadmissible on any other ground, it must
therefore be declared admissible. In accordance with its decision to
apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 4
above), the Court will immediately consider the merits of this
complaint.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
A. The submissions of the parties
The
applicant advanced a series of criticisms of the investigation into
her son’s death. She complained that the authorities had failed
to recognise her as the successor of the injured party, thereby
denying her all the procedural rights associated with such status.
The Balţi municipal court had affirmed that her rights under the
Code of Criminal Procedure had been severely violated, and had noted
that two years after her son’s death she had not had sight of
the investigation file nor had she been officially informed of how
her son died.
She
also criticised the investigation for the shortcomings that led to is
being re-opened three times. It was clear from this, and clearer
still from the very critical remarks contained in the letter from the
office of the Prosecutor General to the military prosecutor at Balţi,
that the investigation had been deficient and dilatory, whether
intentionally or negligently. The report of the scene had omitted
important details such as the height of the branch from the ground,
and the exact type of cord used; these points had only been noted in
the statement taken from a soldier who had assisted the military
prosecutor. The external examination of the body was performed
without a forensic doctor being present, as provided for by the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Because of the failure to record the body
temperature, the exact time of death could not be established. Nor
had there been any attempt to reconstruct her son’s last
moments, leaving open such questions as how long it had taken for him
to die, and whether the cord had snapped before or after this.
The
investigation had assumed that this was a suicide case from the
outset, although at that stage there was insufficient evidence to
exclude the hypothesis of murder. How her son came to have a
significant amount of alcohol in his system had never been
investigated. Similarly, there had been no real attempt to establish
whether he had been in conflict with his superior officers
immediately before he died. Even if he had indeed died by his own
hand, the applicant maintained that it was nonetheless incumbent on
the Government to conduct a sufficiently thorough investigation to
allay any suspicions. Lastly, the applicant pointed to the fact that
the investigation was performed by a trainee military prosecutor
rather than one fully qualified and duly appointed in accordance with
national legislation.
The
Government submitted that while the investigation was re-opened
several times at the instigation of the Prosecutor General’s
office, when it finally ended all of the evidence gathered lead to
the conclusion that this was a case of suicide and that no criminal
offence had been committed. Although the military prosecutor had not
performed his task satisfactorily, the intervention of the office of
the Prosecutor General had ensured that ultimately the investigation
met the standard required by Article 2. All but two of the various
deficiencies observed in the earlier stages had been cured by the
end. The photographs of the body had not been located, but that could
not undermine the findings of the forensic doctor, who was under a
legal duty to report his findings fully and accurately. As for the
involvement of the applicant in the investigation, the Government
argued that it is only where an investigation establishes that a
crime has occurred that one can speak of a victim or an injured
party. Given the conclusion in this case, that no crime had been
committed, there was no crime victim and so the applicant could not
claim the status of successor to the victim.
Even
so, the applicant had been able to exercise certain procedural
rights; the Balţi municipal court had examined her complaint
about the investigation despite her lack of status. The Government
maintained that all relevant investigative steps had been taken, and
that the other steps referred to by the applicant would have had no
bearing on the conclusion reached. The investigator had taken the
rare step of commissioning a post-mortem assessment of the deceased’s
mental state, which supported the view that he had been pre-disposed
to take his life.
As
regards the qualifications of the military prosecutor who conducted
the investigation, the Government maintained that he had the
requisite standing. The fact that the investigation was carried out
with reference to the offence of inducement to suicide and not murder
was of no significance, as this could and would have been changed had
any evidence pertaining to the latter offence emerged. The applicant
had no basis on which to suggest that her son had been murdered. The
Government concluded that the applicant’s complaint was of a
fourth-instance nature.
B. The Court’s assessment
The
applicant did not complain of a substantive violation of Article 2.
The Court will therefore consider the procedural aspect of Article 2
only.
1. The applicable principles
As the Court has already had the opportunity to affirm
in a number of cases concerning the suicide of conscripts, the
procedural protection of the right to life, which is inherent in
Article 2, applies equally to fatalities during compulsory military
service (see Hasan Çalışkan and Others v. Turkey,
no. 13094/02, § 49, 27 May 2008, also Esat Bayram v Turkey,
no. 75535/01, §§ 46-47, 26 May 2009). The competent
authorities must conduct an effective investigation in order to
establish the circumstances of the death and to determine whether
official responsibility is engaged. This is an obligation of means,
not of result.
Particular
diligence is called for when a young man dies at a time when the
military authorities were responsible for his physical and moral
well-being. Where suicide is presumed, the authorities must show that
they have done all in their power to dispel the doubts that the
deceased’s family could reasonably entertain as to the
circumstances surrounding the death. This means in practice
scrutinising closely all elements tending to exclude the possibility
of a criminal act against the deceased. The investigation must be
thorough and detailed. The authorities must take all reasonable steps
to gather the relevant elements. A requirement of promptness and
reasonable expedition is implicit. Furthermore, the next of kin of
the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary
to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (Hasan Çalışkan,
cited above, §§ 50-51).
2. Application to the present case
The
investigation into the death of Ion Anuşca began promptly, as
required by the Convention. Although the applicant has criticised the
initial actions of the investigator, the Court does not find that the
points omitted from his report on the scene were such as to
compromise the investigation. While it appears that no doctor
attended the scene, the Court notes that both the external
examination of the body performed several hours later and the
internal examination that took place two months later reached the
same clear conclusion about the cause of death. The loss of the
photographs of the body does not undermine the results of these
forensic examinations. The failure to take the temperature of the
body, and the consequent inability to determine the precise time of
death is regrettable. However, as emerges from the statements made by
the other soldiers to the investigator, the period between their last
sighting of the applicant’s son and the discovery of his body
was about twenty minutes. Given all of the other elements in the
file, the absence of the precise time of death does not call into
question the conclusion reached by the investigation. The applicant
considered that further measures should have been taken in relation
to the scene, and referred to the many types of measure listed in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, but the Court is not persuaded that these
would have pointed to any other explanation for the death of her son.
It understands that the applicant would wish for a complete account
of her son’s final moments, answering all the questions she
still has, but the procedural obligation under Article 2 does not
necessarily extend so far.
The
applicant contended that her son’s relationship with his
superior officers should have been investigated, as should the fact
that there was a significant level of alcohol in his system when he
died. The Court notes that the investigator did conduct additional
interviews with members of her son’s regiment, which brought to
light certain difficulties he was having with military life. The
statement of P.S. provided an explanation for Ion Anuşca’s
intoxicated state. The fact that this was not taken any further by
the investigator or the military authorities is not, in the
circumstances, a matter for reproach under Article 2.
The
Court considers that the investigation into the death of Ion Anuşca
did ultimately and eventually achieve its end. There are no elements
before it that would cast doubt on the conclusion that the
applicant’s son committed suicide by hanging (contrast with
Esat Bayram, cited above, in which the Court noted patent
contradictions between the forensic reports prepared on where the
bullet entered the deceased’s body, making it impossible to
establish whether death was caused by suicide or an unlawful
act§ 52).
However,
as stated above, the procedural obligation deriving from Article 2
is primarily one of means. Even though the overall finding in this
case can be accepted, the Court is nevertheless struck by the fact
that the office of the Prosecutor General considered it necessary to
intervene three times. On each occasion it ordered the military
prosecutor to re-open the procedure and conduct further inquiries
into what were clearly material issues. Even accepting the
Government’s assertion that the military prosecutor’s
assignment to the task was not contrary to law, his performance of it
was clearly unsatisfactory. The stern rebuke addressed to the Balţi
military prosecutor on 17 January 2008 (see § 23 above) bears
out the applicant’s concerns about an investigation which, by
that stage, had been running for more than three years. The Court
accepts the Government’s argument that the actions of the
office of the Prosecutor General ultimately cured the deficiencies in
the investigation, but they did not and could not make up for the
delay. The Court would stress the requirement of reasonable
expedition. The investigation did indeed commence promptly, but the
time taken for it to finally conclude – 3 years and 7 months –
cannot be justified by its complexity or any objective difficulties.
The applicant therefore had grounds to question to diligence of the
authorities in shedding light on what was, for her, the sudden and
unexplained death of her son during his military service.
Moreover, as is clear from the judgment of the Balţi
municipal court (see § 19 above), the authorities did not
sufficiently involve the applicant in the investigation, at least
during the first two years. The Court has stressed on many occasions
that the involvement of the next of kin serves to ensure public
accountability of the authorities and public scrutiny of their
actions in such situations (see Ramsahai and Others, cited
above, § 321). In this case, the applicant had a strong and
legitimate interest in the conduct of the investigation, which would
have been served by granting her the status she sought under the Code
of Criminal Procedure. The Court does not accept the Government’s
argument on this point, i.e. that it is only once the investigation
has concluded that a crime has been committed that the next of kin
should be recognised as the successors to the victim. Such a view,
which would place suicides outside the scope of the procedural aspect
of Article 2, is at odds with the Court’s case law and
must be rejected. Significant delays in involving the next of kin in
investigative procedures cannot be accepted (see Mikayil Mammadov
v. Azerbaijan, no. 4762/05, § 132, 17 December 2009).
The Government argued that there had been nothing to prevent the
applicant from acquainting herself with the investigation file, and
that she had been informed by the military prosecutor of the closure
of the investigation and copied with his decision. The Court would
emphasise that Article 2 requires more than merely informing the
next of kin of the progress of the investigation, and includes their
active involvement in it (see Salgın v. Turkey, cited
above, § 89). The Court finds that this was not done for the
applicant (see Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790/99, § 93, 5
July 2005).
In
conclusion, having regard to the manner in which Ion Anuşca’s
death was investigated, the time it took and the very limited
involvement of the applicant in the investigation, the Court
considers that the investigation was not “effective”
within the meaning of its case law. There has accordingly been a
violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 116,040 Moldovan lei (MDL) in respect of pecuniary
damage. She estimated that this was the sum that she should have
received from the State under the applicable rules on compensation in
the event of death during military service. She claimed a further
100,000 Euros (EUR) for the psychological suffering she had
endured on account of the delays and inadequacies of the
investigation into her son’s death.
The
Government contended that the applicant had adduced no proof of
actual pecuniary loss. They noted that the applicant had not at any
stage sought compensation from the domestic authorities. As regards
non-pecuniary damage, the Government argued that as there had been no
violation, no compensation was due. In any event, it viewed the
applicant’s claim as excessive in the light of the Court’s
practice in similar cases.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
Regarding non-pecuniary damage, and ruling on an equitable basis, the
Court awards the applicant EUR 8,000.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant made no claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 8,000
(eight thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the national
currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 May 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
