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SIROTNAK v. SLOVAKIA - 30633/06 [2010] ECHR 2084 (21 December 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/2084.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 2084
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF SIROTŇÁK v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 30633/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21
December 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sirotňák v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Ján
Šikuta,
Mihai Poalelungi,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
Vincent A. de Gaetano, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 November 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 30633/06) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Slovak national, Mr Emil Sirotňák (“the
applicant”), on 19 July 2006.
The
Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
On
11 May 2009 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 1).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Pečovská Nová
Ves.
1. Inheritance proceedings
On 16 February 1996 the Prešov
District Court delivered a judgment in an inheritance dispute. The
judgment became final on 14 March 1996.
On 28 August 1996 the Košice Regional Court
rejected the applicant's appeal as lodged by a person who lacked
standing in the proceedings.
2. Civil proceedings
On 5 May 2001 the applicant sought a determination of
the ownership rights in respect of a plot of land which had also been
the subject matter of the above inheritance proceedings.
On 26 November 2003 the Prešov District Court
dismissed his claim and the judgment was upheld by the Prešov
Regional Court on 7 December 2005.
On 13 April 2006 the district court transmitted the
case file to the Supreme Court for a decision on the applicant's
appeal on points of law. On 22 May 2006 the Supreme Court returned
the case file to the district court as having been transmitted
prematurely. The Supreme Court stated that the judgment of 7 December
2005 had not been served on one of the defendants and, therefore, had
not become final. It further stated that the district court should
decide whether to grant the applicant exemption from his obligation
to pay court fees and to instruct the applicant to eliminate
shortcomings in his appeal on points of law.
On 23 and 26 June and 6 October 2006 the applicant
amended his appeal on points of law. On 25 July the district court
exempted the applicant from his obligation to pay court fees. On 14
October 2006 the judgment was served on the defendant and became
final.
On 13 November 2006 the case file was again
transmitted to the Supreme Court. On 19 March 2007 the Supreme Court
rejected the applicant's appeal on points of law. The decision became
final on 4 May 2007.
3. Constitutional proceedings
On 2 March 2006 the applicant complained about a
violation of his right to judicial protection and to a “fair
trial” within a “reasonable time” as a result of
(i) the course of the above sets of proceedings and (ii) the
judgments of the district court of 16 February 1996 and of the
regional court of 7 December 2005.
On 22 November 2006 the Constitutional Court rejected
his complaint for various reasons. As to the inheritance proceedings,
the complaint was rejected as being belated.
As to the civil proceedings, the Constitutional Court
noted that at the time of lodging the constitutional complaint the
judgment of the regional court had not become final as it had not yet
been served on one of the parties to the proceedings. However, the
Constitutional Court held that the appellate court had already
delivered its judgment and thus the applicant's legal uncertainty had
been eliminated at the time of lodging his constitutional complaint.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court rejected the length of
proceedings complaint as being manifestly ill-founded.
It rejected the complaint about unfairness as being
manifestly ill founded, holding that there was no causal link
between the alleged violation and the course of the proceedings
before the regional court.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that
his right to a “fair hearing” had been violated in the
above proceedings and that their length had been incompatible with
the “reasonable time” requirement. He relied on Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In
the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by
[a] ... tribunal...”
Admissibility
1. Inheritance proceedings
The
Government stated that both the applicant's constitutional complaint
and his complaint to the Court had been lodged belatedly.
The
applicant reiterated his complaints.
The Court notes that the proceedings ended by a final decision on
14 March 1996. The present application was introduced on 19
July 2006, that is outside the six months' time-limit laid down in
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
The Constitutional Court
rejected the applicant's complaint as lodged out of time. The Court
notes that applicants are required to use the remedy available
to them under Article 127 of the Constitution
as from January 2002 (Andrášik and Others v.
Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00, 60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00,
60680/00, 68563/01 and 60226/00, ECHR 2002 IX). Therefore, the
constitutional remedy lodged by the applicant cannot affect the above
position.
It follows that this part of the application
must be rejected as having been introduced out of time in accordance
with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
2. Civil proceedings
(a) Alleged length of the proceedings
The
Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic
remedies as he had failed to seek redress before the Constitutional
Court in accordance with the statutory requirements and the
Constitutional Court's practice. The applicant lodged his
constitutional complaint on 2 March 2006. At that time the
proceedings were “pending” neither before the district
court nor before the regional court as the latter had delivered
a judgment on 7 December 2005. The judgment was served on the
applicant on 20 January 2006, and 13 February 2006 he lodged an
appeal on points of law. On 13 April 2006 the case file was
transmitted to the Supreme Court. The Government admitted that the
judgment had not yet become final at the time when the constitutional
complaint was lodged as it had not yet been served on one of the
defendants. However, the Supreme Court became aware of this fact only
after the case file had been transmitted to it. The judgment became
final on 14 October 2006 when it was served on the defendant
concerned. The Government argued that, at the time of lodging the
constitutional complaint, the applicant should have considered the
proceedings as having been finally concluded. In November 2006, the
Constitutional Court, when deciding on the applicant's constitutional
complaint, was aware that the Supreme Court had returned the case
file to the district court as having been submitted prematurely.
However, the Constitutional Court examined whether the admissibility
criteria were met at the date on which the complaint was lodged. The
Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's complaint as, at the
time of its lodging, the applicant's legal uncertainty had been
eliminated. The Government argued that in March 2006, at the time of
introduction of the constitutional complaint, the case file had
already been transmitted to the Supreme Court for a decision on the
applicant's appeal on points of law. The Constitutional Court
rejected the complaint about the length of the proceedings before the
district and regional courts, as it has been the Constitutional
Court's practice to examine length of proceedings complaints only
when the proceedings were still pending before the authority liable
for the alleged violation at the moment when the complaint was lodged
with the Constitutional Court.
The
applicant contested the above arguments. He stated that on 9 March
and in October 2006, upon the district court's request, he had
provided the address of the defendant concerned. The applicant argued
that the district court had been responsible for several procedural
steps and delays even after the adoption of the judgment of 7
December 2005, such as its service on the parties. The applicant
argued that he had exhausted domestic remedies by lodging his
constitutional complaint at a time when the proceedings had not yet
been concluded by a final judgment.
As regards applications against Slovakia concerning
length of proceedings the Court has held that a complaint under
Article 127 of the Constitution is, in principle, an effective
remedy which applicants are required to use for the purposes of
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Andrášik
and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00,
60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00, 68563/01, 60226/00,
22 October 2002). It has also held that applicants should
formulate their complaints in a manner permitting the Constitutional
Court to examine the overall duration of the proceedings (see Obluk
v. Slovakia, no. 69484/01, § 62,
20 June 2006).
Domestic law stipulates a two-month time-limit for
submitting complaints under Article 127 of the Constitution. However,
the practice of the Constitutional Court has been not to apply this
time-limit to length of proceedings complaints and to examine only
those complaints which were lodged before the proceedings complained
of had ended. This practice has been accepted by the Court (see
Mazurek v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 16970/05,
3 March 2009).
In
the case of Mazurek
(cited above), the applicant lodged his constitutional complaint
after the proceedings had been terminated by a final decision.
This is not the case in the present application. The applicant lodged
his complaint with the Constitutional Court after the regional court
had upheld the first-instance judgment, but before that judgment was
served on all the parties to the proceedings and had become final.
Even
though the Constitutional Court, when rejecting the applicant's
complaint, relied on the principle of legal certainty, the Court is
of the opinion that legal uncertainty in the context of judicial or
administrative proceedings can be eliminated only when such
proceedings have ended. It has been the Court's own practice to
examine the duration of proceedings as a whole, that is until they
have ended by a final decision.
As
to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the
proceedings had not yet been concluded by a final judgment when the
constitutional complaint was lodged on 2 March 2006. At the time of
lodging the constitutional complaint, the proceedings had not yet
been pending before the Supreme Court, to which the case file had
been transmitted only on 13 April 2006. The subsequent developments
in the proceedings showed that further delays imputable to the
district court occurred. Even though the district court was not
dealing with the merits of the case after the adoption of the
judgment of 7 December 2005, it still had to carry out
several procedural steps.
In
these circumstances, the manner in which the applicant's complaint
was dealt with by the Constitutional Court failed to respect the
applicant's right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a
hearing within a reasonable time, as interpreted and applied by
the Court.
The
Government's objection relating to the applicant's failure to exhaust
domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed.
The
proceedings complained of lasted six years at three levels of
jurisdiction.
It
follows that this part of the application is not manifestly
ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
(b) Alleged unfairness of the proceedings
The applicant complained that
the manner in which the domestic courts had dealt with the case had
been contrary to his right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
However, in the light of all the
materials in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained
of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights guaranteed under
the Convention or its Protocols.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
B. Merits
The
applicant argued that the proceedings concerning a plot of land had
lasted between 1996 and 2007. He stated that the proceedings had not
been complex, that he had not contributed by his conduct to their
prolongation and that the domestic courts had caused delays
incompatible with the reasonable time requirement guaranteed by
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The
Government argued that the length of the proceedings was not
excessive. They further stated that the proceedings had been complex
from the factual and procedural point of view. The applicant, to a
certain extent, had contributed to their length. Moreover, the few
delays caused by the district court could not lead to finding of a
violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable
time.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law, the Court considers that in the
instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed
to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly
the applicant complained that he had no effective remedy at his
disposal within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, which
reads:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government argued that the applicant had not had an arguable claim
and, therefore, Article 13 of the Convention was not applicable to
the present case. In any event, the applicant had an effective remedy
at his disposal, namely a complaint under Article 127 of the
Constitution. The complaint must be rejected as being manifestly-ill
founded.
The
applicant contested the above argument and argued that although he
had turned to the Constitutional Court, the latter had failed to
provide him with an appropriate redress.
In
the light of its above conclusions in respect of the applicant's
complaints concerning the inheritance proceedings and the complaint
about the alleged unfairness of the civil proceedings, the Court
finds that the applicant cannot be regarded as having an arguable
claim for the purpose of Article 13 of the Convention.
Accordingly,
the Court rejects this part of the application under Article 35
§§ 3 and 4 of the Convention as being manifestly
ill founded.
On
the other hand, the Court finds that the part of the application
concerning the absence of an effective remedy for the alleged breach
of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the
civil proceedings is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it
is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
Merits
The Court reiterates that the remedy under Article 127
of the Constitution is likely to provide appropriate and sufficient
redress to applicants where it allows for the examination of the
entire duration of the proceedings complained of (see Andrášik
and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00,
60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00, 68563/01, 60226/00,
22 October 2002).
Since
the applicant in the present case complained to the Constitutional
Court about the overall duration of the proceedings before the
district and the regional courts and since the Constitutional Court
refused to examine it because the proceedings had not been concluded
by a final judgment, the Court considers that the applicant's right
to an effective remedy has not been respected
(see, mutatis mutandis,
A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia,
no. 13960/06, §§ 59-60, 9 February 2010).
There
has therefore been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
Within
the time-limit set for that purpose, the applicant claimed 17,000
euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government considered the claim exaggerated.
The
Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
B. Costs and expenses
Within
the time-limit set for that purpose, the applicant claimed EUR 273
for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and
for those incurred before the Court. Although the applicant itemised
his claims, he submitted only invoices for an amount equivalent to
EUR 13.48.
The
Government contested the claims concerning the costs of the domestic
proceedings but had no objection to an award of demonstrably incurred
costs in respect of the proceedings before the Court.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 100 for the
applicant's out-of-pocket expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints under Articles 6 §
1 and 13 of the Convention concerning the excessive length of the
civil proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 100 (one hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable
to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 December 2010,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President