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RABAN v. ROMANIA - 25437/08 [2010] ECHR 1625 (26 October 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/1625.html
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[2010] ECHR 1625
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF RABAN v. ROMANIA
(Application
no. 25437/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26
October 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Raban v. Romania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet Fura,
Corneliu
Bîrsan,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Egbert
Myjer,
Ineta Ziemele,
Luis López Guerra,
judges,
and Santiago Quesada,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 5 October 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 25437/08) against Romania
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by an Israeli and Dutch national, Mr David Raban
(the first applicant), in his name and on behalf of his children, Ela
and Ilan Matzliah Raban (the second and third applicants), on 28 May
2008.
The
applicants were represented by Mr E. Freedman, a lawyer practising in
Tel Aviv. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr. Razvan-Horatiu
Radu, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The
Dutch Government, to whom a copy of the application was transmitted
under Rule 44 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court, did
not exercise their right to intervene in the proceedings.
The first applicant, acting in his own name and in his capacity as
the legal representative of his children (the second and third
applicant), alleged, in particular, that there had been a violation
of Articles 8 and 6 of the Convention.
On
11 February 2009 the President of the Third Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
first applicant, Mr David Raban, is an Israeli and Dutch citizen, who
was born in 1957 and lives in Yehud, Israel. The second and third
applicants are his children, Ela Raban, born in 2003, and Ilan
Matzliah Raban, born in 2004. They currently live in Romania with
A.R., their mother.
The
first applicant and A.R. got married in 2002 in Cyprus. The two had
already lived together as a couple in Israel for six months before
the wedding. In 2003 and 2004 respectively, their two children, Ela
and Ilan Matzliah, were born in Israel. Their last place of residence
in Israel was Bat Hefer.
In
2006, as explained by the applicant, the couple, who had joint
custody of the children, agreed that the mother and the two children
would visit the mother's family in Romania for six months. On 27
April 2006, the mother and the children left for Romania; according
to their roundtrip airline tickets, they were scheduled to be back on
24 October 2006.
However,
they never returned to Israel; on 3 November 2006, A.R.'s mother
informed the first applicant that A.R. and the children would remain
in Romania.
Subsequently,
the first applicant filed for the return of his children, under the
Hague Convention (proceedings described under no. 1 below), while
A.R. filed for divorce and custody of the children with the Romanian
courts (proceedings described under no. 2 below).
A. Proceedings for the return of the children lodged
under the Hague Convention
On
8 November 2006 the first applicant filed a request for the return of
his children under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the
Hague Convention”). The request was submitted through the
Israeli Ministry of Justice to the Romanian Ministry of Justice (“the
Ministry”). The first applicant claimed that his wife was
wrongfully retaining their children in Romania, without his consent.
On 14
February 2007 the Ministry, acting as the Central Authority for the
purpose of the Hague Convention, instituted proceedings on behalf of
the first applicant before the Bucharest District Court of the Fourth
Precinct.
On
the basis of the evidence adduced in the case, which included a
“psychological evaluation of the children”, the District
Court found on 11 October 2007 that the retention of the
children in Romania was illegal under Article 3 of the Hague
Convention, as at the time of the retention the father had lawful
custody rights. It also held that the allegations of A.R. according
to which the first applicant had agreed that the children should
remain in Romania as his financial situation in Israel was
precarious, confirmed by the witness M.-A. T., who stated that
neither the applicant, nor A.R. had a job in Israel, were however
unsubstantiated, as the first applicant had proved that he had made
attempts to rent a house for the family, had enrolled the children in
a local kindergarten and was regularly in contact with the children
by phone.
The
defence raised by A.R. under Article 13 § 1 b) of the Hague
Convention was also dismissed by the court; it considered that the
“state of insecurity” invoked and the “general
threat of terrorist attacks” arising in Israel had not proved
to be an obstacle to the family living in Israel for more than five
years prior to the children's removal, and could not be regarded as
having developed to a dangerous degree at that time. The court
ordered that the children be returned to their habitual residence in
Israel no later than three weeks after the judgment became final.
A.R.
filed an appeal against this decision, which was allowed by the
Bucharest Court of Appeal in a final judgment of 7 January 2008.
Out of the panel of three judges, Judge M.H. gave a dissenting
opinion, favouring the reasoning of the first-instance court.
The
majority's decision was based on two conclusions: firstly, that
Article 3 of the Hague Convention was not applicable to the
case, in so far as the children, Romanian citizens, had left Israel
and remained in Romania upon the agreement of the parents; secondly,
that in any event, the exception provided for by Article 13 1 b) of
the Convention was substantiated, as it had been proved that, if
returned to Israel, the children would risk exposure to physical or
psychological harm.
The
appellate court thus found that the children had left Israel and
remained in Romania with the consent of their father, due to the
worsening of his financial situation. The agreement between the
parents was for the children to stay in Romania until the first
applicant's financial situation improved –in that respect, even
the fact that they had bought roundtrip tickets, which were cheaper
than one-way tickets, only underlined the financial difficulties the
family was undergoing; however, as time passed, the evidence showed
that this situation had kept worsening, since the first applicant had
sold the house where they had lived as a family, after the departure
of A.R. with the children, and gone to live with his mother. Also,
the first applicant had not produced any evidence to support his
claim that he had sent money to his children.
The
court further held that the first applicant had not proved that he
had maintained contact with his children; in the file there was only
evidence of one visit paid by the first applicant to his children, on
3 October 2007; the phone calls allegedly made by the first applicant
to his children in Romania had been made from the house of the first
applicant's mother, which was interpreted as meaning that the
conversations had been between the children and their paternal
grandmother.
Hence,
the agreement between the spouses regarding the children remaining in
Romania proved to be real and such an agreement could by no means be
regarded as breaching Article 3 of the Hague Convention.
Moreover,
the evidence in the file showed that the two children had integrated
into the Romanian community successfully – they had good
results at kindergarten and positive psychological evaluations –
arguments which supported a dismissal of the first applicant's
action. The court also held that “the evaluation of the
children carried out by the General Department for Social Assistance
and Child Protection in the presence of a counsellor revealed that no
assessment could be made of the possible effects of the separation of
the father from his children, insofar as there was insufficient
information with regard to the father-children relationship”.
The
defence under Article 13 § 1 b) of the Hague Convention, namely,
that there was a grave risk of exposing the children to intolerable
physical harm if returned to Israel, was also allowed. The court
based their reasoning, inter alia, on “the reports
produced by Amnesty International”, which stated according to
the court, that Bat Hefer was located in a conflict area, where
citizens feared for their safety. At the same time, the court based
its reasoning on travel advice issued in January 2008 by the US State
Department, in which warnings were allegedly made about “potential
conflicts which could arise between the Israelis and the
Palestinians”, and “signs of possible terrorist attacks
in the area” were referred to.
In a
dissenting opinion to the judgment, Judge H.M. underlined that the
above-mentioned documents “did not actually refer specifically
to Bat Hefer, but to other regions of Israel”.
The
applicant was never given a copy of the above-mentioned reports. In a
certificate issued by the Ministry of Justice on 29 May 2008 to the
applicant it was mentioned that neither the Amnesty International
reports, nor the US State Department release were to be found in the
domestic case file.
B. Divorce and custody proceedings lodged under
Romanian law
On
6 March 2007, A.R. filed for divorce, custody of the children and
maintenance before the Bucharest District Court of the Fourth
Precinct.
On
24 September 2008 the first applicant (defendant), represented by an
appointed lawyer, presented his observations in reply to A.R.'s
claims. He contended that the Romanian courts did not have general
jurisdiction in such proceedings, in so far as the marriage was
registered in Cyprus, the defendant was an Israeli and Dutch citizen,
the couple's children were Israeli citizens, and the last marital
home had been in Israel.
He
also lodged counterclaims asking the courts to either grant him full
custody of the two children, or to order their return to their
habitual residence in Israel.
On
18 November 2008, the court rejected the first applicant's plea
regarding the lack of jurisdiction, considering that “the
Romanian courts did have full jurisdiction in such cases, pursuant to
Council
Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility”.
In
its judgment of 19 December 2008, the district court granted A.R a
divorce on the grounds of exclusive fault by the first applicant.
Based
on the conclusions of a social enquiry report on the children's
concrete situation, which held that they were well taken care of and
benefited from a good standard of living, and taking into
consideration their ages (5 and 4, at that time), the court awarded
custody of the children to the mother. The court found that it was in
their best interest to remain with their mother, her care and
presence being a psychological factor which was absolutely essential
for their intellectual, moral and physical development.
In
the absence of any proof regarding the first applicant's employment
and/or income, the court referred to the national minimum wage scale
and ordered him to pay monthly maintenance in the amount of 90 RON in
respect of each child, starting on 6 March 2007 and until they
reached the age of majority.
Neither
the first applicant, nor A.R. have lodged any appeals against this
judgment, which thus became final and enforceable.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The
relevant legal provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction are to be found in Iosub
Caras v. Romania, no. 7198/04, 27 July 2006 and Deak v.
Romania and the United Kingdom, no. 19055/05, § 58, 3 June
2008.
The
Hague Convention was ratified by Romania by Law no. 100 of
16 September 1992.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that the right to respect
for their family life had been violated by the appellate court that
dealt with the Hague Convention proceedings. They thus complained
about the outcome of the proceedings, which they considered to be
contrary to the Hague Convention. Moreover, as the domestic court had
based its final reasoning on documents that were not available to the
parties (see paragraph 15 above) and in so far as that court had
misinterpreted both the applicable legal provisions and the evidence
before it, the whole trial had allegedly been unfair. They
relied on Articles 8 and 6 § 1 of the Convention, which read as
follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court firstly notes that the first applicant lodged this case also on
behalf of his two children, the second and third applicants.
According to the Court's extensive case-law, the standing as the
natural parent suffices to afford him or her the necessary power to
apply to the Court on the children's behalf, too, in order to protect
the children's interests (see Scozzari
and Giunta v. Italy [GC],
nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 138, ECHR 2000-VIII, Sylvester
v. Austria (dec.), nos. 36812/97 and
40104/98 (joined), 26 September 2002 and Iosub
Caras, cited above, § 21).
Secondly,
the Court finds that the complaints raised by the applicants are
essentially directed against the merits of the impugned decision,
concerning the issue of an alleged international abduction of
children. The Court thus estimates that the main legal issue
raised by this application concerns the applicants' right to a family
life, as provided for by Article 8 of the Convention. It therefore
considers that its examination should exclusively address the issue
raised under Article 8 of the Convention, and that therefore it is
not necessary to examine whether there has also been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (mutatis mutandis, Kamil
Uzun v. Turkey, no. 37410/97, § 64, 10 May 2007;
Amanalachioai v. Romania, no. 4023/04, §
63, 26 May 2009; Macready v. the Czech
Republic, nos. 4824/06 and 15512/08, §
67, 22 April 2010).
The
Court notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must
therefore be declared admissible.
Merits
1. The parties' submissions
The
Government contended that the judgment given on 7 January 2008
was in compliance with the provisions of the Hague Convention,
considering the particular circumstances of the case. In particular,
the appellate court found that the removal of the children with the
consent of the father fell outside the scope of the Hague Convention,
in accordance with its Articles 3 and 14; it further considered that
the mother, A.R., had proved that the children were settled and
integrated in their new environment.
Moreover,
on 19 December 2008 the domestic courts allowed the divorce claim
lodged by A.R., giving her full custody of the two children (the
second and third applicants).
However,
if the Court were to find that there had been an interference with
the applicants' right to family life, the Government considered that,
for the reasons enumerated below, the interference was prescribed by
law, had a legitimate aim and was not excessive:
The
interference had a legal basis in the Hague Convention, namely in
Article 13 § 1 b). The legitimate aim of the measure was the
protection of the minors' rights and interests, in so far as, when
giving the impugned judgment, the appellate court took into account
the actual standard of living the children would have had if they
returned to Israel to live with their father (see, mutatis
mutandis, Bianchi v. Switzerland, no. 7548/04, §§
78, 80, 22 June 2006).
The
measure imposed was proportionate and necessary in a democratic
society, with a view also to the fact that the Bucharest Court of
Appeal found Article 3 of the Hague Convention not to be applicable
to the circumstances of the case.
The
first applicant disagreed with the Government's point of view.
Firstly, he underlined that the consent given to the second and third
applicants travelling to Romania was not the equivalent of consent to
them relocating, which meant that Article 3 of the Hague Convention,
regulating both the unlawful removal and retention of children, was
applicable.
Furthermore,
Article 12 of the Hague Convention provided that the courts could
look into arguments regarding children's settlement in a new
environment only if one year had passed between the date of the
alleged abduction and the commencement of the proceedings under the
Hague Convention. The applicant, however, had lodged his claims
within one year of the abduction, which meant that the respective
defence argument used by the domestic courts and by the Government
was inadmissible.
At
the same time, the applicant alleged that, according to the Hague
Convention, the best interests of the child were served by deterring
abductions and insuring the prompt return of those who had been
abducted, the courts in Hague Convention proceedings being charged
with determining the jurisdiction which would resolve the issue of
the best interests of the child.
Moreover,
the applicant contended that under Article 17 of the Hague
Convention, a subsequent custody decision could not constitute
grounds for refusing a return, nor could the economic circumstances
of the petitioner be such a ground.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
In
its recent ruling in Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland
([GC], no. 41615/07, §§ 131 – 140, 6 July 2010,
with further references) the Court articulated and summarized a
number of principles that have emerged from its case-law on the issue
of the international abduction of children, as follows:
(i) The Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum, but,
in accordance with Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (1969), account is to be taken of any relevant
rules of international law applicable to the Contracting Parties
(Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC],
nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, § 90, ECHR 2001 II).
(ii)
The positive obligations that Article 8 of the Convention
imposes on the States with respect to reuniting parents with their
children must therefore be interpreted in the light of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of
25 October 1980 (Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99,
§ 72, ECHR 2003 VII and Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania,
no. 31679/96, § 95, ECHR 2000 I).
(iii)
the Court is competent to review the procedure followed by the
domestic courts, in particular to ascertain whether those courts, in
applying and interpreting the provisions of the Hague Convention,
have secured the guarantees of the Convention and especially those of
Article 8 (see, to that effect, Bianchi, cited above, §
92 and Carlson v. Switzerland, no. 49492/06, § 73, 6
November 2008).
(iv) In this area the decisive issue is whether a fair balance
between the competing interests at stake – those of the child,
of the two parents, and of public order – has been struck,
within the margin of appreciation afforded to States in such matters
(see Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05,
§ 62, ECHR 2007 XIII), bearing in mind, however, that the
child's best interests must be the primary consideration (see, to
that effect, Gnahoré v. France, no. 40031/98, §
59, ECHR 2000 IX).
(v)
“The child's interests” are primarily considered to be
the following two: to have his or her ties with his or her family
maintained, unless it is proved that such ties are undesirable, and
to have his or her development in a sound environment ensured (see,
among many other authorities, Elsholz v. Germany [GC], no.
25735/94, § 50, ECHR 2000 VIII, and Maršálek
v. the Czech Republic, no. 8153/04, § 71, 4 April 2006). The
child's best interests, from a personal development perspective, will
depend on a variety of individual circumstances, in particular his
age and level of maturity, the presence or absence of his parents and
his environment and experiences.
(vi)
A child's return cannot be ordered automatically or mechanically when
the Hague Convention is applicable, as is indicated by the
recognition in that instrument of a number of exceptions to the
obligation to return the child (see in particular Articles 12, 13 and
20), based on considerations concerning the actual person of the
child and its environment, thus showing that it is for the court
hearing the case to adopt an in concreto approach to it (see
Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 72).
(vii)
The task to assess those best interests in each individual case is
thus primarily one for the domestic authorities, which often
have the benefit of direct contact with the persons concerned. To
that end they enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, which remains
subject, however, to a European supervision whereby the Court reviews
under the Convention the decisions that those authorities have taken
in the exercise of that power (see, for example, Hokkanen
v. Finland, 23 September 1994, § 55, Series A
no. 299 A, and Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99,
§§ 65-66, ECHR 2002 I; see also Tiemann
v. France and Germany (dec.), nos. 47457/99 and 47458/99,
ECHR 2000 IV; Bianchi, cited above, § 92; and
Carlson, cited above, § 69).
(vii) In
addition, the Court must ensure that the decision-making process
leading to the adoption of the impugned measures by the domestic
court was fair and allowed those concerned to present their case
fully (see Tiemann, cited above, and Eskinazi and Chelouche
v. Turkey (dec.), no. 14600/05, ECHR 2005 XIII
(extracts)). To that end the Court must ascertain whether the
domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire
family situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a
factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and
made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests
of each person, with a constant concern for determining what the best
solution would be for the abducted child in the context of an
application for his return to his country of origin (see Maumousseau
and Washington, cited above, § 74).
29. Moreover,
as already stated in Varnava and Others v.
Turkey [GC], nos.
16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90,
16072/90 and 16073/90, § 164, ECHR
2009 ...:
“in
line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is best for the facts of
cases to be investigated and issues to be resolved in so far as
possible at the domestic level. It is in the interests of the
applicant, and the efficacy of the Convention system, that the
domestic authorities, who are best placed to do so, act to put right
any alleged breaches of the Convention”.
(b) Application of the general principles
to the present case
The
Court notes, firstly, that it is common ground that the relationship
between the applicant and his children, the other two applicants,
falls within the sphere of family life under Article 8 of the
Convention.
The
Court reiterates that the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of
each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of family life
and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an
interference with the right protected by Article 8 (see Monory v.
Romania and Hungary, no. 71099/01, § 70, 5 April 2005, and
Iosub Caras, cited above, § 29).
The
events under consideration in the instant case amounted to an
interference with the applicants' right to respect for their family
life, as it restricted the enjoyment of each other's company.
The Court must accordingly determine whether the
interference in question was “necessary in a democratic
society” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article
8 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of the above-mentioned
international instruments, the decisive issue being whether a fair
and proportionate balance between the competing interests at stake –
those of the children, of the two parents, and of public order –
was struck, within the margin of appreciation afforded to States in
such matters (see paragraph 27 above, (iv)).
Under
Article 3 of the Hague Convention, the removal or retention of a
child is to be considered “wrongful” where it is in
breach of rights of custody attributed to a person under the law of
the State in which the child was “habitually resident”
immediately before the removal or retention.
In
the present case, the children were born and raised in Israel, which
should therefore be regarded as their “habitual residence”
for the purposes of the Hague Convention. The first applicant and his
wife exercised jointly, under Israeli law, parental responsibility
and rights of custody over their children.
However,
based on the evidence freely adduced in the domestic case-file, the
appellate court found it to be proved that the first applicant had
given his consent for the children's removal to and retention in
Romania until the improvement of his financial situation, which
rendered Article 3 of the Hague Convention inapplicable in such
circumstances (see paragraph 12 above).
Furthermore,
the inapplicability of Article 3 of the Hague Convention was not the
sole argument that led the national jurisdiction to refuse to order
the return of the children. The other arguments put forward by the
appellate court, based on the children's best interests and the
proof, provided by the mother and the domestic social institutions,
that they had integrated into their new environment successfully,
were contrasted with the existing evidence of their being exposed to
a “grave risk or psychological harm” if taken back to
Israel, which made the exception provided for by Article 13 § 1
b) of the Hague Convention applicable (see paragraph 14 above).
The
Court reiterates that the concept of the child's best interests
should be paramount in the procedures put in place by the Hague
Convention. Consideration of what serves best the interests of
the child is therefore of crucial importance in every case of this
kind. In this context, it must be borne in mind that the national
authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons
concerned, it being for the court hearing the case to adopt an in
concreto approach to it (see also paragraph 27 above).
In
the present case, the Court sees that the appellate court did take
into consideration the parties' arguments concerning the consent
given by the father to the retention, and they also provided
reasoning for their interpretation of the provisions of Articles 3
and 13 § 1 b) of the Hague Convention.
Evidence
was included in the file on behalf of both parties to the
proceedings. Relying on the documents submitted by the parties, on
the psychological evaluation of the children, and on the testimonial
statements in the file, the domestic court evaluated the factual
circumstances of the case; it found that the father in fact gave his
consent to the relocation, in so far as his financial situation was
perilous; the court also found that the children were very well
integrated into their new social environment and that they were well
taken care of by their mother, it also having been established that
the first applicant had not visited his children but on one occasion
(paragraph 12) and that he had not sent them any money for support.
These
findings were reiterated, mutatis mutandis, in the subsequent
proceedings regarding divorce and custody matters (see the
conclusions of the domestic court summarized in paragraph 19 above),
and in this context it is to be noted that the first applicant has
not in any way challenged the findings of the domestic court, nor has
he formulated any civil action concerning his visiting rights or
rights to have personal relations with his children.
As
the Court has already held many times, it cannot question the
assessment of the domestic authorities, unless there is clear
evidence of arbitrariness (see, among others, Perlala v. Greece,
no. 17721/04, § 25, 22 February 2007, and Sisojeva and Others
v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 89, ECHR 2007 II).
No
such clear evidence of arbitrariness appears in the present case; on
the contrary, the appellate court has examined the case and given a
judgment paying particular consideration to the principle of the
paramount interests of the children– who were very young (3 and
2 respectively) at the time of their departure from Israel, and who
now appeared to be very well integrated in the new environment (see,
mutatis mutandis, Neulinger
and Shuruk cited above, §§ 145,
148).
The
Court finds therefore no imperative reason to depart from the
domestic court's findings in the case (see also Iosub Caras,
cited above, §37).
The
Court concludes that, having particular regard to the State's margin
of appreciation in the matter and to the in concreto approach
required for the handling of cases involving child-related matters,
the Bucharest Court of Appeal's assessment of the case in the light
of the Hague Convention requirements did not amount to a violation of
Article 8 of the European Convention (see, conversely, Monory,
cited above, §§ 81-83), as it was proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 8 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 October 2010, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall
Registrar President
