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VOYT v. UKRAINE - 22149/05 [2010] ECHR 496 (8 April 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/496.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 496
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF VOYT v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 22149/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 April
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Voyt v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Renate
Jaeger,
Karel Jungwiert,
Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
Mykhaylo
Buromenskiy, ad hoc judge,
and Claudia
Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 March 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 22149/05) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Ukrainian national, Mr Anatoliy Petrovich Voyt (“the
applicant”), on 17 March 2005.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
On
8 September 2008 the
President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1951 and lives in the town of Kryvyy Rig,
Ukraine.
On
12 August 2002 the applicant instituted proceedings in the
Saksaganskyy District Court of Kryvyy Rig (“the District
Court”) against a private company, his former employer, seeking
the rectification of his work records, recovery of various payments,
and claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
On
17 May 2004 the District Court ordered an expert examination and
suspended proceedings. The next hearing was held on 6 April 2005.
On
7 June 2005 the District Court ruled in part for the applicant,
ordering the company to pay him 17,237.47 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)
and to rectify the applicant's work records.
According
to the records provided by the Government, out of seventeen
hearings scheduled between 12 August 2002 and 7 June 2005, six were
adjourned because of the absence, or at the request, of the defendant
or his representative, and one was adjourned because of the absence
of both parties.
On
27 December 2005 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed
the judgment in part and reduced the award to UAH 1,925.
On 10 February 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation
with the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile,
the judgment given in the applicant's favour was enforced on
18 January 2007.
11 On
2 April 2008 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, sitting as a court of cassation, upheld the judgments of the
lower courts.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government contested the applicant's complaint, stating that there
had been no significant periods of inactivity attributable to the
State. They maintained that the case had been complex and that the
judicial authorities had acted with due diligence. According to the
Government, the parties to the domestic proceedings had been
responsible for several delays.
The
applicant disagreed.
The
Court notes that the applicant instituted the proceedings at issue on
12 August 2002. The period in question ended on 2
April 2008. It thus lasted almost five years
and eight months for three levels of jurisdiction.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities, and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000).
The
Court notes that what was at stake for the applicant required
diligence on the part of the State authorities since the proceedings
concerned an employment dispute (see Ruotolo
v. Italy, 27 February 1992, § 17,
Series A no. 230 D).
Although
the domestic courts were required to examine a certain amount of
documentary evidence, the issues before them were not of such a
nature as to necessitate prolonged consideration of the applicant's
case. Therefore, the Court concludes that the subject matter of the
litigation at issue cannot be considered particularly complex.
The Court notes that the
complexity of the case and the applicant's conduct cannot explain the
overall length of the proceedings at issue in the present case. It
considers that a number of delays (in particular the prolonged
periods of procedural inactivity while the expert assessment was
pending, during the consideration of the
applicant's cassation appeal, and the failure of the first-instance
court to ensure the defendant's presence) are attributable to the
Government.
The
Court has frequently found violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained about the lengthy non-enforcement of the
judgment given in his favour and that the proceedings and their
outcome were unfair. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
Having
carefully examined the applicant's submissions in the light of all
the material in its possession, and insofar as the matters complained
of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article
35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 6,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The Government contested the claim.
The
Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage which the
applicant may have suffered.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant lodged no claim in respect of costs and expenses. The
Court, therefore, makes no award.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1
concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that the finding of
a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any
non-pecuniary damage which the applicant may have suffered;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 April 2010, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
