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PINTER v. SLOVAKIA - 18148/05 [2010] ECHR 2024 (14 December 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/2024.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 2024
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF PINTÉR v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 18148/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14
December 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Pintér v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
Vincent Anthony de Gaetano,
judges,
and Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 23 November 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 18148/05) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Slovak national, Mr Eduard Pintér (“the applicant”),
on 4 May 2005.
The
Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
On
1 September 2008 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1944 and lives in SmiZany.
1. The first set of inheritance proceedings
Following the death of the applicant's father on 24
June 1999, inheritance proceedings were instituted in respect of his
estate. The parties to the proceedings were the applicant, his
brother and his mother. In the course of the proceedings only the
applicant's brother was heard and, according to the applicant, his
brother incorrectly declared that the deceased had not left an
estate. The Nitra District Court discontinued the proceedings on 2
September 1999.
The decision was served on the applicant and his
brother on 7 and 8 September 1999, respectively. On 8 September
1999 the decision was served on Ms Veronika Pintérová.
The applicant alleges that the decision was erroneously served on his
brother's wife instead of his mother who had the same name and lived
at the same address. The applicant alleges that the decision had not
yet become final as the delivery slip was not signed by the
addressee. He presented evidence to that effect to the Constitutional
Court.
The decision of 2 September 1999 to discontinue the
proceedings stated that no appeal was available against it, with the
exception of the costs of the proceedings.
The Government stated that the decision of 2 September
1999 had become final on 23 September 1999.
The applicant's mother died on 18 August 2000.
2. The second set of inheritance proceedings
On 29 January 2001 the applicant lodged a request for
the above proceedings to be resumed as new assets had been found and
accused the public notary, who had been appointed to deal with the
case in the above proceedings, of having a conflict of interests. The
applicant alleged that the public notary had erred in the above
proceedings when he had stated, after having heard only his brother
(and not the applicant or his mother), that no estate existed and
that the proceedings had been erroneously discontinued as a result.
Furthermore, the applicant objected that his mother had no knowledge
of the fact that inheritance proceedings in respect of his father's
estate had ended.
On 13 November 2001 the district court decided not to
exclude the public notary in question from dealing with or deciding
on the case.
On 25 August 2003 the applicant, when visiting the
appointed public notary, became aware of the erroneous service on his
brother's wife of the above decision of 2 September 1999.
On 26 August 2003 the applicant complained of undue
delays in the proceedings and requested the Nitra District Court to
withdraw the appointment of the public notary. Following the public
notary's request to be excluded from dealing with the case because of
a conflict of interests, the district court replaced him on 27
October 2003. The newly appointed public notary proceeded with the
case.
At the hearing of 8 July 2004 the applicant argued
that the district court's decision of 2 September 1999 in the
original inheritance proceedings had not become final as it had never
been served on one of the parties, namely his mother.
On 20 September 2004 and 9 May 2005 hearings took
place.
On 6 June 2005 the district court delivered a decision
which became final on 8 September 2005.
3. Constitutional proceedings
On 15 October 2004 the applicant complained about the
length of the above proceedings to the Constitutional Court. He
requested the Constitutional Court to order the court concerned to
avoid further delays in the proceedings and to pay him 80,000
Slovakian korunas (the equivalent of 2,075 euros at that time) as
just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage.
On 27 January 2005 the Constitutional Court declared
the applicant's complaint inadmissible as being manifestly
ill-founded.
As to the first set of proceedings, the Constitutional
Court stated that the applicant had failed to prove erroneous service
of the decision of 2 September 1999. As the decision was served
on all parties to the proceedings and they had not filed an appeal,
the proceedings had come to an end on 23 September 1999 and,
therefore, the district court could not be liable for any further
delays.
As to the second set of proceedings, the
Constitutional Court stated that the district court was not liable
for undue delays, as following the applicant's complaint and request
for replacement of the public notary and following the request of the
public notary to be excluded, the district court had immediately
replaced him. As the newly appointed public notary had proceeded with
the case in an appropriate manner, the Constitutional Court
considered the remedy used by the applicant as having been effective
and did not find any appearance of any unreasonable delays.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Code of Civil Procedure
Article 38 § 1 provides
that the court shall appoint a public notary for dealing with
inheritance matters. The appointment and any change thereto become
effective upon their communication to the public notary.
Under Article 175zb, the court can withdraw the case
from the appointed notary in circumstances when he/she, despite a
warning, causes further undue delays in the inheritance proceedings.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that his right to a “fair hearing”
had been violated in the first set of proceedings and that the length
of both sets of proceedings had been incompatible with the
“reasonable time” requirement. He relied on Article 6 §
1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
Admissibility
1. The first set of inheritance proceedings
The
Government stated that on 29 January 2001 the applicant had for the
first time objected that the decision of 2 September 1999 had
not been served on his mother and, for that reason, had never become
final. That was 5 months after his mother's death. The Government
argued that the applicant had failed to provide any evidence to
support his objection and reiterated the Constitutional Court's
reasoning. They relied on the domestic courts' case-law stating that
in the absence of any proof to the contrary, the particulars on a
delivery slip were deemed to be correct. The Government further
argued that the Court accepted the established practice of the
Constitutional Court to examine constitutional complaints about
length of proceedings only when the proceedings are pending before
the authority liable for the alleged violation at the time when the
complaint is lodged. Moreover, the Government proposed to reject the
complaint about the length of these proceedings as being manifestly
ill-founded. As to the alleged unfairness, they argued that the
Constitutional Court's examination of an individual human rights
complaint is limited by statute to the summary of the complaint, as
formulated by the complainant. The applicant had failed to formulate
his complaint about unfairness of the proceedings in a way which
would have allowed its examination by the Constitutional Court.
Therefore, the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in
accordance with the applicable procedural requirements.
The
applicant reiterated his argument that the decision of 2 September
1999 had not yet been served on his mother and, therefore, that the
first set of inheritance proceedings had not yet ended. He had made
an objection to that effect at the hearing of 8 July 2004. However,
neither the Constitutional Court nor the Government took it into
consideration.
The
Court notes that the domestic courts, including the Constitutional
Court, and the Government considered the proceedings as having been
finally concluded on 23 September 1999. The Court has only a limited
power to examine alleged errors of facts or law imputed to the
national courts and finds no arbitrariness in the domestic courts'
reasoning. The decision to discontinue the proceedings was duly
served on the applicant on 7 September 1999. On 8 September
1999 the decision was served on Ms
Veronika Pintérová, according to the applicant the
applicant's brother's wife, who had the same name and lived at the
same address as the applicant's mother. The domestic court concluded
that the decision had become final on 23 September 1999.
Subsequently, the applicant's mother died on 18
August 2000. In 2001 the applicant initiated a fresh set of
inheritance proceedings in respect of the deceased's assets. In these
circumstances, the Court accepts the
Government's argument concerning the presumption of correctness of a
delivery slip and concerning the date when the first set of
inheritance proceedings ended, namely 23 September 1999.
The
present application was introduced on 4
May 2005, that is outside the six months' time-limit laid down in
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
The applicant exclusively
requested the Constitutional Court to find a breach of his right to a
hearing within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court rejected
it as according to its established practice it can examine such a
complaint only at the time when the proceedings are still pending
before the authority liable for the alleged violation. The Court
accepted this approach (see, e.g.,
Mazurek v. Slovakia
(dec.), 16970/05, on 3 March 2009). Moreover, it is only since
January 2002 that applicants were required to use the remedy
available to them under Article 127 of the Constitution
(Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.),
nos. 57984/00, 60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00, 68563/01 and
60226/00, ECHR 2002 IX). Therefore, the constitutional remedy
lodged by the applicant cannot affect the above position.
It follows that this part of the application
must be rejected as having been introduced out of time in accordance
with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
2.
The second set of inheritance proceedings
The Government pointed to the Constitutional Court's
decision stating that, following the applicant's request, a new
public notary had been appointed and no further delays had occurred.
They considered the remedy used by the applicant as having been
effective and stated that this part of the application must be
rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.
The
applicant reiterated his complaint.
The Court notes that, at the
time of the Constitutional Court's finding, the proceedings had been
pending for four years at one level of jurisdiction. The
Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's complaint as it
considered the remedy used by the applicant as having been effective
and did not find any undue delays in the proceedings.
Although it is true that the
district court, upon the applicant's request, replaced the public
notary on 27 October 2003, the Court, however,
observes that the applicant had challenged the public notary for a
conflict of interests already at the beginning of the second
set of inheritance proceedings, i.e. in
2001. In view of the above, the redress afforded to the
applicant was not adequate and sufficient. The Court therefore
dismisses the Government's argument and concludes that the applicant
did not lose his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34
of the Convention.
Since the applicant was unable
to obtain redress before the Constitutional Court, the Court
concludes that, as to the period of the proceedings following the
Constitutional Court's decision, he was not required, for the
purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, to have again
recourse to the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution (see the
recapitulation of the relevant principles in Becová
v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 23788/06,
18 September 2007).
The period under consideration
started on 29 January 2001 and ended on 8 September 2005 when
the district court's decision became final. The
proceedings lasted 4 years and more than 7 months.
It follows that this part of the
application is not manifestly ill founded within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 35,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
The
Government considered the claim exaggerated.
The
Court awards the applicant EUR 4,600 in respect of non pecuniary
damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant submitted no claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the second set of inheritance proceedings admissible and
the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,600 (four
thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 December 2010,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
