British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
PETR KOROLEV v. RUSSIA - 38112/04 [2010] ECHR 1572 (21 October 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/1572.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 1572
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF PETR KOROLEV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 38112/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 October
2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Petr Korolev v.
Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens, judges,
and André
Wampach, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 September 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 38112/04) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Petr Vasilyevich Korolev
(“the applicant”), on 10 September 2004.
The
applicant was represented by Ms Y. Gavrilova, a lawyer practising in
Vladivostok. The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mrs V. Milinchuk, former Representative of the
Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
On
24 January 2008 the Court declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate the complaints concerning
length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant and
non-enforcement of a foreign judgment in his favour to the
Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1951 and lived in Vladivostok.
A. Labour dispute
On
17 July 1995 the commanding officer of a military unit appointed the
applicant as deputy master of the medium tanker (MT) Argun. On
25 July 1995 the command of the auxiliary fleet service of the
Russian Pacific Fleet sent the applicant on a trade mission to
Singapore. On 1 September 1995 the commander of the military
unit appointed him as master of MT Argun. The applicant
remained in this post until 10 April 1999.
Between
28 April 1994 and 5 April 1996 the tanker was leased out by the State
Committee for Management of the Property of the Russian Federation
(“the State Property Committee”) to a private company
Inakva Co. The lease agreement stipulated that the tanker
was to be staffed by the auxiliary fleet service of the Pacific Fleet
which also paid the staff’s wages in the Russian national
currency. Inakva Co was obligated to cover the part of the
staff’s wages that was paid in foreign currency and the tanker
maintenance costs.
On
5 April 1996 the State Property Committee signed a new lease
agreement with an American company National Pacific Limited.
On
an unspecified date the applicant and his crew brought proceedings in
the High Court of South Africa for the unpaid wages earned by them in
1995, 1996 and 1999.
On
25 May 1999 the tanker was arrested in Cape Town, South Africa,
pending adjudication of the dispute.
By
judgment of 25 November 1999 (of 13 August 1999 according to the
documents submitted by the Government), the High Court of South
Africa declared the Russian Federation to be the lawful owner of the
vessel.
On
12 March 2001 the Ministry of State Property of the Russian
Federation, the successor of the State Property Committee, signed a
new lease agreement with a private company Oil Compact, which
was obligated to undertake all possible measures to release the
tanker from arrest.
By
final judgment of 12 September 2002 the High Court awarded the
applicant 79,750.79 United States dollars against the vessel MT Argun
and interest at the rate of 15.5% per annum on that amount. The MT
Argun was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs and
travel expenses. It was also decided that the vessel would be sold at
an auction to cover the court awards.
On
16 May 2003 the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa heard the
parties’ appeals and upheld the judgment of 12 September 2002.
On
21 November 2003 the Ministry of State Property and Ministry of
Defence signed an agreement with a private agent OAO Sovfrakht
seeking release of MT Argun from arrest and its transfer to
the Russian Military Fleet. On the same day OAO Sovfrakht
signed an agreement with a third party Avangard-2 Shipping Company
S.A. which won the auction and bought the vessel.
On
16 January 2004 the MT Argun was handed over to the Russian
Military Pacific Fleet.
According
to the applicant, in June and July 2006 he received part of the
judicial award in the amount of 7,156 USD in respect of the wages and
4,752 USD in respect of the accrued interest.
On
4 May 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against the State
complaining of the actions (inaction) of the Federal Agency for
Management of State Property in respect of his claims for unpaid
wages and seeking to recover the said wages in the amount of 72.547
USD as well as legal expenses and non-pecuniary damage. On 5 May 2006
the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok declined jurisdiction in
the case. This decision was upheld by the Primorye Regional Court on
28 June 2006.
Thereafter,
the applicant brought the same claims before the Tverskoy District
Court of Moscow. On 3 October 2006 the District Court declined
jurisdiction in favour of a justice of peace. This decision was
upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 February 2007. It appears that
the applicant did not bring his claims to any other court.
B. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
On
25 November 2002 the authorities initiated criminal proceedings in
respect of the applicant in connection with his claims in the South
African court.
On
17 March 2003 the applicant was charged with fraudulent acquirement
of title to the property of the Russian Federation and other related
crimes. On the same day his case was sent for preliminary
investigation to the military prosecutor’s office of the
Pacific Fleet, and the applicant was ordered not to leave town.
On
26 August 2003 the preliminary investigation was stayed pending the
applicant’s convalescence. On 5 December 2003 the investigation
was resumed.
Between
16 January 2004 and 17 June 2005 the applicant and his legal counsel
studied the case file.
On
20 June 2005 the case was submitted for trial by the Leninskiy
District Court of Vladivostok (“the District Court”) and
was assigned to judge I.
On
6 July 2005 the applicant requested that the preparatory hearing be
postponed due to his counsel’s illness.
On
17 November 2005 the District Court refused to examine the case and
ordered the prosecution to redraft the bill of indictment tainted
with a number of defects. The case was returned to the court on
29 November 2005.
On
12 January 2006 the hearing did not take place as the judge was
involved in different proceedings.
The
hearing of 13 January 2006 also did not take place due to the
applicant’s illness. The proceedings were stayed pending his
convalescence.
On
6 July 2006 the proceedings resumed, but the hearing did not take
place as the applicant’s counsel did not appear.
On
12 July 2006 the applicant was granted leave to study the new bill of
indictment until 21 July 2006.
On
24 July 2006 the court granted the applicant’s request to send
the case back to the prosecutor for re-drafting of the bill of
indictment. The case was returned to the court on 18 August 2006 and
was assigned to judge P.
The
hearings scheduled for September and October 2006 did not take place
due to the applicant’s illness.
In
November 2006 the court began hearing the case on the merits. The
court adjourned the proceedings in November 2006, January and June
2007, each time for a week, due to the applicant’s or his
counsel’s illness.
On
25 June 2007 the court adjourned the proceedings for ten days as the
judge was away on a study trip.
The
hearings of 24 December 2007 and 25 January 2008 did not take place
following the applicant’s and his counsel’s failure to
appear.
By
judgment of 11 March 2008 the applicant was convicted of fraudulent
acquirement of title to property by way of obtaining of the court
award of allegedly unpaid wages, and received a suspended sentence of
five years’ imprisonment.
On
2 June 2009 the applicant died.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Code of Civil Procedure of the RSFSR of 1964 in
force until 1 February 2003
Article
437 provided that the procedure for enforcement of foreign judgments
was determined by the relevant international treaties. It further
stated that a judgment of a foreign court could be submitted for
enforcement within three years after its adoption.
B. Code of Civil Procedure of Russia in force as of 1
February 2003
Article
409 provides that judgments of foreign courts concerning civil
matters are recognized and enforced in Russia pursuant to a pertinent
international treaty. It further stipulates that such judgments can
be submitted for enforcement within three years after their adoption.
Article
410 provides that a request for enforcement of a foreign judgment
should be filed with a regional court or other court of equal
standing at the place of the debtor’s residence or location.
Article
411 sets out the rules of procedure applying to the requests for
enforcement of foreign judgments.
C. Decision of the Supreme Court of Russia of 7 June
2002 № 5 Г02 64
The
court ruled that lack of a pertinent international treaty cannot be
cited as grounds for refusal of a request for enforcement of a
foreign judgment. It further stated that such a request can be
granted in the event that the courts of the relevant foreign State
recognize the judgments of the Russian courts on the basis of
reciprocity. It ordered that the lower court verify whether such
reciprocity existed in the case at hand and inquire into the
existence of other international treaties concerning the two relevant
States that might concern co-operation in the legal and judicial
domain.
D. Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family and
Criminal Cases of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 1993
The
Convention requires that that all members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, including Russia, Ukraine and Belarus grant the
citizens of the other member States the national legal regime in all
legal matters. Section III determines the reciprocal order of
recognition and enforcement of the decisions taken by legal bodies in
civil, family and criminal cases.
THE LAW
I. LOCUS STANDI
The
Court takes note of the applicant’s death and of the wish of
Ms Koroleva, his widow, to pursue the proceedings he initiated.
The Court reiterates that where an applicant dies
during the examination of a case his or her heirs may in principle
pursue the application on his or her behalf (see Ječius v.
Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 41, ECHR 2000-IX). Furthermore,
in some cases concerning non-enforcement of court judgments and
length of proceedings, the Court recognised the right of the
relatives of the deceased applicant to pursue the application (see
Shiryayeva v. Russia, no. 21417/04, §§ 8-9,
13 July 2006 concerning the non-enforcement; Horváthová
v. Slovakia, no. 74456/01, § 26, 17 May 2005, in the context
of the length of proceedings).
The
Court notes that the rights at stake in the present case are very
similar to those at the heart of the cases referred to above. Nothing
suggests that the rights the applicant sought to protect through the
Convention mechanism were eminently personal and non-transferable
(see Malhous v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 33071/96, §
1, 12 July 2001). The Government did not contend that Ms Koroleva had
no standing to pursue the case. Therefore, the Court considers that
the applicant’s widow has a legitimate interest in pursuing the
application.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 AND ARTICLE 1
OF PROTOCOL No. 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF NON-ENFORCEMENT
The
applicant complained that the Russian authorities’ failure to
fully pay him the award made by the judgment of 12 September 2002
violated the rights guaranteed to him by Article 6 § 1 and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention. The relevant
provisions read as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
Admissibility
The
Government firstly submitted that the judgment of 12 September
2002 of the High Court of South Africa was not enforceable in Russia
due to the lack of a pertinent agreement between Russia and South
Africa. They further argued that in any event the applicant should
have at least attempted to apply to a national court pursuant to
Articles 410 and 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requesting
enforcement of the judgment and, by failing to do so, he had not
exhausted the available domestic remedies. They Government contended
that the suggested remedy was effective and cited to this effect
three decisions delivered by the Supreme Court of Russia, two of
which upheld enforcement in Russia of the court judgments adopted
previously in Ukraine and Belarus.
The
applicant retorted that application to a national court with a
request for enforcement of the judgment would have been ineffective
in his case as there was no pertinent agreement between Russia and
South Africa required by Article 409 of the Civil Code. He argued
that for this reason the legal precedents cited by the Government
were not applicable to his situation.
The
Court is cognisant of the fact that according to its previous
findings, a person who has obtained a judgment against the State may
not be expected to bring separate enforcement proceedings due to the
fact that the defendant State authority must be duly notified
and is thus well placed to take all necessary initiatives to comply
with it or to transmit it to another competent State authority
responsible for compliance (see Akashev v. Russia, no.
30616/05, § 21, 12 June 2008). At the same time, the Court
admitted in the past that a successful litigant may be required to
undertake certain procedural steps in order to recover the judgment,
provided that the required formalities do not gravely restrict or
reduce his access to the enforcement proceedings (see Shvedov v.
Russia, no. 69306/01, § 32, 20 October 2005).
Turning
to the present situation, the Court observes that the link between a
court of one State and the authorities of another State is not as
immediate and evident as that between the judicial and enforcement
authorities of the same State. It is clear that in the modern
environment most States choose to install a special implementation
procedure for the judgments adopted by other States, unless they have
previously agreed to a different standard. Therefore the Court
considers it reasonable to distinguish the applicant’s
situation from the one where both adjudication of the dispute and
implementation of the judgment occur in the same national legal
system. It will now look at what remedies were available to the
applicant.
The
Court reiterates that the only remedies required by Article 35 of the
Convention to be exhausted are those that relate to the breaches
alleged and at the same time are available and sufficient. It is
incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the
Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in
practice at the relevant time, which was capable of providing redress
in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offered reasonable
prospects of success. However, once this burden of proof has been
satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy
advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some
reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of
the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or
her from the requirement (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no.
25803/94, §§ 75 76, ECHR 1999 V).
Following
this approach, the Court recalls that indeed in arguing for the
effectiveness of the suggested remedy, the Government drew on the
precedents available in respect of the countries with which Russia
does have an international treaty providing for mutual recognition
and enforcement of each other’s judgments (see para. 41 above).
It is satisfied that no such treaty exists between Russia and South
Africa. At the same time, in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Russia of 7 June 2002 cited above (paragraph 40), it is
cognisant that the Russian legal system does not exclude enforcement
of the judgments adopted by the courts of the State with which Russia
has no pertinent agreement and authorizes the courts of general
jurisdiction to consider other relevant factors when examining the
case. Seeing that the cited decision was already in force at the time
the applicant obtained a judgment of the South African court in his
favour, the Court cannot accept the applicant’s argument that
lack of a relevant agreement between two States automatically
rendered the most obvious legal remedy in his case ineffective and
his potential attempts to take advantage of it superfluous. It
considers that, especially in view of the fact that the applicant had
explored several other avenues of action to attain his goal, no
objective circumstance existed that would have made it impossible for
him to file a request with a national court for enforcement of the
judgment.
Regard
being had to the above, the Court concludes that the applicant had
not exhausted the available domestic remedies. Therefore, this
complaint should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§
1 and 3 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings
against him was incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement as provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The
relevant part of the invoked provision reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that the greater part of the length of the
criminal proceedings had been attributable to the applicant. In
particular, they refer to the lengthy time taken up by the applicant
and his counsel to study his case file, as well as numerous incidents
of his or his counsel’s illness and his requests for
adjournment. They further argued that the case had been complex
having concerned an accusation of fraud committed in a foreign State
and involved multiple evidence in a foreign language. The case also
required examination of approximately thirty-four volumes of
documents, forty witnesses and three experts. Finally, they contended
that the domestic court had not idled, scheduled regular hearings and
swiftly examined all procedural matters.
The
applicant disputed the number of examined witnesses and documents and
blamed the prosecution for having added up to the volume of the case.
The
Court observes that the criminal proceedings against the applicant
commenced on 25 November 2002 and ended on 11 March 2008.
Accordingly, it took the domestic authorities approximately five
years and four months to examine the case at one level of
jurisdiction.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the applicant’s conduct and the conduct of the competent
authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier
and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR
1999-II).
The
Court accepts that the applicant’s criminal case bore a certain
degree of complexity having concerned an allegation of fraud
committed in a foreign State and involved a significant amount of
evidence in a foreign language. However, it cannot accept that the
complexity of the case, taken on its own, was such as to justify the
overall length of the proceedings (see, among others, Antonov v.
Russia (dec.), no. 38020/03, 3 November 2005).
As
regards the applicant’s conduct, the Court takes cognisance of
the Government’s submission that a large gap in the proceedings
occurred when the applicant took time to study the case file and that
numerous adjournments happened due to the applicant’s illness.
The Court accepts that the applicant cannot be blamed for taking
advantage of the procedural rights available to him and is satisfied
that an illness constitutes an objective factor responsible for the
delay. At the same time it is of the opinion that the State cannot
bear the responsibility for this either.
Insofar
as the behaviour of the authorities is concerned, the Court observes
that the remittal of the case to the prosecution for correction of
defects on two occasions led to a delay of approximately six weeks.
The adjournment of two hearings due to the judge’s
unavailability also did not hold back the proceedings significantly.
The Court notes that the authorities demonstrated sufficient
diligence in handling the applicant’s case. The hearings were
scheduled regularly, and the adjournments were short.
Having
regard to the relative complexity of the case, significant delays
attributable to the applicant and the authorities’ expeditious
treatment of the case, the Court is satisfied that the “reasonable
time” requirement was not breached in the present case.
There
has, accordingly, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 on this
account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the length of
the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 October 2010, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Christos Rozakis
Deputy Registrar President