FIRST SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.
56305/08
by Gordana GETOŠ-MAGDIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 24 June 2010 as a Chamber composed of:
Christos
Rozakis,
President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly
Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George
Nicolaou,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 27 October 2008,
Having regard to the partial decision of 3 September 2009,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Gordana Getoš Magdić, is a Croatian national who was born in 1968 and lives in Osijek. She is represented before the Court by Ms J. Rincenau, a lawyer practising in Freiburg (Germany), and Ms Ana - Marija Getoš, the applicant's sister. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Ms Š. StaZnik.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Background to the case
In 1991 and 1992 the Osijek Police reported finding, at various locations in Osijek, a number of corpses showing signs that the victims had been murdered. At some point in 2001 the police, at the request of the State Attorney, commenced an inquiry into allegations that during the years 1991 and 1992 a number of civilians had been tortured and executed in Osijek, Croatia. A large number of individuals who had knowledge of these events were interviewed by the police. A voluminous case file was compiled and the inquiry resulted in the identification of the supposed perpetrators, one of whom was the applicant.
In the afternoon of 18 October 2006 an unspecified number of police officers from the Osijek Police department arrived at the applicant's house with a view to taking her to the police station in order to interview her in connection with a suspicion that she had committed war crimes against the civilian population. However, the applicant was not found at home and between 5 and 6 p.m. the Head of the Osijek Police Department telephoned the applicant and told her to come to the Osijek Police Department in order to respond to the said suspicion. At about 8 p.m. on the same day the applicant, accompanied by her father, arrived at the Osijek Police Department. The applicant was immediately separated from her father and taken to an interview room. According to the applicant, she was kept there and questioned continually by the police for fifty-three hours and forty minutes, until about 1.30 a.m. on 21 October 2006. According to the record of the applicant's questioning by the police, she was questioned from 5.25 p.m. on 20 October 2010 until 0.15 a.m. on 21 October 2006. The record was signed by the applicant and her counsel without comment.
2. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
(a) Investigation
On 20 October 2006 the Osijek-Baranja Police Department filed a criminal complaint against five individuals, including the applicant, alleging that there was a reasonable suspicion that during 1991 and 1992 they had committed war crimes against the civilian population.
On 21 October 2006 the investigating judge heard evidence from the five suspects.
On 22 October 2006 the Osijek County Court investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicant and five other suspects in connection with suspected war crimes against the civilian population in 1991 and 1992 in Osijek. Several defendants lodged an appeal against the decision ordering the investigation. The appeals were dismissed on 2 November 2006 by a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court.
On 3 and 13 November 2006, respectively, two other investigations in respect of two further suspects were joined to that concerning the applicant.
On 3 and 6 November 2006 the investigating judge of the Osijek County Court heard evidence from six witnesses. On 13 November 2006 the investigating judge examined the applicant. Since her counsel denied her further services, the judge appointed new counsel for the applicant.
On 24, 27, 29 and 30 November and 1 December 2006 the investigating judge heard evidence from twenty witnesses.
On 4 December 2006 the applicant found new counsel for herself.
On 5 December 2006 the investigating judge ordered the exhumation of two unidentified corpses for DNA analysis.
On 7 December 2006 the investigating judge heard evidence from four witnesses. On 11 December 2006 he heard evidence from two medical experts and six witnesses. On 12, 13 and 14 December he heard evidence from eighteen witnesses. On 15 December 2006 the judge ordered that a forensic examination be carried out. On the same day he heard evidence from a further six witnesses. On 18 December 2006 the forensic expert submitted his report. On the same day the investigating judge heard evidence from six witnesses and on 20 December 2006 from one more witness. On 21 December 2006 the judge heard evidence from the forensic expert. On 22 December 2006 the exhumation of two corpses was carried out.
On 28 December 2006 the judge heard evidence from the applicant.
On 5 January 2007 medical experts submitted their report on the DNA analysis of the two exhumed corpses.
On 12, 17, 22 and 30 January and 1 February 2007 the investigating judge heard evidence from a further eighteen witnesses. On 5 February 2007 the judge held consultations with defence counsel for all defendants. On 7 and 8 February 2007 the judge heard evidence from thirteen witnesses and on 9 February 2007 from two of the defendants. On 14 February 2007 the judge heard evidence from six witnesses, on 15 February 2007 he heard evidence from a medical expert. On 22, 23 and 27 February and 1, 5 and 7March 2007 the judge heard evidence from one defendant and twenty-three witnesses. On 22, 27 and 29 March and 2 and 3 April 2007 the judge heard evidence from two defendants and sixteen witnesses.
(b) Criminal trial
On 16 April 2007 the applicant and six other defendants were indicted before the Osijek County Court for war crimes against the civilian population, an offence under section 120 of the Croatian Criminal Code. The applicant was accused of illegal arrests, torture and liquidation of a number of civilians.
Between 20 and 30 April 2007 all defendants lodged objections to the indictment (prigovor protiv optuZnice). The objections were all dismissed on 22 May 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court and the indictment became final.
On 29 May 2007 the Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction to the Zagreb County Court (Zupanijski sud u Zagrebu) and the proceedings continued before that court.
On 26 June 2007 the applicant's counsel informed the Zagreb County Court that she no longer represented the applicant.
At the hearings held before the Zagreb County Court on 15, 17 and 18 October and 5 November 2007 the parties gave their lists of evidence, commenting on the evidence proposed by their opponents, and the court decided what evidence from the lists was to be called. At hearings on 3, 4, 5, 7, 14 and 20 December 2007 and 7 and 8 January 2008 the seven defendants gave their evidence.
On 11 January 2008 the County Court commissioned a report from a graphology expert. The report was submitted on 17 January 2008.
At hearings on 21, 22 and 23 January 2008 five witnesses gave evidence.
On 25 January 2008 the County Court carried out an on-site inspection of a house in Dubrovačka Street in Osijek.
At hearings on 31 January and 1 February 2008 two witnesses and the expert in graphology gave evidence. On 6 February 2008 the County Court commissioned an additional report from the same expert. The report was submitted on 11 February 2008.
At hearings on 13, 14, 15, 18 and 25 February, 13, 14, 20 and 25 March, 24 April, 12, 13, 14, 28, 29 and 30 May, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18 and 23 July, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 14 and 15 July, 29 August, 1 and 2 September 2008, thirty-nine witnesses gave evidence, as well as an expert in graphology and a medical expert.
On 17 September 2008 the applicant was released, but the criminal trial continued. A judgment was delivered by the Zagreb County Court on 7 May 2009. The applicant was found guilty of committing war crimes against the civilian population and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. The defendants all lodged appeals and the appeal proceedings are currently pending before the Supreme Court.
3. Decisions concerning the applicant's detention
On 19 October 2006 at 1.30 the police formally arrested the applicant, who had already been on the police-station premises since 8 p.m. on 18October 2006, and took her into her police custody for twenty-four hours, under Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The police order expressly stated that the applicant had been arrested on 19 October 2006 at 1.30 a.m., and that she had been informed of the grounds for her arrest and her right to remain silent and to be represented by a lawyer. It was also noted that the applicant herself had appointed R.A. as her defence counsel and that he had arrived on 19 October 2006 at 1.40 a.m. The applicant signed the order without making any comments.
On 19 October 2006, while the applicant's police questioning was ongoing and in her absence, an investigating judge of the Osijek County Court ordered her police custody to be extended for a further twenty-four hours, until 1.30 a.m. on 21 October 2006, under Article 98 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This decision was issued in writing and served on the applicant and her counsel. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“In the submission ... of 19 October 2006 the Osijek-Baranja Police Department, Criminal Police Division, informed this investigating judge that police questioning of the suspect Gordana Getoš-Magdić had been carried out in connection with the criminal offence set out in Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code, committed in the territory of the city of Osijek in 1991 and 1992.
They allege that Gordana Getoš-Magdić was arrested on 19 October 2006 at 1.30 a.m. in connection with a reasonable suspicion that she had committed the said criminal offence and that ... several other members of the [military] squad under her command had also been arrested; [they] were giving their statements on fresh relevant facts and indications, which additionally confirmed the reasonable suspicion that Gordana Getoš-Magdić had committed the said criminal offence; the identification of other members of that squad was also underway, as was identification of the murder victims whose identity had not yet been established, for all of which the first twenty-four hours after the arrest did not suffice. Therefore they ask that the police custody be extended.
The request is well-founded.
The documents in the case file of this court, no. Kio-170/06, which also contains the police case file ..., show that a reasonable suspicion that Gordana Getoš-Magdić committed the criminal offence with which she has been charged arises from the defence given by M.S. ...
Since a police investigation has been carried out in order to establish the identity of the other member of the [military] squad under the command of Gordana Getoš-Magdić and since several members of that squad have also been arrested and the interviews with them are ongoing, and since it is necessary to identify the victims ..., it is obvious that the first twenty-four hours following the arrest could not suffice for these tasks and that a further twenty-four hours of police custody is necessary and sufficient for collecting [further] information on the evidence. In respect of the suspect Gordana Getoš-Magdić, the grounds for detention under Article 102 § 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure exist for the time being because there is a reasonable suspicion that, in order to exculpate herself, she could hinder the criminal proceedings by suborning witnesses. Grounds for detention also exist under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure since the criminal offence [for which she is being held] falls within the category of offences set out in Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is, the criminal offence under Title XII of the Criminal Code, which is liable to imprisonment for twenty years. In view of the fact that [the charges involve allegations of] liquidation by firearms, after which the corpses were thrown into the river Drava, actions typical of an execution, the court finds that these [factors] characterise the circumstances of the offence as serious and thus call for a custodial measure ...”
On 21 October 2006 at 1 a.m. the applicant was examined by the investigating judge of the Osijek County Court for the first time. Relying on Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he ordered an extension of her police custody for forty-eight hours, until 23 October 2006 at 1 a.m.
On 22 October 2006 the investigating judge of the Osijek County Court ordered that the applicant and four other suspects be detained for a further month, until 1.30 a.m. on 19 November 2006. The decision expressly stated that the applicant had been arrested on 19 October 2006 at 1.30 a.m. and that her detention was to be counted from that moment. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“Since it is necessary to interview a large number of witnesses during the investigation, many of whom are members of the Croatian Army, that is, colleagues of the defendants, the court finds that there is a reasonable suspicion that the defendants, if at large, might suborn these witnesses; this fulfils the conditions for detention under Article 102 § 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Furthermore, the first to fifth defendants are suspected of having committed the criminal offence set out in Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code, which is liable to twenty years' imprisonment, in that they illegally arrested some individuals of Serbian origin, then illegally interrogated and ill-treated them, after which they bound their hands and mouths with self-adhesive tape and took some of them to the banks of the river Drava, where they killed them with shots from firearms and threw their bodies into the river Drava. Therefore, since these are actions typical of an execution, the court finds that the circumstances of the offence can be characterised as particularly serious and thus call for a custodial measure ...”
On 22 October 2006 the applicant was transferred to Zagreb Prison. The proceedings continued before the Osijek County Court, about three hundred kilometres away.
On 25 October 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 22 October 2006 ordering her detention. She argued that she had co-operated with the investigative bodies and admitted that she had committed the offences of which she was accused, and that therefore the same purpose might have been achieved through other measures such as home detention, bail or preventive measures. Furthermore, she was ready to hand over her passport. She further stressed her young age and that she was the mother of a minor child who, owing to her age and health, had constant need of a mother's presence, and that she, the applicant, contributed to the subsistence of her family.
On 31 October 2006 the appeal was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“Contrary to the allegations in the defendants' appeals, the investigating judge correctly found that the legal grounds for the defendants' detention under Article 102 § 1 (2 and 4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure did exist.
There is a reasonable suspicion that the defendants committed a criminal offence against humanity and international law, namely war crimes against the civilian population as set out under Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code. A decision by the investigating judge ... of 22 October 2006 ordered that an investigation be carried out in respect of the said defendants, in connection with a reasonable suspicion that in the period from the middle of October to the end of December 1991 in Osijek, during the defence of the city from the joint aggression by the Y[ugoslav] P[eoples'] A[rmy] and rebels from the local Serbian population against the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, they [acted] contrary to Article 3 of the [Fourth] Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and Article 4 §§ 1 and 2(a), Article 5 § 3 and Article 13 § 2 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), in that B.G., as the secretary of the Secretariat for Peoples' Defence of the Osijek Municipality, acting as the de facto, and from 7 December 1991 also the formal, commander-in-chief of the defence of Osijek City, ordered the first defendant I.K. and the ... defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić to form a [military] squad of dependable and loyal persons for special reconnaissance-sabotaging tasks, which would be under his supervision. After they had formed such a squad, on a number of occasions he illegally ordered them to arrest civilians of Serbian origin, and ordered their ill-treatment and killing; the first defendant, I.K., as the squad commander, and the ... defendant, Gordana Getoš-Magdić, as commander of one of the subdivisions of the squad, accepted and carried out these orders or transmitted them to the members of the squad ...
The investigating judge's order accepted a request by the Osijek County State Attorney's Office to hear evidence from thirty-one persons in connection with the commission of the said criminal offences ... Furthermore, the investigation order states that some of these witnesses had been members of the same squad as the defendants ... None of the witnesses has been examined so far. Therefore, the investigating judge's conclusion that, once at large, the defendants might hinder the criminal proceedings by suborning witnesses was justified. There is therefore a legal ground for detention under Article 102 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Furthermore, in view of the manner in which the criminal offences of which the defendants were accused had been committed, and because of a reasonable suspicion that they had committed the criminal offence of war crimes against the civilian population, carrying a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, and in view of the illegal arrests, interrogations and ill-treatment, binding of hands and mouths [of the victims] with self-adhesive tape and subsequent liquidation of a large number of civilians, the investigating judge correctly found that these factors, taken together, characterised the circumstances of the offence as particularly serious and that detention was necessary because the legal grounds set out in Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been fulfilled.”
On 17 November 2006 the investigating judge of the Osijek County Court extended the detention of the applicant and four other defendants until 19January 2007, again on the grounds set out in Article 102 § 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This decision was upheld by a three-judge panel of the Osijek County on 29 November 2006.
On 22 December 2006 the applicant was transferred to Osijek Prison.
On 18 January and 17 February 2007 the investigating judge of the Osijek County Court again extended the detention of the applicant and four other defendants, on the grounds set out in Article 102 § 1(2 and 4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On 3 April 2007 the applicant requested that her detention measure be lifted.
On 16 April 2007 the Osijek County State Attorney's Office filed an indictment against the applicant in the Osijek County Court, on charges of having committed war crimes against the civilian population. On the same day a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court ordered the applicant's further detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“Defence counsel for the third defendant, Gordana Getoš-Magdić, relied in particular on the health ailments of the defendant and her minor child. She argued that the same aim could have been achieved with preventive measures.
...
In the indictment of the Osijek County State Attorney ... of 16 April 2007 the defendants ... were accused of having ordered killings and ill-treatment of members of the civilian population, ...and thus of committing a criminal offence against humanity and international law – war crimes against the civilian population – as set out in Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The factual description from the indictment alleged that in November and December 1991 in Osijek, in the period when the city was being defended from the joint aggression by the Y[ugoslav] P[eoples'] A[rmy] and the paramilitary formations of the rebel local Serbian population against the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, the defendants had acted contrary to Article 3 of the [Fourth] Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War as well as Article 4 §§ 1 and 2(a), Article 5 § 3 and Article 13 § 2 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), in that the first defendant B.G., initially as the secretary of the Secretariat for Peoples' Defence of the Osijek Municipality and from 7 December 1991 as the commander-in-chief of the defence of Osijek City, the second defendant I.K. as a commander of the special [military] squad for reconnaissance and sabotaging tasks, the third defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić as a commander of one of the subdivisions of that squad and the fourth to seventh defendants as members of that subdivision, had participated in illegal arrests, kidnappings, inhuman treatment and killings of civilians of Serbian origin. In November and December 1991 in Osijek, they had arrested an unknown man, and bound with self-adhesive tape J.G., M.K., S.V., an unknown woman and B.G., and had taken them to the banks of the river Drava. Once there they had shot them in the head with firearms and thrown their bodies into the river. They had also taken B.L. and A.Š. to 30 Dubrovačka Street, where they had struck A.Š. all over his body and had then taken them to the banks of the Drava where they had shot them with firearms before throwing them into the river. They had beaten M.S., thus causing him multiple injuries and had then tied him up with rope and killed him by throwing him from a railway bridge into the Drava. They had arrested P.L., taken him to the banks of the Drava, shot him with firearms and thrown [his body] into the river. They had arrested R.R., taken him to 30 Dubrovačka Street and then to the banks of the Drava, where they had shot him at least twice with firearms and thrown him into the river, but he had nevertheless survived; [the defendants] had thus committed the criminal offence of war crimes against the civilian population under Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code.
The existence of a reasonable suspicion that the defendants committed a criminal offence is a general ground for ordering and extending their detention.
The said criminal offence is liable to at least five years' imprisonment or imprisonment for twenty years. Taken together, the above-mentioned circumstances of the offence, involving particularly brutal and ruthless actions by the defendants against the victims, constitute particularly serious circumstances, which require that the custodial measure imposed on the defendants ... be extended ... under the legal grounds set out in Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
...”
In an appeal of 19 April 2007 the applicant argued, inter alia, that the court had failed to give adequate reasons for the necessity of her detention, particularly in view of her difficult health and family situation. She relied on medical documentation showing that she had suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder since 1999, together with back problems and epilepsy. She also relied on medical documentation showing that her daughter, born in 1999, suffered from nightmares.
On 27 April 2007 the Supreme Court quashed the impugned decision on the ground that the County Court had failed to give adequate reasons for extending the applicant's detention and that the reasons given had been contradictory.
On 30 April 2007 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the applicant's detention on the grounds set out in Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“This panel finds that since the last decision on detention ordered under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure there have been no significant changes as regards the relevant circumstances in respect of the defendant ... Gordana Getoš Magdić. That is to say that the acts of which the defendants are accused, as regards their modus operandi and entire criminal activity, surpassed the usual manner of committing the criminal offence of war crime against the civilian population. This is indicated by the facts in the indictment showing that the defendants had acted as an organised group, had been mutually connected and that [their acts] had all been motivated by national hatred. ...”
In her appeal of 5 May 2007 the applicant reiterated her previous arguments.
On 11 May 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“At this stage of the proceedings, now the indictment has been lodged ... this court considers that there is a high degree of suspicion that the defendants committed the criminal offences with which they have been charged. The decision on their further detention must be based exclusively on an assessment of the elements which, judging from the facts alleged in the indictment, might lead to the conclusion that in this case ... the manner in which the offence was committed, or the fact that it was committed in particularly serious circumstances, justify detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The defendants are correct in their assertion that the gravity of the offence in itself does not suffice to conclude that there are particularly serious circumstances which make detention necessary. However, the first-instance court found that such circumstances did exist on the basis of the concrete facts and acts of which the defendants are accused. The criminal offence of war crimes against the civilian population may be constituted by various acts. The defendants have been charged with the gravest acts, involving illegal arrests, ill-treatment and killings of civilians who had not given any cause for such acts. All the victims were citizens of Osijek, whose security the first defendant was under an obligation to defend, a fact correctly pointed out by the first-instance court when assessing the gravity of the charges against him.
The Supreme Court considers the finding of the first-instance court that the offence was committed in particularly serious circumstances to have been correct. The charges against the defendants include the fact that, on the order of the first defendant B.G., the defendants I.K. and Gordana Getoš-Magdić formed a [military] squad for special reconnaissance-sabotaging tasks and ordered the members of the squad to illegally arrest civilians of Serbian and other national origins, torture and kill them, which orders the defendants M.S., D.K., T.V. and Z.D. carried out. Thus they, tempore criminis, organised the liquidation of the civilian population in that territory, in that they systematically arrested, detained, tortured and killed individuals. The treatment of victims was exceptionally brutal and utterly inhuman. Some of them had been severely beaten, bound with self-adhesive tape and then taken to the banks of the river Drava, where they had been executed by shots from firearms to their heads and bodies, before being thrown into the river. In the case of the victim R.R., who had survived being shot in the head and being throwing into the river, an additional order that he be killed in hospital had been issued.
The court also considers that the above acts by the defendants represent particularly serious circumstances, which exceed the ordinary form of such crimes. Further detention of the defendants on the grounds provided for under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is therefore justified.
The defendants' assertion that the criminal proceedings could be conducted without their detention because the same purpose could be achieved with other preventive measures cannot be accepted. The aim of detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to remove possible obstacles for efficient and unhindered conduct of the criminal proceedings as is the case with the grounds for detention set out in Article 102 § 1(1, 2 and 3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The aim of detention under [Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure] is that the persons whose acts cause special moral reproach should not be kept at large, as this could influence the public such as to diminish trust in the criminal justice system.”
On 29 May 2007 the Supreme Court ordered that the further proceedings be conducted before the Zagreb County Court.
On 11 July 2007 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant's detention on the grounds set out in Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This decision was quashed by the Supreme Court on 27 July 2007 because defence counsel had not been duly summoned to the hearing on the defendants' detention.
On 2 August 2007 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant's detention. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 21 September 2007. On 23 November 2007 the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant's detention. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 12 December 2007. They all relied on the particularly serious circumstances in which the applicant had allegedly committed the offence, under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On 13 December 2007 the applicant lodged a request for the custodial measure against her to be lifted. She relied, inter alia, on Article 5 of the Convention, arguing that the courts ordering and extending her detention had not made any relevant assessment as to her personal contribution to the offences with which she had been charged or to her personal situation, in particular her health. The request was dismissed by the Zagreb County Court on 14 December 2007.
On 12 February 2008 the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant's detention and at the same time dismissed her request that the custodial measure be lifted. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“A reasonable suspicion that the third [the applicant], fifth and sixth defendants committed the criminal offences defined in the indictment still exists, this being a general statutory requirement under Article 102 § 1 of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure] for extending the detention.
The third, fifth and sixth defendants have been indicted for criminal offences against humanity and international law – war crimes against the civilian population - under Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code, liable to a minimum of five years' imprisonment or imprisonment of twenty years; this is one of the criteria for detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure].
Furthermore, the third, fifth and sixth defendants have been indicted for the gravest acts which could possibly be committed against the civilian population, namely illegal arrests, torture and killings of civilians. The civilians were tortured and killed for no reason and the motive was national hatred.
The charge against the third defendant, Gordana Getoš-Magdić, states that she, together with the second defendant, I.K., on the order of the first defendant B.G., formed a [military] squad for special reconnaissance-sabotaging tasks and illegally arrested civilians of Serbian and other national origin, tortured and killed them, and transmitted such orders to their subordinates in the said squad... The victims were severely beaten and then taken to the banks of the river Drava, bound with self-adhesive tape and shot in the head; their bodies then being thrown into the river.
A further charge against the third defendant, Gordana Getoš-Magdić, states that, together with the sixth defendant T.V. and the seventh defendant, Z.D., she took B.L from his family house ... , arrested him and detained him in a house at 30 Dubrovačka Street.
...
In respect of the victim R.R., who had been shot in the head on the orders of the first defendant B.G. but nevertheless survived, it is alleged that the third defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić ordered that he be killed in hospital.
The above descriptions of the acts of the third, fifth and sixth defendants contain a number of circumstances which, in their nature and intensity, can be characterised as particularly serious circumstances of the offence; for this reason, detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure] remains necessary.
...
Judging from the gravity of the offences with which they are charged and the sentences that could be expected on the basis of the information in the case file, the length of time that the third, fifth and sixth defendants have so far been detained does not appear disproportionate to a degree that is decisive in ordering their further detention.
The request of the third defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić that her detention be replaced by home arrest is not well-founded, because the measure of home arrest has not been prescribed as an alternative for detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure].
Section 3 of the Rules on Home Arrest (Official Gazette no. 3 of 7 January 2008) provides that the freedoms and rights of a detainee under home arrest may be restricted to the extent needed for the fulfilment of the purpose for which home arrest has been ordered; to prevent the detainee from absconding; to prevent repetition, completion or commitment of a criminal offence he or she has been threatening to commit; to prevent communication between the detainee and other persons, save for those he or she lives with or who provide him or her with the necessary means of subsistence.
Since the allegations in the request that the detention measure be lifted are not of such a nature as to justify the lifting of that measure, in the opinion of this panel the conditions for ordering an alternative preventive measure have not yet been fulfilled, the request has to be dismissed ...”
In her appeal of 14 February 2008 the applicant reiterated her arguments from her previous request that the custodial measure against her be lifted. On 22 February 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. It reiterated its previous conclusions as to the gravity of the offence and the particularly serious circumstances in which the offence was committed, and further established as follows:
“The acts of the defendants as described above show a high degree of ruthlessness, brutality and cruelty towards civilians, which resulted in the grave consequence of the killing of these persons. Therefore, this appellate court finds that such acts by the defendants significantly exceeded the usual acts and consequences of such offences and that in their intensity and nature they show that the offence was committed in particularly serious circumstances, such that detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure] remains necessary.
The arguments of the defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić ... that the facts in the indictment had not been proven are not of decisive importance for extending her detention, because it is sufficient for there to be a relevant degree of reasonable suspicion; this follows from the indictment and the evidence so far presented, although the final assessment of all evidence and the defendants' defence, and the subsequent assessment of whether the relevant facts have or have not been proven in respect of the criminal offences at issue, is in the hands of the trial panel...
Contrary to the arguments advanced by defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning detention do not run counter to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention), since Article 5 of the Convention provides that the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence of fleeing after having done so, and this is not at odds with Article 102 1 of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure].
The state of health of the defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić does not preclude the existence of the statutory ground for extending her detention, because any necessary medical care could be provided in prison or, exceptionally, outside the prison. Likewise, any necessary medical, psychological or other assistance can be given to her child in adequate institutions, staffed by appropriate experts.
Contrary to the objections of the defendant Gordana Getoš-Magdić ... the preventive measures under Article 90 of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure] could not fulfil the aim of the extended detention [under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal procedure], nor can this measure be replaced by house arrest, because Article 102 of the C[ode of] C[criminal] P[rocedure] does not provide for such an option.”
On 25 March 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint arguing, inter alia, that the duration of the investigation and of her detention had exceeded a reasonable time and that her detention could no longer be extended solely on the ground of the gravity of the charges against her.
On an unspecified date the applicant again lodged a request that the custodial measure against her be lifted.
On 22 April 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant's detention and dismissed her request. It reiterated its previous reasoning from its decision of 12 February 2008.
In an appeal of 26 April 2008 the applicant again relied on her family and state of health as grounds for lifting the custodial measure. On 7 May 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
On 29 May 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant's constitutional complaint of 25 March 2008 inadmissible, on the ground that the impugned decisions had ceased to exist since, in the meantime, a fresh decision extending the applicant's detention had been issued.
In a constitutional complaint of 9 June 2008 the applicant reiterated her arguments from her previous constitutional complaint of 25 March 2008.
On 4 July 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant's detention on the same grounds as before. On 28 July 2008 the Supreme Court upheld this decision.
The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint in which she reiterated her previous arguments.
On 17 September 2008 the Constitutional Court accepted the constitutional complaint and quashed the decisions of the Zagreb County Court of 4 July 2008 and of the Supreme Court of 28 July 2008, on the ground that the lower courts had failed to apply the principle of proportionality when assessing the necessity and adequacy of the applicant's further detention. It further held as follows:
“Owing to their particular gravity and the possible public reaction, certain criminal offences may cause public unrest which could justify detention. In the view of this court, when assessing whether further detention of an applicant is justified under the grounds set out in Article 102 § 1(4) of the C[ode of] C[riminal] P[rocedure], the gravity of the offence in itself does not suffice but, in addition, the [above] ground for detention must exist in reality. The extension of detention should not amount to the anticipated prison term.
In the court's opinion, the significance of the initial grounds for the applicants' detention, in view of the passage of time and the fact that the applicants have so far been detained for almost two years, does not suffice to justify further extension of their detention.
The Constitutional Court considers that in the present case (apart from the fact that the detention has already lasted too long) the public interest in extending the applicants' detention during the criminal proceedings against them – in which their guilt for the alleged criminal offences has yet to be decided – does not carry more weight than the right of personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.
...”
The applicant was released on the same day.
B. Relevant domestic law
The relevant part of the Croatian Constitution (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 41/2001 and 55/2001) reads:
Article 140
“International agreements concluded and ratified in accordance with the Constitution and made public, and which are in effect, are incorporated into Croatian law and are, in terms of legal effect, above statutes. ...”
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kazneni zakon Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 62/2003, 178/2004 and 115/2006) read as follows:
Article 97
“(1) The police shall immediately, or within twenty-four hours at the latest, bring the arrested person to an investigating judge or release him or her. Reasons shall be given for any delay.
...”
Article 98
“(1) The investigating judge may, at the request of the police or the State Attorney, in a written and reasoned decision, order detention of the arrested person for twenty-four hours where the investigating judge has established that there is a well-founded suspicion that the arrestee has committed the criminal offence with which he or she has been charged, and where the grounds under Article 102 § 1(1 and 2) of the present Act exist and detention is necessary in order to establish identity, verify an alibi, collect evidence or remove a serious risk for the lives or health of persons or for assets of significant value ... Exceptionally, the investigating judge may, at the request of the police or the State Attorney, order that the arrestee be kept in police custody where [he or she has been charged] with criminal offences under Article 181 of this Act which are liable to a prison term exceeding five years.
(2) The investigating judge may, proprio motu or at the request of the State Attorney, order that the arrestee be kept in custody for up to forty-eight hours where he or she considers that there is a well-founded suspicion that the arrestee has committed the criminal offence with which he or she has been charged and that grounds under Article 102 § 1 of the present Code obtain, in cases where the State Attorney has not made a request for an investigation or an indictment. Where the State Attorney fails to bring a request for investigation or an indictment within forty-eight hours, the arrestee shall be released.
(3) Where the arrestee has been kept in custody under paragraph 1 of the present Article, the investigating judge may order custody under paragraph 2 hereof for a further twenty-four hours.
...”
8. General Provisions on Detention
Section 101
(1) Detention may be imposed only if the same purpose cannot be achieved by another [preventive] measure.
(2) The detention measure shall be lifted and the detainee released as soon as the grounds for detention cease to exist.
(3) When deciding on detention, in particular its duration, the court shall take into consideration the proportionality between the gravity of the offence, the sentence which ... may be expected, and the need to order and determine the duration of the detention.
(4) The judicial authorities conducting the criminal proceedings shall proceed with particular urgency when the defendant is being held in detention and shall review as a matter of course whether the grounds and legal conditions for detention have ceased to exist, in which case the custodial measure shall immediately be lifted.
9. Grounds for Ordering Detention
Section 102
(1) Where a reasonable suspicion exists that a person has committed an offence, that person may be placed in detention:
...
2. if there is a risk that he or she might destroy, hide, alter or forge evidence or traces relevant for the criminal proceedings or might suborn witnesses, or where there is a risk of collusion;
4. if the charges involved relate to murder, robbery, rape, terrorism, kidnapping, abuse of narcotic drugs, extortion or any other offence carrying a sentence of at least twelve years' imprisonment, when detention is justified by the modus operandi or other particularly serious circumstances of the offence;
...”
Article 106
“(1) Detention ordered by an investigating judge ... shall not exceed one month ...
(2) During the investigation the investigating judge ... may, for justified reasons, extend detention for the first time for a maximum of two months and then for a further maximum of three months.
(3) The maximum duration of detention during the investigation shall not exceed six months ...”
Article 107
“...
(2) After the indictment has been lodged ... a [judicial] panel ... shall examine every two months whether the statutory conditions for detention have continued to exist ...”
Appeal against a decision ordering, lifting or extending a custodial measure
Article 110
(1) A defendant, defence counsel or the State Attorney may lodge an appeal against a decision ordering, extending or lifting a custodial measure, within two days thereof...
...”
The relevant part of Article 120 of the Criminal Code (Osnovni krivični zakon Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 31/1993) reads as follows:
War Crimes against the Civilian Population
“Whoever, in violation of the rules of international law during war, armed conflict or occupation, orders: ... the killing, torture or inhuman treatment of civilians; ... the infliction of grave suffering on or injuries to the bodily integrity or health of civilians; ... measures of fear and terror against civilians or the taking of hostages, ... illegal arrests ... shall be sentenced to not less than five years' imprisonment or to twenty years' imprisonment.
...”
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention that her initial detention between 18 October 2006 at 8 p.m. and 21 October at 1.40 a.m. had not been entirely covered by the decisions ordering and extending her detention; and that after her arrest she had not been brought promptly before a judge.
She further complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention of the grounds for and the length of her detention.
She also complained that the proceedings concerning the lawfulness of her detention were not in conformity with the guarantees of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant's detention by the police
The applicant firstly submitted several complaints as regards her initial detention from 18 October 2006 at 8 p.m. to 21 October 2006 at 1.40 a.m. She claimed that this period had not been entirely covered by the decisions ordering and extending her detention. She further complained that, following her arrest, she had not been brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power. She relied on Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power ...”
(a) The parties' arguments as to admissibility
The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies since she had lodged neither an appeal nor a constitutional complaint against the decision ordering and extending her detention by the police.
The applicant contested that argument.
(b) The Court's assessment
(i) General principles
The Court reiterates that in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with an issue after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, for example, Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, § 33, Series A no. 296-A, and Remli v. France, 23 April 1996, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II). Thus, the complaint submitted to the Court must first have been made to the appropriate national courts, at least in substance, in accordance with the formal requirements of domestic law and within the prescribed time-limits. To hold otherwise would mean duplicating the domestic process with proceedings before the Court, and that would hardly be compatible with the subsidiary nature of the Convention (see Gavril Yosifov v. Bulgaria, no. 74012/01, § 42, 6 November 2008). Nevertheless, the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires only that an applicant make normal use of remedies which are effective, sufficient and accessible in respect of his or her Convention grievances (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004, and John Sammut and Visa Investments Limited v. Malta (dec.), no. 27023/03, 28 June 2005).
(ii) Application of these principles to the present case
The Court notes that the applicant arrived at the police station at around 8 p.m. on 18 October 2006 and that her formal police custody started on 19 October 2006 at 1.30 a.m. Her detention under the direct police order lasted for twenty-four hours, until 20 October 2006 at 1.30 a.m. The applicant signed the order in which it was expressly stated that she had been arrested on 19 October 2006 at 1.30 a.m. and she made no objections to the order. After that, the extension of her police custody was ordered in a decision of an investigating judge of the Osijek County Court on 19 October 2006. In that decision the judge expressly stated that the applicant had been arrested on 19 October 2006 at 1.30 am. The decision was served on the applicant and her counsel.
The Court notes that the applicant complained that in reality she had been detained from the moment she had arrived at the police station, that is to say from 18 October 2006 at 8 p.m. She further complained that she had not been brought before a judge promptly, but only after fifty-three hours and forty minutes from the time of her arrest.
In this connection the Court notes that, although the applicant had a right to lodge an appeal against the decision of the investigating judge in which she could have put forward the above complaints, she failed to do so. Had her appeal been unsuccessful she could also have lodged a constitutional complaint.
Furthermore, a decision of the Osijek County Court investigating judge of 22 October 2006, issued after a hearing in the applicant's presence, again expressly mentioned that the applicant had been arrested on 19 October 2006 at 1.30 am. Although the applicant did lodge an appeal against that decision, she neither expressly nor in substance made any objection as to the time of her arrest from which her detention was to be counted. Likewise, she did not complain that she had not been brought promptly before a judge. Instead, her appeal focussed on the grounds for ordering her detention and on her request for release. The appeal was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court.
It is also to be noted that in respect of the appellate decision the applicant was additionally entitled to lodge a constitutional complaint, which she also failed to do.
In this connection the Court further notes that the Convention has been incorporated into Croatian law and is thus directly applicable in Croatia.
The Court considers that the applicant, by failing to lodge an appeal and possibly a constitutional complaint against the decisions of the Osijek County Court investigating judge of 20 and 22 October 2006, failed to exhaust domestic remedies. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2. The applicant's further detention
The applicant also submitted complaints as regards her further detention. She complained that her right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial had not been respected and that the gravity of the offences she had been charged with could not be regarded as a relevant and sufficient reason for the domestic courts repeatedly to extend her detention. She relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
(a) The parties' arguments as to the admissibility of the complaint
The Government argued that, following the decision of the Constitutional Court of 17 September 2008, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the violations alleged under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention because the Constitutional Court had found a violation of that provision.
The applicant disputed that argument.
(b) The Court's assessment
(i) General principles
The Court reiterates that under Article 34 of the Convention it “may receive applications from any person ... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto”. It falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention. In this regard, the question whether an applicant can claim to be a victim of the violation alleged is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, § 30, ECHR 2002-III, and Trepashkin v. Russia, no. 36898/03, § 67, 19 July 2007).
The Court also reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him or her of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 36, Reports 1996-III, and Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI). Such acknowledgment and redress are usually the result of the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Koç and Tambaş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 46947/99, 24 February 2005).
The Court further reiterates that the machinery for the protection of fundamental rights established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. The Convention does not lay down for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring within their internal law the effective implementation of the Convention. The choice as to the most appropriate means of achieving this is in principle a matter for the domestic authorities, who are in continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries and are better placed to assess the possibilities and resources afforded by their respective domestic legal systems (see Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, 6 February 1976, § 50, Series A no. 20; Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 91, ECHR 2001-I; and Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 90, ECHR 2007 II).
(ii) Application of these principles to the present case
The Court notes firstly that the applicant complained that the reasons relied on by the national courts for ordering and extending her detention had been insufficient and inadequate throughout her detention. As to the decision of the Constitutional Court of 17 September 2008, it quashed the Supreme Court's decision of 28 July 2008 on the grounds that the latter had failed to establish two conditions for ordering further detention: (a) whether the grounds justifying deprivation of liberty were still “relevant and sufficient”; and (b) whether the competent authorities had displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, “only where both conditions are met can the duration of continued detention be seen as reasonable”.
Prior to the Constitutional Court's decision of 17 September 2008, in the proceedings before the national courts, the applicant had lodged several constitutional complaints which were either dismissed or declared inadmissible. In its decision of 17 September 2008 the Constitutional Court made no reference to the applicant's overall detention. It only quashed the Supreme Court's decision of 28 July 2008, without any findings as to whether there had been a violation of the applicant's rights under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Of even greater importance for the issue of the applicant's victim status is that she has no right under the national law to claim any compensation in connection with her complaint about the duration of her detention. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that the applicant has lost her victim status in respect of her complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
It follows that the Government's objection must be dismissed.
(c) The parties' observations as to the merits of the complaint
The applicant argued that the grounds for ordering and extending her detention had been insufficient. As regards the danger of suborning witnesses, the applicant maintained that such a ground for ordering her detention was in contradiction with the national authorities' finding that she had already signed her confession in front of the police, although she explained that she had done so under duress. As regards the gravity of the charges against her, the applicant argued that the detention orders relying on that ground had completely disregarded her confession, the fact that the proceedings had not been public and her personal circumstances such as her state of health, and that no alternative measures had been considered.
The Government argued that the reasons relied on by the national courts for ordering and extending the applicant's detention – the danger of absconding and the gravity of the charges – had been relevant and sufficient.
The Government also argued that, owing to the gravity of the charges against the applicant, her release could have caused public disorder. They explained that the case concerned a sensitive issue of charges of war crimes committed by Croatian soldiers.
They submitted further that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been very complex since they had concerned a number of allegations of criminal activity on the part of two defendants and that the national authorities had displayed due diligence in their conduct of the proceedings.
(d) The Court's conclusion
The Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
3. Decision of the Constitutional Court of 29 May 2008
The applicant also complained that the procedures concerning her appeals against the detention orders issued against her had not met the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
The applicant maintained that the Constitutional Court had declared her constitutional complaint of 25 March 2008, lodged against the decisions of the Supreme Court of 22 February 2008 and the Zagreb Court of 12 February 2008, inadmissible solely on the ground that a fresh decision extending her detention had been adopted in the meantime. In the applicant's view, such a practice ran counter to the requirements of Article 5 § 4 and Article 13 of the Convention.
The Government argued that the applicant's detention had been frequently reviewed by the competent courts of their own motion and that the applicant had also had the possibility under domestic law of applying for her detention order to be lifted. The applicant had always been able to lodge an appeal with the Supreme Court against every decision extending her detention and her appeals had been speedily decided. As regards the powers of the Constitutional Court in matters concerning detention, the Government submitted that it was empowered to review decisions ordering and extending detention and to quash such decisions where it found that they had contravened the right to personal liberty, as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Convention. However, the requirements of Article 5 § 4 in Croatia were satisfied through judicial protection by lower courts, up to and including the Supreme Court, and could not go so far as to be applicable to constitutional complaint proceedings.
The Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant's complaints concerning the duration of and the grounds for her detention and her right to a review of her detention.
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President