British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
KHURAVA v. UKRAINE - 8503/05 [2010] ECHR 498 (8 April 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/498.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 498
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF KHURAVA v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 8503/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8
April 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Khurava v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Renate
Jaeger,
Rait Maruste,
Mark Villiger,
Mirjana
Lazarova Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
judges,
Mykhaylo Buromenskiy, ad hoc judge,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 March 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 8503/05) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Ukrainian national, Ms Galina Andreyevna Khurava (“the
applicant”), on 16 February 2005.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
On
4 November 2008 the
Court declared the application partly inadmissible and decided to
communicate the complaints concerning the length of the proceedings,
the interference with the applicant's property right as a result of
the lengthy consideration of her claims and the lack of an effective
remedy to the Government. It also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the city of Odessa, Ukraine.
On
22 May 1992 the applicant was dismissed.
On
20 August 1992 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Suvorovsky
District Court of Odessa (“the District Court”) against
her former employer, seeking recovery of salary arrears and other
payments owed to her, and compensation for failure to observe the
correct procedure for her dismissal.
On
28 October 1992 the proceedings in the case were suspended pending
the outcome of another set of proceedings concerning the applicant's
reinstatement.
The
next hearing was scheduled for 10 June 2002.
On
27 June 2002 the District Court found against the applicant.
On
30 July 2002 the same court declared her appeal inadmissible owing to
its procedural shortcomings.
On
7 November 2002 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court
of Appeal”) quashed that ruling and declared the appeal
admissible.
On
2 June 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 27 June
2002 and referred the case back for fresh consideration. On the same
date the court adopted a separate ruling, drawing the attention of
the President of the District Court to the length of the proceedings
in question.
On
6 July 2004 the District Court again found against the applicant.
On
7 December 2004 the Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and
rendered a new one, finding in part for the applicant. It awarded the
applicant 29,483,71 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH, about 4,082 euros) in
salary arrears and other payments and UAH 2,000 (about 277 euros) in
compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On the same date the court
adopted another separate ruling, drawing the attention of the
President of the District Court to the length of the proceedings in
question.
The
applicant appealed in cassation against the judgment of 7 December
2004. On 13 July 2007 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, sitting
as a cassation court, upheld that judgment.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She further complained
under Article 13 of the lack of an effective remedy for the
length-of-proceedings complaint. The provisions at issue read as
follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. ...”
Article 13
“Everyone
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.”
The
Government contested the applicant's complaints.
The
period to be taken into consideration began only on 11 September
1997 when the recognition by Ukraine of the right of individual
petition took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the
time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state
of proceedings at the time. The period in question ended on 13 July
2007. It thus lasted more than nine years and ten months for three
levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that these complaints are not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on
any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR
2000- VII). The Court reiterates that special diligence is necessary
in employment disputes (See Ruotolo v. Italy, judgment of 27 February
1992, Series A no. 230-D, p. 39, § 17)
The
Court has frequently found violations of Articles 6 § 1 and 13
of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the
present case (see Frydlender, cited above, § 46 and
Vashchenko v. Ukraine,
no. 26864/03, §§ 55 and 59, 26 June 2008).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Articles 6 § 1 and
13 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO
THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings
complained of had infringed her right to the peaceful enjoyment of
her possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The
Government contested that argument.
The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
Having regard to its finding under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph
22 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine
whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (see Zanghì v. Italy, judgment of 19 February
1991, Series A no. 194-C, p. 47, § 23).
III APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 68,642 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary
damage and EUR 8,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested these claims.
The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation
found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this
claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant, on an equitable
basis, EUR 3,100 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed UAH 301,25 (about EUR 30) for her postal
expenses.
The Government left the matter to the Court's discretion.
According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 30 under this head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should
be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention;
Holds
that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of
the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,100
(three thousand one hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage
and EUR 30 (thirty euros) for costs and expenses, plus any tax that
may be chargeable to the applicant, to be converted into the national
currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date
of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 April 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
