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KUCZERA v. POLAND - 275/02 [2010] ECHR 1280 (14 September 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/1280.html
Cite as:
[2010] ECHR 1280
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KUCZERA v. POLAND
(Application
no. 275/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 September 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kuczera v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 August 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 275/02) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Jerzy Kuczera
(“the applicant”), on 14 July 2000.
The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by
Mr Z. Cichoń, a lawyer practising in Cracow. The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołasiewicz of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been deprived of his
right of access to a court, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention.
On
9 February 2006 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3 of the Convention).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Pleśna.
The
applicant and his brother, S.K., leased a substantial area of farming
land. After the applicant had been hospitalised, he asked his brother
to gather the crops. The applicant submits that his brother sold the
crops and the agricultural machines which they co-owned and took all
the profits.
On
6 October 1998 the applicant brought a claim against his brother in
the Tarnów Regional Court, seeking 73,095 Polish zlotys (PLN)
in compensation. He also sought an exemption from court fees
(PLN 4,985.70).
On
21 October 1998 the Regional Court exempted the applicant from court
fees. On 2 November 1998 it granted legal aid to the applicant.
On
16 November 1998 the applicant modified his claim by joining his
brother's wife as a defendant. He also requested the court to issue
an interim order to secure his claims by way of, inter alia,
registering a charge over the defendants' property and attaching
their bank accounts. On 2 December 1998 the applicant
submitted some additional information requested by the court in
relation to his request for an interim measure. On 6 April 1999
the Regional Court granted the interim order in part.
On
28 April 1999 the applicant increased his claim to PLN 123,035.
On
28 May 1999 the Regional Court revoked the applicant's exemption from
court fees and the decision to grant him legal aid. The Regional
Court considered that the information in the file indicated that the
applicant was not an indigent person unable to pay court fees and
other costs related to the litigation. It noted that the applicant
owned two houses and that in 1998 he had had 16,000 United States
dollars deposited in the bank. Thus, the Regional Court found that
the applicant had not submitted accurate information about his
financial status. Consequently, it imposed a fine on the applicant in
the amount of PLN 100.
On
17 June 1999 the applicant appealed against that decision. He
contested the court's findings. The applicant submitted that a charge
had been registered over his property in Gromnik, while the other
property, located in Pleśna, was a small house where he lived
with his extended family. He further stated that all his savings had
been invested in the farming of the leased land and that he had been
deprived of any profits by his brother. He further submitted that his
only income was a modest invalidity benefit.
On
6 July 1999 the Cracow Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
appeal. It relied on the fact that the applicant had failed to
disclose all the relevant information about his financial status in
his original application for an exemption from court fees.
On
23 July 1999 the Tarnów Regional Court ordered the applicant
to pay PLN 4,985.70 in court fees. On 28 July 1999 the applicant
applied for leave to pay the relevant fees in instalments. He claimed
that he had been receiving invalidity benefit and could not pay the
amount in question all at once. He also submitted that he could not
take up any offers of work because of his poor health.
On
10 September 1999 the Regional Court granted the applicant leave to
pay the court fees in ten monthly instalments. Until March 2000 the
applicant paid six instalments.
On
20 February 2000 the applicant increased his claim to PLN 470,400,
following the submission of a number of documents by the defendant
which indicated the amount of profit made from the jointly leased
land.
On
23 March 2000 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay
PLN 21,445.30 in court fees for the modification of his claim.
On
27 March 2000 the applicant requested the court to exempt him from
those court fees and to cancel the four remaining monthly instalments
he was supposed to pay. The applicant submitted that his only income
was an invalidity benefit in the monthly amount of PLN 578.46 and
that he was unfit for work. He stated that he had been hospitalised
from 11 September until 4 October 1999 and that he had
subsequently broken his spine and had again been hospitalised. He
further submitted that he had transferred his property in Pleśna
by way of a donation to his children. The other property, located in
Gromnik, was a wooden house in need of renovation and lacking basic
amenities. The applicant also supported two of his children aged 13
and 18. His wife worked at a school and her monthly salary was PLN
497. He did not have any savings and owned a four year-old
Polish car.
On
30 March 2000 the Tarnów Regional Court refused the
applicant's request for exemption from the court fees. It held,
referring to the case-law of the Supreme Court from 1935 and 1937,
that the donation of the applicant's property to his children should
be treated as a fraudulent disposal of the property with a view to
fulfilling the eligibility requirements for exemption from court
fees. Additionally, the Regional Court considered that the applicant
had adult children who had an obligation to support him financially
if necessary. That obligation extended, in the court's view, to
helping the applicant in funding the court proceedings.
Furthermore,
the Regional Court considered that the applicant could have sold some
of his property or mortgaged it. That way, in the court's view, the
applicant would have been able to secure sufficient means for funding
the litigation. The Regional Court underlined that the applicant's
case was not one in which it had been necessary to file a claim
immediately. The court observed that a party intending to institute
court proceedings had to take into account the costs involved and
secure them in advance from the income received over a longer period
of time. Only in exceptional cases, when the immediate institution of
proceedings was necessary (on account of the limitation of actions),
could a party rely exclusively on his or her current income.
The
Regional Court considered that the applicant, when increasing his
claim to PLN 470,400, had to take into account the obligation to pay
the relevant fees, even more so given that it had not been necessary
to modify his claim at that particular time.
The
applicant appealed against the Regional Court's decision. He
submitted that he had not disposed of any of his property in order to
obtain an exemption from court fees since he still owned the property
in Gromnik. However, that latter property did not generate any
profit. The applicant disagreed with the Regional Court regarding the
motives behind his donation. He stated that he had simply wanted to
provide for his children's future. The applicant emphasised that he
had no possibility of securing the required amount of court fees and
that the impugned decision had been based on speculation about his
financial status. Replying to the Regional Court's argument about the
possibility of securing the necessary funds over a period of time,
the applicant submitted that given his current level of income and
his incapacity for work, he would never be able to secure the
necessary funds.
On
9 May 2000 the Cracow Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the
Regional Court. It further concurred with the Regional Court's
finding that disposing of the applicant's property in Pleśna by
way of donation could not justify another exemption from court fees.
It
appears that on a later unknown date the applicant paid the remaining
four instalments and the court proceeded with the examination of the
merits of the case.
Following
a request of 21 June 2002, the Tarnów Regional Court exempted
the defendants S.K and H.K. from the court fees at a session held in
camera on 9 July 2002.
On
11 January 2003 the applicant once again increased his claim to
PLN 672,729.50 (instead of the initial PLN 73,095). The court
fee was set at PLN 31,581 and the applicant asked for an
exemption. The request was dismissed by the Tarnów Regional
Court on 19 March 2003. The court held that while it was true that
the applicant and his wife supported themselves from small invalidity
pensions, the applicant owned a house in Pleśna. The court
stressed that since the applicant had donated his property to his
children, they should have helped him with the court fees. Lastly,
the court held that the applicant did not justify the increased claim
by any new facts or evidence but merely asked for a higher sum. On 15
May 2003 the Kraków Court of Appeal upheld this decision
repeating the same reasons.
At
a hearing held on 6 April 2004 the applicant again decided to modify
his claim and increased it, this time to PLN 123,035 (instead of the
PLN 73,095). On 7 April 2004 the Tarnów Regional Court
dismissed his request to exempt him from court fees. The court
referred to the reasons previously given.
On
8 November 2004 the Tarnów Regional Court gave judgment and
dismissed the applicant's claim. The judgment became final on
22 December 2004.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The
legal provisions applicable at the material time and questions of
practice are set out in paragraphs 23-33 of the judgment delivered by
the Court on 19 June 2001 in the case of Kreuz v. Poland (no.
28249/95, ECHR 2001-VI; see also Jedamski and Jedamska v.
Poland, no. 73547/01, §§ 29 39).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF LACK OF ACCESS TO A COURT
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that
the excessive court fees required from him for proceeding with his
claim had been in breach of his right of access to a court for the
determination of his civil rights. The relevant parts of Article 6 §
1 provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal established by law. ...”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant maintained that the sum required from him for proceeding
with his claim had been unusually high and disproportionate to his
means. It had been much higher than his yearly income. He had not had
any savings since he had invested them in a farming venture. The
courts had further failed to take into consideration his state of
health and his actual earning capacity. In addition, they had
required him to mortgage his property in order to obtain means for
paying the court fees.
The
applicant concluded that his right of access to a court had been
breached.
(b) The Government
The
Government firstly recapitulated the general rules concerning
exemption from court fees.
Secondly
they noted that although the applicant had initially been exempted
from court fees by the Regional Court, the court had later verified
the applicant's financial situation and revoked the exemption. They
maintained that the applicant had failed to satisfy the conditions
for an exemption from court fees as set out in Article 113 § 3
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The
Government maintained that the courts had acceded to the applicant's
request and allowed him to pay the court fees in monthly instalments
despite the fact that he had submitted fraudulent information about
his financial status.
Lastly,
they stressed that the domestic authorities had displayed particular
diligence in handling the applicant's case. All decisions had been
reasoned carefully and in a detailed manner.
In
sum, the Government invited the Court to find that there had been no
violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Principles deriving from the Court's
case-law
The
Court observes that in its judgment in Kreuz v. Poland
(cited above, § 60) it dealt with the question whether the
requirement to pay substantial fees to civil courts in connection
with claims could be regarded as a restriction on the right of access
to a court.
In
this connection the Court held that the amount of the fees assessed
in the light of the particular circumstances of a given case,
including the applicant's ability to pay them, and the phase of the
proceedings at which that restriction had been impose, were factors
which were material in determining whether or not a person had
enjoyed his right of access and had “a ... hearing by [a]
tribunal”.
(b) Application of the above principles to
the present case
The
Court will now determine whether, in the particular circumstances of
the present case, the fee actually required constituted a restriction
that impaired the very essence of the applicant's right of access to
a court.
The
Court firstly notes that the case concerned the applicant's claim for
compensation against his brother for alleged deception. The fee in
the case was determined as a fraction of the value of the claim,
namely the amount of compensation sought.
The
Court observes that while the authorities initially exempted the
applicant from the fees due in his case, they subsequently revoked
the exemption in particular because he had failed to disclose all the
relevant information about his financial status (see paragraphs 8 and
11-13 above). They further refused to accept the applicant's
arguments that he was unable to pay the court fees and that he was
unfit for work. They assessed his financial situation on the ground
that he owned property which, in their opinion, he could have sold or
mortgaged. In addition, they stressed that the applicant had adult
children to whom he donated his house, who should have helped him to
finance the court proceedings. On that basis, they concluded that the
applicant could have procured sufficient funds to pay the court fees
in question (see paragraphs 12, 20 and 21).
The
Court further observes that the applicant on four occasions
significantly increased the value of his claim. Eventually he sought
an amount considerably higher than the first claim (see paragraphs 7,
10, 16, 26 an 27 above). In this respect it must be stressed that
applicants who deliberately inflate the value of their claims for
compensation cannot be expected to be exempted entirely from the
payment of court fees or from the requirement to contribute in a
reasonable amount to the costs of taking the action (see Kupiec
v. Poland no. 16828/02, § 49, 3 February 2009).
The
Court further notes that despite the exaggerated amount of
compensation claimed by the applicant, on two occasions the domestic
authorities exempted him from the court fees due. In addition, they
allowed him to pay the fees in monthly instalments (see paragraphs 8,
15 and 24 above). Lastly, the Court observes that the Tarnów
Regional Court eventually examined the merits of the applicant's
original claim (see paragraph 28 above).
In
the circumstances, the Court considers that the amount of fees
required from the applicant in the present case cannot be considered
a disproportionate restriction on his right of access to a court.
The
Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings relating to his application for an interim measure had
been excessive. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,
which provides, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal...”
The
Court observes that the alleged violation occurred in the course of
the interlocutory proceedings relating to the application of an
interim measure (see paragraph 9 above). Even assuming that Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention is applicable to the proceedings at issue
(see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06,
§ 83-86, ECHR 2009 ...), the Court notes that in any event
they ended on 6 April 1999, thus more than six months before the date
on which this complaint was submitted.
It
follows that this part of the application has been introduced out of
time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1
and 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that he had not had an effective remedy
in respect of the length of the interlocutory proceedings. He relied
on Article 13 of the Convention.
The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law,
Article 13 applies only where an individual has an “arguable
claim”
to be the victim of a violation of a Convention right (see
Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, § 157,
ECHR 2000 XI). In view of its
conclusions above (see paragraph 46), the Court considers that the
applicant has no arguable
claim of a
violation of his rights under other provisions of the Convention
which would have required a remedy within the meaning of
Article 13.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and
must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning lack of access
to a court admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of lack of access to
a court.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 September 2010,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza Deputy Registrar President
