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WENERSKI v. POLAND - 44369/02 [2009] ECHR 96 (20 January 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/96.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 96
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF WENERSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 44369/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20
January 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Wenerski v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ledi
Bianku,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 December 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 44369/02) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Ernest Wenerski (“the
applicant”), on 29 November 2002.
The
applicant was represented by Mr J. Skrzydło, a lawyer practising
in Łódź. The Polish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On
17 October 2006 the Court declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate to the Government the
applicant's complaints concerning his allegedly improper medical care
in the detention centre and the censorship of his correspondence with
the Court. It also decided to examine the merits of the application
at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Kluczbork.
The
applicant is a habitual offender and has a criminal record. He was
charged with robbery and detained on remand in the Wołomin
Detention Centre and later in the Łódź Detention
Centre from 18 December 2001 to 8 August 2003, when the final
judgment was given in his case. At present he is serving prison
sentences after conviction for various offences.
A. Facts relating to the complaint under Article 3 of
the Convention about the lack of proper medical care in a detention
centre
1. The applicant's health condition
The
applicant suffers from severe ophthalmological problems resulting
from an eye injury sustained during a fight with a fellow inmate. In
1996, before he was detained, his right eye was removed. He is
currently one-eyed. His problems concern mainly the socket of his
extracted eye.
In
1998 an expert in ophthalmology, Prof. J.Sz., found it necessary to
operate on the applicant's right eye socket to have the remains of
the extracted eye removed. The surgery should have been performed
while the applicant was released from detention. However, it did not
take place, for unknown reasons.
In
April and June 2000 different specialists from Warsaw and Bytom
examined the applicant. It was suggested that he undergo a
reconstruction of his right eye socket at Warsaw Medical University
Hospital, which was scheduled for 14 August 2000. In a decision of 3
July 2000 the Medical Commission at Warsaw Remand Centre ordered a
two-month suspension of the applicant's prison sentence. It appears
that the operation was not performed as the applicant failed to
appear for a preliminary examination.
On
14 February 2002, while the applicant was detained on remand, another
specialist in ophthalmology discovered that there was a need to
perform a reconstruction of his right eye socket. An operation was
scheduled for 22 April 2002; it was, however, postponed until 27 May
2002, since as stated in the applicant's medical certificate of 29
April 2002, the hospital refused to perform it “under escort”,
which implied that he would be transported back to a detention
centre's hospital immediately after the operation.
The
surgery scheduled for 27 May 2002 was not performed since the
applicant was granted neither release from detention nor a suspension
of his prison sentence for the necessary period. The Government
observed that on 24 May 2002 new criminal charges had been brought
against the applicant and that for this reason he could not be
released. In this connection, the judge in charge of the applicant's
case asked the Bytom Remand Centre hospital whether the applicant's
operation could be postponed. This question was answered in the
negative after an examination on 22 August 2002. Moreover, the
applicant was found to be in need of a different operation on his
left eye, namely a vitrectomy.
The
applicant's vitrectomy on his left eye was scheduled to be performed
at the Bytom Remand Centre hospital on 3 October 2002. It was
cancelled since the applicant refused to undergo this operation at
the Bytom Remand Centre hospital. He protested against the conditions
in which it was to take place and insisted on being treated at Warsaw
Medical University Hospital.
On
10 June 2002 the applicant was examined in the ophthalmology ward of
the Bytom Remand Centre hospital. The doctors, however, decided not
to operate on the applicant's right eye socket in the Remand Centre
hospital, since special facilities had to be in place. Therefore it
was decided to have the operation performed at Warsaw Medical
University Hospital on 22 September 2002. It was further requested
that the applicant be released for the period of the operation and
aftercare. The surgery did not take place since the applicant was not
granted release, for unknown reasons.
In
the meantime a doctor at Warsaw Medical University Hospital agreed to
operate on the applicant's right eye socket “under escort”,
which did not require the applicant to be released.
In
a letter of 8 October 2002 the hospital which had agreed to perform
the operation “under escort” scheduled the operation for
19 November 2002. Furthermore, in a letter of 29 October
2002 another hospital confirmed that an operation on the applicant
could be carried out “under escort”.
An
entry in the applicant's medical records dated 19 November 2002
stated that the operation should be performed immediately. For
unknown reasons, the surgery did not take place.
On
31 December 2002 the Łódź Detention Centre informed
the Wołomin District Court that an operation had been scheduled
for 4 February 2003 and that any postponement of the planned
treatment of the applicant might harm his health and endanger his
life. Nevertheless, it transpires from the case file that the
applicant was not treated on that date.
On
18 February 2004 the partial reconstruction of the applicant's right
eye socket was performed at the Norbert Balicki Academic Clinical
Hospital in Łódź. Subsequently, during a check-up on
20 October 2004 at the Bytom Remand Centre hospital, the applicant
was found to be in need of a supplementary operation on his right eye
socket.
On
10 November 2004 another specialist gave an opinion on the
applicant's condition in which he stated that the operation had
merely an aesthetic purpose and that it could be performed “under
escort” in January 2005.
In
a letter of 12 April 2005 a different hospital, which had been asked
to perform the operation “under escort”, refused to do
so.
In
the applicant's medical records covering the period from July until
October 2005 it was repeatedly stated that the operation should be
performed immediately.
On
1 April 2005 at the surgical ward of the Medical Academy in Gdańsk
a foreign body (a metal bar) was removed from the applicant's right
eye socket. It was the result of a self-inflicted injury of an
unspecified date.
On
17 January 2006 the applicant was transported to a hospital to see a
doctor. There, the applicant was diagnosed with an inflammation of
his right eye socket. The specialist recommended waiting for an
operation until the inflammation had healed.
In
a letter of 15 March 2006 the applicant informed the Court that the
operation had not yet been performed. He stressed that his state of
health had seriously deteriorated and that he was suffering from an
inflammation of his right eye socket.
During
an examination of 14 August 2006 at the Łódź
Detention Centre, the specialist found that the applicant's right eye
was infected with a virus and that his condition required urgent
surgery.
In
December 2006 the applicant was transported to the Plastic Surgery
Ward of the Clinical Hospital of the Polish Ministry of Defence, as
the operation to be performed was of a highly complicated character.
A specialist examining the applicant found that a complex,
multi-stage plastic operation on the applicant's right eye socket had
to be performed. It was stressed, however, that such procedures were
not covered by the Polish National Health Fund. In a letter of 2
January 2007 the applicant was informed that the operation could be
performed, provided that he covered its costs.
On
9 January 2007, after the applicant had again been examined at the
Łódź Detention Centre, it was found that his right
eye socket had to be urgently operated on.
Medical
certificates of 16 January 2007 issued by the Łódź
Detention Centre stated that there was no inflammation of the
applicant's right eye socket and that his condition could be treated
at the centre's hospital ward. It appears that the surgery was not
performed.
After
another refusal to have the operation performed, the applicant
contacted the Oncology Centre at the Maria Skłodowska-Curie
Institute, headed by Prof. E.T., requesting help. In reply to the
applicant's letter Prof. E.T., after examining his medical
records, stated that his condition required immediate surgery and
scheduled the date of the consultation for 15 February 2007. The
consultation did not take place, since it appears that the management
of the Łódź Detention Centre did not grant the
necessary leave.
On
9 February and 30 March 2007 the Bytom Remand Centre hospital
informed the applicant that its ophthalmology ward did not perform
plastic surgery on eye sockets.
2. Remedies used by the applicant
The
applicant used various means in order to draw the attention of the
authorities to his health problems.
On
numerous occasions he requested to be released from detention on
remand on account of his eye problems.
His
requests were repeatedly refused (decision of the Wołomin
District Prosecutor of 4 March 2002 and decisions of the Wołomin
District Court of 30 July 2002 and 12 November 2002). His appeal
against the decision of 4 March 2002 was dismissed (the Warsaw
Regional Prosecutor's decision of 5 April 2002).
The
applicant also tried to challenge his detention by lodging an appeal
against an order of 20 November 2002 prolonging his detention on
remand. In a decision of 13 December 2002 the Warsaw Regional Court
dismissed his appeal against the detention order of 20 November
2002.
The
applicant also lodged requests for a suspension in serving his prison
sentence for the period of his treatment in hospital and aftercare.
His requests were refused by the Łódź Regional Court
in decisions of 2 December 2002, 29 November 2004 and 27
February 2006.
The
courts repeatedly stated in their reasons for their decisions that
the requested operation could be performed “under escort”,
without leave being necessary, and that the delay in performing the
operation would not result in any deterioration of the applicant's
health. In its refusal of 27 February 2006 the court also relied
on the fact that the inflammation of the applicant's right eye socket
was a medical contra-indication against the immediate performance of
the operation. It considered that the operation should be delayed
until the inflammation had healed.
The
applicant also lodged numerous complaints with the authorities in
charge of detention centres, as well as with supervisory
institutions, about his lack of proper medical care. All his
complaints were found to be unsubstantiated. The authorities
repeatedly stated that the applicant had been seen by doctors on
numerous occasions, that he had been given all medicines prescribed
for him and that there were no medical arguments against the
operation being carried out “under escort” (letters of
the Warsaw-Białołęka Detention Centre of 10 January
2003 and the Warsaw Regional Inspectorate of 27 January 2003). It was
also emphasised that the applicant had not proved that he had used
the suspensions of his prison sentence which he had previously been
granted in compliance with their purpose (undergoing medical
treatment).
The
applicant contested the finding that he had not undergone any medical
treatment during the periods when he had been granted suspensions of
his prison sentence. He instituted criminal proceedings against the
health-care institution of the detention centre on a charge of making
a false statement. In the course of these proceedings it was
established that the applicant had undergone some medical treatment
during the contested periods (he had had his eye removed).
B. Facts relating to the complaint under Article 8 of
the Convention
The
applicant submitted an envelope sent to him from the Court, bearing
the logo of the Council of Europe. It bears stamps marked “censored”
and “a judge” and a stamp of the Warsaw-Białołęka
Detention Centre with the date 9 April 2003 and an illegible
signature. It also bears a stamp of the Council of Europe with the
date 25 March 2003. It appears from the case file that the applicant
was not present when the correspondence was censored. Furthermore,
the applicant claimed that his correspondence had been stopped and
that he had received it with a delay of about one month.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Access to medical assistance for convicted and
remand prisoners
Rules
on access to medical assistance for convicted prisoners are set out
in the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences of 6 June 1997 (Kodeks
karny wykonawczy – “the 1997 Code”), which
entered into force on 1 September 1998.
The
relevant part of Article 115 § 1 of the Code provides as
follows:
“A convicted person shall have access to free
health care ...”
Article
115 was substantially amended in 2003 and on subsequent occasions,
the amendments extensively covering the range of medical assistance
available to convicted persons and rules for its application. The
provision referred to above remained unchanged in substance.
As
regards access to medical assistance for persons detained on remand,
Article 214 § 1 of the Code provides as follows:
“Unless exceptions are provided for in the present
Chapter, a person detained on remand shall enjoy at least the same
rights as are secured to a convicted person serving a sentence of
imprisonment under the ordinary regime in a closed prison. No
restrictions shall be applied to him except such as are necessary to
secure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings, to maintain order
and security in a remand centre and to prevent demoralisation of
remand prisoners.”
B. Censorship of correspondence
The
relevant domestic law concerning the censorship of prisoners'
correspondence is set out in the Court's judgment in the case of
Michta v. Poland, no. 13425/02, §§ 33-39, 4 May
2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that he had not received adequate medical care
while in detention. He further complained that the date for his
operation had repeatedly been postponed and that it had been the
authorities' responsibility to have it rescheduled. He alleged that
the delay in performing his operation had resulted in the
deterioration of his health and in other forms of suffering. He
relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
The
Government contested these arguments.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Parties' submissions
(a) The Government
At
the outset, the Government submitted that none of the medical
opinions had referred to the urgent nature of the surgery to be
performed on the applicant. They stressed that according to the
medical data at their disposal, the operation in question was a
matter of aesthetics, rather than health or life.
Further,
the Government claimed that the applicant had never complained that
he had been denied access to medical care. On the contrary, as the
Government submitted, the applicant had been provided with the
necessary medical assistance, including assistance from external
specialists in ophthalmology. Moreover, his health condition had been
carefully monitored by the doctor and the nursing staff present at
the detention centre throughout the entire period of his detention.
In the Government's view, it could not be said that the applicant had
been subjected to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable
level of suffering inherent in any detention.
The
Government also stressed that the applicant had systematically caused
his condition to deteriorate; among other things, he had suffered
from an inflammation of his right eye socket as a result of a
self-inflicted injury. Further, he had repeatedly refused to give his
consent to undergo treatment offered in the detention centre's
hospital ward.
Lastly,
the Government alleged that Article 3 of the Convention could not be
interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee
on health grounds or to have him transferred to a civilian hospital
for surgery.
The
Government concluded that the complaint was ill-founded on the
merits. They submitted that the applicant's treatment had not
exceeded the minimum threshold of severity beyond which there was
a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
(b) The applicant
The
applicant pointed first to the State's special responsibilities
towards persons deprived of their liberty, in particular as regards
their right to have access to medical care. In this connection he
stressed that a person was usually free to choose a specialist to
treat his condition and a method of recommended treatment.
Furthermore, a person could always refuse to undergo an operation,
even if it was life-saving. As concerns those who were detained,
however, their choices in this respect were very limited. They could
not opt for a particular specialist to treat them, nor did their lack
of consent relieve the custodial authorities of the duty to provide
the necessary medical assistance, by force if required. This
followed from the State's duty to protect those under its
jurisdiction, in particular those in a vulnerable position in
custody. Having regard to that duty, the applicant stressed
that compulsory medical treatment did not violate Article 3 of the
Convention, provided that it was necessary from a medical point of
view and carried out in conformity with standards accepted by medical
science. Even an obstructive attitude on the part of the person
concerned did not constitute an obstacle to providing necessary and
urgent treatment.
Further,
the applicant claimed that Article 3 of the Convention imposed an
obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being and lives
of detainees. The scope of
this obligation depended, he argued, on the factual circumstances of
each case. If a detainee's condition deteriorated, and his health was
at risk and the State failed to provide adequate treatment, such an
omission breached Article 3 of the Convention. In this connection the
applicant stressed that for many years he had been denied treatment
on his eyes at different hospitals outside the detention centre.
Bearing in mind that the prison's hospital ward did not have the
facilities to perform complicated surgery on the applicant's right
eye socket, the relevant authorities should have considered
alternative ways of ensuring the medical treatment, such as granting
him temporary release for a period necessary for treatment outside
the detention centre and aftercare. In any event he should have been
afforded the possibility of undergoing the operation “under
escort”, in particular since some specialists had agreed to
such special conditions being put in place.
Lastly,
the applicant alleged that the level of ill-treatment he had suffered
as a result of the lack of adequate medical treatment for his eye
condition had by far exceeded the minimum threshold required to fall
within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, he
stressed that he had already lost sight in his right eye as a result
of a fight with an inmate and that a very long time had elapsed after
that incident without the necessary operation being carried out.
Further, he stressed that several specialists' opinions had referred
to the urgent nature of the surgery to be performed, whereas the
relevant authorities had failed to respond accordingly, giving
different invalid reasons for not having the surgery carried out.
2. General principles
The
Court reiterates that according to its case-law, ill-treatment must
attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope
of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level
is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its
physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and
state of health of the victim (see Vilvarajah and Others v. the
United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 36, §
107; Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR
2000-XI; and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, § 67,
ECHR 2001-III).
The
Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation
involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of
suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate
treatment or punishment. As regards prisoners or detainees, the Court
has repeatedly noted that measures depriving a person of his liberty
may often involve such an element. However, under Article 3 of the
Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained in
conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity,
that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not
subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the
unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given
the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are
adequately secured (see Kudła, cited above, §§
91-94).
3. The Court's assessment
In
the present case, the Court notes firstly that it is undisputed
between the parties that the applicant has been suffering for a
number of years from different eye problems, in particular that
relating to his right eye socket, following a fight with a fellow
inmate in 1996, in consequence of which his right eye was removed.
What
the parties disagree on, and what appears to lie at the core of the
case at hand, concerns the adequacy of the treatment afforded to the
applicant. The Government claimed that the applicant had been
provided with the necessary care, whereas the applicant on the
contrary contested the Government's findings (see paragraphs 46-53
above).
In
these circumstances, the Court finds it necessary to establish
whether the applicant was in fact denied adequate medical assistance
in the present case and, as a consequence, was caused suffering. If
this question is to be answered in the affirmative, it must be
ascertained whether it amounted to ill-treatment of a level exceeding
the threshold required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the
Convention.
As
to the applicant's problems with his right eye socket, the Court
notes that the medical documentation submitted by both the Government
and the applicant shows that as early as in 1998 an expert in
ophthalmology found it necessary to perform an operation on the
applicant's right eye socket (see paragraph 7 above). The same
conclusion was reached on subsequent dates by several other
specialists (see, inter alia, paragraphs 8, 9 and 17
above), who further stressed the urgent nature of the treatment (see,
inter alia, paragraphs 15, 16, 20 and 26 above). In addition,
it is to be observed that the applicant on several occasions
complained of pain and suffering as a consequence of the surgery not
being performed (see, inter alia, paragraphs 23, 30 et seq.
above).
Accordingly
the Court is satisfied that the applicant must have suffered
considerable pain in connection with his eye problem.
As
to the Government's arguments that the applicant had contributed
substantially to the deterioration of his eyes by injuring himself
and refusing hospitalisation (see paragraph 48 above), it is to be
observed that the applicant only once refused his consent to an
operation (see paragraph 11 above) and on only single occasion was
the applicant treated to remove a metal object he had placed in his
right eye socket (see paragraph 21 above).
The
Court is accordingly not able to accept that the deterioration in the
applicant's medical condition can be attributed solely to the
applicant's own actions. In this connection the Court accepts that,
as the applicant argued (see paragraph 51 above), since both
convicted and remand prisoners are in a very vulnerable position in
terms of their access to medical assistance, it is the authorities'
special duty to provide them with adequate and necessary treatment,
in particular when it has been established that such treatment is
urgent, regardless of the circumstances.
An
important factor to be taken into consideration in establishing the
level of ill-treatment which took place is the time the applicant
spent in detention without surgery being performed, in particular on
his right eye socket. In this connection the Court notes that the
relevant custodial authorities had undoubtedly been aware of the need
to have the applicant's right eye socket operated on since 1998, when
the first medical report to that effect was drafted. The Court notes,
however, that, despite its urgent nature, the authorities failed to
follow this recommendation, giving different reasons, until 18
February 2004, when the partial reconstruction of the applicant's
right eye socket was eventually carried out at the Norbert Balicki
Academic Clinical Hospital in Łódź (see paragraph 17
above).
Hence,
the Court observes that the applicant was denied necessary and urgent
treatment for at least six years.
The
Court further notes that the Government failed to provide valid
reasons for the lack of necessary steps taken to ensure that the
operation on the applicant's right eye socket was carried out without
delay. In this connection the Court accepts that having surgery
performed in an external hospital on a detainee may present a
security risk and might therefore involve a certain degree of
associated operational problems, which may cause some delay (see
Pilčić v. Croatia, no. 33138/06, § 41, 17
January 2008). However, as appears from the medical records
submitted, at least two hospitals agreed to have the operation
performed “under escort” with special security measures
put in place (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above). Despite their consent,
the surgery was not carried out.
The
foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that by leaving the applicant to suffer considerable pain
for a prolonged period of time as a result of the failure to provide
him with necessary and urgent treatment on his right eye socket from
1998 until 18 February 2004, the custodial authorities acted in
breach of their obligations to provide effective medical treatment
and that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading
treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The
Court accordingly finds that there has been a violation of Article 3
of the Convention.
As
regards the subsequent doctors' recommendation on supplementary
plastic surgery to be performed after 2004 (see paragraphs 17-29
above), the Court notes that it was found to be purely of an
aesthetic character (see paragraphs 18 and 25 above). The Court
further notes that such treatment is not reimbursed under the
national social security scheme (see paragraph 25), regardless of the
person's status. It follows that no issue arises in this respect
under Article 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that his correspondence with the Court had been
stopped for a month and censored while he was detained on remand. He
relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant,
read as follows:
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for ... his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
The Government's plea of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
The
Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all
available domestic remedies. They alleged that he had failed to bring
an action under Articles 24 and 23 in conjunction with Article
448 of the Civil Code. These provisions would have allowed the
applicant to assert that by censoring his correspondence the
authorities had breached his personal rights protected by the Civil
Code and to claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
In this connection, the Government relied on the
Warsaw Regional Court's judgment of 27 November 2006 in which a
prisoner had been awarded 5,000 Polish zlotys in damages from the
State Treasury for a breach of the confidentiality of his
correspondence with the Central Board of the Prison Service and the
Central Electoral Office. The Regional Court had held that the
confidentiality of one's correspondence was one of the personal
rights protected under Article 23 of the Civil Code and that in
the event of its breach a claimant could be entitled to an award for
non-pecuniary damage.
The
applicant argued that the civil action provided for in Article 24 in
conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code did not constitute an
effective domestic remedy in respect of the censorship of
correspondence. He therefore requested that the Government's plea of
non-exhaustion be dismissed.
The
Court notes that the alleged interference with the applicant's
correspondence occurred in 2003, whereas the Government relied
on the Warsaw Regional Court's judgment of 27 November 2006. Any
relevance that the latter judgment might possibly have in respect of
the present case is therefore reduced by the fact that that it was
given after the relevant time (see, for example, V. v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, § 57, ECHR 1999-IX).
It
follows that the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Existence of interference
The
Court notes that the envelope sent to the applicant by the Court
bears stamps marked “censored” and “a judge”,
and also a stamp of the Warsaw-Białołęka Detention
Centre with the date 9 April 2003 and an illegible signature. It also
bears a stamp of the Council of Europe with the date 25 March 2003.
It appears that the envelope was opened and subsequently resealed.
Accordingly,
the Court considers that, despite no separate stamp being visible on
the letter, it can be assumed that the envelope was opened and its
content read through. The Court has held on many occasions that as
long as the Polish authorities continue the practice of marking
detainees' letters with the “censored” stamp, it has no
alternative but to presume that those letters have been opened and
their contents read (see Matwiejczuk v. Poland, no.
37641/97, § 99, 2 December 2003; Pisk-Piskowski v.
Poland, no. 92/03, § 26, 14 June 2005; Michta,
cited above, § 58; and Lewak, cited above, §
29).
It
follows that in respect of the applicant's letter there was an
“interference” with his right to respect for his
correspondence as provided by Article 8 of the Convention.
2. Whether the interference was “in accordance
with the law”
The
Court notes that the Government failed to show that there was a legal
basis in domestic law for the impugned interference. The Court notes
that it occurred once, while the applicant was detained on remand.
The
Court notes that the prohibition of censorship of convicted persons'
correspondence with it is set forth in Article 103 of the Code of
Execution of Criminal Sentences. The Court further notes that, by
Article 214 of the same Code, persons detained on remand should
enjoy the same rights as those convicted in a final judgment.
Accordingly, this prohibition is also applicable to those detained on
remand (see Michta, cited above, § 61).
Hence,
the censorship of the Court's letter to the applicant was contrary to
domestic law. It follows that the interference in the present case
was not “in accordance with the law”.
Having
regard to that finding, the Court does not consider it necessary to
ascertain whether the other requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8
of the Convention were complied with.
Consequently,
the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the non-pecuniary
damage resulting from the alleged violations of Articles 3 and 8 of
the Convention.
The
Government found the applicant's claim to be exorbitant.
As
to the applicant's claim in relation to Article 3 of the Convention,
the Court notes that it has found the applicant's rights guaranteed
under that Article to have been violated. In particular, it has found
that the applicant was not provided with adequate medical assistance
while he was detained for a period of six years, although such
assistance had been found to be urgent and necessary. The Court has
further found that this must have undoubtedly caused him both
physical and mental suffering. In consequence, ruling on an equitable
basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards
the applicant EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) under this head, plus
any tax that may be chargeable.
As
to the applicant's claim in relation to Article 8 of the Convention,
the Court finds that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage
and, ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41, awards
him EUR 500 (five hundred euros) under this head, plus any tax that
may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not submit a claim for any costs and expenses incurred.
Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him
any sum on that account.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
8 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,500
(three thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent
State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax
that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 January 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President