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Alexei CATAN and Others v Moldova and Russia - 43370/04 [2010] ECHR 1831 (15 June 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/2000.html
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FOURTH
SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF
Applications nos.
43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06
by Alexei CATAN and Others
against
Moldova and Russia
The European Court of
Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 15 June 2010 as a
Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Anatoly Kovler,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
regard to the above applications lodged on 25 October 2004,
Having
regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Governments
and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having
regard to the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 9 June
2009,
Having
deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The
applicants are Moldovan nationals (see Annex). They are represented
before the Court by Mr I. Manole, Mr A. Postică and
Mr V. Ţurcan, lawyers practising in Chişinău,
and Mr A. Unger, professor of law at London South Bank University.
The Moldovan Government are represented by their Agent, Mr V. Grosu
and the Russian Government are represented by their Agent, Mr G.
Matyushkin.
At
the oral hearing on 9 June 2009 the applicants were represented by Mr
Manole and Mr Postica, assisted by Ms D.I. Straisteanu. The Moldovan
Government were represented by Mr Grosu, assisted by Ms I. Rusu and
the Russian Government were represented by Mr Matyushkin, assisted by
Ms O. Sirotkina, Ms O. Yurchenko, Ms I. Koganova, Mr N. Fomin,
Ms T. Kleymenova and Mr Makhnev.
A. The historical background
The
country which subsequently became the Republic of Moldova was created
as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on 2 August 1940 from
a part of Bessarabia and a strip of land on the eastern bank of the
Dniester (see further Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08,
§§ 11-17, ECHR 2010-...). This eastern region, now known as
Transdniestria, had since 1924, together with a number of territories
which are now part of Ukraine, been part of the Moldavian Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic. The population of Transdniestria was
originally composed principally of Ukrainians and
Romanians/Moldovans, but from the 1920s onwards it was subject to
significant immigration by industrial workers from elsewhere in the
Soviet Union, particularly Russians and Ukrainians. It was assessed
in 1989 to be composed ethnically and linguistically of 40% Moldovan,
28% Ukrainian, 24% Russian and 8% others.
According
to the 1978 Constitution of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
there were two official languages: Russian and “Moldavian”
(Romanian/Moldovan written with the Cyrillic script).
In
August and September 1989 the Latin alphabet was reintroduced in
Moldova for written Romanian/Moldovan, which became the first
official language.
On
23 June 1990 Moldova proclaimed its sovereignty; on 23 May 1991 it
changed its name to the Republic of Moldova; and on 27 August 1991
the Moldovan parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence of
the Republic of Moldova, whose territory included Transdniestria.
B. Summary of the facts found in Ilaşcu and
Others v. Moldova and Russia
1. The Transdniestrian conflict
The
facts concerning the armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the period up to
late 2003 are set out in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and
Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-183, ECHR 2004 VII
and only a summary of the key events is provided here for ease of
reference.
From
1989 onwards, a movement of resistance to Moldovan independence had
been forming in Transdniestria. On 2 September 1990 Transdniestrian
separatists announced the creation of the “Moldavian Republic
of Transdniestria” (the “MRT”). On 25 August
1991 the “Supreme Council of the MRT” adopted the
“declaration of independence” of the “MRT”.
On 1 December 1991 a “presidential election”, declared
illegal by the Moldovan authorities, was organised in the
Transdniestrian provinces and Mr Igor Smirnov claimed to have been
elected “President of the MRT”. To date, the “MRT”
has not been recognised by the international community.
At
the time of Moldova's declaration of independence, it did not have
its own army. The USSR's 14th Army, whose headquarters had been in
Chişinău since 1956, remained on Moldovan territory,
although from 1990 onwards equipment and personnel began to be
withdrawn. In 1991 the 14th Army in Moldova was
composed of several thousand soldiers, infantry units, artillery
(notably an anti-aircraft missile system), armoured vehicles and
aircraft (including planes and strike helicopters). It had a number
of ammunition stores, including one of the largest in Europe at
Colbasna in Transdniestria.
By
Decree no. 234 of 14 November 1991 the President of Moldova declared
that ammunition, weapons, military transport, military bases and
other property belonging to the military units of the Soviet armed
forces stationed in Moldovan territory were the property of the
Republic of Moldova.
By
a decree dated 5 December 1991, Mr Smirnov decided to place the
military units of the 14th Army deployed in Transdniestria under the
command of “the National Defence and Security Department of the
Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria”. Mr Smirnov appointed the
Commander of the 14th Army, Lieutenant-General Iakovlev, as head of
the “TRM” “National Defence and Security
Department”. In December 1991 Lieutenant-General Iakovlev was
arrested by the Moldovan authorities, who accused him of helping the
Transdniestrian separatists to arm themselves by using the weapon
stocks of the 14th Army. However, he was subsequently released
following the intercession of the Government of the Russian
Federation.
At
the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 violent clashes broke out
between the Transdniestrian separatist forces and the Moldovan
security forces, claiming the lives of several hundred people.
On
6 December 1991, in an appeal to the international community and the
United Nations Security Council, the Moldovan Government protested
against the occupation, on 3 December 1991, of the Moldovan towns of
Grigoriopol, Dubăsari, Slobozia, Tiraspol and Ribniţa,
situated on the left bank of the Dniester, by the 14th Army under the
command of Lieutenant-General Iakovlev. They accused the authorities
of the USSR, particularly the Ministry of Defence, of having prompted
these acts. The soldiers of the 14th Army were accused of
distributing military equipment to the Transdniestrian separatists
and organising the separatists into military detachments which were
terrorising the civilian population.
In
1991-92 a number of 14th Army military units joined the
Transdniestrian separatists. In the Ilascu judgment
(paragraphs 57 and 380), the Court found it established beyond
reasonable doubt that Transdniestrian separatists were able, with the
assistance of 14th Army personnel, to arm themselves with weapons
taken from the stores of the 14th Army stationed in Transdniestria.
In addition, large numbers of Russian nationals from outside the
region, particularly Cossacks, went to Transdniestria to fight with
the separatists against the Moldovan forces. Given the support
provided to the separatists by the troops of the 14th Army and the
massive transfer to them of arms and ammunition from the 14th Army's
stores, the Moldovan army was in a position of inferiority that
prevented it from regaining control of Transdniestria. On 2 April
1992 General Netkachev, the new Commander of the 14th Army (which on
1 April 1992 had become the “Russian Operational Group in the
Transdniestrian region of Moldova” or “ROG”),
ordered the Moldovan forces which had encircled the town of Tighina
(Bender), held by the separatists, to withdraw immediately, failing
which the Russian army would take counter-measures.
2. The ceasefire agreement, the Joint Control
Commission and the peace-keeping force
On
21 July 1992 the President of the Republic of Moldova, Mr Snegur,
and the President of the Russian Federation, Mr Yeltsin, signed an
agreement on the principles for the friendly settlement of the armed
conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova
(“the ceasefire agreement”).
The
agreement introduced the principle of a security zone to be created
by the withdrawal of the armies of the “parties to the
conflict” (Article 1 § 2). Under Article 2 of the
agreement, a Joint Control Commission (“the JCC”) was set
up, composed of representatives of Moldova, the Russian Federation
and Transdniestria, with its headquarters in Tighina. The agreement
also provided for a peacekeeping force charged with ensuring
observance of the ceasefire and security arrangements, composed of
five Russian battalions, three Moldovan battalions and two
Transdniestrian battalions under the orders of a joint military
command structure which was itself subordinate to the JCC. Under
Article 3 of the agreement, the town of Tighina was declared a region
subject to a security regime and its administration was put in the
hands of “local organs of self-government, if necessary acting
together with the control commission”. The JCC was given the
task of maintaining order in Tighina, together with the police.
Article 4 required the 14th Army of the Russian Federation, stationed
in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to remain strictly
neutral. Article 5 prohibited sanctions or blockades and laid down
the objective of removing all obstacles to the free movement of
goods, services and persons. The measures provided for in the
agreement were defined as “a very important part of the
settlement of the conflict by political means” (Article 7).
On
a number of occasions from 1995 onwards the Moldovan authorities
complained that ROG/14th Army personnel and the Russian contingent of
the JCC's peace-keeping force had infringed the principle of
neutrality set out in the ceasefire agreement and that, inter
alia, Transdniestrians had been able to acquire further military
equipment and assistance from the ROG/14th Army. These allegations
were firmly denied by the Russian authorities. In addition, the
Moldovan delegation to the JCC alleged that the Transdniestrians had
created new military posts and customs checkpoints within the
security zone, in breach of the ceasefire agreement. In the Ilascu
judgment (paragraph 100) the Court found it established, by the
evidence contained in the JCC's official documents, that in various
areas of Transdniestria under the control of the Russian peacekeeping
forces, such as Tighina, the Transdniestrian separatist forces were
breaching the ceasefire agreement.
The
Convention was signed by Moldova on 13 July 1995 and was ratified on
12 September 1997. It was signed by Russia on 28 February 1996 and
was ratified on 5 May 1998.
In
March 2003 the Russian peacekeeping forces in Transdniestria
comprised 294 soldiers, 17 armoured vehicles, 29 other vehicles and
264 firearms. In the Ilascu judgment (paragraph 103), the
Court did not find that any soldier of the ROG/14th Army had been
employed in the Russian peacekeeping force.
3. International political developments regarding
Transdniestria
On
29 July 1994 Moldova adopted a new Constitution. It provided, inter
alia, that Moldova is neutral, that it prohibits the stationing
in its territory of troops belonging to other States and that a form
of autonomy may be granted to regions which include some areas on the
left bank of the Dniester. According to Article 13 of the
Constitution, the national language is Moldovan, to be written using
the Latin alphabet.
On
8 May 1997 in Moscow, Mr Lucinschi, the President of Moldova, and Mr
Smirnov, the “President of the MRT”, signed a memorandum
laying down the basis for the normalisation of relations between the
Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria (“the 1997 Memorandum”).
Under the terms of the 1997 Memorandum, decisions concerning
Transdniestria had to be agreed by both sides, powers had to be
shared and delegated and guarantees had to be secured reciprocally.
Transdniestria had to be allowed to participate in the conduct of the
foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova on questions concerning its
own interests to be defined by mutual agreement. Transdniestria would
have the right unilaterally to establish and maintain international
contacts in economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other
fields, to be determined by mutual agreement. The parties undertook
to settle conflicts through negotiation, with the assistance where
necessary of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as guarantors of
compliance with the agreements reached, and of the OSCE and the CIS.
The 1997 Memorandum was countersigned by the representatives of the
guarantor States, namely Mr Yeltsin for the Russian Federation
and Mr Kuchma for Ukraine, and by Mr H. Petersen, the OSCE President.
4. The presence in Transdniestria of ROG/14th Army
equipment and personnel following the ceasefire agreement
After
the end of the armed conflict, senior officers of the ROG/14th Army
participated in public life in Transdniestria. In particular,
soldiers of the ROG/14th Army took part in the elections in
Transdniestria, military parades of the Transdniestrian forces and
other public events. On 11 September 1993 General Lebed, who was
then Commander of the ROG/14th Army, was elected a member of the
“Supreme Soviet of the MRT”.
Article
4 of the ceasefire agreement required Moldova and the Russian
Federation to negotiate the withdrawal of the ROG/14th Army from
Moldovan territory. On 21 October 1994 an agreement was reached
between the Moldovan and Russian Governments whereby Russia would
withdraw its military formations within three years of the entry into
force of the agreement. The parties further agreed, within the same
time-frame, to bring about the political settlement of the
Transdniestrian conflict through the establishment of a special
status for the “Transdniestrian region of the Republic of
Moldova”. Under Article 5 of the agreement, the sale of any
type of military technology, weapons or ammunition belonging to the
military forces of the Russian Federation stationed in the territory
of the Republic of Moldova could take place only by way of a special
agreement between the Governments of the two countries.
On
9 November 1994 the Moldovan Government adopted the decision to
implement the agreement of 21 October 1994. The Russian Government
submitted a similar decision for ratification to the Duma. On 17
November 1998, as the agreement had still not been ratified by the
Duma, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
asked the Duma to remove the matter from its order of business, on
the ground that “any decision by the Ministry to reconsider
this issue will depend on the evolution of relations with the
Republic of Moldova and the Transdniestrian region and on a political
settlement in the area”. In January 1999 the agreement was
removed from the Duma's order of business and the agreement has not
come into force.
On
20 March 1998 an agreement concerning the military assets of the
ROG/14th Army was signed in Odessa by Mr Chernomyrdin, on behalf of
the Russian Federation, and Mr Smirnov, “President of the MRT”.
According to the timetable annexed to the agreement, the withdrawal
and decommissioning of certain stocks, to be disposed of by explosion
or other mechanical process, was to be completed by 31 December 2001.
The withdrawal (transfer and decommissioning) of surplus ammunition
and other ROG/14th Army equipment and personnel not forming part of
the peacekeeping forces was planned to take place by 31 December 2002
at the latest.
A
number of trainloads of ROG/14th Army equipment left Transdniestria
between 1999 and 2002.
On
19 November 2001 the Russian Government submitted to the Court a
document showing that in October 2001 the Russian Federation and the
“MRT” had signed a further agreement on the withdrawal of
the Russian forces. Under that agreement, in compensation for the
withdrawal of part of the Russian military equipment stationed in
Transdniestria, the “MRT” was granted a reduction of one
hundred million United States dollars in its debt for gas imported
from the Russian Federation, and the transfer to it by the ROG/14th
Army of part of its equipment capable of being put to civilian use.
According
to a document submitted to the Court in November 2002 by the Moldovan
Government, the volume of weaponry, ammunition and military equipment
belonging to the ROG/14th Army which had been withdrawn by November
2002 from the territory of the Republic of Moldova by virtue of the
agreement of 21 October 1994 represented only 15% of the total volume
declared in 1994 as being stationed in Moldovan territory.
According
to an OSCE press release, 29 railway wagons carrying bridge-building
equipment and field kitchens were removed on 24 December 2002.
The same press release quoted a declaration by the Commander of the
ROG, General Boris Sergeyev, to the effect that the latest
withdrawals had been made possible by an agreement with the
Transdniestrians under which the “MRT” was to receive
half of the non-military equipment and supplies withdrawn. General
Sergeyev cited the example of the withdrawal, on 16 December 2002, of
77 lorries, which had been followed by the transfer of 77 ROG lorries
to the Transdniestrians.
In
June 2001, according to information supplied to the Court by the
Russian Government, the ROG/14th Army still had some 2,200 troops in
Transdniestria. In his witness evidence, General Sergeyev asserted
that in 2002 just under 1,500 troops remained. According to the
evidence heard by the Court in the Ilascu case, in 2003 at
least 200,000 tonnes of ROG/14th Army arms and
ammunition remained in Transdniestria, mainly at Colbasna, together
with 106 battle tanks, 42 armoured cars, 109 armoured personnel
carriers, 54 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, 123 cannons and
mortars, 206 anti-tank weapons, 226 anti-aircraft guns, nine
helicopters and 1,648 vehicles of various kinds (see the Ilascu
judgment, cited above, paragraph 131).
5. Economic and political support from the Russian
Federation to the “MRT”
In
the Ilaşcu judgment (paragraphs 137-138, 144-145 and 154;
and see also paragraph 381) the Court referred to uncontested
press and television reports, predating the ratification of the
Convention by Russia in May 1998, of statements of support for the
separatist regime by eminent Russian political figures, including the
President and Vice-President of the Russian Federation at the time,
Mr Yeltsin and Mr Rutskoy. It also referred to Resolution no. 1334
IGD of 17 November 1995, where the Duma of the Russian Federation
declared Transdniestria a “zone of special strategic interest
for Russia”. Before and after ratification of the Convention by
the Russian Federation, representatives of the Duma and other
prominent figures had travelled to Transdniestria and taken part in
official events there and representatives of the “MRT”
regime had travelled to Moscow on official visits, notably to the
Duma.
Both
before and after ratification of the Convention by the Russian
Federation, prominent members of the “MRT” regime were
granted Russian citizenship, including, on 19 May 1994,
Lieutenant-General Iakovlev, the former commander of the 14th Army
and former head of the “Defence and Security Department of the
MRT”; in 1997, Mr Mărăcuţă, the “President
of the Supreme Soviet of the MRT”; in 1999, Mr Caraman, another
“MRT” leader; and Mr Smirnov in 1997 or 1999.
In
the Ilaşcu judgment (paragraphs 150-160 and 390) the
Court also found it uncontested that the arms industry, which was one
of the pillars of the Transdniestrian economy, was directly supported
by Russian firms including the Rosvoorouzhenie (Росвооружение)
and Elektrommash companies. The Russian firm Iterra had bought the
largest undertaking in Transdniestria, the Râbniţa
engineering works, despite the opposition of the Moldovan
authorities. In addition, Russia, through the 14th Army/ROG,
constituted a major employer and purchaser of supplies in
Transdniestria. The Russian Federation has separate contracts with
the “MRT” for the supply of gas and electricity and
supplied gas to Transdniestria on more advantageous terms than
applied for the rest of Moldova.
C. Events subsequent to the Ilascu and Others
judgment
1 Arms withdrawal
In
2003, the OSCE observed and verified the withdrawal from
Transdniestria of 11 trains of Russian military equipment and 31
trains loaded with more than 15,000 tons of ammunition. However, the
following year, in 2004, the OSCE reported that only one train
containing approximately 1,000 tons of ammunition had been removed.
At
the end of 2004, approximately 21,000 metric tons of ammunition
remained, together with more than 40,000 small arms and light weapons
and approximately ten trainloads of miscellaneous military equipment.
The
Commander of the ROG reported in May 2005 that surplus stocks of
40,000 small arms and light weapons had been destroyed, but the OSCE
was not allowed to verify these claims. On 13 November 2006, a group
of 30 OSCE Heads of Delegations, along with OSCE Mission members
gained access for the first time since March 2004 to the Russian
Federation ammunition depot in Colbaşna in northern
Transdniestria.
Since
2004 there have been no verified withdrawals of any Russian arms or
equipment from Transdniestria.
2. Political developments
In
November 2003, the Russian Federation put forward a settlement
proposal, the “Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State
Structure of the United State” (referred to as the “Kozak
Memorandum”). The Kozak Memorandum proposed a new federal
structure for Moldova, under which the authorities of the “MRT”
would have had a substantial degree of autonomy and guaranteed
representation in the new “federal legislature”. The
Kozak Memorandum included transitional provisions under which, until
2015, a three-quarters majority in a newly created legislative second
chamber, composed of four representatives from Gagauzia, nine from
Transdniestria and 13 from the new federal legislature's first
chamber, would have been required to confirm federal organic laws.
This would have given the “MRT” representatives in the
second chamber an effective veto over any legislation affecting all
of Moldova until 2015. On 25 November 2003, having previously
indicated his willingness to accept these proposals, the President of
Moldova, President Voronin, decided not to sign the Kozak Memorandum.
Further
five-sided negotiations involving representatives from Moldova, the
“MRT”, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE took
place in the first half of 2004, although no agreements were reached.
However, in July 2004, in response to closures of Romanian-language
schools in Transdniestria (see paragraphs 43-63 below), Moldova
suspended its participation in the five-sided talks.
In
May 2005, the Ukrainian Government introduced a proposal, “Towards
a Settlement through Democratization” (summarized in the report
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: see paragraph
63 below). In July 2005, citing the Ukrainian plan, the Moldovan
parliament adopted a law, “On the Basic Principles of a Special
Legal Status of Transdniestria”. Formal negotiations resumed in
October 2005, with the European Union (“EU”) and the
United States of America participating as observers (referred to as
“the 5+2 talks”).
In
December 2005, an EU Border Assistance Mission was established to
help combat illegal trade between Ukraine and Moldova and in March
2006 Ukraine and Moldova began implementing a 2003 customs agreement
under which Transdniestrian companies engaged in cross-border trade
had to register in Chişinău in order to be issued documents
indicating the goods' country of origin, in accordance with World
Trade Organisation protocols. Ukraine undertook to refuse to permit
goods without such export documents to pass across its border. In
what was seen as a response to these new customs measures,
Transdniestrian representatives refused to continue with the 5+2
talks. However, President Voronin and Mr Smirnov met in Bender on 11
April 2008 and agreed to initiate confidence-building measures.
Informal 5+2 discussions were held in Odessa in April 2008 and in
Moldova in July 2008. A further Russian-brokered meeting took place
between President Voronin and Mr Smirnov on 18 March 2009.
3. The schools crisis and the facts concerning the
applicants' cases
According
to Article 12 of the MRT “Constitution”, the official
languages within the MRT are “Moldavian”, Russian and
Ukrainian. Article 6 of the “MRT Law on languages”,
which was adopted on 8 September 1992, states that, for all
purposes, “Moldavian” must be written with the Cyrillic
alphabet. The “law” provides further that use of the
Latin alphabet may amount to an offence and Article 200-3 of the “MRT
Code of Administrative Offences”, adopted on 19 July 2002,
states that:
“Failure by persons holding public office and
other persons in the executive and State administration, in public
associations, as well as in other organisations, regardless of their
legal status and form of ownership, and in other entities, situated
on the territory of the MRT, to observe MRT's legislation on the
functioning of languages on the territory of MRT ... entails
liability in the form of a fine which may amount to 50 (fifty)
minimal salaries [approximately EUR 30].”
On
18 August 1994 the “MRT” authorities forbade the use of
the Latin script in schools. By a decision of 21 May 1999, the “MRT”
ordered that all schools belonging to “foreign States”
and functioning on “its” territory had to register with
the “MRT” authorities, failing which they would not be
recognised and would be deprived of their rights.
On
14 July 2004 the “MRT” authorities began taking steps to
close down all schools using the Latin script. At the date of
adoption of the present decision, there remain only six schools in
Transdniestria using the Moldovan (Romanian) language and the Latin
script.
a. Catan and Others (application no.
43370/04)
The
applicants are among the 600 children studying at Evrica High School
in Rîbniţa, their parents and one of the teachers.
From
1997 Evrica School used premises situated on Gagarin Street built
with Moldovan public funds. The school was registered with the
Moldovan Ministry of Education and was using the Latin script and a
curriculum approved by that Ministry.
Following
the “MRT decision” of 21 May 1999 (see paragraph 43
above), Evrika School refused to register, since registration would
require it to use the Cyrillic script and the curriculum devised by
the “MRT” regime. On 26 February 2004 the building
used by the school was transferred by the “MRT”
authorities to the “Rîbniţa Department of
Education”. In July 2004, following a number of closures of
Latin-script schools within the “MRT”, the pupils,
parents and teachers of Evrika School took it upon themselves to
guard the school day and night. On 29 July 2004 Transdniestrian
police stormed the school and evicted the women and children who were
inside it. Over the following days local police and officials from
the “Rîbniţa Department of Education” visited
the parents of children registered with the school, asking them to
withdraw their children from the school and to put them in a school
registered with the “MRT” regime. The parents were
allegedly told that if they did not do so, they would be fired from
their jobs and would even be deprived of their parental rights. As a
result of this pressure, many parents withdrew their children and
transferred them to another school.
On
29 September 2004, and following the intervention of the OSCE Mission
to Moldova, the school was able to register with the “Tiraspol
Chamber of Registration” as a foreign institution of private
education, but could not resume its activity for lack of premises. On
2 October 2004 the “MRT” regime allowed the school to
reopen in another building, which had previously housed a
kindergarten. The building is rented from the “MRT” and
the Moldovan Government has paid for it to be refurbished. The
school's repeated requests to be allowed to return to the building
situated on Gagarin Street, which is bigger and more appropriate,
were rejected on the ground that another school was now using that
building. The applicants allege that the rented premises are
inappropriate for a secondary school, in that the lighting, corridors
and classrooms are not fully adapted and there are no laboratories or
sports facilities. The school is administered by the Moldovan
Ministry of Education, which pays the teachers' salaries and provides
educational material. It uses the Latin alphabet and a Moldovan
curriculum.
The
applicants filed a number of petitions and complaints with the
authorities of the Russian Federation. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation replied by making public general
statements about the escalation of the conflict around the
Romanian-language schools in Transdniestria. Stating that the
underlying problem was the ongoing conflict between Moldova and the
“MRT”, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew the
attention of Moldova and the “MRT” to the fact that the
use of force to solve the conflict could endanger security in the
region and urged them to use various types of negotiations in order
to solve the conflict. The applicants also complained about their
situation to the Moldovan authorities.
The
school became the target of a systematic campaign of vandalism and
broken windows. The applicants allege that this campaign started in
2004; the Moldovan Government claim that it started in the autumn of
2007. On 10 April 2008 the Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration asked
the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe to intervene to try and bring an end to the attacks. The
applicants also allege that the children are intimidated by the local
Russian-speaking population and are afraid to speak Moldovan outside
the school.
On
16 July 2008 the Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration sought the
assistance of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in transporting educational
and construction material and money for teachers' salaries across the
“border” with the “MRT”.
There
were 683 pupils at the school during the academic year 2002-2003.
During the year 2008-2009 that number had fallen to 345.
b. Caldare and Others (application no.
8252/05)
The
applicants are children studying at Alexandru cel Bun High School in
Tighina, Bender, and their parents. The school had been using
premises situated on Kosmodemianskaia Street built with Moldovan
public funds and rented to them by the Moldovan authorities. The
school was registered with the Moldovan Ministry of Education and was
therefore using the Latin script and a curriculum approved by the
Ministry of Education.
On
4 June 2004, the “MRT Ministry for Education” warned the
school that it would be closed down if it did not register with them,
and that disciplinary measures would be taken against the head
teacher. On 18 July 2004 the school was disconnected from
electricity and water supplies and on 19 July 2004 the school
administration was notified that it could no longer use the premises
on Kosmodemianskaia Street. However, teachers, pupils and parents
occupied the building, refusing to leave. Transdniestrian police
tried unsuccessfully to reoccupy the premises, and eventually
surrendered the building. They withdrew on 28 July 2004. On 20
September 2004, and following various negotiations with international
observers, including representatives of the Council of Europe, the
school was reconnected to water and electricity.
The
“MRT” regime allowed the school to reopen in
September 2004, but in different premises, rented from the “MRT”
authorities. The school is currently using three buildings, located
in separate districts of the town. The main building has no
cafeteria, science or sports facilities and cannot be reached by
public transport. The Moldovan Government has provided the school
with a bus and computers. They are also paying for the refurbishment
of the sanitary facilities in one of the buildings.
The
applicants have filed a number of petitions and complaints with the
Russian and Moldovan authorities.
There
were 1751 pupils at the school in 2002-2003 and 901 in 2008-2009.
c. Cercavschi and Others (application no.
18454/06)
The
applicants are children studying at the Ştefan cel Mare
secondary school in Grigoriopol, their parents and the director of
the school.
In
1996, at the request of the parents and their children, the school,
which was using a Cyrillic alphabet curriculum, filed a number of
petitions with the “MRT” regime requesting to be allowed
to use the Latin script. As a result, between 1996 and 2002, the
“MRT” orchestrated a campaign of hostile press reports,
intimidation and threats by security forces. These measures
reached a climax on 22 August 2002 when Transdniestrian police
stormed the school and evicted the teachers, the pupils and their
parents who were inside it. On 28 August 2002 the President of the
Pupils Committee was arrested and subsequently sentenced to fifteen
days' administrative imprisonment. Following these incidents, 300
pupils left the school.
Faced
with the occupation of the building by the “MRT” regime,
the Moldovan Ministry of Education decided that the school should be
transferred temporarily to a building in Doroţcaia, a village
about 20 kilometres from Grigoripol and which is under Moldovan
control. Each day, pupils and teachers are taken to Doroţcaia in
buses provided by the Moldovan Government. They are subjected to bag
searches and identity checks by “MRT” officials and also,
allegedly, acts of harassment such as spitting and verbal abuse.
Representatives
of the school filed a number of petitions and complained about this
situation to the OSCE, the United Nations Organisation, as well as to
the Russian and Moldovan authorities. The Russian authorities replied
by urging both Moldova and “MRT” to use various types of
negotiations in order to solve the conflict. The Moldovan authorities
informed the applicants that they could do nothing further to help.
There
were 709 pupils at the school in 2000-2001 and 169 in 2008-2009.
D. Reports of international bodies concerning the
situation with regard to Transdniestria during the period since the
adoption of the Ilascu and Others judgment
1. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
On
16 September 2005 the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring
Committee) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) issued a report on “The functioning of the democratic
Institutions in Moldova”. The section devoted to Transdniestria
reads as follows:
“31. Major new developments have occurred during
the last months which the Assembly has to follow very closely and
accompany in the best possible way.
32. Following intense diplomatic contacts between
Moldova and Ukraine, at the GUAM Summit in Chisinau on 22 April the
Ukrainian President Yushchenko announced a 7-point initiative to
settle the Transnistrian issue. ...
The main thrust of this new plan is to achieve a
long-lasting solution through the democratisation of Transnistria.
This would entail:
– the creation of conditions for the development
of democracy, civil society, and a multi-party system in
Transnistria;
– holding of free and democratic elections to the
Transniestrian Supreme Soviet, monitored by the European Union, the
OSCE, the Council of Europe, Russia, United States, and other
democratic countries including Ukraine;
– the transformation of the current format of
peacekeeping operation into an international mission of military and
civil observers under the aegis of the OSCE and the expansion of the
number of Ukrainian military observers in the region;
– admission by Transniestrian authorities of an
international monitoring mission, to include Ukrainian experts, to
military-industrial enterprises in the Transniestrian region;
– a short-term OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine
to verify the movement of goods and persons through the
Ukrainian-Moldovan border.
33. The full text of the Ukrainian plan was presented on
16-17 May at a meeting of the representatives of the mediators and
Moldova and Transnistria in Vinnitsa, Ukraine after the Ukrainian
Secretary of Security Council Pyotr Poroshenko and Moldavian
presidential aide Mark Tkachuk spent almost a month doing 'shuttle
diplomacy'.
34. The reactions were varied but cautiously positive.
35. On 10 June the Moldovan Parliament adopted a
'Declaration on the Ukrainian initiative of settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict' as well as two appeals, on demilitarisation
and on promoting the criteria of democratisation of the Transnistrian
region of the Republic of Moldova (see appendix II).
36. The declaration welcomed the initiative of President
Yushchenko, hoping that it would become 'a major factor in the
achievement by Moldova of its territorial and civil unity'. The
parliament however regretted that the Ukrainian initiative did not
reflect some important principles of settlement, in the first place
the withdrawal of Russian troops; demilitarisation; the principles
and conditions of the region's democratisation and the establishing
of a transparent and legal control over the Transnistrian segment of
the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. It called for additional efforts by
the international community and Ukraine in this respect.
37. The parliament also criticised a number of
provisions which might 'infringe upon the sovereignty of the Republic
of Moldova', such as the co-participation of Transnistria in the
conduct of foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova and the proposal
to create the so-called conciliation committee. The Parliament
insisted on resolving the conflict within the framework of the
Moldovan Constitution through dialogue with a new, democratically
elected, Transnistrian leadership. There are thus a number of
divergences between the Ukrainian initiative and the approach to
implementing it chosen by Moldova.
38. The mediators in the Transnistrian conflict (the
OSCE, Russia and Ukraine) stated that the plan provided a concrete
impetus toward achieving a settlement. At all of their latest
meetings they called for resuming direct, continuing dialogue on
resolution of the conflict.
39. More delicate is the position of Russia. It is clear
that through its military and economic presence and thanks to the
strong cultural and linguistic links with Transnistria, Russia would
like to retain its strong influence over the territory. The press
recently reported the existence of an 'Action plan of retaining
Russian influence in the Moldova Republic', details of which are kept
secret. Russia is still strongly attached to the so-called 'Kozak
Memorandum' of 2003, which proposed to Moldova a federal solution.
Moldova had nearly accepted the plan; it refused to sign it at the
last moment, allegedly under Western influence.
40. Over the last months, there have been several signs
of tension. For instance, on 18 February the Russian Federation State
Duma adopted with a large majority a resolution requesting from the
Russian government a number of economic and other sanctions against
Moldova, with the exclusion of Transnistria, if the Moldovan
authorities did not change their 'economic blockade of
Transdniestria.' The sanctions included a ban on imports of Moldovan
alcohol and tobacco, world market prices for exports of Russian
natural gas to Moldova and visas for Moldovans entering Russia.
41. Both appeals adopted by the Moldovan parliament
called on the Council of Europe for support and, concerning the
democratisation of Transnistria, to engage actively in the process.
During our visit in Chisinau our interlocutors repeatedly stressed
the importance they attached to the expertise and experience of our
organisation in this respect. The documents adopted by the Moldovan
Parliament were officially submitted by its Speaker to the Monitoring
Committee 'for examination in the framework of the Moldova's
monitoring exercise' and for 'analysis, comments and recommendations,
as well as ideas of the Parliamentary Assembly that could contribute
to the democratisation of the Transnistrian region and final
settlement of the conflict'.
42. At the first sight, the plan should be followed
closely by the Council of Europe, as the leading organisation in the
field of democracy, human rights and rule of law. The Committee has
therefore entrusted us with the responsibility of visiting Kiev,
Moscow, Bucharest and Brussels in order to meet the main figures
responsible for the Ukrainian plan and get acquainted with all its
details. On the basis of this information we will make specific
proposals for the Assembly to play an effective part in the plan's
progress.
43. A number of questions remain about the
implementation of the Ukrainian plan and the conditions set by the
Moldovan parliament. However, against the background of all the
failed diplomatic attempts, it has one strong advantage. It combines
diplomatic efforts with specific measures for democratisation, in
Transnistria but also in Moldova, which must serve as an example. The
initiative also comes at the right moment, as it coincides with a
major strive for democratisation and European integration in the
entire region.
44. Not only Moldova, whose territorial integrity and
sovereignty have been violated, but Europe as a whole can no longer
afford to have this 'black hole' on its territory. Transnistria is a
centre of all kinds of illicit trade and, in the first place arms
trafficking and all forms of smuggling. Political life continues to
be dominated by the secret police; fundamental freedom and liberties
are curtailed.
45. One of the most difficult elements appears to be the
possibility to organise democratic elections in Transnistria. For
this the region needs to have freely functioning political parties,
media and civil society. The 27 March local elections in Transnistria
(to elect village, settlement, city and district councils, as well as
the chairmen of village and settlement councils) showed that real
strong opposition is still missing. These elections by the way were
considered as a test for the scheduled December 2005 elections for
the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet.
46. However, there are some interesting developments,
especially concerning a group of Supreme Soviet members led by the
Deputy Speaker Evgeny Shevchuk. On 29 April this group initiated
ambitious draft changes to the Transnistrian 'constitution' aiming at
reinforcing this 'parliament''s role vis-à-vis the 'president'
and the executive – for instance by granting it the right to a
no-confidence vote on 'ministers' and other officials appointed by
the 'president', or the right to control the work and the spending of
the executive. Some more modest changes, as well as a draft law on
local administration, stipulating that the chairmen of raion and city
councils have to be elected by the councils by secret vote, were
adopted on 18 May at first reading. Mr Shevchuk is also
promoting a legislative initiate to transform the regional official
'TV PMR' into a public broadcasting institution.
47. On 22 June the Supreme Soviet recommended that
'president' Smirnov dismiss the 'minister' of justice Victor Balala.
Balala, who is one the closest allies of the 'president', recently
decided to transfer registration functions from his 'ministry' to a
quasi-commercial 'chamber of experts.'
48. On 22 July the Moldovan parliament approved in two
readings the Law on the Main Provisions of a Special Legal Status for
Populated Areas on the Left Bank of Dniestr (Transnistria). The law
established an autonomous territorial unit which is an inseparable
part of Moldova and – within the plenary powers established
under the Constitution and legislation of Moldova – decides on
questions within its jurisdiction. The law stipulates that populated
localities on the left bank of the Dniester may join Transnistria or
secede from it on the basis of local referenda and in conformity with
the Moldovan legislation.”
In
the light of this report, PACE adopted a resolution in which it
resolved, inter alia, that:
“10. The Assembly welcomes the resumption of
negotiations following Ukraine's optimistic initiative of settling
the Transnistrian conflict by giving priority to democratisation. It
hopes that the current five-member format, involving Moldova, the
Transnistrian region, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, will be extended
to include also the Council of Europe. It emphasises the need for
effective supervision of the border between Moldova and Ukraine, arms
stocks and the production of armaments factories. Given their
accumulated expertise, the Assembly wishes its rapporteurs to be
associated with all these developments.
11. Any settlement of the Transnistrian conflict must be
based on the inviolable principle of full respect for Moldova's
territorial integrity and sovereignty. In accordance with the rule of
law, any solution must accord with the popular will as expressed in
fully free and democratic elections run by internationally recognised
authorities.”
2. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE)
In
its Annual Report for 2004, the OSCE referred to events in
Transdniestria as follows:
“...The most disruptive development, however, was
the Transdniestrian decision in mid-July to close the Moldovan
schools in Transdniestrian territory teaching in Latin script. In
response, the Moldovan side suspended its participation in the
five-sided political settlement negotiations.
Together with co-mediators from the Russian Federation
and Ukraine, the Mission went to extraordinary lengths from mid-July
well into autumn to ameliorate the school crisis and to find and
implement a solution. The Mission also sought to defuse tensions
between the sides concerning freedom of movement, farmlands, and
railways.”
In
2004 the OSCE also observed that:
“Only one train containing approximately 1,000
tons of ammunition was removed from the Operative Group of Russian
Forces depots in Transdniestria in 2004. Approximately 21,000 metric
tons of ammunition remain to be removed, together with more than
40,000 small arms and light weapons and approximately ten trainloads
of miscellaneous military equipment. The Mission continued to
co-ordinate technical and financial assistance to the Russian
Federation for these activities.”
The
2005 Annual Report stated:
“The Mission concentrated its efforts on
restarting the political settlement negotiations, stalled since
summer 2004. The mediators from the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and
the OSCE held consultations with representatives from Chisinau and
Tiraspol in January, May and September. At the May meeting, Ukraine
introduced President Victor Yushchenko's settlement plan, Toward a
Settlement through Democratization. This initiative envisages
democratization of the Transdniestrian region through internationally
conducted elections to the regional legislative body, along with
steps to promote demilitarization, transparency and increased
confidence.
In July, the Moldovan Parliament, citing the Ukrainian
Plan, adopted a law On the Basic Principles of a Special Legal Status
of Transdniestria. During consultations in September in Odessa,
Chisinau and Tiraspol agreed to invite the EU and US to participate
as observers in the negotiations. Formal negotiations resumed in an
enlarged format in October after a 15-month break and continued in
December following the OSCE Ministerial Council in Ljubljana. On 15
December, the Presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation,
Victor Yushchenko and Vladimir Putin, issued a Joint Statement
welcoming the resumption of negotiations on the settlement of the
Transdniestrian conflict.
In September, Presidents Voronin and Yushchenko jointly
requested the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to consider sending an
International Assessment Mission (IAM) to analyse democratic
conditions in Transdniestria and necessary steps for conducting
democratic elections in the region. In parallel, the OSCE Mission
conducted technical consultations and analyses on basic requirements
for democratic elections in the Transdniestrian region, as proposed
in the Yushchenko Plan. At the October negotiating round, the OSCE
Chairmanship was asked to continue consultations on the possibility
of organizing an IAM to the Transdniestrian region.
Together with military experts from the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, the OSCE Mission completed development of a
package of proposed confidence- and security- building measures,
which were presented by the three mediators in July. The Mission
subsequently began consultations on the package with representatives
of Chisinau and Tiraspol. The October negotiating round welcomed
possible progress on enhancing transparency through a mutual exchange
of military data, as envisaged in elements of this package.”
On
the question of Russian military withdrawal, the OSCE observed:
“There was no withdrawal of Russian arms and
equipment from the Transniestrian region during 2005. Roughly 20,000
metric tons of ammunition remain to be removed. The commander of the
Operative Group of Russian Forces reported in May that surplus stocks
of 40,000 small arms and light weapons stored by Russian forces in
the Transdniestrian region have been destroyed. The OSCE has not been
allowed to verify these claims.”
In
2006, the OSCE reported as follows:
“The 17 September 'independence' referendum and
the 10 December 'presidential' elections in Transnistria –
neither one recognized nor monitored by the OSCE – shaped the
political environment of this work ...
To spur on the settlement talks, the Mission drafted in
early 2006 documents that suggested: a possible delimitation of
competencies between central and regional authorities; a mechanism
for monitoring factories in the Transnistrian military-industrial
complex; a plan for the exchange of military data; and an assessment
mission to evaluate conditions and make recommendations for
democratic elections in Transnistria. The Transnistrian side,
however, refused to continue negotiations after the March
introduction of new customs rules for Transnistrian exports, and thus
no progress could be made including on these projects. Attempts to
unblock this stalemate through consultations among the mediators
(OSCE, Russian Federation and Ukraine) and the observers (European
Union and the United States of America) in April, May and November
and consultations of the mediators and observers with each of the
sides separately in October were to no avail. ...
On 13 November, a group of 30 OSCE Heads of Delegations,
along with OSCE Mission members gained access for the first time
since March 2004 to the Russian Federation ammunition depot in
Colbasna, near the Moldovan-Ukrainian border in northern
Transnistria. There were no withdrawals, however, of Russian
ammunition or equipment from Transnistria during 2006, and more than
21,000 tons of ammunition remain stored in the region ...”
The
Annual Report for 2007 stated:
“The mediators in the Transnistrian settlement
process, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, and the
observers, the European Union and the United States, met four times.
The mediators and observers met informally with the Moldovan and
Transnistrian sides once, in October. All meetings concentrated on
finding ways to restart formal settlement negotiations, which have
nonetheless failed to resume. ...
The Mission witnessed that there were no withdrawals of
Russian ammunition or equipment during 2007. The Voluntary Fund
retains sufficient resources to complete the withdrawal tasks.”
In
2008, the OSCE observed:
“Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and
Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov met in April for the first time in
seven years and followed up with another meeting on 24 December.
Mediators from the OSCE, Russian Federation and Ukraine and observers
from the European Union and the United States met five times.
Informal meetings of the sides with mediators and observers took
place five times. These and additional shuttle diplomacy efforts by
the Mission notwithstanding, formal negotiations in the '5+2' format
were not resumed. ...
There were no withdrawals of Russian ammunition or
equipment from the Transistrian region during 2008. The Voluntary
Fund retains sufficient resources to complete withdrawal tasks.”
3. International non-governmental organisations
In
its report dated 17 June 2004, “Moldova: Regional Tensions over
Transdniestria” (Europe Report no. 157), the International
Crisis Group (ICG) found as follows (extract from the Executive
Summary):
“Russia's support for the self-proclaimed and
unrecognised Dniestrian Moldovan Republic (DMR) has prevented
resolution of the conflict and inhibited Moldova's progress towards
broader integration into European political and economic structures.
In its recent and largely unilateral attempts to resolve the
Transdniestrian conflict, Russia has demonstrated almost a Cold War
mindset. Despite comforting rhetoric regarding Russian-European Union
(EU) relations and Russian-U.S. cooperation on conflict resolution
and peacekeeping within the Newly Independent States of the former
Soviet Union (NIS), old habits appear to die hard. Russia remains
reluctant to see the EU, U.S. or the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) play an active role in resolving the
conflict because Moldova is still viewed by many in Moscow as a
sphere of exclusively Russian geopolitical interest.
It has not been difficult for Russia to exploit
Moldova's political and economic instability for its own interests.
Despite having accepted concrete deadlines for withdrawing its
troops, Russia has repeatedly back-pedalled while trying to force
through a political settlement that would have ensured, through
unbalanced constitutional arrangements, continued Russian influence
on Moldovan policymaking and prolongation of its military presence in
a peacekeeping guise. It has so far been unwilling to use its
influence on the DMR [“MRT”] leadership to promote an
approach to conflict resolution that balances the legitimate
interests of all parties.
Ukrainian and Moldovan business circles have become
adept at using the parallel DMR economy to their own ends, regularly
participating in re-export and other illegal practices. Some have
used political influence to prevent, delay, and obstruct decisions
which could have put pressure on the DMR leadership to compromise.
These include abolition of tax and customs regulations favourable to
the illegal re-export business, enforcement of effective border and
customs control, and collection of customs and taxes at internal
'borders'.
With backing from Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan
economic elites, the DMR leadership has become more assertive.
Recognising that international recognition is unlikely, it has
focused on preserving de facto independence through a loose
confederation with Moldova. Unfortunately, DMR leaders - taking
advantage of contradictions in the tax and customs systems of Moldova
and the DMR - continue to draw substantial profits from legal and
illegal economic activities including re-exports, smuggling and arms
production.
The DMR has become a self-aware actor with its own
interests and strategies, possessing a limited scope for independent
political manoeuvre but an extensive web of economic and other links
across Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine. However, it remains heavily
dependent on Russian political and economic support and does not like
to put itself in a position where it must act counter to Russian
policy. Russian and DMR interests often overlap but in some instances
DMR leaders have been able to design and implement strategies to
avoid Russian pressure, delay negotiations, obstruct Russian
initiatives, and undermine Russian policies by playing up
disagreements between the co-mediators and capitalising on
alternative sources of external support.
Russia's most recent attempt to enforce a settlement -
the Kozak Memorandum in October and November 2003 - has shown that
its influence, while pervasive, has clear limits. Russia is unable to
push through a settlement without the support of Moldova and the
international community, especially key players such as the OSCE, EU,
and the U.S. A comprehensive political settlement requires an
approach that can bridge the differences between Russia and other key
international actors while fairly considering the interests of both
the Moldovan government and the DMR.
Despite an understanding that Russia should not be
antagonised, the gravitational pull of European integration is strong
in Moldova. Recently, even its communist leadership has stressed the
need to do more to achieve that goal. The country has rarely been on
Western radar screens during the last decade, however, and it will
need more demonstrable EU and U.S. backing if it is to resist Russian
political and material support for the DMR and Transdniestrian
obstruction of the negotiation process. International actors must
also help Moldova to secure its own borders against the illicit
economic activities which keep Transdniestria afloat and affect its
European neighbours as well.
The conflict can only be resolved if the international
community uses its influence on Russia bilaterally and within the
OSCE. Only then, and with a substantially more determined commitment
to political, economic and administrative reform on its own part,
will Moldova be able to realise its European aspirations. A
comprehensive strategy towards Moldova, Ukraine and Russia within the
EU's Wider Europe Policy would be a critical first step.”
In its report of 17 August 2006, “Moldova's Uncertain Future”
(Europe Report no. 175), the ICG observed (extract from the Executive
Summary):
“With Romania's expected entry into the European
Union in 2007, the EU will share a border with Moldova, a weak state
divided by conflict and plagued by corruption and organised crime.
Moldova's leadership has declared its desire to join the EU, but its
commitment to European values is suspect, and efforts to resolve its
dispute with the breakaway region of Transdniestria have failed to
end a damaging stalemate that has persisted for fifteen years. Young
people have little confidence in the country's future and are leaving
at an alarming rate. If Moldova is to become a stable part of the
EU's neighbourhood, there will need to be much greater international
engagement, not only in conflict resolution but in spurring domestic
reforms to help make the country more attractive to its citizens.
Two recent initiatives by the EU and Ukraine gave rise
to hopes that the balance of forces in the separatist dispute had
changed significantly. An EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)
launched in late 2005 has helped curb smuggling along the
Transdniestrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine frontier, a key source
of revenue for the authorities in Tiraspol, the Transdniestrian
capital. At the same time, Kiev's implementation of a landmark
customs regime to assist Moldova in regulating Transdniestrian
exports has reduced the ability of businesses in the breakaway region
to operate without Moldovan oversight, striking a major psychological
blow.
But optimism that these measures would ultimately force
Transdniestria to make diplomatic concessions appears to have been
false. Although EUBAM has had significant success, particularly given
its small size and budget, widespread smuggling continues. Nor has
the Ukrainian customs regime had a decisive effect on Transdniestrian
businesses, which remain capable of profitable legal trade as they
were in the past. Moreover, domestic political uncertainty has raised
questions about whether Kiev will continue to enforce the new
regulations.
Russia has increased its support for Transdniestria,
sending economic aid and taking punitive measures against Moldova,
including a crippling ban on wine exports, one of its main revenue
sources. Moscow refuses to withdraw troops based in Transdniestria
since Soviet times whose presence serves to preserve the status quo.
With Russian support, the Transdniestrian leader, Igor Smirnov, has
little incentive to compromise in his drive toward independence. The
internationally-mediated negotiations between the two parties are
going nowhere, despite the presence since 2005 of the EU and U.S. as
observers. Although some understanding had been reached about the
level of autonomy in a settlement, Moldova has hardened its position
to match Transdniestria's intransigence.”
In
its report entitled “Freedom in the World 2009”, Freedom
House commented, inter alia:
“Moldova rejected a Russian-backed federalization
plan in November 2003 after it drew public protests. The latest round
of formal multilateral talks collapsed in early 2006, and
Transnistrian referendum voters in September 2006 overwhelmingly
backed a course of independence with the goal of eventually joining
Russia, although the legitimacy of the vote was not recognized by
Moldova or the international community.
In the absence of active 5+2 negotiations, Voronin
pursued bilateral talks with Russia and took a number of steps to
bring Moldova's foreign policy into line with the Kremlin's. For much
of 2008, he urged Russia to accept a proposal whereby Transnistria
would receive substantial autonomy within Moldova, a strong and
unitary presence in the Moldovan Parliament, and the right to secede
if Moldova were to unite with Romania in the future. Russian property
rights would be respected, and Russian troops would be replaced by
civilian observers. Voronin defended his separate 'consultations'
with Russia by saying that any settlement would be finalized in the
5+2 format.
The Transnistria issue took on an added degree of
urgency in August 2008, after Russia fought a brief conflict with
Georgia and recognized the independence of two breakaway regions
there. Russian officials said they had no plans to recognize the PMR
['MRT'], but warned Moldova not to adopt Georgia's confrontational
stance. The Moldovan government in turn rejected any comparison and
repeated its commitment to peaceful negotiations. Some experts
expressed concerns that Russia could impose a harsh settlement on
Moldova in the bilateral talks and then recognize the PMR if the plan
were rejected.
Transnistrian president Igor Smirnov's relations with
Voronin remained tense throughout the year, as the Moldovan leader
effectively negotiated over Smirnov's head and expressed clear
frustration with the PMR leadership. The two men met in April for the
first time since 2001, then again in December. Days after the April
meeting, Romanian president Traian Basescu indirectly raised the
prospect of a partition in which Ukraine would absorb Transnistria
and Romania would annex Moldova proper, prompting Voronin to accuse
him of sabotaging the negotiations. Meanwhile, Russian president
Dmitri Medvedev met with Voronin and Smirnov separately during the
year ...
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Residents of Transnistria cannot elect their leaders
democratically, and they are unable to participate freely in Moldovan
elections...
Corruption and organized crime are serious problems in
Transnistria ...
The media environment is restrictive ...
Religious freedom is restricted ...
Although several thousand students study Moldovan using
the Latin script, this practice is restricted. The Moldovan language
and Latin alphabet are associated with support for unity with
Moldova, while Russian and the Cyrillic alphabet are associated with
separatist goals. Parents who send their children to schools using
Latin script, and the schools themselves, have faced routine
harassment from the security services.
The authorities severely restrict freedom of assembly
and rarely issue required permits for public protests ...
The judiciary is subservient to the executive and
generally implements the will of the authorities ...
Authorities discriminate against ethnic Moldovans, who
make up about 40 percent of the population. It is believed that
ethnic Russians and Ukrainians together comprise a slim majority, and
as many as a third of the region's residents reportedly hold Russian
passports.”
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
The
International Law Commission (ILC) adopted its Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft
Articles”) in August 2001. Chapter II of the Draft Articles
deals with “Attribution of Conduct to a State” and
provides:
“Article 4: Conduct of organs of a State
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be
considered an act of that State under international law, whether the
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the
State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central
government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity
which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the
State.
Article 5: Conduct of persons or entities exercising
elements of governmental authority
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ
of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of
that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall
be considered an act of the State under international law, provided
the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular
instance.
Article 6: Conduct of organs placed at the disposal
of a State by another State
The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a
State by another State shall be considered an act of the former State
under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of
elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal
it is placed.
Article 7: Excess of authority or contravention of
instructions
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or
entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority
shall be considered an act of the State under international law if
the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds
its authority or contravenes instructions.
Article 8: Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under
the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.
Article 9: Conduct carried out in the absence or
default of the official authorities
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or
group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental
authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and
in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements
of authority.
Article 10: Conduct of an insurrectional or other
movement
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement
which becomes the new government of a State shall be considered an
act of that State under international law.
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional
or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the
territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its
administration shall be considered an act of the new State under
international law.
3. This article is without prejudice to the
attribution to a State of any conduct, however related to that of the
movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by
virtue of articles 4 to 9.
Article 11: Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a
State as its own
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the
preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that
State under international law if and to the extent that the State
acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.”
B. Case-law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
In
the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro), judgment of 26 February 2007, the ICJ
held, on the question of State responsibility:
“391. The first issue raised by this argument is
whether it is possible in principle to attribute to a State conduct
of persons - or groups of persons - who, while they do not have the
legal status of State organs, in fact act under such strict control
by the State that they must be treated as its organs for purposes of
the necessary attribution leading to the State's responsibility for
an internationally wrongful act. The Court has in fact already
addressed this question, and given an answer to it in principle, in
its Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America) (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp.
62-64). In paragraph 109 of that Judgment the Court stated that it
had to
'determine . . . whether or not the relationship of the
contras to the United States Government was so much one of dependence
on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to
equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United
States Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government' (p.
62).
Then, examining the facts in the light of the
information in its possession, the Court observed that 'there is no
clear evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a
degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as
acting on its behalf' (para. 109), and went on to conclude that 'the
evidence available to the Court . . . is insufficient to demonstrate
[the contras'] complete dependence on United States aid', so that the
Court was 'unable to determine that the contra force may be equated
for legal purposes with the forces of the United States' (pp. 62-63,
para. 110).
392. The passages quoted show that, according to the
Court's jurisprudence, persons, groups of persons or entities may,
for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with State
organs even if that status does not follow from internal law,
provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in
'complete dependence' on the State, of which they are ultimately
merely the instrument. In such a case, it is appropriate to look
beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the
relationship between the person taking action, and the State to which
he is so closely attached as to appear to be nothing more than its
agent: any other solution would allow States to escape their
international responsibility by choosing to act through persons or
entities whose supposed independence would be purely fictitious.
393. However, so to equate persons or entities with
State organs when they do not have that status under internal law
must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great
degree of State control over them, a relationship which the Court's
Judgment quoted above expressly described as 'complete dependence'.
...”
The
ICJ went on to find that Serbia was not directly responsible for
genocide during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. It held nonetheless that
Serbia had violated its positive obligation to prevent genocide,
under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, by failing to take all measures within its power to stop
the genocide that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995 and by having
failed to transfer Ratko Mladić, indicted for genocide and
complicity in genocide, for trial by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
COMPLAINTS
The
applicants complained about the closure of their schools and their
harassment by the “MRT” authorities under Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Articles 3 and 8 of the
Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.
THE LAW
I. WHETHER THE APPLICANTS COME WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
EITHER OR BOTH OF THE RESPONDENT STATES
A. The submissions of the parties
1. The applicants
The
applicants submitted that Moldova had ratified the Convention with
effect throughout the whole of its territory. The Court had found
that the Government's declaration made at the time of ratification,
that it would not be able to guarantee compliance with its provisions
in respect of the acts or omissions of the organs of the “MRT”,
was invalid, since its effect would be to deprive the population of
the area controlled by the “MRT” of the protection of the
Convention for an indefinite period (Ilascu and Others v. Moldova
and Russia (dec), no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII). In the Ilascu
judgment, cited above, the Court had found that although the
Moldovan Government did not exercise authority over the “MRT”,
they nonetheless had positive obligations to take measures to secure
to the applicants the rights guaranteed under the Convention.
Moldova's positive obligations as regards Transdniestria required it
both to withhold support from the separatist regime and to take
political, economic and legal action aimed at re-instating its own
control over the region. The applicants accused the Moldovan
Government of lacking an effective strategy as regards the
negotiation of a settlement to the conflict or the destabilisation of
the “MRT” regime. In particular, the issue of the
withdrawal of Russian weapons and forces from the region had not been
raised by Moldova at international level since 2007. Furthermore, it
appeared to be Moldovan policy to increase the country's economic
dependence on the Russian Federation. In 2009 the major source of
electricity for the entire country became the Moldovan Power Station,
owned by a Russian company and situated in Transdniestria. Moldova
was also dependent on Russia for gas and had not sought to find an
alternative source of supply. Thus Moldova's political leverage to
secure Russian military withdrawal from the region was weak. The
applicants also criticised the Moldovan Government for failing to
provide sufficient numbers of police officers and judges to enforce
Moldovan criminal law within the area controlled by the “MRT”
and for failing to ensure that people living in this region had
access to Moldovan newspapers and audiovisual media. Their financial
assistance to the applicants' schools was not sufficient to satisfy
Moldova's positive obligation. This was the minimum level of
assistance provided to all Moldovan State schools.
The
applicants pointed out that the closure of the schools occurred in
July 2004, very shortly after the Court, in its judgment of 8 July
2004 in Ilascu and Others (cited above), had found that events
in Transdniestria fell within Russia's jurisdiction. In the
applicants' submission, the “MRT” separatist regime was
created in 1991-1992 with Russia's support. Although it had its own
authorities and administration, it remained under the effective
control, or at least the decisive influence, of Russia and survived
only by virtue of Russia's military, economic, financial and
political support.
Moreover,
since July 2004, during the period when the applicants were seeking
redress for their situation, Russia's support for the “MRT”
continued. One example was Russia's reaction to the declaration
signed on 30 December 2005 by Moldova and Ukraine with a view to
regulating the export of goods produced by Transdniestrian companies.
The agreement entered into effect on 1 March 2006. On 4 March 2006
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted with the issue of a
press release accusing the Ukrainian Government of failing “to
take into account the reality” of the situation in
Transdniestria and of attempting to place the “MRT” under
economic pressure and thus force it to capitulate. On 7 March 2006 a
delegation including members of the Russian Security Service and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs travelled to Tiraspol. On 25 March
2006, in an action which the Moldovan authorities condemned as
unlawful, Russia delivered over 230 tons of medicine and food to
Transdniestria. During the same period, Russia imposed an import ban
on Moldovan wine on the ground that it did not meet the required
standard of quality.
The
applicants claimed that the “MRT's” economy was dependent
on and oriented towards Russia. The majority of companies in the
region were Russian-owned. During the recent “gas crisis”,
when the Russian Federation stopped the gas supply to Ukraine and a
number of other countries on the ground that they had large
outstanding gas bills, Russia continued to supply the “MRT”,
which had a similar debt, and in addition supplied it with credits
and other forms of aid.
The
Russian Federation provided educational materials in Russian to the
“MRT” without informing or consulting with the Moldovan
Government. Numerous Russian institutions of higher education had
opened branches within the “MRT” and recognised the
educational qualifications issued by the “MRT Ministry of
Education”. Russia characterised this aid and cooperation as
falling within the framework of its general programme to assist
Russian nationals resident abroad. However, the level of the
assistance provided and the failure to channel it through the
Moldovan authorities amounted to a denial of Moldova's sovereignty
over the region.
In
addition, Russia had still not withdrawn its military forces from the
region, in breach of all its international obligations. Although the
number of personnel had decreased since 1992, the existing military
presence was still significant, as was the munitions stockpile. At
the time of the events complained of in July/August 2004, there were
approximately 20,887 tons of Russian munitions and 10 train carriages
full of military equipment still stationed in Transdniestria.
According to information published by the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the “MRT” authorities
had blocked the withdrawal of Russian troops in protest both at
Moldova's refusal to sign the Kozak Memorandum and at its refusal to
annul “MRT” debts to the Russian Gas Company, Gasprom,
and as part of an “economic blockade” against Moldova in
retaliation for the Moldovan-Ukrainian border agreement (see
paragraph 41 above). Following this action by the “MRT”,
the withdrawal of Russian equipment and personnel had remained
frozen. On 14 March 2006 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe adopted a resolution calling upon Russia to cease its
cooperation with the “MRT” and remove its ammunition and
troops, but Russia had not complied. On 26 August 2008, the day on
which Russia acknowledged the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was reported as
having said that “the parties involved in the Transdniestrian
conflict are ready to come back to the 'Kozak Plan'”. The
applicants interpreted this comment, and particularly its timing, as
political blackmail by Russia of Moldova.
The
Court had examined the relationship between the Transdniestrian
separatists and the Russian Federation in the Ilascu judgment,
cited above, paragraphs 137-161. There was circumstantial evidence
indicating that the Russian Government enjoyed a close relationship
with the “MRT” leaders. The “Minister of Justice”
in the “MRT” between 2000 and 2005, Victor Balala, was a
member of the Russian Duma until 1996/1997. The “Chief of the
MRT Internal Security Service” was Vladimir Antiufeev, a former
Russian general. Most of the “MRT” leaders had Russian
citizenship and many had obtained it relatively recently. Russia had
protested at the European Union policy to refuse visas to the “MRT”
leaders. Representatives of Russia and Russian military equipment
were involved in annual parades celebrating “the creation of
the MRT”.
In
conclusion, the applicants emphasised that, as was also shown by the
reports of highly respected non-governmental organisations such as
International Crisis Group (see paragraphs 70-71 above), the actions
of the Russian Federation as a guarantor-State in the Transdniestrian
conflict undermined efforts to establish the rule of law and respect
for human rights in the region. Russia used its influence and control
over the “MRT” to pursue its own political and
geopolitical interests within the region. Russia bore responsibility
for the continued survival of the separatist regime and thus for the
violations of human rights suffered by the applicants.
2. The Moldovan Government
The
Moldovan Government accepted that Transdniestria fell within its
territorial jurisdiction. However, they emphasised that the
jurisdiction was not effective; Moldovan law could not be enforced
within the secessionist territory. They had referred to this
situation when Moldova made its reservation upon signing the
Convention.
The
“MRT” regime was not recognised at international level.
Nonetheless, although the Moldovan Government had not yet brought any
complaint before the International Court of Justice, they considered
that the “MRT” was politically, militarily and
economically sustained by the Russian Federation, in breach of the
principle of State sovereignty. In consequence, the Court had found
at paragraph 341 of the Ilaşcu and Others judgment that:
“... when confronted with a regime sustained militarily,
politically and economically by a power such as the Russian
Federation, there was little Moldova could do to re-establish its
authority over Transdniestrian territory.” Consequently, in
terms of international responsibility, the Republic of Moldova could
not be considered responsible for the actions performed by the
Transdniestrian separatists in connection with the linguistic and
ethnic persecution complained of by the applicants. Moreover, Moldova
had taken all measures within its power to secure the applicants'
rights.
The
Court had also held in Ilaşcu that the Russian
Federation's responsibility was engaged in respect of the unlawful
acts committed by the Transdniestrian separatists, regard being had
to the military and political support it gave them to help them set
up the separatist regime and the participation of its military
personnel in the fighting (paragraphs 382 and 394). The Moldovan
Government were therefore surprised by the statement made by the
Russian Government in its letter to the Court of 7 September 2007,
that the situation had changed since early 1990 and that
“Transdniestria is not a terra nullius in international law
terms, it makes itself known as a sovereign state”. In support
of this position the Russian Government had cited a report entitled
“State Sovereignty of Prednestrovskaia Moldavskaya Respublica
(Prednestrovie) under International law” prepared by the
International Council of democratic Institutions and state
Sovereignty (ICDISS). The ICDISS was the only organisation in the
world which had dared to publish a report taking a stance in direct
opposition to that taken by the international community. Moreover the
identity of the members of the ICDISS and their credibility were
seriously open to doubts: some commentators alleged that the
organisation had been established solely to represent Russian
interests in respect of the Transdniestrian conflict, others that its
reports were placed on the internet by Transdniestrian
counterfeiters.
3. The Russian Government
The
Russian Government emphasised that one of the necessary conditions
for State responsibility under international law was the possibility
of attributing the conduct in question to the State. They referred to
Chapter II of the ILC's Draft Articles and the case-law of the ICJ to
the effect that the conduct of persons other than the State's own
governmental authorities could be considered the acts of that State
only if they acted on the State's instructions or under its direction
and control, to the extent that there was a relationship of “complete
dependence” between the State authorities and the persons in
question and control in respect of each operation in which the
alleged violations occurred (see paragraphs 73-74 above). The
Convention formed part of international law and the Court should take
the judgments of the ICJ into account when interpreting it.
Moreover,
according to the Court's own case-law, in particular the decision in
Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting
States (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001 XII,
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention was primarily
territorial and it was only in exceptional circumstances that an act
performed extra-territorially could amount to an exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 1. One such example, referred to in
Banković (paragraph 70), was “when as a consequence
of military action (lawful or unlawful) [a State] exercised effective
control of an area outside its national territory” (and see
also Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March
1995, Series A no. 310 and Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no.
25781/94, ECHR 2001 IV). The Russian Government contended
that the Court's conclusion in the Ilaşcu judgment, cited
above, was incorrect as regards the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation. In Ilaşcu the Court did not apply the
“effective control” test applied in previous cases.
Instead, the Court held in Ilaşcu, paragraph 392, that:
“... the 'MRT', set up in 1991-92 with the
support of the Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and
its own administration, remains under the effective authority, or at
the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian
Federation, and in any event that it survives by virtue of the
military, economic, financial and political support given to it by
the Russian Federation”.
The
Court's reliance on Russia's “decisive influence”
involved an application of principles which were inconsistent with
the Banković decision and which should not be followed in
the present case. The Court's reasoning in Ilascu was flawed
in that it reversed the concepts of “jurisdiction” and
“responsibility”. In international law, confirmed in
Banković, “jurisdiction” was a primary notion
and “responsibility” was derivative. However, the Court
in Ilaşcu in effect held that since Russia had
“responsibility” for events in Transdniestria, it also
had “jurisdiction”.
In
any event, they contended that the present case was distinguishable
from Ilaşcu. The Court had found in Ilaşcu
that the applicants had been arrested in June 1992 with the
participation of soldiers of the 14th Army and this was the decisive
factor for the Court in attributing responsibility to the Russian
Federation, even though the arrest had taken place some six years
before Russia had ratified the Convention. In the present case there
was no involvement by Russian troops or other Russian State agents in
the closure of the Latin-script schools. Russia's only involvement
was as a mediator.
In
the Russian Government's submission, the de facto
Transdniestrian authorities had never been and were not currently
authorities of the Russian Federation, nor did they act on its
instructions or under its control. Russia was not an occupying power
in Transdniestria and had never assumed the role of the existing
Transdniestrian authorities. There was a great difference between the
situation in Transdniestria and that in Northern Cyprus. Not least,
the Court had found in Loizidou and in Cyprus v. Turkey
that there were over 30,000 Turkish troops stationed in Northern
Cyprus, deployed throughout the entire territory and in control of
communications. In contrast in Transdniestria there had been no
military intervention by Russia in order to exercise control. During
the period of the military conflict the Russian troops, who had only
just ceased to be Soviet troops and two-thirds of whom were natives
of the region, were caught out by events in the place where they had
been stationed for many years. The remainder of the ROG troops in
Transdniestria were not engaged in any active duties except guarding
the weapon stocks which were due to be moved out. In addition, there
were 400 Russian soldiers who formed part of the peace-keeping force
stationed in Transdniestria pursuant to international agreements. Any
subordination of the Transdniestrian authorities to the authorities
of the Russian Federation was out of the question; this was also
demonstrated by the fact that the local administration repeatedly
hindered efforts to remove the remaining Russian military equipment.
The local authorities had always retained their independence and
continued to do so. There was no evidence of any relationship of
control or coordination between the Russian Federation and the
Transdniestrian authorities in respect of the applicants' schools.
Transdniestria was an autonomous region within the Republic of
Moldova and the Russian Federation had never recognised its
independence.
The
Russian Government took issue with the applicants' claims that the
Russian Federation provided continuing economic support to the “MRT”.
They denied that the public company Gazprom supplied gas separately
to Transdniestria at more favourable rates. In fact, there was no
separate contract for the “MRT”: gas for the entire
territory of Moldova was supplied to Moldovagaz, which managed the
onward sale and distribution throughout the territory. Moldovagaz had
been created for this purpose in 1999 and was owned jointly by
Gazprom (50%), the Republic of Moldova (35.33%) and the “MRT”
(13.44%). The Russian Government also denied that they had given
support to the “MRT” by writing off a USD 1 billion debt.
The real position was more complex. Moldovagaz owed a debt of USD 1.8
billion to Gazprom for gas consumed but not paid for, of which USD
1.5 billion related to gas consumed in Transdniestria. Under Russian
domestic law, Gazprom was subject to heavy financial sanctions as a
result of the unpaid debt. However, it could not simply limit or stop
gas supplies to the Republic of Moldova, because it needed to use the
pipeline under Moldova to supply the Baltic countries. It therefore
entered into negotiations, which were still continuing, for an
acceptable solution. Part of the aim of the 2003-2004 agreement
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova was to
resolve the debt problem, by writing it off, and also to motivate the
“MRT” into consenting to the removal of an equivalent
value of military equipment. However, the negotiations failed and the
scheme was not implemented. The Russian Government accepted that they
had provided humanitarian aid to Transdniestria, but emphasised that
this was in accordance with international state practice and that
they had also provided such aid to other parts of Moldova and to
Ukraine. For example, in 2003-2004, when Moldova was affected by
drought, the Russian Federation had supplied it with grain. In 2006
and 2007, following another drought, the Russian Federation supplied
Transdniestria with food and medical aid and short-term credits to
help support the agricultural sector; in 2008 humanitarian aid was
provided to Ukraine, Moldova and Transdniestria, following a flood.
The
Russian Government denied the applicants' accusation that they had
attempted to put pressure on Moldova following the rejection of the
Kozak Memorandum by adopting economic sanctions. Moldovan wine was
banned from importation to Russia to protect the Russian market from
inferior produce. The measures complied with international trade laws
and applied equally to goods from the Transdniestrian region. The ban
was lifted in November 2007, following the inspection of Moldovan
winemakers by Russian specialists. Similar protective measures were
taken in relation to Moldovan meat, fruit and other crops but,
following an inspection process, imports resumed in 2007.
In
conclusion, the Russian Government did not accept that the facts in
issue fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. They
considered, however, that the events fell within the jurisdiction of
Moldova, as the Court had held in the Ilaşcu judgment,
cited above.
B. The Court's assessment
The
Court considers that the questions whether the applicants fall within
the jurisdiction of either or both of the respondent States is
closely linked to the merits of the applicants' complaints. It
therefore joins these preliminary questions to the merits.
II. WHETHER THE APPLICANTS HAVE EXHAUSTED DOMESTIC
REMEDIES
A. The submissions of the parties
1. The applicants
The
applicants contended that they were not obliged to exhaust any
domestic remedies since there were none which could offer redress.
Moldovan court decisions could not be executed on the territory
controlled by the “MRT” and so the applicants had not
lodged any application with the Moldovan courts but had instead
petitioned the Government directly.
2. The Moldovan Government
The
Moldovan Government submitted that since Moldova was the
internationally recognised sovereign State in respect of
Transdniestria, the applicants could have complained about the
alleged violations of the Convention before the Moldovan courts. It
would, however, have been impossible for any judgment to be
effectively enforced within the territory controlled by the MRT.
3. The Russian Government
It
was the Russian Government's position that, since Russia had no
jurisdiction, there were no remedies available to the applicants
under Russian law. However, the applicants should have used the
remedies provided by Moldovan law, since Transdniestria was an
integral part of Moldova.
B. The Court's assessment
It
is primordial that the machinery of protection established by the
Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human
rights. This Court is concerned with the supervision of the
implementation by Contracting States of their obligations under the
Convention. It cannot, and must not, usurp the role of Contracting
States whose responsibility it is to ensure that the fundamental
rights and freedoms enshrined therein are respected and protected on
a domestic level. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is
therefore an indispensable part of the functioning of this system of
protection. States are dispensed from answering before an
international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity
to put matters right through their own legal system and those who
wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns
complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies
provided by the national legal system (see Demopoulos and Others
v. Turkey [GC] (dec.), no. 46113/99, § 69, ECHR
2010-...).
Under
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention normal recourse should be had
by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to
afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of
the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in
theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite
accessibility and effectiveness (Akdivar and Others, cited
above, paragraph 66). The burden of proof is on the Government to
satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in
theory and in practice at the relevant time; that is to say, that it
was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in
respect of the applicant's complaints and offered reasonable
prospects of success. Once this burden of proof is satisfied, it
falls to the applicant to show that the remedy advanced by the
Government was in fact exhausted, or was for some reason inadequate
and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that
there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the
requirement (Akdivar and Others, cited above, paragraph
68). The exhaustion rule is, however, inapplicable where
an administrative practice, namely a repetition of acts incompatible
with the Convention and official tolerance by the State authorities,
has been shown to exist and is of such a nature as to make
proceedings futile or ineffective (see Ireland v. the United
Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 159, Series A no. 25; Akdivar
and Others, cited above, §§ 66-67; Denmark v. Turkey
(dec), no. 34382/97, 8 June 1999; Cyprus v. Turkey, cited
above, § 99).
The
Court recalls that the object of the present applications is to
obtain a declaration that the closure of the schools and subsequent
harassment of the pupils, parents and teachers fall within the
jurisdiction of both Moldova and Russia and that both States are
responsible for violations of the applicants' rights and under an
obligation to make redress. Other than petitioning the Governments of
the two respondent States, the applicants have made no attempt to use
national remedies.
Given
that it is the Russian Federation's position that events in
Transdniestria do not fall within its jurisdiction and that no
remedies would therefore be available through the Russian legal
system, it does not appear that the applicants had at their disposal
any remedies under Russian domestic law.
As
regards the complaints against the Republic of Moldova, it is common
ground between the applicants and the Moldovan Government that
judgments of Moldovan courts are unenforceable within the territory
controlled by the “MRT”. On the evidence before it, the
Court finds that this is the case; indeed, the lack of control by the
organs of the Moldovan State over the Transdniestrian administration
is at the heart of the application. Nor has it been demonstrated to
the Court's satisfaction that there exists any remedy within the
Moldovan domestic legal order which could have compelled the Moldovan
Government to take additional measures to seek to regain control over
Transdniestria or in some other way to ensure that inhabitants of the
region, such as the applicants, were secured their rights under the
Convention.
Finally,
it must be examined whether the applicants should have applied to the
“MRT” courts. In this respect the Court recalls its
findings in Cyprus v. Turkey and Demopoulos, both cited
above, that, in the interests of the inhabitants, international law
cannot entirely disregard the legal systems of de facto entities
unrecognised by the international community. To hold otherwise would
amount to stripping the inhabitants of such territories of all their
rights whenever they are discussed in an international context, which
would amount to depriving them even of the minimum standard of rights
to which they are entitled. Accordingly, the inhabitants of such
territories may be required to exhaust local remedies, unless their
inexistence or ineffectiveness can be proved – a point to be
examined on a case-by-case basis (Cyprus v. Turkey, cited
above, §§ 90-99; Demopoulos, cited above, §§
92-98). However, in the present case the impugned measures were taken
by the “MRT” authorities in order to enforce compliance
with the “MRT Constitution” and “MRT legislation”
on the use of languages. The Court has no evidence of the
availability of any effective remedy before the courts within the
“MRT” and, indeed, the respondent Governments do not
contend that the applicants should have attempted to make use of such
a remedy.
In
conclusion, the Court does not find that there were any domestic
remedies available to the applicants in respect of the complaints
they have raised before the Court. It concludes, therefore, that the
application should not be declared inadmissible on grounds of
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained of a violation of their rights under Article 3
of the Convention, which provides:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
They
contended that the events surrounding the closure of the schools and
the restrictions and harassment suffered by them because of the
prohibition of the use of the Moldovan/Romanian language in
Transdniestrian schools had caused extreme psychological suffering.
They submitted three reports prepared on 20 April and 18 May 2009 by
a psychologist of the Rehabilitation Centre of Torture Victims
“Memoria” (RCTV “Memoria”), a
non-governmental organisation based in Chişinău to provide
assistance to victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment. The reports contained a psychological evaluation
of the applicants based on the Hopkins Symptoms Checklist
(“HSCL-25”), which measures symptoms of anxiety and
depression and provides both a general and a depression score for the
test participants. A total score over 1.75 is correlated with severe
emotional distress of unspecified diagnosis and a depression score
over 1.75 is correlated with major depression. According to these
reports, 120 applicants, out of a total of 152 tested, reported
symptoms of anxiety and 108 reported symptoms of depression over the
1.75 threshold.
The
Court recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The
assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the
case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the
victim (see Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, §
95, ECHR 2008). The Court has considered treatment to be
“inhuman” because, inter alia, it was
premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either
actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. It has
deemed treatment to be “degrading” because it was such as
to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority
capable of humiliating and debasing them (see, among other
authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96,
§ 92, ECHR 2000-XI). Discriminatory treatment can in principle
amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3, where
it attains a level of severity such as to constitute an affront to
human dignity (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United
Kingdom, §§ 90-92, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series
A no. 94; Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§
305-311).
In
the present case, the applicants complain of discriminatory treatment
at the hands of the Transdniestrian authorities and allege that the
schools crisis has caused many of them severe levels of anxiety and
depression. They do not, however, provide any objective medical
evidence; the self-administered HSCL-25 tests are no substitute for
an examination and assessment by a mental health professional. The
Court does not doubt that the temporary closure of the schools and
the current situation, where the children are required to pursue
their studies in poor conditions with the fear of further
interference in the future, has caused some or all of the applicants
anxiety and depression. However, the evidence before it does not
support the view that the high threshold of Article 3 has been
reached. It therefore considers that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded and must be declared inadmissible in
accordance with Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained of a violation of their rights under Article 8
of the Convention, which provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
The
applicants underlined that, besides language and script, members of
the Moldovan community did not differ greatly from other ethnic
groups within the “MRT”. Ethnic Moldovans did not have
any racially distinctive features; nor did they practice a different
religion; they were united by language. For this reason, any
restriction on the right or opportunity to use the Moldovan language
and Latin script had a great impact on the cultural identity and
integrity of the Moldovan community in the “MRT”. The
applicant parents were not able freely to enjoy their right under
Article 8 to bring up their children to share their culture and
language. The applicant teachers suffered interference with their
right to exercise the profession for which they had trained. The
children studying at the Ştefan cel Mare secondary school in
Grigoriopol had to submit to searches and security checks twice a day
when they crossed the “border” between “MRT”
controlled and Moldovan controlled territory (see paragraph 60
above). The “MRT” border guards were frequently verbally
abusive. All the children, at all three schools, were subjected to
harassment from private individuals as a result of “MRT”
propaganda against ethnic Moldovans who wished to study in their
native language using the Latin script.
The
applicants contended that the interference with their Article 8
rights was not in accordance with the law, had no legitimate aim and
was disproportionate. The “MRT”, as an unrecognised
entity under international law, did not have the authority to adopt
legislation. Neither respondent Government had attempted to justify
the restrictions and abuse suffered by the applicants.
The
Court considers that the complaint under Article 8 raises serious
questions of fact and law, including the preliminary question whether
or not Article 8 applies to the facts of the case, which are of such
complexity that their determination should depend on an examination
on the merits. These complaints cannot, therefore, be considered
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention, and no other ground for declaring them inadmissible
has been established.
V. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF
PROTOCOL No. 1
The
applicants invoke Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 which provides:
“No person shall be denied the right to education.
In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with
their own religious and philosophical convictions.”
A. The submissions of the parties
1. The applicants
The
applicants stressed that from an early age, children learn the core
values of their society through the educational system. Disregarding
the children's interests, the “MRT” regime used the
schools conflict to attempt to compel the communities using the
schools to accept “MRT” rule. The “MRT”
authorities, with the assistance of the Russian Federation, were
attempting to put in place an educational system identical to that of
Russia. They were prepared to use physical force, psychological
pressure, misinformation, manipulation of the crowd and incitement of
ethnic and linguistic hatred to achieve their aims.
The
applicants emphasised that the “MRT” is an illegal
structure, unrecognised by the international community, and that its
so-called “law” and “Constitution” could have
no legal effects. According to the “MRT law”, the
applicants' schools were classified as “non-governmental
associations”. The 2004 “resolution” of the
“Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria”, which held that there
should be no public schools within the region which were not under
“MRT” administration, had not been amended or abolished.
The schools' activity, therefore, continued to be illegal according
to “MRT law” and their future was precarious.
Furthermore, as a result of the actions of the “MRT”
authorities, the children were forced to study in very difficult
conditions (see paragraphs 45-62 above).
The
applicants, who are Moldovan citizens, asked only that the children
should be permitted to be educated in the Moldovan official language
and in accordance with the curriculum and standards applied by the
Moldovan Ministry of Education.
2. The Moldovan Government
According
to the information available to the Moldovan Government, education in
the three schools which were the subject of the present applications
was currently being carried out in the official Moldovan language,
using the Latin script, and based on curricula approved by the
Moldovan Ministry of Education and Youth (MEY). The applicants had
not provided any evidence to prove that the “MRT”
authorities had been successful in their attempts to impose the
Cyrillic script and an “MRT” curriculum. The MEY owned
the premises, managed the schools, paid the teachers and provided
educational materials and other assistance. Qualifications obtained
in the schools could be registered with the MEY, which would issue
the student with an equivalent Moldovan educational document, which
could be used to gain access to higher education in Moldova or
abroad. Thus, despite the attempts of the “MRT”
authorities, the children were receiving an education in their own
language and according to the convictions of their parents.
3. The Russian Government
The
Russian Government emphasised that since Transdniestria was part of
Moldovan territory it was not possible for them to verify the facts
as claimed by the applicants. They had, however, been involved in the
international mediation process organised under the aegis of the
OSCE. They observed that “according to the laws of
Transdniestria, the right to education is guaranteed to its citizens
in accordance with the generally accepted international standards
fixed in the constitution of the region” and that “the
education process [in Transdniestria] complied with the state
educational standards equivalent to the standards of other CIS
countries.”
According
to the Russian Government, the “MRT” regime considered
that the six Romanian language schools, including the applicants'
schools, had broken “MRT law” by failing to register with
the local authorities, effecting financial transactions when
unregistered and carrying out educational activities without a
licence. The “MRT” authorities took the view that Moldova
had blocked their efforts to formalise the schools' position. The
“MRT” had made a number of compromises. In 1996-97
temporary licences for educational activity had been issued to the
three schools which were the subject of the present case, on the
condition that before the expiry of the temporary licences the
schools would bring themselves into line with Transdniestrian
educational standards. However, the schools failed to comply with
this condition and did not complete the registration and
accreditation processes. In 2002-2003 the “Ministry of
Education” had written to the head of the OSCE mission in
Moldova on seven occasions, informing him of the situation. In Spring
2003 the OSCE made efforts to reach a compromise solution, but this
was not acceptable to the applicants' schools. The Russian Government
emphasised repeatedly that they had had no control over nor
involvement in the acts of the Transdniestrian authorities in closing
the schools temporarily, relocating them or cutting their supplies.
In
its case-law under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 the Court usually
examined the particular facts in the context of the legal, social and
cultural conditions within the State concerned. It would be
impossible to determine the merits of the present case in
abstracto, before the Court had first reached a conclusion about
the jurisdiction of the respondent States in relation to
Transdniestria.
B. The Court's assessment
The
Court considers that these complaints raise serious questions of fact
and law which are of such complexity that their determination should
depend on an examination on the merits. These complaints cannot,
therefore, be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and no other ground for
declaring them inadmissible has been established.
VI. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF
THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE
CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The
applicants further complained of a breach of the above provisions
taken in conjunction with Article 14, which states:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
They
alleged that they had been the victims of discriminatory treatment by
the Transdniestrian separatist regime because of their ethnicity and
language.
The
Court recalls that Article 14 complements the other substantive
provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent
existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those
provisions (see, amongst many authorities, Şahin v. Germany
[GC], no. 30943/96, § 85, ECHR 2003-VIII).
The
Court has held, above, that the ill-treatment complained of did not
meet the threshold of Article 3. It follows that the complaint under
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 3 is also inadmissible
as manifestly ill-founded.
The
Court has declared the applicants' complaints under Article 8 of the
Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 admissible. It notes that
the applicants complain that they are discriminated against by the
Transdniestrian authorities because of their Moldovan ethnicity and
mother tongue, which are grounds of discrimination prohibited by
Article 14. It considers that these complaints raise serious
questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their
determination should depend on an examination on the merits. These
complaints cannot, therefore, be considered manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and no
other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides
to join the applications;
Joins to the merits the question whether the applicants fall
within the jurisdiction of either or both respondent States;
Declares admissible the complaints under Article 8 of the
Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone and in
conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, against the Republic
of Moldova and the Russian Federation, without prejudging the merits;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
ANNEX
43370/04
CATAN and Others v. Moldova and Russia
|
No.
|
Applicant
|
Date
of birth
|
Permanent
address
(city)
|
Date of introduction of the
application
|
-
|
CATAN Alexei
|
02/06/1962
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
CATAN Elena
|
09/10/1988
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
TIHOVSCHI Andrei
|
09/12/1958
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SARACUŢA Victor
|
20/08/1967
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SARACUŢA Doina
|
14/10/1990
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SARACUŢA Tatiana
|
16/05/1996
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
CRIJANOVSCHI Anastasia
|
11/11/1969
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
CRIJANOVSCHI Oxana
|
24/11/1990
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
CRIJANOVSCHI Olesea
|
20/11/1994
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
PRIMAC MARIA
|
04/05/1961
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
PRIMAC Ana
|
18/06/1991
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
CACEROVSCHI Lilia
|
14/10/1969
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
CACEROVSCHI Andrei
|
07/01/1990
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
CACEROVSCHI Tatiana
|
31/08/1995
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
DUBCEAC Dora
|
12/11/1957
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
DUBCEAC Vladimir
|
22/07/1993
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SCRIPNIC Tatiana
|
29/08/1961
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SCRIPNIC Corneliu
|
25/04/1989
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
BULGAC Elena
|
29/01/1968
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
BULGAC Cristina
|
18/04/1998
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
BULGAC Diana
|
29/05/1990
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SAFONOVA Lidia
|
26/12/1967
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SAFONOVA Olesea
|
14/04/1990
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SAFONOVA Alisa
|
18/06/1995
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
PETELIN Tatiana
|
13/06/1969
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
PETELIN Daniel
|
15/06/1994
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SALEBA Tatiana
|
24/05/1969
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
-
|
SALEBA Iana
|
26/09/1989
|
Râbniţa
|
25/10/2004
|
18454/06 CERCAVSCHI and Others v. Moldova and Russia
|
No.
|
Applicant
|
Date
of birth
|
Permanent
address
(city)
|
Date of introduction of the
application
|
-
|
CERCAVSCHI Eleonora
|
11/09/1960
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
JMACOVA Nadejda
|
05/04/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
MUNTEAN Ion
|
03/03/1958
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
MUNTEAN Dumitru
|
17/09/1991
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
JITARIUC Svetlana
|
31/03/1960
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
JITARIUC Laura
|
01/10/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PAVALUC Nadejda
|
08/05/1969
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PAVALUC Andrei
|
19/03/1991
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PAVALUC Ion
|
11/01/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BRIGALDA Svetlana
|
02/09/1971
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BRIGALDA Serghei
|
08/10/1967
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIRILIUC
Natalia
|
24/05/1966
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIRILIUC Tatiana
|
26/04/1991
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIRILIUC Mihail
|
08061997
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
FRANŢUJAN Tatiana
|
22/03/1968
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
FRANŢUJAN Victoria
|
31/10/1988
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
FRANŢUJAN Elena
|
23/05/1990
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
FRANŢUJAN Tatiana
|
01/02/1971
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PLOTEAN Viorelia
|
25/08/1968
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PLOTEAN Cristina
|
03/07//1990
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PLOTEAN Victoria
|
13/02/1992
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ROŞCA Nicolae
|
17/12/1957
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ROŞCA Victoria
|
09/04/1990
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
RACILA Zinaida
|
10/04/1965
|
Râbniţa
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
RACILA Ludmila
|
03/01/1989
|
Râbniţa
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
RACILA Ecaterina
|
01/02/1991
|
Râbniţa
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GORAŞ Vladimir
|
31/07/1967
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GORAŞ Valeriu
|
29/06/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GORAŞ Angela
|
30/07/1970
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
COJOCARU Mariana
|
16/10/1974
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
COJOCARU Doina
|
06/11/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
COJOCARU Corina
|
11/09/1996
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
COJOCARU Andrei
|
03/06/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
COJOCARU Elena
|
03/06/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BODAC Ion
|
02/06/1962
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BODAC Tatiana
|
24/07/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ROTARU Emilia
|
17/08/1968
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ROTARU Ion
|
30/08/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ROTARU Mihai
|
16/08/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CALANDEA Galina
|
18/01/1974
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CALANDEA Iurie
|
30/10/1967
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIRICOI Natalia
|
27/02/1964
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIRICOI Dumitru
|
06/08/1992
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ZEABENŢEV
Andrei
|
28/12/1997
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GAZUL Svetlana
|
23/02/1967
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GAZUL Victor
|
05/08/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GAZUL Constantin
|
26/11/1992
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TARAN Igor
|
30/01/1969
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TARAN Olga
|
03/03/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
IVANOV Lidia
|
31/03/1967
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
IVANOV Cristina
|
30/09/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BOVAR Natalia
|
15/07/1971
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BOVAR Alexandru
|
12/08/1992
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BOVAR Ana
|
14/12/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GAVRILAŞENCO Maria
|
04/02/1964
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GAVRILAŞENCO Olga
|
08/10/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PALADI Natalia
|
24/05/1979
|
Doroţcaia
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
SANDUL Serghei
|
07/07/1970
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
SANDUL Liubovi
|
15/08/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GAZ Diana
|
21/05/1987
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TRANDAFIR Natalia
|
24/11/1987
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GOLOVCO Irina
|
05/05/1987
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GOLOVCO Elena
|
14/06/1987
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TIRON Ana
|
19/06/1987
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TIRON Valentina
|
01/07/1955
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TRANDAFIR Galina
|
26/08/1964
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TULCII Igor
|
07/07/1963
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
TULCII Olga
|
01/10/1987
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PARVAN Elena
|
22/10/1973
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PARVAN Natalia
|
26/09/1993
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
PARVAN Vitalie
|
29/06/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BALTAG Tamara
|
13/09/1961
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BALTAG Igor
|
16/12/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BALTAG Liuba
|
18/11/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GOGOI Svetlana
|
14/08/1977
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
GOGOI Nicolae
|
20/05/1998
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
MONOLATI Svetlana
|
16/08/1975
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIŞCARI Ghenadie
|
19/12/1961
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIŞCARI Egor
|
23/09/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
NAZARET Natalia
|
13/11/1958
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
NAZARET Elena
|
14/04/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
NAZARET Gheorghe
|
04/08/1958
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
POGREBAN Ludmila
|
07/07/1968
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
MASLENCO Boris
|
07/07/1966
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
MASLENCO Tatiana
|
20/05/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
MASLENCO Valentina
|
02/02/1966
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
MASLENCO Ion
|
25/05/1992
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
CHIRICOI Liuba
|
16/04/1960
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BACIOI Anatoli
|
29/08/1960
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BACIOI Irina
|
24/05/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BACIOI Nina
|
18/08/1962
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BACIOI Mariana
|
24/05/1989
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BOZU Nina
|
18/07/1966
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BOZU Nicolae
|
11/10/1964
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
BOZU Sergiu
|
20/11/1988
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ARCAN Liuba
|
10/02/1977
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
ARCAN Irina
|
08/10/1994
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
STANILA Raisa
|
18/02/1961
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
-
|
STANILA Svetlana
|
20/12/1988
|
Grigoriopol
|
04/04/2006
|
8252/05 CALDARE and Others v. Moldova and Russia
|
No.
|
Applicant
|
Date
of birth
|
Permanent
address
(city)
|
Date of introduction of the
application
|
-
|
CALDARE Elena
|
15/08/1969
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CALDARE Ruxanda
|
02/02/1992
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
GĂINĂ Maria
|
17/11/1967
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
GĂINĂ Victoria
|
02/04/1989
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
GĂINĂ Alina
|
15/12/1992
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
PĂDURARU Constantin
|
02/06/1967
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
PĂDURARU Elena
|
08/06/1995
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
MUNTEANU Raisa
|
04/08/1958
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
MUNTEANU Iulia
|
21/02/1994
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
MUNTEANU Veronica
|
24/09/1987
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
SAVA Maria
|
18/10/1960
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
SAVA Roman
|
22/12/1990
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
SAVA Ştefan
|
22/12/1990
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CARACACI Claudia
|
05/06/1959
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CARACACI Ala
|
04/02/1987
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CARACACI Oxana
|
04/03/1988
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
ŢOPA Maria
|
30/06/1955
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
ŢOPA Ana
|
30/01/1987
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
TELIPIS Olga
|
24/10/1955
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
TELIPIS Alexandra
|
26/05/1990
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
TELIPIS Cristina
|
26/05/1990
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
BURAC Tamara
|
31/08/1965
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
BURAC Irina
|
04/04/1986
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
BURAC Dorin
|
14/07/1994
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CÎRLAN Valentina
|
01/04/1969
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CÎRLAN Artiom
|
08/07/1991
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CÎRLAN Sergiu
|
28/05/1995
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
BEIU Elena
|
06/07/1970
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
BEIU Vladimir
|
28/05/1991
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
ŢURCANU Tamara
|
06/10/1963
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
ŢURCANU Andrei
|
29/09/1987
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CALMÎC Ecaterina
|
05/07/1971
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
CALMÎC Vadim
|
10/12/1992
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
RÎJALO Larisa
|
01/04/1966
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
RÎJALO Rodica
|
07/10/1989
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
SIMONOV Aurelia
|
18/09/1970
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
GRIŢCAN Natalia
|
04/09/1994
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
GRIŢCAN Olga
|
31/07/1996
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
LIULICA Victoria
|
28/04/1963
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
LIULICA Elena
|
10/05/1990
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
LIULICA Maxim
|
26/05/1987
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
DOCHIN Elena
|
29/09/1965
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
-
|
DOCHIN Cristina
|
08/08/1989
|
Bender/Tighina
|
20/12/2004
|
