British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
KHASUYEVA v. RUSSIA - 28159/03 [2009] ECHR 881 (11 June 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/881.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 881
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF
KHASUYEVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 28159/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11
June 2009
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Khasuyeva v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos
Rozakis,
President,
Anatoly
Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre
Erik Jebens,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George Nicolaou,
and
Søren Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 19 May 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 28159/03) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mrs Zura Abdullayevna
Khasuyeva (“the applicant”), on 29 July 2003.
The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by lawyers
of the Stichting Russian Justice Initiative (“SRJI”), an
NGO based in the Netherlands with a representative office in Russia.
The Russian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr P. Laptev, the former
Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of
Human Rights and subsequently by their new representative, Mr G.
Matyushkin.
The
applicant alleged that her son had disappeared after being detained
by servicemen in Chechnya on 30 August 2001. She complained
under Articles 2, 3, 5 and 13.
By
a decision of 25 September 2008, the Court declared the application
partially admissible.
The
President of the Chamber acceded to the Government's request not to
make publicly accessible the documents from the criminal
investigation file deposited with the Registry in connection with the
application (Rule 33 of Rules of Court).
The
Chamber having decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing
on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine), the
parties replied in writing to each other's observations.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1955 and lives in
Urus-Martan. The applicant is the mother of Abu Khasuyev, who was
born in 1978.
A. The disappearance of the applicant's son
1. General background information
At
the material time the applicant lived with her son, Abu Khasuyev, his
wife and his minor daughter. Abu Khasuyev worked as a physical
training teacher. The family lived in a flat in a two-storey block of
flats at 20 Sovetskaya Street, Urus-Martan, Chechnya. The applicant
submitted a copy of Abu Khasuyev's passport with the official
registration of his domicile at 20 Sovetskaya Street in Urus-Martan.
According to the applicant, houses in the street were renumbered at
some point later, after the events, and their address was changed to
18 Sovetskaya Street. According to the Government, at the material
time the applicant and her family resided at 18 Sovetskaya Street.
The
Russian federal forces had had full control over the town of
Urus-Martan since December 1999. Numerous military units were
stationed in the town and on its outskirts. The various public
bodies, including the town administration, the district military
commander's office and law enforcement agencies, were functioning
properly.
In
August 2001 the federal military authorities placed further
checkpoints around the town to ensure that all transport going into
or out of Urus-Martan passed through those checkpoints.
At
the time of the events described below one of the checkpoints was
located just across the street from the applicant's block of flats.
In the vicinity of the applicant's building there was another
checkpoint of the Russian military forces, the town administration
and the Urus-Martan district department of the interior (the ROVD).
Several police officers stood watch on the roof of the ROVD round the
clock. According to the applicant, her house could be clearly seen
from the rooftop. The applicant produced a photograph of her street
and indicated the location of the checkpoints and the respective
administrative buildings.
2. Information submitted by the applicant
According
to the applicant, on 30 August 2001 she was at work. Her son was at
home. He was sick and was staying in bed with an intravenous drip.
His wife, daughter, and one of the applicant's sisters were also at
home.
Around
1 p.m. the applicant's daughter-in-law was about to leave for a local
food market. When she opened the door a group of about ten men in
camouflage uniforms rushed into the flat. They had machine guns and
sniper rifles with silencers (“vintorez”). They
spoke unaccented Russian. All but two of them were wearing masks.
Those without masks were fair-haired, blue-eyed and had a Slavic
appearance. The applicant's relatives thought that the intruders were
Russian military servicemen.
The
intruders did not produce identity papers or any documents to justify
their actions, gave no explanations, and quickly searched the flat.
The
applicant's sister lost consciousness at the sight of the men. The
men pointed their machine guns at the applicant's daughter-in-law and
her three-month-old daughter. The applicant's daughter-in-law heard
the intruders enter Abu Khasuyev's room and order him to lie on the
floor. After that she saw the intruders taking her husband outside.
He was barefoot, a T-shirt which he was wearing was pulled over his
head and his hands were behind his head.
The
applicant's daughter-in-law asked one of the men without masks why
they were arresting Abu Khasuyev and where they were taking him. In
response the officer asked her what relation she was to the arrested
person, his wife or sister. The applicant's daughter-in-law replied
that she was Abu Khasuyev's wife, and the man ordered the others not
to let her out and to block the flat door. After that they left. The
applicant's daughter-in-law managed to run out into the entrance hall
of the block of flats. The intruders then blocked the hall's entrance
door from the outside; the applicant's daughter-in-law could not get
out and started screaming.
The
men took Abu Khasuyev outside and forced him into a white VAZ-2107
(“Zhiguli”) car parked next to the block of flats,
a few metres from the checkpoint. According to eyewitnesses, the
officers who were on duty at the checkpoint saw what was happening,
but made no attempt to interfere. Two intruders placed Abu Khasuyev
between them, and another one ordered the driver to go to “the
base”. One of the intruders stood next to the car, pointing his
gun at the gathering crowd, and ordering them to keep away. He
shouted that the detainee had a grenade.
When
the applicant's daughter-in-law managed to get outside she ran to the
white VAZ-2107 car and saw her husband in the car with his hands tied
behind his head. He had no grenade. A red VAZ-2121 (“Niva”)
car with a man in military uniform and a UAZ vehicle (“Tabletka”)
with several masked men in camouflage uniforms were parked nearby.
All the vehicles had tinted windows and no registration plates. The
vehicles then left in a northerly direction.
The
applicant has had no news of her son since 30 August 2001.
In
support of her statement concerning the circumstances of Abu
Khasuyev's abduction the applicant submitted the following documents:
a statement by Mrs R.Zh. dated 8 June 2004; a statement by Mrs A.E.
dated 14 July 2004; a statement by Mrs A.Kh. dated 20 July 2004; a
statement by herself dated 3 July 2005 and a statement by Mr R.D.
dated 18 July 2005.
3. Information submitted by the Government
The
Government did not challenge most of the facts as presented by the
applicant. They stated that it had been established that “on 30
August 2001, at about 1 p.m., unidentified persons in camouflage
uniforms and masks, armed with automatic weapons, abducted A. Kh.
Khasuyev from 18 Sovetskaya Street in the town of Urus-Martan,
Chechnya”.
B. The applicant's search for Abu Khasuyev
Immediately
after Abu Khasuyev's abduction, the applicant's daughter-in-law found
the applicant and informed her about the events.
On
30 August 2001 the applicant went to the ROVD and submitted a written
complaint about her son's abduction to the head of the ROVD. The
officer told her that he was unaware that her son had been taken
away.
On
the same date the applicant went to the military commander's office;
a duty officer informed her that the military commander was away.
On
31 August 2001 the applicant requested in writing that the military
commander, the head of the ROVD, and the head of the Urus-Martan
administration assist her in establishing her son's whereabouts.
On
1 September 2001 the applicant spoke to the military commander,
General Gadzhiyev. He told her that he had been away from Urus-Martan
on 30 August 2001, was unaware of the incident, and invited her to
come again on 3 September 2001.
On
3 September 2001 the applicant again met Mr Gadzhiyev and enquired
about her son. The military commander asked her whether she was
talking about someone from the two-storey block of flats. The
applicant answered in the affirmative and then Mr Gadzhiyev told her
that the person in question was not detained in the military
commander's office and had probably been taken to the Chernokozovo
detention centre.
On
the following day the applicant went to Chernokozovo and spoke with
the head of the detention centre, who informed her that Abu Khasuyev
was not listed among the detainees.
On
20 September 2001 the applicant spoke with the deputy head of the
Chechnya Department of the Federal Security Service (the FSB) who
assured her that they had not arrested her son and that they were
unaware of his whereabouts. He also stated that it was difficult to
find out who had detained Abu Khasuyev, as there were a lot of
different military units in Urus-Martan.
Since
then the applicant has repeatedly applied in person and in writing to
various public bodies, including prosecutors of various levels,
administrative authorities of Chechnya, the ROVD, the Urus-Martan
military commander, the Chechnya FSB, the Special Envoy of the
Russian President in the Chechen Republic for Rights and Freedoms, a
deputy of the State Duma, and the Russian President. She has also
addressed herself to the OSCE and various NGOs, including Memorial
and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In her letters to
the authorities the applicant referred to the circumstances of her
son's abduction and asked for assistance and details of the
investigation. She also stated that her son was a school teacher and
had never participated in illegal armed groups. Those enquiries
mostly remained unanswered, or only formal responses were given by
which the respective requests were forwarded to various prosecutors'
offices “for examination”.
According
to the applicant, she and her daughter-in-law also participated in
examinations of unidentified corpses found in Chechnya.
C. The official investigation into the disappearance of
Abu Khasuyev
1. Information submitted by the applicant
At
some point in October 2001 an investigator from the ROVD visited the
applicant's home and informed her that a search for her son had
commenced on 10 October 2001. Then the investigator questioned the
applicant, her daughter-in-law and one of the neighbours. According
to the applicant, the questions related mostly to Abu Khasuyev's
personality rather than to the circumstances of his disappearance.
Some
time later in October 2001 the applicant was summoned to the ROVD; an
investigator, who introduced himself as Sasha, told her that her son
was dead. In reply to the applicant's request for proof, the
investigator referred to a certain register in which there was an
entry to this effect. Some time later she spoke to an officer from
the ROVD, who showed her the register and read out from it that
“Khasuyev had been killed”. During the ensuing
conversation the applicant found out that the investigator had
mistakenly been referring to another person. After that the
investigator assured her that the search for her son would be
continued.
On
29 October 2001 the Chechnya FSB informed the applicant that they had
not detained Abu Khasuyev, and that they were unable to establish his
whereabouts.
On
12 November 2001 the military prosecutor of the North Caucasus
Military Circuit forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's
abduction to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102.
On
22 December 2001 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor's office (the
Urus-Martan prosecutor's office) opened a criminal investigation into
Abu Khasuyev's disappearance under Article 126 § 1 of the
Criminal Code (kidnapping). The file was assigned no. 25170.
On
9 January 2002 the applicant was granted victim status in the
criminal case.
On
22 February 2002 the investigators suspended the investigation in the
criminal case for failure to establish the identity of the
perpetrators. The applicant was informed about this decision on
3 December 2002 (see paragraph 42 below).
On
18 April 2002 the Department of Administration of Punishments of the
Volgograd Region informed the applicant that Abu Khasuyev had not
been detained in their pre-trial detention centres or penitentiary
facilities.
On
1 July 2002 the Chechnya representative in the State Duma referred
the applicant's complaint that her son had been abducted to the
Chechnya prosecutor's office.
On
2 October 2002 the Department of the Prosecutor General's office in
the Southern Federal Circuit forwarded the applicant's request for
assistance in establishing Abu Khasuyev's whereabouts to the Chechnya
prosecutor's office for examination.
On
3 December 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the
applicant that the criminal investigation had been suspended on 22
February 2002, then resumed on 20 November 2002, and that it was
currently in progress.
On
24 March 2003 (in the submitted documents the date
is also given as 25 March 2003) the Urus-Martan prosecutor's
office suspended the investigation in the criminal case for failure
to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The applicant was not
informed about this decision.
On
5 April 2003 the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment
(the UGA) forwarded the applicant's complaint that her son had been
abducted to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102. On
16 and 22 May 2003 the latter informed the applicant that “[her]
request did not contain any information concerning the involvement of
military personnel in the abduction of Abu Khasuyev”.
On
2 September 2003 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martan district
prosecutor that her son had been abducted. In her letter she stated
that Abu Khasuyev had been abducted by representatives of
law-enforcement agencies, who had arrived in a red VAZ-2121 car and a
white VAZ-2107 car with blackened windows and without registration
numbers and that her son had been taken away in the white car.
Further, the applicant complained that the officers from the military
commander's office who had been on duty that day had failed to stop
the abductors. The applicant pointed out that she had spoken with the
military commander General Gadzhiyev, who had told her that her son
had probably been taken to the Chernokozovo detention centre. No
response was given to this complaint.
On
4 October 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended
for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators.
On
20 January 2004 the investigators informed the applicant that on 4
October 2003 they had suspended the investigation in the criminal
case.
On
27 April 2004 the Urus-Martan prosecutor's office rejected the
applicant's request for access to the investigation file, stating
that access could be granted only upon completion of the criminal
investigation.
On
7 June 2004 the investigators informed the applicant that they had
suspended the investigation in the criminal case owing to the
expiration of the time-limits and failure to establish the identity
of the perpetrators.
On
7 August 2004 the applicant requested the Urus-Martan prosecutor's
office to inform her about the progress of the investigation in the
criminal case. No response was given to this request.
On
15 August 2004 the Urus-Martan prosecutor's office resumed the
investigation in criminal case no. 25170. The applicant was
informed about the decision on the same date.
On
3 December 2004 the applicant requested the Urus-Martan prosecutor's
office to inform her of progress in case no. 25170; to question the
officers who had been manning the checkpoint located in the vicinity
of the applicant's house and to resume the investigation. No response
was given to this request.
On
15 June 2004 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martan Town Court
(“Town Court”) that the investigation in the criminal
case was ineffective. She requested the court to order the
prosecutor's office to resume the criminal investigation, carry it
out in a thorough and effective manner, take necessary investigative
measures, and authorise her access to the investigation file.
On
16 June 2005 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martan district
prosecutor that her son had been abducted by servicemen of the
Urus-Martan power structures (силовых
структур).
In her letter she pointed out that employees of the Urus-Martan
district military commander's office had witnessed the abduction as
they had been on watch duty in close proximity to her house. The
applicant pointed out that she had already submitted her account to
this effect to the investigative authorities but the latter had
failed to establish the whereabouts of her abducted son. The
applicant complained about the lack of information concerning the
investigation and requested to be informed in writing of what
measures were being taken by the prosecutor's office. No response was
given to this complaint.
On
29 June 2004 the Town Court allowed the applicant's complaint in part
and ordered the prosecutor's office to carry out a thorough and
effective investigation. As regards the request for access to the
investigation file, the court stated that the investigation was still
pending and therefore the applicant had no right of access to the
file. On 17 August 2004 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld this
decision on appeal.
On
15 September 2004 the investigators suspended the investigation in
the criminal case for failure to establish the identity of the
perpetrators. The applicant was informed about the decision on the
same date.
On
21 October 2005 the applicant again complained to the Urus-Martan
prosecutor's office. She stated that she had not received any
response to her request of 16 June 2005 and pointed out that the lack
of information concerning the criminal proceedings precluded her from
appealing against the actions of the prosecutor's office, which had
been procrastinating in the investigation. The applicant requested to
be informed about the progress of the investigation and asked the
authorities to resume the investigation in the criminal case. No
response was given to this complaint.
On
25 October 2005 the Urus-Martan prosecutor's office resumed the
investigation in the criminal case owing to “the need to carry
out a number of investigative actions aimed at solving the crime”.
The applicant was informed about this decision on the same date.
On
25 November 2005 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended
for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The
applicant was informed about this decision on the same date.
On
19 June 2006 the Urus-Martan prosecutor's office resumed the
investigation in the criminal case. The applicant was informed about
the decision on the same date. The applicant was not informed about
further developments in the criminal case.
2. Information submitted by the Government
Referring
to the information provided by the Prosecutor General's office, the
Government stated in their initial submission that upon receipt of
the applicant's written complaint about her son's abduction, on
22 December 2001 the Urus-Martan prosecutor's office had opened
criminal case no. 25170 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code
(kidnapping). At the same time, in their later submission, the
Government stated that on 27 October 2001 the district prosecutor's
office opened another investigation into the same events and the
criminal case file was assigned no. 25140. The investigation of
both criminal cases was joined in one criminal case in December 2006
(see paragraph 75 below).
According
to the Government, the criminal investigation into the abduction of
Abu Khasuyev had been suspended on a number of
occasions, specifically: on 22 February 2002, 24 March and 4 October
2003, 15 September 2004, 25 November 2005, 19 July 2006 and 12
January 2007, and had been resumed on 20 November 2002, 4 September
2003, 15 August 2004, 25 October 2005, 19 June and 12 December 2006
and 10 April 2008; but it had failed to identify those responsible
for the abduction of the applicant's son. However, the
applicant had been duly informed about all suspensions and
resumptions of the criminal proceedings.
According
to the Government, on 9 January 2002 the applicant was granted victim
status in criminal case no. 25170 and questioned. Nonetheless, in
November 2006 the applicant was again granted victim status, this
time in criminal case no. 25140, and questioned again (see
paragraph 74 below). On both occasions she provided similar
statements by describing in detail the circumstances of her son's
abduction. She stated that her son had been abducted by military
servicemen, who had arrived in a red VAZ-2121 car, a white VAZ-2107
car, and a UAZ vehicle; that the abductors had spoken unaccented
Russian and refused to explain the reasons for her son's abduction.
On
6 September 2004 the investigators again questioned the applicant.
Her witness statement was similar to the one provided on 9 January
2002. In addition, the applicant stated that although the servicemen
who had been manning the checkpoint across the street from her house
had witnessed the abduction, they had failed to stop the
perpetrators; that the military commander General Gadzhiyev had told
her that Abu Khasuyev had been taken to the detention centre in
Chernokozovo and that the administration of the detention centre had
denied having him as one of their detainees.
On 8 September 2004 the investigators questioned the wife of Abu
Khasuyev, Mrs R.Zh., who stated that at 1.30 p.m. on 30 August 2001 a
group of about ten armed men in camouflage uniform had broken into
the flat. They spoke unaccented Russian. Abu Khasuyev had been sick
and stayed at home that day. The intruders had taken him away without
providing any explanations. The men had arrived in a red VAZ-2121
car, a white VAZ-2107 car, and a UAZ vehicle; none of the vehicles
had had registration numbers. The witness had seen the intruders
forcing her husband into the white VAZ car and the cars driving away
in the direction of Grozny.
On 29 October 2005 the investigators again questioned the applicant.
She explained that she had nothing to add to the statements she had
given previously.
The
Government further submitted that on 19 June 2006 the district
prosecutor had approved a plan of measures to be taken by the
investigation into the disappearance of the applicant's son.
According to the plan, a number of requests for investigative
measures had been issued to various law enforcement bodies; however,
those efforts had failed to produce any tangible results.
On
20 June 2006 the investigators forwarded a number of requests for
information to various detention centres concerning the whereabouts
of Abu Khasuyev. According to their replies, the applicant's son was
not detained in any of those centres.
On
22 June 2006 the investigators questioned Mrs A.Kh., who stated that
at about 1 p.m. on 30 August 2001 she had arrived at the applicant's
house. Abu Khasuyev was ill and had stayed at home that day.
According to the witness, she had been changing in one of the rooms
when two armed men in camouflage uniforms, one of them masked, walked
into the room. When Mrs A.Kh. saw the men she fainted. When she
regained consciousness the intruders had already gone, taking Abu
Khasuyev with them.
On
28 June 2006 the investigators questioned an officer of the ROVD, Mr
R.G., who stated that in October 2002 the applicant had not requested
any information from him and that he had not shown to her any
registration logs.
On
28 June 2006 the investigators also questioned Mr R.D., who stated
that at lunchtime on 30 August 2001 he and his friend Mr Kh.O. had
been walking past the two-storey apartment building at 20
Sovetskaya Street and past the checkpoint situated across from the
building when they saw men in military uniforms armed with automatic
weapons; two of them were putting a tall young man who was barefoot
and had his T-shirt pulled over his head into a white VAZ-2107 car.
The third man, who was the driver, had ordered: “To the base,
to the base”. Another armed man had been standing next to the
car, pointing his machine gun around and yelling that everyone should
keep away. The witness and Mr Kh.O. had been standing about five
metres away and could observe closely what was happening. Another two
vehicles had been parked nearby; a military UAZ vehicle had been on
the left side of the road and a VAZ-2121 car on the right. After the
young man had been placed in the car, all three vehicles had driven
away in a northerly direction.
According to the Government, on 28 June 2006 the investigators also
questioned Mrs A.E., who stated that at about 10 a.m. on 30 August
2001 she had been at home. Suddenly, she had heard screaming from the
applicant's flat and gone to the yard. She had seen a group of men
armed with automatic weapons taking a young man outside with a
T-shirt pulled over his head. Some time later she had found out that
this young man was Abu Khasuyev.
On
6 July 2006 the investigators conducted a crime scene examination in
the applicant's flat. Nothing was collected from the scene.
On
8 November 2006 the applicant was granted victim status in criminal
case no. 25410 and questioned again. The applicant provided a
statement similar to the ones she had provided on 9 January 2002 and
6 September 2004.
On
12 December 2006 the investigators joined the investigation of
criminal cases no. 25140 and no. 25170. The joined case file was
assigned no. 25170.
On
12 December 2006 the investigators again forwarded a number of
requests to various law enforcement agencies asking for assistance in
carrying out investigative measures aimed at establishing the
whereabouts of Abu Khasuyev and identifying the perpetrators.
According to their responses, the efforts made by the agencies in
connection with those requests had failed to produce any tangible
results.
On
14 December 2006 the investigators questioned Mr S.G., who stated
that in the evening of 30 August 2001 he had found out that a group
of unidentified men armed with automatic weapons had abducted Abu
Khasuyev.
On
15 December, 22 December and 27 December 2006, and probably on 25
June 2007 (the date is illegible) the investigators questioned Mrs
A.G, Mr L.M. Mr I.I. and Mr M. Sh., each of whom provided a statement
similar to that of Mr S.G.
On
22 June 2007 applicant was questioned again. Her statement was
similar to the ones provided on 9 January 2002, 6 September 2004 and
8 November 2006.
On
10 April 2008 a supervisory prosecutor from the Chechnya prosecutor's
office ordered the investigators to resume the suspended
investigation in the criminal case. The decision stated, inter alia,
the following:
“...On 12 January 2007 the investigator of the
Urus-Martan district prosecutor's office decided to suspend the
investigation in criminal case no. 25170 for failure to
establish the identity of the perpetrators...
This decision is unlawful and unsubstantiated, as in
violation of Article 208 § 5 of the Criminal Procedure
Code the investigation failed to take all possible measures in the
absence of the culprits.
For instance, the investigation failed to establish or
question the witnesses to Abu Khasuyev's abduction; to question the
former head of the ROVD, as well as the head of the criminal search
division of the ROVD and the head of the public safety division of
the ROVD... during the questioning of Z. Khasuyeva the investigators
failed to clarify a number of important circumstances surrounding her
son's abduction and take other possible investigative and operational
search measures.
The decision to suspend the investigation in the
criminal case should be overruled and the case should be returned
[for further investigation]...”
On the same date the supervising prosecutor issued a decision
ordering the investigation to take the following actions in the
criminal case:
“1. To make a plan of the investigative and
operational search measures ...
2. To establish the identity of eyewitnesses to Abu
Khasuyev's abduction and question them about the incident.
3. ....to question the former head of the ROVD, as well
as the head of the criminal search division of the ROVD and the head
of the public safety division of the ROVD about the circumstances of
the case; also, to find out what measures they had taken to establish
the identity of the armed men who had been driving around in
Urus-Martan on 30 August 2001 in a white VAZ-2107 or VAZ-2106 car,
red Niva car [VAZ-2121] and a khaki UAZ Tabletka vehicle and had
abducted Abu Khasuyev from his house.
4. ...to question Mr G. Gadzhiyev, the former
Urus-Martan district military commander, who, according to
Z.Khasuyeva...., knew who had arrested her son Abu Khasuyev and told
her that her son had probably been taken to the remand detention
centre in Chernokozovo; [the investigators] should establish officers
of which law enforcement agency had been manning the checkpoint
located across from Z. Khasuyeva's house...
5...to establish to the owners of the white VAZ-2107 or
VAZ-2106, the red Niva car and the khaki UAZ Tabletka.
6. To establish which power structures had stationed
people in August 2001 in Urus-Martan and to find out whether they
used VAZ-2107 or VAZ-2106, the red Niva car and the khaki UAZ
Tabletka.
7. ....to establish who was on duty at the checkpoint
situated across the street from the house of Z. Khasuyeva on 30
August 2001 at about 1 p.m.....;
8. ...to request from the UGA information concerning
special operations on 30 August 2001 in Urus-Martan and to find
out whether any military orders to conduct operational-search
measures had been issued [by them] to the units stationed [at the
time] in Urus-Martan.
9. To request the same information from the Central
Archives of the Ministry of Defence.
10. To question again Z. Khasuyeva and find out the
following:
-which relatives of hers had received information “from
unofficial sources” that after the abduction her son Abu
Khasuyev had been taken to the Urus-Martan district military
commander's office where he had been detained on the third
floor?.....
11. To question the witnesses.... about the persons Z.
Khasuyeva referred to as “unofficial sources of information”...
12. To establish .... the reasons for the failure [to
act] by... the officers of the ROVD who.... had been on duty on the
roof of the ROVD on 30 August 2001, from where [they] could clearly
see the house....
13. ... to question Mr Kh.O., who on 30 August 2001 was
walking down Sovetskaya Street in Urus-Martan with Mr R.D. and saw
the abduction of Abu Khasuyev.....
14. ....to verify whether any information concerning Abu
Khasuyev is available in the Main Information Centre of the Chechnya
Ministry of the Interior, the Main Informational and Analytical
Centre of the Russian Ministry of the Interior and its Data Base...
17. ... if there is sufficient information about the
involvement of servicemen of the Russian federal forces ...to forward
the case ... under the rules of jurisdiction... to an appropriate
military investigating authority...”
On
9 June 2008 the supervising prosecutor decided that the investigation
in the criminal case should be conducted by a joint investigation
group consisting of investigators from the public prosecutor's office
and the military prosecutor's office. The reasons for this decision
were as follows:
“...upon examination of the criminal case file it
was established that there were sufficient grounds to assume that the
crime [the abduction of Abu Khasuyev] had been committed with the
participation of servicemen of the Russian federal forces, and this
had been confirmed, in particular, by the use of armoured vehicles
during the crime and by the carrying out of the special operation...”
According to the Government, the investigation into the abduction of
Abu Khasuyev was still in progress. From the information obtained by
the investigation it followed that Abu Khasuyev had not been detained
by the Russian federal forces and that no special operations had been
carried out in his respect.
3. Documents submitted by the Government
After
the partial admissibility decision of 25 September 2008, the Court
again requested the Government to submit a copy of the investigation
file into the disappearance of Abu Khasuyev.
In
response to the Court's request, the Government submitted a
substantial number of documents from the investigation file,
comprising two volumes and running to 416 pages. The Government
requested the Court to apply Rule 33 § 3 of Rules of
Court concerning confidentiality of the submitted documents and to
restrict public access to the documentation submitted. In their
request the Government stated that the criminal investigation was
still in progress and that public disclosure of the documents
submitted could be detrimental to the interests of participants in
the criminal proceedings.
The
Government further stated that a copy of the entire investigation
file could not be submitted to the Court owing to the absence of any
guarantees on the part of the Court of non-disclosure of the secret
data contained in the investigation file. In this respect the
Government referred to Article 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
since the file contained information concerning
the participants in the criminal proceedings.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
For
a summary of relevant domestic law see Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v.
Russia (no. 40464/02, §§ 67-69, 10 May 2007).
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
A. Arguments of the parties
The Government contended that
the application should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies as the investigation
into the disappearance of Abu Khasuyev
was still in progress. They further submitted that the applicant had
the right to appeal against the investigators' decisions to
supervising prosecutors or domestic courts.
The applicant contested that
objection. She contended that the Government had not indicated which
particular domestic remedy she had not availed herself of and further
stated that the Government's argument to the effect that the
investigation was pending related to the merits of the present case
rather than to the question of its admissibility.
B. The Court's assessment
In the present case, the Court
took no decision about the exhaustion of domestic remedies at the
admissibility stage, having found that this question was too closely
linked to the merits. It will now proceed to examine the arguments of
the parties in the light of the provisions of the Convention and its
relevant practice (for a relevant summary, see Estamirov
and Others v. Russia, no. 60272/00,
§§ 73-74, 12 October
2006).
As regards the Government's objection concerning the
pending criminal investigation, that is criminal law remedies, the
Court observes that the applicant complained to the law enforcement
authorities after the abduction of her son and that the investigation
has been pending since 27 October 2001. The applicant and the
Government dispute the effectiveness of this investigation.
The Court considers that this limb of the Government's
preliminary objection raises issues concerning the effectiveness of
the criminal investigation which are closely linked to the merits of
the applicant's complaints. Thus, it considers that these matters
fall to be examined below under the substantive provisions of the
Convention.
II. THE COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The parties' arguments
The
applicant argued that it was beyond reasonable doubt that Abu
Khasuyev had been detained by representatives of the Russian federal
forces, this fact being confirmed by eyewitness statements. In
particular, she stated that the abduction of Abu Khasuyev had been
carried out by a large group of Russian-speaking representatives of
law enforcement agencies who had been armed and driving the military
cars. The applicant's son had been detained in the daytime, in close
proximity to the Russian federal forces' checkpoint, in the town
centre of Urus-Martan, which had been under the full control of the
authorities, who nonetheless had failed to take any measures to stop
the abduction. She further stressed that Abu Khasuyev had been taken
away in life-threatening circumstances, given the widespread practice
of forced disappearances in Chechnya during the period in question.
The applicant thus argued that, in view of the above and given that
her son had been missing for almost five years at the time of the
submission of the observations, he may be presumed to have been
deprived of his life by representatives of the State.
The
Government argued that the investigation had not obtained any
evidence to the effect that representatives of the Russian federal
forces had been involved in the abduction of Abu Khasuyev. They
argued therefore that there were no grounds to claim that Abu
Khasuyev's right to life, guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention,
had been breached by representatives of the Russian power structures.
The Government further claimed that the investigation into the
disappearance of the applicant's son met the Convention requirement
of effectiveness, as all measures envisaged in national law were
being taken to identify the perpetrators.
B. Article 38 § 1 (a) and consequent
inferences drawn by the Court
In their observations made
before the decision on admissibility, the Government stated that it
would be contrary to Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
for them to submit the complete investigation file. After the
decision on admissibility of the application the Government provided
an update on the progress of the investigation and 416 pages of
documents from the file, including copies of the investigators'
decisions, which contained descriptions of the investigative steps
that had been taken, and a number of witness statements. They argued
that other documents from the investigation files could not be
submitted and again referred to Article 161 of the Criminal
Procedure Code.
The Court has on many occasions
reiterated that the Contracting States are required to furnish all
necessary facilities to the Court and that a failure on a
Government's part to submit information which is in their hands,
without a satisfactory explanation, may not only give rise to the
drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant's
allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of
compliance by a respondent State with its obligations under
Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention (see
Timurtaÿ v. Turkey,
no. 23531/94, § 66, ECHR 2000-VI).
The Court recalls
notes that in previous cases it has
already found a reference to Article 161 of the Criminal Procedural
Code insufficient to justify the withholding of key information
requested by the Court (see, among other authorities, Imakayeva
v. Russia, no. 7615/02, § 123,
ECHR 2006-... (extracts)). It therefore regrets the Government's
position in respect of the remaining documents from the investigation
file and does not find that reference to the above-mentioned
provision of the national legislation can serve as a basis for
withholding documents requested by the Court.
At the same time, the Court
reiterates that Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention is
applicable to cases which have been declared admissible. It notes
that the Government have submitted a large part of the procedural
documents from the criminal investigation file, as requested by the
Court. These documents contain a detailed description of the
investigation and witness statements which have made a significantly
contributioned
to the examination of the case. As to the remainder, the Court finds
that it can draw inferences from the Government's failure to disclose
the entire contents of the file.
In
view of these inferences and the circumstances of the present case,
the Court does not find it necessary to draw separate conclusions
under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention.
C. The Court's evaluation of the facts
The
Court observes that it has developed a number of general principles
relating to the establishment of facts in dispute, in particular when
faced with allegations of disappearance under Article 2 of the
Convention (for a summary of these, see Bazorkina v. Russia,
no. 69481/01, §§ 103-109, 27 July 2006). The Court
also notes that the conduct of the parties when evidence is being
obtained has to be taken into account (see Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 161, Series A no. 25). In
view of this, and bearing in mind the principles referred to above,
the Court finds that it can draw inferences from the Government's
conduct in respect of the well-foundedness of the applicant's
allegations. The Court will thus proceed to examine crucial elements
in the present case that should be taken into account when deciding
whether the applicant's son can be presumed dead and whether his
death can be attributed to the authorities.
The
applicant alleged that the persons who had taken Abu Khasuyev away on
30 August 2001 and then killed him
were State agents. The Government did not dispute any of the factual
elements underlying the application and did not provide any other
explanation of the events.
The
Court notes that the applicant's version of the events is supported
by the witness statements collected by her and by the investigation.
The applicant and the neighbours stated that the perpetrators had
acted in a manner similar to that of a security operation –
they had been wearing masks and camouflage uniforms, had been armed
with automatic weapons and spoke Russian among themselves and to the
residents. They had broken into the applicant's flat during the
daytime, in close proximity to the checkpoint of the Russian federal
forces. In her applications to the authorities the applicant
consistently maintained that her son had been detained by unknown
servicemen and requested the investigation to look into that
possibility (see paragraphs 45 and 54 above).
The
Court finds that the fact that a large group of armed men in uniform
in broad daylight, equipped with vehicles, was able to move freely
through military roadblocks and to proceed to arrest the applicant's
son at his home in a town area, across the street from a military
checkpoint, strongly supports the applicant's allegation that these
were State servicemen. The domestic investigation also accepted
factual assumptions as presented by the applicant and took steps to
check whether law enforcement bodies were involved in the arrest. The
investigation did establish that the military were involved in the
abduction of the applicant's son (see paragraph 82 above), but it
does not appear that any further steps were taken to establish
exactly which military unit.
The
Court observes that where the applicant makes out a prima facie
case and the Court is prevented from reaching factual conclusions
owing to a lack of documents, it is for the Government to argue
conclusively why the documents in question cannot serve to
corroborate the allegations made by the applicant, or to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation of how the events in question
occurred. The burden of proof is thus shifted to the Government and
if they fail in their arguments, issues will arise under Article 2
and/or Article 3 (see Toğcu v. Turkey, no. 27601/95,
§ 95, 31 May 2005, and Akkum and Others v. Turkey,
no. 21894/93, § 211, ECHR 2005 II).
Taking
into account the above elements, the Court is satisfied that the
applicant has made a prima facie case that her son was detained by
State servicemen. The Government's statement that the investigation
did not find any evidence to support the involvement of special
forces in the abduction is insufficient to discharge them from the
above-mentioned burden of proof. Drawing support from the consistent
explanations and accounts contained in the documents submitted by the
parties and having regard to the Government's failure to provide any
other plausible explanation of the events in question, the Court
considers that Abu Khasuyev was arrested on 30 August 2001 in
his flat in Urus-Martan by State servicemen during an unacknowledged
security operation.
There
has been no reliable news of the applicant's son since 30 August
2001. His name has not been found in any official detention
facilities' records. Finally, the Government did not submit any
explanation as to what had happened to him after his arrest.
The
Court notes with great concern that a number of cases have come
before it which suggest that the phenomenon of “disappearances”
is well known in Chechnya (see, among others, Bazorkina, cited
above; Imakayeva, cited above; Luluyev and Others v.
Russia, no. 69480/01, ECHR 2006 ... (extracts);
Baysayeva v. Russia, no. 74237/01, 5 April 2007;
Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia, cited above; and
Alikhadzhiyeva v. Russia, no. 68007/01, 5 July
2007). A number of international reports point to the same
conclusion. The Court has already found that, in the context of the
conflict in Chechnya, when a person is detained by unidentified
servicemen without any subsequent acknowledgment of the detention,
this can be regarded as life-threatening. The absence of Abu Khasuyev
or of any news of him for more than seven years supports this
assumption. For the above reasons the Court considers that it has
been established beyond reasonable doubt that he must be presumed
dead following unacknowledged detention by State servicemen.
As
it follows from the documents submitted by the Government, as late as
April 2008, that is more than six and half years after the crime had
occurred and the investigation had been opened, the most basic steps
had not been taken related to the establishment of the identity of
the perpetrators and the questioning of the witnesses about the
events of 30 August 2001 (see paragraph 81 above).
Furthermore,
in a case involving disappearance, the Court finds it particularly
regrettable that there should have been no thorough investigation of
the relevant facts by the domestic prosecutors or courts. The
documents submitted by the Government from the investigation file
opened by the prosecutor's office do not suggest any progress in more
than six years and, if anything, show the incomplete and inadequate
nature of those proceedings. Moreover, the stance of the prosecutor's
office and the other law enforcement authorities after the news of
Abu Khasuyev's detention had been communicated to them by the
applicant contributed significantly to the likelihood of the
disappearance, as no necessary steps were taken in the crucial first
days and weeks after the arrest. The authorities' behaviour in the
face of the applicant's well-substantiated complaints gives rise to a
strong presumption of at least acquiescence in the situation and
raises strong doubts as to the objectivity of the investigation.
For
the above reasons the Court considers that it has been established
that Abu Khasuyev must be presumed dead following his unacknowledged
detention by State servicemen.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 2 of the Convention that her son
had disappeared after being detained by Russian servicemen and that
the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an effective
investigation of the matter. Article 2 reads:
“1. Everyone's right to life shall be
protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded
as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from
the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful
violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to
prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose
of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
A. The alleged violation of the right to life of Abu
Khasuyev
The
applicant maintained her complaint and argued that her son had been
detained by State servicemen and should be presumed dead in the
absence of any reliable news of him for several years.
The
Government referred to the fact that the investigation had obtained
no evidence to the effect that Abu Khasuyev was dead, or that
representatives of the federal power structures had been involved in
his abduction or alleged killing.
Article
2, which safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances
when deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most
fundamental provisions in the Convention, to which no derogation is
permitted. In the light of the importance of the protection afforded
by Article 2, the Court must subject deprivation of life to the most
careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of
State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances (see, among
other authorities, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, §§
146-147, and Avşar v. Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 391,
ECHR 2001 VII (extracts)).
The
Court has already established that the applicant's son must be
presumed dead following unacknowledged arrest by State servicemen. In
the absence of any justification put forward by the Government, the
Court finds that his death can be attributed to the State and that
there has been a violation of Article 2 in respect of Abu Khasuyev.
B. The alleged inadequacy of the investigation into the
abduction
The
applicant argued that the investigation into her son's disappearance
had fallen short of the requirements of domestic law and the
Convention standards. She pointed out that although she had informed
the authorities about her son's abduction on 30 August 2001 the
investigation had not commenced until 27 October 2001 (and/or 22
December 2001), almost two months after her son's abduction. The
applicant pointed out that from 22 December 2001 to 29 June 2004,
that is for more than two years, she had been the only witness
questioned by the investigation. The applicant also pointed out that
prior to the communication of her application to the respondent
Government, only she and two of her relatives had been questioned by
the investigation; that the authorities had failed to question a
number of important witnesses, including the military servicemen who
had been on duty at the checkpoint and could have witnessed Abu
Khasuyev's abduction, as well as local residents who also could have
witnessed the events. In addition, the investigation had failed to
take any measures to establish the law enforcement agency to which
the vehicles used during her son's abduction could have belonged. The
applicant argued that the investigation had been excessively long,
that it had been pending for more than seven years but had failed to
produce any tangible results, having been repeatedly suspended and
reopened. Furthermore, although the authorities had provided the
applicant with copies of the decisions concerning the suspensions of
the criminal investigation, these documents had not contained
sufficient information which would have enabled her to appeal against
them. In addition, the applicant had not been granted access to the
case file.
The
Government claimed that the investigation into the disappearance of
the applicant's son met the Convention requirement of effectiveness
as all measures envisaged in national law were being taken to
identify those responsible.
The
Court has on many occasions stated that the obligation to protect the
right to life under Article 2 of the Convention also requires by
implication that there should be some form of effective official
investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the
use of force. It has developed a number of guiding principles to be
followed for an investigation to comply with the Convention's
requirements (for a summary of these principles see Bazorkina,
cited above, §§ 117-119).
In
the present case, an investigation of the abduction was carried out.
The Court must assess whether that investigation met the requirements
of Article 2 of the Convention.
The
Court notes at the outset that the documents from the investigation
were partially disclosed by the Government. It therefore has to
assess the effectiveness of the investigation on the basis of these
documents, documents submitted by the applicant and the information
about the investigation's progress presented by the Government.
As
to the facts of the case, it has already been established that no
proper investigation has taken place into the disappearance of Abu
Khasuyev. The Court notes that the investigation was opened on 27
October 2001, that is one month and twenty-seven days after the
detention had occurred. This delay in itself was liable to affect the
investigation of a crime such as abduction in life-threatening
circumstances, where crucial action has to be taken in the first days
after the event. The crime scene investigation in the applicant's
flat was conducted only on 6 July 2006, which is four years, ten
months and seven days after the abduction (see paragraph 73 above).
It also appears that within the two years following the abduction the
applicant was the only witness questioned by the investigators. In
April 2008 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigation,
indicated the number of crucial steps which had been delayed and
ordered the investigators to carry them out (see paragraph 81 above).
It
is obvious that these measures, if they were to produce any
meaningful results, should have been taken immediately after the
crime was reported to the authorities, and as soon as the
investigation commenced. These delays, for which there has been no
explanation in the instant case, not only demonstrate the
authorities' failure to act of their own motion but also constitute a
breach of the obligation to exercise exemplary diligence and
promptness in dealing with such a serious crime (see Paul and
Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 86,
ECHR 2002-II).
A
number of essential steps were never taken. Most notably, it does not
appear that the investigation tried to identify and question the
servicemen who had been manning the checkpoint situated across the
street from the applicant's house or that they had tried to identify
and question any of the servicemen who might have participated in a
special operation in Urus-Martan and could have been involved in the
detention of Abu Khasuyev.
The
Court also notes that even though the applicant was granted victim
status twice (see paragraphs 63 and 74 above), she was only informed
of the suspensions and resumptions of the proceedings, and not of any
other significant developments. Accordingly, the investigators failed
to ensure that the investigation received the required level of
public scrutiny, or to safeguard the interests of the next of kin in
the proceedings.
Finally,
the Court notes that the investigation was suspended and resumed at
least seven times and that on several occasions the supervising
prosecutors and the local court criticised deficiencies in the
proceedings and ordered remedial measures. However, it appears that
these instructions were not complied with.
The
Government raised the possibility for the applicant to make use of
judicial review of the decisions of the investigating authorities in
the context of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court observes
that the applicant, having no access to the case file and not being
properly informed of the progress of the investigation, could not
have effectively challenged the actions or omissions of investigating
authorities before a court. Furthermore, the investigation has been
resumed by the prosecuting authorities themselves a number of times
due to the need to take additional investigative steps. However,
they still failed to investigate the applicant's allegations
properly. Moreover, owing to the time that had elapsed since the
events complained of, certain investigative measures that should have
been carried out much earlier could no longer be usefully conducted.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the remedy relied on by the
Government was ineffective in the circumstances and dismisses their
preliminary objection as regards the applicant's failure to exhaust
domestic remedies within the context of the criminal investigation.
In
the light of the foregoing, the Court dismisses the Government's
preliminary objection as regards the applicant's failure to exhaust
domestic remedies within the context of the criminal investigation,
and holds that the authorities failed to carry out an effective
criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
disappearance of Abu Khasuyev, in breach of Article 2 in its
procedural aspect.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant relied on Article 3 of the Convention, submitting that as a
result of her son's disappearance and the State's failure to
investigate those events properly, she had endured mental suffering
in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ”
The
Government contended that there was no evidence confirming that the
applicant had been subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 of
the Convention stating that “the investigation did not receive
any information concerning inhuman or degrading treatment of the
applicant by officials of the Russian Federation”.
The Court observes that the question whether a member
of the family of a “disappeared person” is a victim of
treatment contrary to Article 3 will depend on the existence of
special factors which give the suffering of the applicant a dimension
and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be
regarded as inevitably having been caused to relatives of a victim of
a serious human rights violation. Relevant elements will include the
proximity of the family tie, the particular circumstances of the
relationship, the extent to which the family member witnessed the
events in question, the involvement of the family member in the
attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person and the
way in which the authorities responded to those enquiries. The Court
would further emphasise that the essence of such a violation does not
mainly lie in the fact of the “disappearance” of the
family member but rather concerns the authorities' reactions and
attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention. It
is especially in respect of the latter that a relative may claim
directly to be a victim of the authorities' conduct (see Orhan v.
Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 358, 18 June 2002, and
Imakayeva, cited above, § 164).
In
the present case the Court notes that the applicant is the mother of
the disappeared man. For more than seven years she has not had any
news of him. During this period the applicant has applied to various
official bodies with enquiries about her son, both in writing and in
person. Despite her attempts, she has never received any plausible
explanation or information as to what became of her son following his
detention. The responses received by the applicant mostly denied that
the State was responsible for his arrest or simply informed her that
an investigation was ongoing. The Court's findings under the
procedural aspect of Article 2 are also of direct relevance here.
In
view of the above, the Court finds that the applicant suffered, and
continues to suffer, distress and anguish as a result of the
disappearance of her son and her inability to find out what happened
to him. The manner in which her complaints have been dealt with by
the authorities must be considered to constitute inhuman treatment
contrary to Article 3.
The
Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further stated that Abu Khasuyev had been detained in
violation of the guarantees of Article 5 of the Convention, which
reads, in so far as relevant:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law:...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed
promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his
arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or
detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”
In
the Government's opinion, no evidence was obtained by the
investigation to confirm that Abu Khasuyev was detained in breach of
the guarantees set out in Article 5 of the Convention.
The
Court has previously noted the fundamental importance of the
guarantees contained in Article 5 to secure the right of individuals
in a democracy to be free from arbitrary detention. It has also
stated that unacknowledged detention is a complete negation of these
guarantees and discloses a very grave violation of Article 5 (see
Çiçek v. Turkey, no. 25704/94, § 164,
27 February 2001, and Luluyev, cited above, § 122).
The Court has found that Abu Khasuyev was detained by
State servicemen on 30 August 2001 and has not been seen since.
His detention was not acknowledged, was not logged in any custody
records and there exists no official trace of his subsequent
whereabouts or fate. In accordance with the Court's practice, this
fact in itself must be considered a most serious failing, since it
enables those responsible for an act of deprivation of liberty to
conceal their involvement in a crime, to cover their tracks and to
escape accountability for the fate of a detainee. Furthermore, the
absence of detention records, noting such matters as the date, time
and location of detention and the name of the detainee as well as the
reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it,
must be seen as incompatible with the very purpose of Article 5 of
the Convention (see Orhan, cited above, § 371).
The
Court further considers that the authorities should have been more
alert to the need for a thorough and prompt investigation of the
applicant's complaints that her son had been detained and taken away
in life-threatening circumstances. However, the Court's findings
above in relation to Article 2 and, in particular, the conduct of the
investigation, leave no doubt that the authorities failed to take
prompt and effective measures to safeguard him against the risk of
disappearance.
Consequently,
the Court finds that Abu Khasuyev was held in unacknowledged
detention without any of the safeguards contained in Article 5. This
constitutes a particularly grave violation of the right to liberty
and security enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that she had been deprived of effective remedies
in respect of the aforementioned violations, contrary to Article 13
of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The
Government contended that the applicant had had effective remedies at
her disposal as required by Article 13 of the Convention and that the
authorities had not prevented her from using them. In particular, the
applicant had had an opportunity to appeal against the actions or
omissions of the investigating authorities to supervising prosecutors
and to the courts.
The
Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the
availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the
substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they
might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. Given the
fundamental importance of the right to protection of life, Article 13
requires, in addition to the payment of compensation where
appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of
leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for
the deprivation of life and infliction of treatment contrary to
Article 3, including effective access for the complainant to the
investigation procedure leading to the identification and punishment
of those responsible (see Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no.
38361/97, §§ 161-162, ECHR 2002-IV, and Süheyla
Aydın v. Turkey, no. 25660/94, § 208, 24 May
2005). The Court further reiterates that the requirements of
Article 13 are broader than a Contracting State's obligation
under Article 2 to conduct an effective investigation (see Khashiyev
and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, § 183, 24
February 2005).
It
follows that in circumstances where, as here, the criminal
investigation into the disappearance was ineffective and the
effectiveness of any other remedy that may have existed was
consequently undermined, the State has failed in its obligation under
Article 13 of the Convention.
Consequently,
there has been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article
2 of the Convention.
As
regards the applicants' reference to Articles 3 and 5 of the
Convention, the Court considers that, in the circumstances, no
separate issue arises in respect of Article 13 in conjunction with
Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention (see Kukayev
v. Russia, no. 29361/02, § 119,
15 November 2007, and Aziyevy v.
Russia, no. 77626/01, § 118,
20 March 2008).
VII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE
41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary damage
The
applicant made a claim in respect Abu Khasuyev's loss of earnings.
She claimed a total of 567,497 Russian roubles (RUB) under this head
(16,200 euros (EUR)).
The
applicant submitted that she was financially dependent on her son Abu
Khasuyev and that she would have benefited from his financial support
in the above amount. The applicant's calculations were based on the
provisions of the Russian Civil Code and the actuarial tables for use
in personal injury and fatal accident cases published by the United
Kingdom Government Actuary's Department in 2007 (“Ogden
tables”).
The
Government regarded these claims as unsubstantiated.
The
Court reiterates that there must be a clear causal connection between
the damage claimed by the applicant and the violation of the
Convention, and that this may, in an appropriate case, include
compensation in respect of loss of earnings. Having regard to its
above conclusions, it finds that there is a direct causal link
between the violation of Article 2 in respect of the applicant's
son and the loss by her of the financial support which he could have
provided. Having regard to the applicant's submissions and the
absence of any documents substantiating the earnings of Abu Khasuyev
at the time of the abduction, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 12,000 in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may
be chargeable on that amount.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
The
applicant claimed EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage
for the suffering she had endured as a result of the loss of her
family member, the indifference shown by the authorities towards her
and the failure to provide any information about the fate of her son.
The
Government found the amounts claimed excessive.
The
Court has found a violation of Articles 2, 5 and 13 of the Convention
on account of the unacknowledged detention and disappearance of the
applicant's son. The applicant herself has been found to have been
victim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The Court thus
accepts that she has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be
compensated for solely by the findings of violations. It awards the
applicant EUR 35,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable
thereon.
C. Costs and expenses
The
applicant was represented by the SRJI. They submitted an itemised
schedule of costs and expenses that included research and interviews
in Chechnya and Moscow, at a rate of EUR 50 per hour, and the
drafting of legal documents submitted to the Court and the domestic
authorities, at a rate of EUR 50 per hour for SRJI lawyers and EUR
150 per hour for SRJI senior staff and experts. The aggregate claim
in respect of costs and expenses related to the applicant's legal
representation amounted to EUR 8,943.
The
Government did not dispute the details of the calculations submitted
by the applicant.
The
Court has to establish first whether the costs and expenses indicated
by the applicant were actually incurred and, second, whether they
were necessary (see McCann and Others, cited above, §
220).
Having
regard to the details of the contract and submitted documents, the
Court is satisfied that these rates are reasonable and reflect the
expenses actually incurred by the applicant's representatives.
Further,
it has to be established whether the costs and expenses incurred for
legal representation were necessary. The Court notes that this case
was rather complex and required a certain amount of research and
preparation.
Having regard to the details of the claims submitted
by the applicant, the Court awards her the amount of EUR 8,943
as claimed, less EUR 850 received by way of legal aid from the
Council of Europe, together with any value-added tax that may be
chargeable, the net award to be paid into the representatives' bank
account in the Netherlands,
as identified by the applicant.
D. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Dismisses the Government's preliminary
objection;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 2 of the Convention in respect of Abu Khasuyev;
3. Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention
in respect of the failure to conduct an effective investigation into
the circumstances in which Abu Khasuyev
had disappeared;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 of the Convention in respect of Abu Khasuyev;
6. Holds
that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention
in conjunction with Article 2;
7. Holds
that no separate issues arise under Article 13 of the Convention in
respect of the alleged violations of Articles 3 and 5;
8. Holds
that there is no need to examine separately the applicant's
complaints under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the
Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on
which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into
Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement,
save for the payment in respect of costs and expenses:
(i) EUR 12,000
(twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of pecuniary damage to the applicant;
(ii) EUR 35,000
(thirty five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage to the applicant;
(iii) EUR 8,093
(eight thousand and ninety three euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be
paid into the representatives' bank account in the Netherlands;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 June 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President