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KRZYSZTOFIAK v. POLAND - 38018/07 [2010] ECHR 613 (20 April 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/613.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 613
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KRZYSZTOFIAK v. POLAND
(Application
no. 38018/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20
April 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Krzysztofiak v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 23 March 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 38018/07) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Marian
Krzysztofiak (“the applicant”), on 8 August 2007.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that his pre-trial detention had
exceeded a “reasonable time” within the meaning of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention
and that the length of the criminal proceedings against him
had been excessive.
On
9 February 2009 the
President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give notice
of the application to the Government. It was also decided to examine
the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Gdynia.
A. Criminal proceedings
against the applicant and his pre-trial detention
On
17 March 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug
trafficking.
On
the same date the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy)
remanded him in custody, relying on a reasonable suspicion that he
had committed the offence in question. The court indicated that the
evidence which had been gathered in the case, in particular the
testimonies of other suspects, showed that there was a sufficient
probability that the applicant had committed the offences with which
he had been charged. It attached importance to the likelihood of a
severe prison sentence being imposed on the applicant and the
risk that he would attempt to induce witnesses to give false
testimony or, by other means, would obstruct the proceedings. The
latter risk was considered of the utmost importance in the light of
the fact that the case involved a large number of alleged
accomplices.
An
appeal by the applicant against the detention order, likewise his
further appeals against decisions extending his detention and all of
his subsequent, numerous applications for release and appeals against
refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. In his applications and
appeals, he argued that his lengthy detention had violated the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the
imposition of this measure.
In
the course of the investigation, the applicant's detention was
extended on several occasions, namely, on 8 June 2006
(to 2 September 2006), 24 August 2006 (to 2
December 2006) and 16 November 2006 (to 15 December
2006). In their decisions, which also concerned several other
suspects, the courts stressed the fact that some of the accused
– not the applicant however – had been acting
in an organised criminal group. Furthermore, they referred
to the fact that, owing to the complexity of the case, the
investigation had still not been completed. Lastly, the courts
underlined the unique nature of the proceedings involving
drug-trafficking, which often took more time because offences and
suspects emerged gradually.
On
5 December 2006 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gdańsk
Regional Court (Sąd
Okręgowy). The applicant
was charged with drug trafficking. The bill of indictment comprised
numerous charges of drug trafficking brought against twenty-one
defendants. Although several defendants were charged with acting as
part of an organised criminal group, the
applicant himself was not charged with being a member of such a
group.
On
29 March 2007 the trial court held the first hearing. Between
29 March 2007 and 26 June 2008 the trial court scheduled
nineteen hearings, seven of which were adjourned or cancelled for
various reasons, such as: the failure of the police to take some of
the accused from the detention centres to the court, the summer
break, the resignation of one of the defence lawyers and the
illness of one of the co-accused.
During
the court proceedings, Gdańsk Regional Court further extended
the applicant's pre-trial detention on several occasions, namely,
on 12 December 2006 (to 31 May 2007), an unspecified
subsequent date, 25 October 2007 (to 31 January 2008) and
29 January 2008 (to 15 March 2008). The applicant
appealed against the last two decisions.
On
29 November 2007 and on 12 February 2008 the Gdańsk Court of
Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny), in its decisions dismissing the
applicant's appeals, underlined the complexity of the case, the
severity of the penalty to which the applicant was liable and
the particular nature of the proceedings involving
drug-trafficking. Having regard to the organised character of the
alleged criminal activities, it also held that the applicant's
detention was necessary in order to prevent him and the other
co-accused from interfering with the proceedings. Finally, referring
to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, it observed that the
applicant's detention, although long, was justified on grounds of
public interest.
Because
the length of the applicant's detention had reached the statutory
two-year time limit, as laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania
karnego), the Gdańsk Regional Court applied to the Gdańsk
Court of Appeal, asking for the applicant's detention to be extended
beyond that term. The Gdańsk Court of Appeal extended his
detention on 20 February 2008 (to 31 March 2008) and 19 March
2008 (to 30 June 2008). The court referred in particular to the need
to obtain evidence from several further witnesses.
The
applicant appealed against the decision of 20 February 2008 but the
appeal was dismissed by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal
on 11 March 2008.
On
26 June 2008 the Gdańsk Regional Court ordered the applicant
to be released under police supervision. The
court also barred the applicant from leaving the country. It
took into account the fact that the trial court had almost finished
the taking of evidence and that the risk of collusion had become less
significant.
The
applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against the above mentioned
decision, arguing that, before being arrested, he had lived and
worked in Denmark and that, by prohibiting him from leaving Poland,
he was being prevented from joining his family and taking up his
former job.
On
16 July 2008 the Gdańsk Court of
Appeal upheld
the lower court decision to place the applicant under police
supervision and prohibit him from leaving the country.
The
criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending.
B. Proceedings
under the 2004 Act
On
17 February 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Gdańsk
Court of Appeal under section 5 of the Law of 17 June 2004
on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a
reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do
rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez
nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”).
The
applicant sought a ruling that the length of the proceedings before
the Gdańsk Regional Court had been excessive and an award of
just satisfaction of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN).
On
11 June 2008 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal dismissed his complaint
as unfounded. It found that, out of about eighteen hearings
scheduled in the case, only a few had been adjourned. The court
further stated that, in December 2007, no hearing could be
scheduled because the applicant had dismissed his legal-aid counsel
and had been given time to appoint one of his choice. The Court
of Appeal concluded that the proceedings had been conducted with the
requisite speed and without undue delay.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Preventive
measures, including detention during the judicial proceedings
The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition
of pre trial detention on
remand (tymczasowe
aresztowanie), the grounds for its
extension, release from detention and rules governing other,
so-called “preventive measures”
(środki zapobiegawcze)
are set out in the Court's judgments in the cases of Gołek
v. Poland (no. 31330/02, §§
27-33, 25 April 2006) and Celejewski
v. Poland
(no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 May 2006).
B. Remedies against unreasonable length of proceedings
The relevant domestic law and
practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial and
enforcement proceedings, in particular the applicable provisions of
the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court's decisions in the cases
of Charzyński v. Poland,
no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§
12-23, ECHR 2005-V, and Ratajczyk
v. Poland,
no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005 VIII,
and in its the judgment
in the case of Krasuski v. Poland,
no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
On
1 May 2009 the Law of 20 February 2009 on amendments to the Law on
complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable
time (Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony
do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez
nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2009 Amendment”)
entered into force.
Pursuant to section 1 of the 2009 Amendment, the
amended name of the 2004 Act reads as follows:
“[the Law] on complaints about a breach of the
right to an investigation conducted and supervised by a Prosecutor
and to a trial within a reasonable time.”
Following
the 2009 Amendment, section 1 of the 2004 Act, in so far as relevant,
reads as follows:
“1. The Act stipulates the principles of and
the procedure for the lodging
of a complaint by a party whose
right to a trial within a reasonable time has been breached as a
result of an action or the inaction of a court or of the prosecutor
conducting or supervising the investigation.”
Pursuant
to section 4 of the amended 2004 Act, in so far as relevant:
“5. If a complaint concerns the unreasonable
length of an investigation, it will be examined by the court
immediately above the court competent to deal with the case.”
Section
6 of the amended 2004 Act provides, in so far as relevant:
“3. The complaint may contain a request for the
court conducting the proceedings or the prosecutor conducting or
supervising the investigation, to take actions in a specific
time-limit or to pay suitable just satisfaction as specified in
section 12 subsection 4.”
Section
10 of the amended 2004 Act reads, in so far as relevant:
“2a. If the complaint concerns unreasonable length
of the investigation, the competent court informs the State Treasury
– the prosecutor immediately above the prosecutor conducting or
supervising the investigation – and serves him with a copy of
the complaint.”
Section
12 of the amended 2004 Act provides, in so far as relevant:
“4. If the complaint is justified, the court
may, at the request of the complainant, award ... just satisfaction
of between 2,000 and 20,000 Polish zlotys to be paid by the State
Treasury or by a bailiff, if the proceedings have been conducted by a
bailiff.”
Pursuant
to section 14 of the amended 2004 Act:
“A party may lodge a new complaint in respect of
the same set of proceedings twelve months after the court has decided
on the previous complaint or six months after where the complainant
has been remanded in custody during the investigation, or where
these are enforcement proceedings or any other proceedings concerning
execution of a court's ruling.”
Section
2 of the 2009 Amendment lays down the following transitional rules in
relation to applications which are already pending before the Court:
“1. Within six months of the date of
entry into force of this law, persons who, before that date, had
lodged a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights ...
complaining of a breach of the right to an investigation within a
reasonable time as guaranteed by Article 6 (1) of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ..., may, if their complaint to the Court was lodged in the
course of the impugned investigation and if the Court has not adopted
a decision concerning the admissibility of their case, lodge a
complaint, on the basis of the provisions of this law, that the
length of the proceedings was unreasonable. .
2. A complaint lodged under subsection 1
shall indicate the date on which the application was lodged with the
Court.
3. The relevant court shall immediately inform the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of any complaints lodged under
subsection 1.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his pre-trial detention had
been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that the Government raised a preliminary objection that
the applicant had failed to exhaust the remedies provided for by
Polish law as regards his complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, in that he did not appeal against some of the decisions
extending his detention.
In
the present case, the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision
of 17 March 2006, which had ordered his pre-trial detention, and
against numerous other decisions which had extended his detention. He
also lodged requests for the detention order to be lifted or for a
more lenient preventive measure to be imposed (see paragraph 8
above). The Court considers that the purpose of the remedy used by
the applicant was to obtain a review of his detention pending trial.
In the circumstances of the case this remedy constituted an adequate
and effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 of the
Convention as its aim was to obtain his release. It follows
from the Court's case-law that the applicant is not required
to appeal against each and every decision extending his
detention (see, by contrast, Bronk
v. Poland (dec.), no. 30848/03,
11 September 2007).
The
Court further notes that the arguments raised by the Government are
similar to those already examined and rejected in previous cases
against Poland (see Tomecki v. Poland, no. 47944/06, §§
19-21, 20 May 2008, and Buta v. Poland, no. 18368/02, §§
25-27, 28 November 2006) and that the Government have not submitted
any new circumstances which would lead the Court to depart from its
previous findings.
It
follows that this complaint cannot be rejected for non exhaustion
of domestic remedies. The Court further notes that this complaint is
not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on
any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
applicant's detention started on 17 March 2006, when he was arrested
on suspicion of drug trafficking. On 26 June 2008 the applicant was
released from custody and placed under police supervision.
Accordingly,
the period to be taken into consideration amounts to two years, three
months and nine days.
2. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant submitted in general terms that he had been kept
in pre-trial detention for an unjustified length of time. He
argued that the length of his pre-trial detention meant that it could
no longer be considered
a temporary measure but that it had amounted to the serving of a
prison sentence.
(b) The Government
The Government submitted that the applicant's
detention had satisfied all the criteria laid down in the Court's
case-law.
Firstly, they pointed out that the evidence which had
been obtained in the proceedings had indicated that there was a
strong likelihood that the applicant had committed the crimes in
question. Secondly, the charges brought against him concerned
numerous offences which had been committed in connection with an
organised criminal group, for which the applicant faced a heavy
sentence. Thus, bearing in mind the seriousness of the charges
and the sentence he faced, the applicant's detention had been
justified.
The
Government further argued that the aforementioned circumstances had
remained valid for the whole term of the applicant's detention.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
The
Court reiterates that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention were stated in a
number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110
et seq, ECHR 2000 XI, and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further
references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on
four grounds, namely, (1) the serious nature of the offences with
which he had been charged, (2) the severity of the penalty to which
he was liable, (3) the need to obtain extensive evidence and (4) the
need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings.
The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had
committed the serious offences he was charged with could initially
warrant his detention. In addition, it considers that the need to
obtain voluminous evidence from many sources, coupled with the fact
that in the course of the investigation new suspects had been
identified, constituted relevant and sufficient grounds for the
applicant's detention at the early stages of the trial.
However,
with the passage of time those grounds inevitably became less and
less relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other
grounds adduced by the judicial authorities were “relevant”
and “sufficient” (see, Kudła cited above, §
111).
The
Court notes that the judicial authorities relied heavily on the
likelihood that a severe sentence would be imposed on the applicant
given the serious nature of the offences at issue. According to them,
that likelihood created a presumption that the applicant would
obstruct the proceedings. In this respect, the Court recalls that the
severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the
assessment of the risk of absconding or re-offending. However,
the Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot
by itself serve to justify long periods of pre-trial detention
(see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§
80-81, 26 July 2001).
As regards the risk that the
applicant would obstruct the proceedings, the Court is not persuaded
that it constituted a valid ground for the entire length of his
pre-trial detention. Firstly, it notes that the Gdańsk District
Court, when originally remanding the applicant in custody, made only
a general reference to the risk that the applicant would tamper
with evidence. Secondly, the Court notes
that the relevant decisions did not contain any argument
capable of showing that these fears were well founded. Such
a generally formulated risk, flowing from the nature of the
offences with which the applicant had been charged, might possibly
be accepted as the basis for his detention at the initial stages
of the proceedings. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other factor
capable of showing that the risk of his influencing witnesses
actually existed, the Court cannot accept that ground as a
justification for holding the applicant in custody for the entire
period in question.
The
Court agrees with the Government that the criminal case against the
applicant can be considered complex, regard being had to the nature
of the charges and the scope of the evidence to be taken. The
Court's attention has been drawn in particular to the significant
number of those charged (see paragraph 10 above). However, it appears
that the authorities referred to the complexity of the case in a
general manner and failed to indicate how the nature of the case
had required the applicant's continued detention. The Court
notes that the authorities were faced with the difficult task
of determining the facts and the degree of alleged
responsibility of each of the defendants who had been charged with
acting as part of an organised criminal group. However,
the applicant himself was not charged with being a member of such a
group (see paragraph 10 above). Consequently, this
circumstance was not relevant for the assessment of his situation.
In
these circumstances, the Court concludes that the grounds given by
the domestic authorities were not “relevant” or
“sufficient” to justify keeping the applicant in
detention for two years, three months and nine days. It is not
therefore necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted
with special diligence.
In
view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been
a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings had
been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads
as follows:
“In the determination of ...any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 17 March 2006 when the
applicant was arrested and has not yet ended. It has thus lasted
three years and eleven months for one level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted the
remedies available to him under Polish law. In this connection they
maintained that, since 1 May 2009, the date on which the amendment to
the 2004 Act entered into force, it had been possible for the
applicant to seek compensation for the damage resulting from the
excessive length of the investigation. The Government further
submitted that the applicant had not lodged a claim with the civil
courts under section 16 of the 2004 Act in conjunction with
Article 417 of the Civil Code seeking compensation for damage
suffered as a result of the excessive length of the proceedings.
The
applicant contested the Government's arguments. First, he submitted
that he had already lodged an unsuccessful complaint under the 2004
Act. He further argued that he had not been able to lodge an action
under section 16 of the 2004 Act in conjunction with Article 417
of the Civil Code because it was clear from its wording that only a
party which had not lodged a complaint under section 5 of the 2004
Act may claim damages under the above-mentioned provisions of the
Civil Code. Finally, he noted that, under Article 417 of the Civil
Code, a party may only claim pecuniary damage.
The
Court notes that the applicant lodged a complaint concerning the
length of the proceedings with the Gdańsk Court of Appeal under
section 5 of the 2004 Act and it was dismissed (see
paragraph 20 above).
The
Court has already examined the remedies provided under section 5 of
the 2004 Act for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention and found them effective in respect of complaints
concerning the excessive length of judicial proceedings in Poland
(see Charzyński v. Poland (dec.),
no. 15212/03, §§ 36-43, and Michalak v. Poland
(dec.), no. 24549/03, §§ 37-44).
Furthermore,
the Court has also held that, having exhausted the available remedy
provided by the 2004 Act, an applicant was not required to embark
on another attempt to obtain redress by bringing a civil action for
compensation (see Cichla v. Poland,
no. 18036/03, § 26, 10 October 2006, and
Jagiełło v. Poland, no. 59738/00, § 24,
23 January 2007).
Finally,
the Court observes that the applicant could not have lodged a
complaint under section 2 of the 2009 Amendment because he had lodged
his complaint with the Court after the investigation in the criminal
proceedings against him had already ended. Therefore, the remedy
provided by the transitional rules was not relevant in the particular
circumstances of the present case.
Accordingly,
the Court concludes that, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1
of the Convention, the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies. It
follows that the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court firstly observes that the case could be considered complex,
regard being had to the fact that it involved a number of defendants
and voluminous evidence. However, it considers that this in itself
cannot justify the overall length of the proceedings.
As
regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court observes that
although the applicant had dismissed his legal-aid counsel in
December 2007 which prevented the trial court from scheduling a
hearing during that month (see paragraph 20 above), it cannot be
established that the applicant substantially contributed to the
delays in the proceedings.
With
respect to the conduct of the authorities, the Court considers that
the investigation was completed by the
prosecution authorities within a relatively short period of
time. The Court further notes that more than one third of the
hearings scheduled by the trial court during the first two years
of the judicial proceedings was adjourned or cancelled (see
paragraph 11 above).
The
Court would point out that the duty to administer justice
expeditiously was incumbent in the first place on the domestic
authorities. Notwithstanding the significant difficulties which they
faced in the present case due to its complexity, the domestic
authorities were required to organise the trial efficiently and
ensure that the Convention guarantees were fully respected in the
proceedings. Moreover, the Court notes that the proceedings, which
have already lasted almost four years, are still pending before the
first-instance court.
Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the overall
length of the proceedings, the Court considers that the reasonable
time requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has not been
respected. Consequently, there has been a violation of this
provision.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant further complained
in substance under Article 6 that the criminal proceedings against
him had been unfair. In that respect he submitted that the
proceedings had been based only on the testimonies of one of the
co-accused. Invoking Article 8 of the Convention, he also complained
that his correspondence had been censored by the prison authorities.
Finally, the applicant alleged that his right to respect for
family life had been violated because, throughout his detention, he
had spoken on the telephone with his wife and children only
three times.
As
regards the complaint concerning the alleged unfairness of the
criminal proceedings, the Court notes that the relevant proceedings
against the applicant are still pending before the first-instance
court. Accordingly, this complaint must be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention as being premature.
As
regards the remainder of the applicant's complaints, the Court has
examined them as submitted by the applicant. However, having regard
to all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters
complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that the
applicant has failed to substantiate his complaints.
In particular, in respect of the applicant's complaint concerning the
alleged censorship of his correspondence, the Court observes that the
applicant has failed to substantiate his allegations, as he did
not submit copies of the allegedly censored letters. Furthermore, the
letters in his file do not show any signs of censorship or any other
form of interference.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
46 of the Convention provides:
“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they
are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise
its execution.”
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicant
The
applicant did not submit any observations concerning this provision.
2. The Government
The Government referred to the
arguments submitted previously in the case of Figas
v. Poland (no. 7883/07,
§§ 41-44, 23 June 2009).
The
Government concluded that, bearing in mind the efforts of the Polish
authorities and the legislative reforms which were and had been
undertaken by them to solve the problem of the length of detention
during judicial proceedings, Poland could not be said to have failed
to comply with its obligations under Article 46 of the Convention to
obey the Court's judgments.
B. The Court's assessment
Recently,
in the case of Kauczor v. Poland (see Kauczor, cited
above, § 58 et seq., with further references) the Court held
that the 2007 Resolution of the Committee of Ministers taken together
with the number of judgments already delivered and of pending
cases raising an issue of excessive detention incompatible with
Article 5 § 3 had demonstrated that the violation of the
applicant's right under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention had
originated in a widespread problem arising out of the malfunctioning
of the Polish criminal justice system which had affected, and may
still affect in the future, an as yet unidentified but potentially
considerable number of persons charged in criminal proceedings.
In
the present case, as in other numerous similar detention cases, the
authorities did not justify the applicant's
continued detention with relevant and sufficient reasons (see
paragraphs 50-51 above). Consequently, the Court sees no reason to
diverge from its findings made in Kauczor
as to the existence of a structural problem and the need for the
Polish State to adopt measures to remedy the situation (see Kauczor,
cited above, §§ 60-62 ).
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
The
Government submitted that the applicant's claim for just satisfaction
was groundless in the light of the circumstances of the case.
The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non pecuniary
damage on account of the protracted length of the proceedings. The
Court further finds that the applicant has suffered non pecuniary
damage by reason of the length of his detention, which is not
sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation of the
Convention. Considering the circumstances of the case and making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant EUR 3,100 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses involved in
the proceedings.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints under Article 5 § 3
of the Convention concerning the unreasonable length of the
applicant's pre-trial detention and under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention concerning the unreasonable length of proceedings
admissible and the reminder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation
of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of
the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,100
(three thousand one hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to be converted into the
currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date
of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 April 2010, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
