British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
KOSTYCHEV v. UKRAINE - 27820/04 [2010] ECHR 505 (8 April 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/505.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 505
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF KOSTYCHEV v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 27820/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 April
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kostychev v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Renate
Jaeger,
Karel Jungwiert,
Mark
Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana
Lazarova Trajkovska, judges,
Mykhaylo Buromenskiy, ad
hoc judge,
and Claudia
Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 March 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 27820/04) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Ukrainian national, Mr Yuriy Grigoryevich Kostychev (“the
applicant”), on 19 July 2004.
The
applicant was represented by Mr A.A. Kristenko, a lawyer practising
in Kharkiv. The Ukrainian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
On
20 June 2008 the
President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1940 and lives in the city of Kharkiv.
On
2 October 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Kyivsky
District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”) against
his former employer seeking various payments owed to him upon his
retirement, including compensation for belated salary payments.
On
10 October 2000 the case was transferred to another court for
consideration but on 14 August 2001 it was sent back to the District
Court.
On
16 October 2002 the District Court found in part for the applicant.
Both parties appealed against that judgment.
In
the period from February 2003 to March 2004 the Kharkiv Regional
Court of Appeal, having taken over the case, remitted it back to the
District Court on several occasions in view of the procedural flaws.
On
30 March 2004, the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal amended the
judgment of 16 October 2002, increasing the amount awarded to the
applicant. On the same date the court adopted a separate ruling,
drawing the attention of the President of the District Court to the
numerous shortcomings in the way the judge of the first instance
court had examined the case. According to the Court of Appeal, these
shortcomings had caused delays in the proceedings.
In
April 2004 the applicant and the defendant lodged their cassation
appeals before the Supreme Court. On 24 May 2006 it upheld the
decisions taken by the lower courts.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 2 October 2000 and
ended on 24 May 2006. It thus lasted five years and almost eight
months for three levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court notes that the
complexity of the case and the applicant's conduct cannot explain the
overall length of the proceedings at issue in the present case. It
finds that a number of delays (in particular, the remittals of the
case) are attributable to the respondent State.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Relying
on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained of
the courts' assessment of evidence and interpretation of the law and
challenged the outcome of the proceedings.
Having
carefully considered the applicant's submissions in the light of all
the material in its possession, the Court finds that, in so far as
the matters complained of are within its competence, they do not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to
Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The Government contested the claim.
The
Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage which the
applicant may have suffered.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 in respect of expenses for legal
assistance and EUR 1,000 for the costs and other expenses.
The Government contested the claims.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
rejects the applicant's claim for costs and expenses.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that the finding of
a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any
non-pecuniary damage which the applicant may have suffered;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 April 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
