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SLAWOMIR v. POLAND - 28300/06 [2009] ECHR 87 (20 January 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/87.html
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[2009] ECHR 87
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF SŁAWOMIR MUSIAŁ v. POLAND
(Application
no. 28300/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 January
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Sławomir Musiał v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 December 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 28300/06) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national,
Mr Sławomir Musiał (“the applicant”),
on 18 June 2006.
The Polish Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The
applicant alleged that the medical care and treatment offered to him
during his detention in Sosnowiec and Zabrze Remand Centres and Herby
Stare Prison had been inadequate in view of his epilepsy,
schizophrenia and other mental disorders. He also complained of
overcrowding and poor conditions in the above-mentioned detention
facilities.
On
30 August 2007 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under
the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 41
of the Rules of the Court, it was decided to examine the merits of
the application at the same time as its admissibility and to give
priority to the case.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1978 and is currently detained in Herby Stare
Prison, Poland.
The
applicant has been suffering from epilepsy since his early childhood.
More recently he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and other
serious mental disorders. Prior to his detention, he had attempted to
commit suicide and had received in-patient treatment in a psychiatric
hospital.
A. The applicant's medical treatment in detention
On
19 April 2005 the Będzin District Court (Sąd Rejonowy)
remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of committing
robbery and battery. Subsequently, the applicant's pre trial
detention was extended by the Będzin District Court in decisions
of 14 October 2005 and 11 January 2006, and by the Myszków
District Court in decisions of 5 June and 28 September
2006.
On
being taken into detention, the applicant was committed to an
unspecified remand centre, presumably Sosnowiec Remand Centre.
On
20 April 2005 he was taken to a State psychiatric hospital in Czeladź
experiencing intensive auditory hallucinations of a psychotic nature.
He remained there for two days.
On
22 April 2005 the applicant was committed to Zabrze Remand Centre but
on the same day he was transferred to Rybnik Psychiatric Hospital for
observation. On 17 or 18 July 2005 the applicant was transferred back
to Zabrze Remand Centre and he remained there until 4 January
2006.
During
his detention in Zabrze Remand Centre the applicant was taking
psychotropic medicines and he was examined by a psychiatrist on
19 July, 23 August, 6, 21 and 27 September, 8 and 22 November,
and 20 and 30 December 2005. In addition, the applicant was
under the constant supervision of a psychologist who examined him on
19 July, 23 August, 15 November and 15 December 2005. Finally,
the applicant was examined by a prison general practitioner in
connection with dermatological problems, coughs, backaches and
gastrological disorders.
From
4 January until 5 April 2006 the applicant was detained in Sosnowiec
Remand Centre.
On
15 January 2006 he was again taken to Czeladź Psychiatric
Hospital experiencing auditory hallucinations and suicidal thoughts.
On the following day the applicant's condition stabilised. He was
prescribed medicines and returned to Sosnowiec Remand Centre. It was
suggested that he should remain under psychiatric supervision.
On
23 January 2006 at about 11 p.m. the applicant attempted to hang
himself in Sosnowiec Remand Centre. He was rescued by his fellow
cellmates. Immediately afterwards he was examined by the in-house
doctor, who did not find any injuries.
On
24 January 2006 the applicant was taken to Czeladź Psychiatric
Hospital. Because of the lack of places, he was transported to Opole
Psychiatric Hospital, where he was examined by doctors. The applicant
was diagnosed with schizophrenia and it was suggested that he remain
under psychiatric supervision. Nevertheless, the applicant was not
admitted to the hospital as there was no room. As a result, he was
taken back to Sosnowiec Remand Centre.
During
his remaining time in Sosnowiec Remand Centre the applicant claimed
that he had experienced hallucinations. He received regular
pharmacological treatment, including psychotropic medicines. Between
January and April 2006 he was examined nine times by a psychiatrist
or a general practitioner.
On
22 May 2006 the applicant was transferred to Herby Stare Prison.
On
his admission to Herby Stare Prison the applicant was examined by a
neurologist. The examination did not confirm that the applicant
suffered from the disorders which he had described, such as epilepsy,
hallucinations and anxiety; nevertheless, the doctor prescribed
pharmacological treatment and ordered a psychiatric consultation and
observation.
On
25 May 2006 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist. He
complained that he was suffering from insomnia and auditory
hallucinations. Moreover, he claimed to have been followed and spied
on by his cellmates. The doctor prescribed a drug to treat the
applicant's schizophrenia and ordered that he should remain under the
supervision of a psychiatrist.
On
1 June 2006 the applicant missed his appointment with a psychiatrist
but he was examined one week later. On 27 June 2006 he was examined
by a general practitioner and on 10 July 2006 once more by a
psychiatrist. During the latter visit, the applicant declared that he
was well.
Subsequently,
between July 2006 and August 2007 the applicant was examined
thirty-five times by doctors with different specialities, including a
psychiatrist and a neurosurgeon.
It
appears that from 2 April until 4 June 2007 the applicant was
hospitalised in a prison psychiatric ward.
From
4 June until 23 or 28 August 2007 he was again detained in Herby
Stare Prison. On the day of his release the applicant declared that
he was well and had not been experiencing any hallucinations lately.
On
7 September 2007 the applicant was again committed to Herby Stare
Prison. He has been detained there to this day.
B. Conditions of the applicant's detention
The
parties' statements relating to the conditions of the applicant's
detention are, to a large extent, contradictory.
1. Zabrze Remand Centre
(a) Uncontested facts
In
Zabrze Remand Centre, from 18 July until 20 October 2005, the
applicant was detained in cell no. 41 and from 20 October 2005 until
4 January 2006 in cell no. 42. Both cells measured approximately
6.7 square metres.
(b) Facts in dispute
(i) The Government
The
Government did not provide any information as to the number of
detainees sharing cells with the applicant. They submitted, however,
that Zabrze Remand Centre had faced the problem of overcrowding;
indeed, its governor decided to reduce the statutory minimum standard
of three square metres per person. On 14 June, 30 September and
29 November 2005 a penitentiary judge was informed about the
Governor's decision.
The
Government also submitted that in Zabrze Remand Centre each of the
applicant's cells had had an annex with a toilet cubicle and a
washbasin. That area was separated from the rest of the cell and
offered privacy. Detainees were supplied with toiletries and bed
linen was changed once every two weeks. The window surface in each of
the applicant's cells was over one square metre. The applicant was
allowed to take a shower once a week. The shower room had eight
shower heads. Sixteen people were allowed inside and they showered in
two groups on a rotation basis.
In
the Government's submission the applicant had been allowed to have
one hour of outdoor exercise in one of seven yards, two of which
measured 150 and 120 square metres. The applicant could also
participate in social activities two or three times per week for
approximately two hours. In addition, he could stay in an
entertainment room watching television, reading or playing board
games. Finally, in the Government's submission the applicant had
access to radio and television programmes through the prison internal
broadcasting system and he could rent five books per week from a
prison library.
The
Government submitted that the applicant had not been given any
disciplinary punishments while in Zabrze Remand Centre. On the
contrary, he had twice been rewarded for good behaviour.
(ii) The applicant
The
applicant submitted that he shared the cells in question with two
other inmates.
Moreover,
he maintained that his cells had been dirty and infested with
bedbugs, cockroaches and fungus. Detainees had smoked cigarettes all
day long inside the cells. The bed linen and towels were not properly
washed and there was a stench in the air. The detainees had washed in
cold water. The applicant also claimed that there had been no
television set or board games in the entertainment room and that he
had not been informed about any social activities available in the
remand centre.
The
applicant also complained of the practice of bullying detainees by
the staff of Zabrze Remand Centre. He submitted that warders had
ordered disciplinary punishment under any pretext, demolished cells
during frequent and unjustified searches, made detainees undress and
do squats and also deprived them of sleep.
2. Sosnowiec Remand Centre
(a) Uncontested facts
In
Sosnowiec Remand Centre, between 4 January and 5 April 2006, the
applicant was initially detained in cell no. 37, which measured
almost sixteen square metres and was shared by four to five persons
including the applicant. From 6 February until 30 March 2006 he was
detained together with two other detainees in the medical wing's cell
no. 58. That cell measured thirteen square metres. Finally, from 30
March until 5 April 2006 he was detained in cell no. 56, which
measured ten square metres and a half and was shared by two people.
When the number of new admissions increased as of January 2006, the
governor of Sosnowiec Remand Centre decided to reduce the available
cell space below the minimum statutory limit and to convey the
necessary information to the competent penitentiary judge.
(b) Facts in dispute
(i) The Government
The
Government submitted that the sanitary conditions in Sosnowiec Remand
Centre had been decent. Each cell had a separate sanitary annex with
a toilet cubicle and a washbasin. Detainees took a hot bath or shower
once a week. During his detention in cell no. 58 the applicant could
take one bath per day. In that cell detainees had access to hot
water. In all other cells they were allowed to use a water immersion
heater or a wireless kettle. All cells were sufficiently lit and
ventilated. Detainees had one hour of outdoor exercise per day and
they were also allowed to spend time in an entertainment room. The
entertainment room in Wing IV of Sosnowiec Remand Centre, where the
applicant had been detained, was equipped with board games and tables
to play table football and table tennis. In addition, in the remand
centre detainees had access to a library and, in the spring and
summertime, to a volleyball court.
(ii) The applicant
The applicant contested the above submissions by
saying that sanitary conditions in Sosnowiec Remand Centre had been
inadequate. The cells were damp and dirty, the towels and bed
linen were not washed and the detainees washed in cold water.
3. Herby Stare Prison
(a) Uncontested facts
The
applicant was detained in Herby Stare Prison during three separate
periods: from 22 May 2006 and 2 April 2007, from 4 June and 28 August
2007, and from 7 September 2007 onwards.
(b) Facts in dispute
(i) The Government
The
Government supplied the list of cells which the applicant had
occupied at different periods. The surface area of these cells varied
between ten and eighteen square metres. Their occupancy rate,
however, had not been disclosed. On the other hand, the Government
submitted that the prison's governor had made a decision to reduce
the available cell space below the minimum statutory limit and that
between May 2006 and October 2007 he had informed a
penitentiary judge about that fact on nineteen occasions.
They
claimed that in Herby Stare Prison the sanitary conditions had been
decent. Each cell had a separate sanitary annex with a toilet cubicle
and a washbasin. Detainees took a hot bath or shower once a week. The
bath house was equipped with nineteen shower heads and four or five
persons were allowed inside at a time.
(ii) The applicant
The
applicant argued that all the cells in which he had been detained had
been seriously overcrowded. For example, cell no. 32, which measured
eighteen square metres, had been shared by nine or ten persons.
The
applicant also submitted that sanitary conditions in Herby Stare
Prison had been inadequate. Similarly to the other detention
facilities where he had been held, the cells were damp and dirty, the
towels and bed linen were not washed and the detainees washed in cold
water. In addition in Herby Stare Prison the shower room was located
in a separate building. In wintertime in particular, it had been
difficult for detainees to walk back to the living quarters with wet
hair and without proper clothing. Moreover the applicant complained
of the lack of privacy because the showers had not been separated.
C. The applicant's complaints to domestic courts and
authorities
The
applicant did not lodge any formal complaints with the penitentiary
authorities on the basis of the Code of Execution of Criminal
Sentences. He complained, however, to various State authorities, i.e.
to the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) about the
inadequate medical care he had received and the conditions of his
detention. He also filed several requests for release on health
grounds.
In
a letter of 6 July 2006 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that his
allegations had been considered ill founded. It was emphasised
that the applicant had been under constant psychiatric supervision
and that he had been hospitalised whenever necessary.
On
31 July 2006 the Myszków District Court refused to release the
applicant from pre trial detention on health grounds as
requested by his lawyer. The court referred to unspecified medical
reports which stated that the applicant was not suffering from any
mental illness, but merely from an antisocial personality disorder.
On
23 November 2006 the Częstochowa Regional Court (Sąd
Okręgowy) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant
against a decision of 28 September 2006 by which the Myszków
District Court had extended his pre trial detention.
The
applicant argued that, because of his mental illness, he should not
be held in a detention centre but in a psychiatric hospital. He
referred to a number of medical reports which had confirmed his
schizophrenia diagnosis and in which it had been recommended that he
should remain under psychiatric supervision.
The
Częstochowa Regional Court held that there were no
contraindications to the applicant's detention in a remand centre.
The court stated that, admittedly, a number of psychiatrists from
both State and prison hospitals had directed that the applicant
should be placed under psychiatric supervision. The court observed,
however, that the diagnosis was not credible since the doctors
had not had long term contact with the applicant and had
not had full access to his medical records. Instead, the court relied
on an opinion delivered by experts in psychiatry from Rybnik
Hospital, who were of the view that the applicant was not suffering
from any psychotic disorder. The court stressed that, unlike the
others, the latter expert opinion was thorough, as it had been drawn
up further to the applicant's five week period under psychiatric
observation at Rybnik Hospital in 2005 and based on the medical
records of his psychiatric treatment prior to his detention. On the
other hand, the court took note of discrepancies between the medical
reports before it and recommended that the report of the experts from
Rybnik Psychiatric Hospital be updated. Nevertheless, the court did
not agree to release the applicant from pre trial detention in a
remand centre.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Relevant constitutional provisions
48. Article
2 of the Constitution reads as follows:
“The Republic of Poland shall be a democratic
State ruled by law and implementing the principles of social
justice.”
Article
40 of the Constitution reads:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Article 41 of the Constitution, in its relevant part, provides:
“4. Anyone deprived of liberty shall be
treated in a humane manner.”
B. General rules on conditions of detention
1. Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences
Article
110 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (Kodeks
karny wykonawczy – “the Code”) provides:
“1. A sentenced person shall be placed
in an individual cell or a cell shared with other inmates.
2. The area of the cell shall be no less than
3 square metres per detainee.”
Article
248 of the Code provides:
“1. In particularly justified cases a
governor of a prison or remand centre may decide to place detainees,
for a specified period of time, in conditions where the area of the
cell is less than 3 square metres per person. Any such decision shall
be promptly communicated to a penitentiary judge.
2. The Minister of Justice shall determine,
by means of an ordinance, the rules which are to be followed by the
relevant authorities in a situation where the number of persons
detained in prisons and remand centres exceeds on a nationwide scale
the overall capacity of such establishments ...”
2. The 2000 and 2003 Ordinances
On
the basis of Article 248 of the Code, the Minister of Justice issued
the Ordinance of 26 October 2000 on the rules to be followed by the
relevant authorities when the number of persons detained in prisons
and remand centres exceeded on a nationwide scale the overall
capacity of such establishments (Rozporządzenie Ministra
Sprawiedliwości w sprawie trybu postępowania właściwych
organów w wypadku, gdy liczba osadzonych w zakładach
karnych lub aresztach śledczych przekroczy w skali kraju ogólną
pojemność tych zakładów – “the
2000 Ordinance”). On 26 August 2003 the Minister of Justice
issued a new ordinance with the same title (“the 2003
Ordinance”), which replaced the previous ordinance. It entered
into force on 1 September 2003.
Paragraph
1.1 of this Ordinance provided:
“In the event that the number of detainees placed
in prisons and remand centres, as well as in subordinate detention
facilities, hereinafter referred to as 'establishments', exceeds on a
nationwide scale the overall capacity of such establishments, the
Director General of the Prison Service, within seven days from the
day the capacity is exceeded, shall convey the relevant information
to the Minister of Justice, the regional directors of the Prison
Service and the governors of the establishments ...”
Paragraph
2 of the Ordinance read:
“1. Having received the relevant information, the
regional director of the prison service and the governor of the
establishment are under a duty, each within their own sphere of
competence, to take action in order to adapt quarters not otherwise
included in the establishment's [accommodation] capacity, to comply
with the conditions required for a cell.
...
3. In the event that the establishment's
capacity is exceeded, detainees shall be placed in supplementary
cells for a specified period of time.
4. In the event that the additional
accommodation in the supplementary cells is used up, detainees may be
placed in conditions where the area of a cell is less than 3 square
metres per person.”
C. Medical and psychiatric care in detention facilities
The
general duty of the State to protect persons with mental disabilities
is derived from the Mental Health Protection Act of 19 August 1994
(Ustawa o ochronie zdrowia psychicznego – “the
1994 Act”), which entered into force on 21 January 1995. The
1994 Act recognises mental health as a fundamental personal right of
every person.
Specific
rules regarding detention in a medical institution, as well as
psychiatric care in prisons and remand centres, are provided for in
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Execution of Criminal
Sentences, as well as in a number of ordinances issued by the
Minister of Justice.
Article
259, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that,
unless there are particular reasons to the contrary, pre-trial
detention should be waived if it could result in putting a detainee's
life or health at risk.
Article
260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the other hand, provides:
“If required by the accused's health condition,
[his] pre-trial detention may take the form of placement in a
suitable medical establishment.”
Article
213 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences provides:
“In cases described in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, pre trial detention shall take place outside a remand
centre, in a medical establishment indicated by an authority
responsible for the detainee. The same authority shall also provide
directions as to the conditions of the detainee's placement in the
indicated medical establishment.”
On
the basis of Article 115, paragraph 10, of the Code of Execution of
Criminal Sentences, the Minister of Justice issued the Ordinance of
31 October 2003 on the detailed rules, scope and procedure
relating to the provision of medical services to persons deprived of
their liberty by health care establishments for persons deprived
of their liberty (Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości
w sprawie szczegółowych zasad, zakresu i trybu udzielania
świadczeń zdrowotnych osobom pozbawionym wolności
przez zakłady opieki zdrowotnej dla osób pozbawionych
wolności – “the October 2003 Ordinance”).
It entered into force on 17 December 2003.
Under
paragraph 1.1 of the October 2003 Ordinance, health care
establishments for persons deprived of their liberty provide, inter
alia, medical and psychological examinations, medical and
psychological treatment and preventive medical care to persons
deprived of their liberty.
Paragraph
1 of this Ordinance further provides:
“2. In justified cases, if the medical
services as enumerated in sub paragraph 1 cannot be
provided to persons deprived of their liberty by the health care
establishments for persons deprived of their liberty, in particular
owing to the lack of specialised medical equipment, such medical
services may be provided by public health care establishments.
3. In cases described in sub paragraph
2, the head of a health-care establishment for persons deprived of
their liberty shall decide whether or not such medical services
[provided by public health care establishments] are
necessary...”
Paragraph
7 of the October 2003 Ordinance states:
“1. The decision to place a person
deprived of his liberty in a prison medical centre shall be taken by
a prison doctor or, in his absence, by a nurse ...
2. The decision as to whether or not it is
necessary to place a person deprived of his liberty in a ... prison
hospital shall be taken by the prison hospital's director or by a
delegated prison doctor.”
Paragraph 11 of the October 2003 Ordinance provides:
“In the event of a suspicion that a person
deprived of his liberty suffers from mental disorders, mental
retardation ..., the prison doctor:
(1) shall give directions as to the placement
of the person concerned in prison, the manner of observation and the
mode of proceeding [with the person concerned];
(2) shall direct the person concerned to
undergo a psychiatric examination.”
Paragraph
12.1 of the October 2003 Ordinance states:
“A person deprived of his liberty shall be placed
in the psychiatric ward of a prison hospital:
(1) if a court has ordered the examination of
such person together with psychiatric observation;
(2) [if this has been] directed – in
compliance with the rules of the Mental Health Protection Act of
19 August 1994 – by a psychiatrist because of the
diagnosis of mental disorders which require examination or treatment
in hospital.”
Paragraph
13 of the October 2003 Ordinance further provides:
“In justified cases, if, as a result of a
psychiatric examination together with psychiatric observation, a
person deprived of his liberty has been diagnosed with mental
illness, mental retardation or any other mental dysfunction ...,
based on the decision of a chief doctor, [such person] shall remain
in the psychiatric ward of a prison hospital until the relevant
court's ruling.”
On
the basis of Article 249 of the Code of Execution of Criminal
Sentences, the Minister of Justice issued the Ordinance of 25 August
2003 on the code of practice for the organisation and arrangement of
pre trial detention (Rozporządzenie Ministra
Sprawiedliwości w sprawie regulaminu organizacyjno-porządkowego
wykonywania tymczasowego aresztowania “the
August 2003 Ordinance”). It entered into force on 1 September
2003.
The
August 2003 Ordinance states that pre trial detention takes
place in remand centres. However, paragraph 28 of the Ordinance
provides:
“1. With regard to detainees held in
hospitals ..., as well as chronically ill [detainees], the governor
[of a remand centre] may, at the request of or after consultation
with a doctor, make necessary exceptions to the arrangements for
pre trial detention as envisaged in the code of practice, in so
far as this is justified by the health condition of the detainees
concerned.
2. Sub paragraph 1 shall be applied in
respect of detainees who have been diagnosed with non-psychotic
psychiatric disorders, mental retardation ... The governor [of a
remand centre] may make [necessary] exceptions at the request of or
after consultation with a doctor or a psychologist.”
The
rules governing cooperation between prison health care
establishments and public health care facilities are set out in
the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice issued on 10 September 2003
on the detailed rules, scope and procedure for the cooperation of
health care establishments with health services in prisons and
remand centres in the provision of medical services to persons
deprived of their liberty (Rozporządzenie Ministra
Sprawiedliwości w sprawie szczegółowych zasad,
zakresu i trybu współdziałania zakładów
opieki zdrowotnej ze służbą zdrowia w zakładach
karnych i aresztach śledczych w zapewnianiu świadczeń
zdrowotnych osobom pozbawionym wolności – “the
September 2003 Ordinance”). It entered into force on
17 October 2003.
D. Judicial review and complaints to administrative
authorities
Detention
and prison establishments in Poland are supervised by penitentiary
judges who act under the authority of the Minister of Justice.
Under
Article 6 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (“the Code”)
a convicted person is entitled to make applications, complaints and
requests to the authorities enforcing the sentence.
Article
7, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Code provides that a convicted person
can challenge before a court any unlawful decision issued by a judge,
a penitentiary judge, a governor of a prison or a remand centre, a
regional director or the Director General of the Prison Service or a
court probation officer. Applications relating to the execution of
prison sentences are examined by a competent penitentiary court.
The
remainder of Article 7 of the Code reads as follows:
“3. Appeals against decisions [mentioned in
paragraph 1] shall be lodged within seven days of the date of the
publication or the service of the decision; the decision [in
question] shall be published or served with a reasoned opinion and an
instruction as to the right, deadline and procedure for lodging an
appeal. An appeal shall be lodged with the authority which issued the
contested decision. If [that] authority does not consider the appeal
favourably, it shall refer it, together with the case file and
without undue delay, to the competent court.
4. The Court competent for examining the appeal may
suspend the enforcement of the contested decision ...
5. Having examined the appeal, the court shall decide
either to uphold the contested decision, or to quash or vary it; the
court's decision shall not be subject to an interlocutory appeal.”
In
addition, under Article 33 of the Code, a penitentiary judge is
entitled to make unrestricted visits to detention facilities, to
acquaint himself with documents and to be provided with explanations
from the management of these establishments. A penitentiary judge
also has the power to communicate with persons deprived of their
liberty without the presence of third persons and to examine their
applications and complaints.
Article 34 of the Code in its relevant part reads as follows:
“1. A penitentiary judge shall quash an unlawful
decision [issued by, inter alia, the governor of a prison or
remand centre, the Regional Director or the Director General of the
Prison Service] concerning a person deprived of his liberty.
2. An appeal to the penitentiary court lies against the
decision of a penitentiary judge...
4. In the event of finding that the deprivation of
liberty is not in accordance with the law, a penitentiary judge
shall, without undue delay, inform the authority [in charge of the
person concerned] of that fact, and, if necessary, shall order the
release of the person concerned.”
Lastly,
Article 102, paragraph 10, of the Code guarantees a convicted person
a right to lodge applications, complaints and requests with other
competent authorities, such as the management of a prison or remand
centre, heads of units of the Prison Service, penitentiary judges,
prosecutors and the Ombudsman. Detailed rules on the procedure are
laid down in the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice issued on 13
August 2003 on the manner of proceeding with applications, complaints
and requests by persons detained in prisons and remand centres
(Rozporządzenie w sprawie sposobów załatwiania
wniosków, skarg i próśb osób osadzonych w
zakładach karnych i aresztach śledczych – “the
August 2003 Ordinance”).
E. Civil remedies
1. Relevant legal provisions
Article 23 of the Civil Code contains a non-exhaustive
list of so called “personal rights” (prawa
osobiste). This provision states:
“The personal rights of an individual, such as, in
particular, health, liberty, honour, freedom of conscience, name or
pseudonym, image, secrecy of correspondence, inviolability of the
home, scientific or artistic work, [as well as] inventions and
improvements, shall be protected by the civil law regardless of the
protection laid down in other legal provisions.”
Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code provides:
“A person whose personal rights are at risk [of
infringement] by a third party may seek an injunction, unless the
activity [complained of] is not unlawful. In the event of
infringement [the person concerned] may also require the party who
caused the infringement to take the necessary steps to remove the
consequences of the infringement ... In compliance with the
principles of this Code [the person concerned] may also seek
pecuniary compensation or may ask the court to award an adequate sum
for the benefit of a specific public interest.”
Article
445 § 1 of the Civil Code, applicable in the event a person
suffers a bodily injury or a health disorder as a result of an
unlawful act or omission of a State agent, reads as follows:
“... [T]he court may award to the injured person
an adequate sum in pecuniary compensation for the damage suffered.”
Under
Article 448 of the Civil Code, a person whose personal rights have
been infringed may seek compensation. That provision, in its
relevant part, reads:
“The court may grant an adequate sum as pecuniary
compensation for non-material damage (krzywda) suffered to
anyone whose personal rights have been infringed. Alternatively, the
person concerned, regardless of seeking any other relief that may be
necessary for removing the consequences of the infringement
sustained, may ask the court to award an adequate sum for the benefit
of a specific public interest ...”
In
addition, Articles 417 et seq. of the Polish Civil Code provide for
the State's liability in tort.
Article
417 § 1 of the Civil Code formerly provided:
“The State Treasury shall be liable for damage
(szkoda) caused by an agent of the State in carrying out acts
entrusted to him.”
After
being amended in 2004, Article 417 § 1 of the Civil Code
provides:
“The State Treasury, or [as the case may be] a
self-government entity or other legal person responsible for
exercising public authority, shall be liable for any damage (szkoda)
caused by an unlawful act or omission [committed] in connection with
the exercise of public authority.”
2. Case-law of civil courts as submitted by the
Government
In
their submissions on the admissibility and the merits of the case the
Government referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court of
28 February 2007 and to nine recent judgments in which domestic
courts had examined claims for compensation brought by former
detainees on account of the alleged infringement of their personal
rights.
(a) Supreme Court's judgment of 28
February 2007
On
28 February 2007 the Supreme Court recognised for the first time the
right of a detainee under Article 24, read in conjunction with
Article 448 of the Civil Code, to lodge a civil claim against the
State Treasury for damage resulting from overcrowding and inadequate
living and sanitary conditions in a detention establishment.
That
judgment originated from the civil action brought by a certain A.D.,
who was remanded in custody shortly after he had suffered a
complicated fracture of his leg and arm. The plaintiff argued that he
had not received adequate medical care in detention and that he had
been detained in overcrowded cells in poor sanitary conditions.
The
Supreme Court quashed the second-instance judgment in which the
applicant's claim had been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the
case should have been examined under Article 24, in conjunction with
Article 448 of the Civil Code, and that it was the respondent
who had the burden of proving that the conditions of detention had
been in compliance with the statutory standards and that the
plaintiff's personal rights had not been infringed. The case was
remitted to the appeal court.
On
6 December 2007 the Wrocław Court of Appeal examined the case
under Article 24 in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The appeal court reiterated that
overcrowding coupled with inadequate living and sanitary conditions
in a detention facility could give rise to degrading treatment in
breach of a detainee's personal rights. The court condemned the
practice of maintaining high rates of occupation in detention
facilities throughout the country and stressed that the minimum
standard of three square metres per person was to be reduced only in
exceptional circumstances and for a short period of time. On the
other hand, the Wrocław Court of Appeal observed that in the
light of the Supreme Court's established case-law, a trial court did
not have a duty to award compensation for each personal right's
infringement. One of the main criteria in assessing whether or not to
award compensation for a breach of a personal right was the degree of
fault on the part of a respondent party. The court held that in
relation to the overcrowding, no fault could be attributed to the
management of a particular detention facility since the management
were not in a position to refuse new admissions even when the average
capacity of a detention facility had already been exceeded.
Considering the large scale of the problem in the country and the
fact that the competent authorities had not acted with a particular
intent to humiliate the plaintiff or in bad faith, the appeal court
found that awarding compensation for a breach of personal rights on
account of overcrowding and poor conditions of detention would
contradict the universal sense of justice. Ultimately, the case was
dismissed.
(b) Judgments of other civil courts
In
five of the other cases cited by the Government the plaintiffs,
non-smokers detained with smoking inmates, had been awarded
compensation because it had been found that they were at risk of
suffering or had actually suffered a health disorder.
Another
one of the cases referred to concerned a prisoner who had suffered
food poisoning in prison and another one concerned a detainee who had
been beaten up by his fellow inmate.
In
another case, of a certain J.K., who had been detained for seven days
in an overcrowded and unsanitary cell, the Warsaw Court of Appeal had
granted partial compensation on account of the fact that the prison's
governor had failed to inform a competent penitentiary judge, in
compliance with the applicable procedure, about the problem of
overcrowding present at the time when the plaintiff was serving his
sentence there.
Finally,
in the case of a certain S.G. the Cracow Court of Appeal had held
that there had been no legal basis to grant compensation for
detaining the plaintiff in an overcrowded cell. The court observed
that the protection of personal rights offered by Article 24 § 1
of the Civil Code was conditional on two elements: firstly, there
must have been an infringement or a risk of infringement of the right
protected; secondly, the infringement must have resulted from an
unlawful act or omission. It was reiterated that an act or omission
was not unlawful, even though it might breach personal rights, as
long as it was based on a valid legal provision. The court further
noted that the plaintiff had the burden of proving the infringement
or the risk of infringement while the respondent had the burden of
proving that his acts or omissions were not unlawful. The Cracow
Court of Appeal held that detaining the plaintiff in conditions below
the minimum standard established by Article 110 § 2 of the Code
of Execution of Criminal Sentences was not unlawful, as it was
regulated by the 2003 Ordinance.
F. Constitutional Court's practice
1. The Ombudsman's application
On
13 December 2005 the Ombudsman made an application under Article 191,
read in conjunction with Article 188 of the Constitution, to the
Constitutional Court, asking for the 2003 Ordinance to be declared
unconstitutional. More specifically, the Ombudsman asked for it to be
declared incompatible with Articles 40 and 41 of the Constitution and
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular,
the Ombudsman challenged paragraph 2(4) of the 2003 Ordinance, which
allowed the prison authorities to place a detainee in a cell where
there was an area of less than 3 square metres per person, for
an indefinite period of time. This, in his opinion, was contrary to
the interim nature of Article 248 of the Code of Execution of
Criminal Sentences and led to the legitimisation of the chronic
overcrowding in detention facilities.
On 18
April 2006 the Ombudsman limited the scope of his initial
application, asking the Constitutional Court (skarga
konstytucyjna) to declare paragraph 2(4) of the 2003 Ordinance to
be in breach of Article 41 of the Polish Constitution.
On 19
April 2006, a day before the date set for the Constitutional Court's
hearing, the Minister of Justice abrogated the impugned Ordinance in
its entirety and issued a new one under the same title and with
immediate effect (“the 2006 Ordinance”). The provisions
of the new 2006 Ordinance remain the same as in the previous
instrument, except for paragraph 2(4), which currently reads as
follows:
“In the event that the additional accommodation in
the supplementary cells is used up, detainees may be placed, for a
specified period of time, in conditions where the area of a cell is
less than 3 square metres per person.”
As a
consequence of these changes, on 19 April 2006 the Ombudsman withdrew
his application.
2. Judgment of 26 May 2008
On
22 May 2006 a certain J.G., who was at the time in prison, made a
constitutional complaint (skarga konstytucyjna) under
Article 191, read in conjunction with Article 79 of the
Constitution, asking for Article 248 of the Code of Execution of
Criminal Sentences to be declared unconstitutional. He alleged
that the impugned provision infringed, inter alia, the
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment as derived
from Articles 40 and 41 of the Constitution. He challenged Article
248 in particular in so far as it allowed for the placement of
detainees for an indefinite period of time in cells below the
statutory size.
On 26
May 2008 the Constitutional Court held, inter alia, that the
impugned Article 248 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences
was in breach of Article 40 (prohibition of torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 41 § 4
(right of a detainee to be treated in a humane manner) and Article 2
(the principle of the rule of law) of the Constitution. The court
stressed that the provision lacked clarity and precision, which
allowed for a very broad interpretation.
The
Constitutional Court found that, in effect, the provision in question
allowed for an indefinite and arbitrary placement of detainees in
cells below the statutory size of three square metres per person,
thus causing chronic overcrowding in Polish prisons and exposing
detainees to the risk of inhuman treatment. The court observed that
the overcrowding of detention facilities had to be treated as a
serious problem, posing a permanent threat to rehabilitation of
prisoners. Moreover, in the court's view, the overcrowding in itself
could be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment. If combined
with additional aggravating circumstances, it may even be considered
as torture. In that connection the court noted that already the
minimum statutory standards of three square metres per person was one
of the lowest ones in Europe.
The
Constitutional Court further stressed that the provision in question
was meant to be applied only in particularly justified cases, for
example an engineering or building disaster in prison. Such a
provision should not leave any doubt as to the definition of those
permissible circumstances, the minimum size of the cell and maximum
time when the new standards would apply. It should also lay down
clear principles on how many times a detainee could be placed in
conditions below the standard requirements and the precise procedural
rules to be followed in such cases. Conversely, in practice Article
248 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences gave a wide
discretion to prison governors to decide what constituted
“particularly justified circumstances” and in consequence
sanctioned the permanent state of overcrowding in detention
facilities. It allowed for the placement of detainees in a cell where
the area was below the statutory size for an indefinite period of
time and it did not set a minimum permissible area.
The
Constitutional Court, taking into consideration “the permanent
overcrowding of the Polish detention facilities”, ruled that
the unconstitutional Article 248 of the Code of Execution of Criminal
Sentences should lose its binding force within eighteen months from
the date of the publication of the judgment. The Constitutional Court
justified the delayed entry into force of its judgment by the need to
undertake a series of actions to reorganise the whole penitentiary
system in Poland, in order to, ultimately, eliminate the problem of
overcrowding. It was also noted that, in parallel, a reform of
criminal policy was desired with the aim of achieving a wider
implementation of preventive measures other than deprivation of
liberty. The court observed that an immediate entry into force of its
judgment would only aggravate the already existing pathological
situation where, because of the lack of room in Polish prisons, many
convicted persons could not serve their prison sentences. At the time
when the judgment was being passed, the problem concerned 40,000
persons.
In
addition, the Constitutional Court under the principle of the
so-called “right of privilege” (przywilej korzyści)
ordered an individual measure, namely that with regard to the author
of the constitutional complaint the judgment should enter into force
immediately after its publication. The right of privilege is relied
on by the Constitutional Court in the event the proceedings
instituted by an individual terminate with a judgment with a delayed
entry into force. This principle aims at rewarding the individual who
brought the first constitutional complaint concerning a particular
matter for his or her proactive attitude.
As
regards the context of the case, all the State authorities involved
in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, namely the
Prosecutor General, the Ombudsman and the Speaker of the Sejm,
acknowledged the existence of the overcrowding in the Polish
detention facilities. The Prosecutor General, in his pleadings of 6
December 2007, submitted that the problem of overcrowding in Polish
detention facilities had continually existed since 2000, arising from
the flawed interpretation of the impugned provision by domestic
courts and penitentiary authorities. He also pointed out that, with
the rate of overcrowding peaking at 118.9% on 31 August 2007,
the prison authorities estimated that 15,000 new places were needed
in order to secure to detainees the statutory space of three square
metres per person.
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
Recommendation
No. R (98) 7 of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe to the member States concerning
the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, in
its relevant parts, reads as follows:
“I. Main characteristics of the right
to health care in prison
A. Access to a doctor
1. When entering prison and later on while in
custody, prisoners should be able at any time to have access to a
doctor or a fully qualified nurse, irrespective of their detention
regime and without undue delay, if required by their state of health.
All detainees should benefit from appropriate medical examinations on
admission. Special emphasis should be put on the screening of mental
disorders, of psychological adaptation to prison, of withdrawal
symptoms resulting from use of drugs, medication or alcohol, and of
contagious and chronic conditions.
...
3. A prison's health care service should at
least be able to provide outpatient consultations and emergency
treatment. When the state of health of the inmates requires treatment
which cannot be guaranteed in prison, everything possible should be
done to ensure that treatment is given, in all security, in health
establishments outside the prison.
4. Prisoners should have access to a doctor,
when necessary, at any time during the day and the night. Someone
competent to provide first aid should always be present on the prison
premises. In case of serious emergencies, the doctor, a member of the
nursing staff and the prison management should be warned; active
participation and commitment of the custodial staff is essential.
5. Access to psychiatric consultation and
counselling should be secured. There should be a psychiatric team in
larger penal institutions. If this is not available as in the smaller
establishments, consultations should be assured by a psychiatrist,
practising in hospital or in private.
...
III. The organisation of health care in
prison with specific reference to the management of certain common
problems
D. Psychiatric symptoms, mental disturbance
and major personality disorders, risk of suicide
55. Prisoners suffering from serious mental
disturbance should be kept and cared for in a hospital facility which
is adequately equipped and possesses appropriately trained staff. The
decision to admit an inmate to a public hospital should be made by a
psychiatrist, subject to authorisation by the competent authorities.
...
58. The risk of suicide should be constantly
assessed both by medical and custodial staff. Physical methods
designed to avoid self-harm, close and constant observation, dialogue
and reassurance, as appropriate, should be used in moments of
crisis.”
Recommendation
Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the
European Prison Rules, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:
“The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Europe,
Having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights
and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, ...
Recommends that governments of member states:
- be guided in their legislation, policies
and practice by the rules contained in the appendix to this
recommendation, which replaces Recommendation No. R (87) 3 of the
Committee of Ministers on the European Prison Rules;
...
Appendix to Recommendation Rec(2006)2
...
12.1 Persons who are suffering from mental
illness and whose state of mental health is incompatible with
detention in a prison should be detained in an establishment
specially designed for the purpose.
12.2 If such persons are nevertheless
exceptionally held in prison there shall be special regulations that
take account of their status and needs.
...
39. Prison authorities shall safeguard the
health of all prisoners in their care.
...
40.3 Prisoners shall have access to the
health services available in the country without discrimination on
the grounds of their legal situation.
40.4 Medical services in prison shall seek to
detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which
prisoners may suffer.
40.5 All necessary medical, surgical and
psychiatric services including those available in the community shall
be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.
...
47.1 Specialised prisons or sections under
medical control shall be available for the observation and treatment
of prisoners suffering from mental disorder or abnormality who do not
necessarily fall under the provisions of Rule 12.
47.2 The prison medical service shall provide
for the psychiatric treatment of all prisoners who are in need of
such treatment and pay special attention to suicide prevention.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the conditions of his detention were very
poor and failed in particular to meet the standard required for
persons in his state of health. He also alleged that the medical care
provided to him within the penitentiary system was inadequate and his
health condition had deteriorated. He argued that he should be
detained in a proper psychiatric institution rather than a detention
facility.
The
applicant's complaints fall to be examined under Article 3 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
1. Government's preliminary objection
The
Government raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the applicant
had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him.
(a) The Government
The
Government acknowledged that the applicant had filed a number of
complaints with various State authorities. Those complaints, however,
had either not concerned the conditions of the applicant's detention
or had not been lodged in compliance with procedural requirements.
They
argued that there were several effective remedies available to the
applicant under the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences,
including an appeal against any unlawful decision of a penitentiary
authority and a complaint to a penitentiary judge about detention
conditions, even in the absence of any formal decision on that
matter.
In
addition the Government argued that the applicant could have, but had
not, made use of the remedies of a compensatory nature governed by
the provisions of Article 23 and 24 of the Civil Code, in conjunction
with Article 445 or Article 448 of the Civil Code, in order to bring
an action for compensation for the alleged health disorder sustained
as a result of the inadequate conditions of his detention.
In
that connection the Government referred to the judgment of the
Supreme Court of 28 February 2007 which recognised for the first
time the right of a detainee under Article 24, read in conjunction
with Article 448 of the Civil Code, to lodge a civil claim against
the State Treasury for damage resulting from overcrowding and
inadequate living and sanitary conditions in a detention
establishment (see paragraphs 56-58 above).They also submitted copies
of nine recent judgments in which domestic courts had examined claims
for compensation brought by former detainees on account of the
alleged infringement of their personal rights (see paragraph 59
above).
Finally,
the Government submitted that the applicant should have made an
application to the Constitutional Court under Article 191, read
in conjunction with Article 79 of the Constitution, asking for
the 2006 Ordinance to be declared unconstitutional.
(b) The applicant
The
applicant did not comment on the Government's preliminary objection.
2. General principles relating to exhaustion of
domestic remedies
The
Court observes that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
contained in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires that
normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are
available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches
alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be
sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing
which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness
(see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey,
judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996 IV, § 65).
In
the area of the exhaustion of domestic remedies there is a
distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the
Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the
remedy was an effective one available in theory and practice at the
relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was capable of
providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and
offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden
has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the
remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for
some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular
circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances
absolving him or her from the requirement (ibid., § 68).
In
addition, Article 35 § 1 must be applied with some degree of
flexibility and without excessive formalism. This means amongst other
things that it must take realistic account not only of the existence
of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party
concerned but also of the general legal and political context in
which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the
applicants (ibid., § 69).
3. Application of these principles to the present case
(a) As regards complaints to penitentiary
authorities
In
certain circumstances recourse to the administrative authorities
could be considered an effective remedy in respect of complaints
concerning the application or implementation of prison regulations
(see, among other authorities, Boyle and Rice v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 26, §
65). It is true that, in general, a detainee should be required to
put his complaints about his situation in prison before a
penitentiary judge. Nonetheless, regard being had to his limited
capacities as a person with psychiatric problems, the applicant
should not be expected or required to act with the utmost
scrupulousness in availing himself of all the remedies available
under the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences.
Even though the applicant did not lodge formal
complaints under the provisions of the Code of Execution of Criminal
Sentences indicated by the Government, the penitentiary authorities
were aware of his situation because he had complained of inadequate
medical care and detention conditions in each of his numerous appeals
to be released from pre-trial detention and in a separate application
to the Ombudsman (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01,
§ 70, 28 March 2006). The complaint lodged with the Ombudsman
was considered ill-founded and the applications for release were
dismissed by the domestic courts for the same reason (see paragraphs
42-45 above). The detention measure was upheld despite the existence
of discrepancies between different medical reports concerning the
applicant's mental health (see paragraph 47 above).
Moreover,
the Court notes that the Constitutional Court in its recent judgment
in fact defined the overcrowding of Polish detention facilities as a
structural problem affecting a large part of the prison population
and persisting since 2000 throughout the entire country (see
paragraph 61 above). The Court is also mindful of the fact that at
the relevant time the governors of detention facilities, in which the
applicant was held, acknowledged officially the existence of
overcrowding and made decisions to reduce the statutory minimum
standard of three square metres per person (see paragraphs 27, 33 and
37 above).
In
these circumstances, it cannot be said that any attempt by the
applicant to seek with the penitentiary authorities an improvement of
the conditions of his detention would give sufficient prospects of a
successful outcome. By making the relevant appeals to the Ombudsman
and the courts deciding on his pre-trial detention, the applicant
sufficiently brought to light his situation as regards both the
medical care and the overall conditions of his detention.
(b) As regards civil law remedies
Secondly,
in the Court's view, the institution of civil proceedings could not
have remedied the applicant's situation either.
The
Court welcomes the new developments in domestic jurisprudence, in
particular the new direction in the interpretation and application of
the Civil Code provisions on availability of damages for a breach of
personal rights, which was set by the 2007 Supreme Court's judgment.
However, without prejudice to its assessment of the issue of
exhaustion of domestic remedies in other cases pending before it, the
Court observes that the judgments of domestic courts referred to by
the Government arose from situations distinct from that of the
applicant in the present case. They mainly concerned the practice of
mixing smoking and non-smoking prisoners, a practice which was
indisputably not in compliance with domestic law. Two cases concerned
healthy prisoners held in overcrowded and unsanitary cells whose
civil actions, contrary to the Government's submission, did not
succeed. The judgments in those cases clearly illustrate that the
domestic courts have consistently interpreted Article 24 § 1 of
the Civil Code as being conditional on two elements, one of them
being that the infringement alleged must have resulted from an
unlawful act or omission. The analysis of the relevant Polish
case-law shows that prior to the judgment of the Constitutional Court
of 26 May 2008 the policy of reducing the space for each individual
in detention establishments was considered to be in accordance with
domestic law and was widespread. The latter has been confirmed by the
Constitutional Court, the Prosecutor General, the Ombudsman and the
Speaker of the Sejm. All these authorities referred explicitly
to the flawed interpretation of Article 248 of the Code of Execution
of Criminal Sentences by the domestic courts and penitentiary
authorities (see paragraph 61 above).
In
that connection, the Court reiterates that, according to its
established case-law, the purpose of the domestic remedies rule in
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention is to afford the
Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the
violations alleged against them before those allegations are
submitted to the Court (see Dankevich v. Ukraine,
no. 40679/98, § 107, 29 April 2003). It must
be noted that the applicant was detained on 19 April 2005
and that he lodged his application with the Court on 18 June 2006.
By the time of the landmark Constitutional Court's ruling of
26 May 2008 the applicant had already spent over three
years in detention and his case has been pending before the Court for
nearly two years.
Lastly,
the Court observes that the Government have not alluded to any
decisions of the domestic courts indicating that individuals detained
in inadequate conditions generally, or more particularly detainees
with serious health problems, have succeeded in obtaining an
improvement of the status quo, that is, a transfer to a
non-smoking cell or, as would be desirable in the applicant's
situation, a transfer from prison to an institution specialising in
the treatment of the mentally ill. The civil remedies referred to by
the Government have proved to be merely of a compensatory nature
since no domestic court has so far imposed an injunction in order to
change the situation which had given rise to the infringement of the
prisoner's personal rights.
(c) As regards constitutional complaint
Thirdly,
the Court notes that, as it has held in previous cases, procedures
before constitutional courts to which individuals have direct access
under domestic law constitute a remedy to be exhausted before lodging
a complaint with the Court (see X v. Germany, no.
8499/99, Commission decision of 7 October 1980, Decisions and Reports
21, p. 176, and Castells v. Spain, no. 11798/85,
judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, §§
24-32).
The
Government provided an example of a constitutional complaint in which
an individual had alleged essentially that Article 248 of the Code of
Execution of Criminal Sentences Court was unconstitutional in so far
as it allowed for the placement of detainees for an indefinite period
of time in cells below the statutory size.
The
Court has already taken note of the Constitutional Court's judgment
of 26 May 2008 in which the impugned provision had been
declared unconstitutional (see paragraph 61 above). It observes,
however, that the subject matter of the above constitutional
complaint and of the instant application is not identical.
In
the case before the Court, the complaint under Article 3 of the
Convention is neither focused on nor limited to the overcrowding and
resultant poor living and sanitary conditions in the applicant's
detention facilities. The applicant, who suffers from particular
mental and neurological disorders, complained, above all, that the
medical care provided to him within the penitentiary system was
inadequate and that he should be detained in a proper psychiatric
institution rather than an ordinary detention facility. The situation
in question has been caused by a flawed implementation of the
relevant law and not by the law as such. The alleged facts that the
applicant was detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells together
with smoking inmates constitute only additional elements of the case,
possibly to be considered aggravating factors in the applicant's
overall situation.
In
this connection, the Court, mindful of the applicant's limited
capacities as a person with psychiatric problems and held in custody,
observes that only a remedy able to address his complaint in its
integrity and not only its selected aspects, could realistically
redress the applicant's situation.
It
follows that an individual complaint to the Constitutional Court
cannot be recognised as an effective remedy, within the meaning of
the Convention, in the circumstances of the applicant in the instant
case.
(d) Conclusion
The
Court observes that, in the circumstances of the present case, the
remedies referred to by the Government were not capable of providing
redress in respect of the applicant's complaint. Having regard
to the above considerations, the Court dismisses the Government's
preliminary objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The
Court also considers that the instant application is not manifestly
ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further finds that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
The
applicant complained that the medical care provided to him within the
penitentiary system was inadequate and his health condition had
deteriorated. He also alleged that the conditions of his detention
were very poor and failed in particular to meet the standard required
for persons in his state of health. He argued that he should be
detained in a proper psychiatric institution rather than a detention
facility.
The
Government disputed that the treatment complained of had attained the
minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of
Article 3. They argued that the applicant had remained under constant
medical supervision. He had regularly consulted general practitioners
or doctors with various specialities according to his wishes and
needs. Whenever necessary, the applicant had obtained emergency
treatment at a specialist hospital. Overall, the relevant authorities
had carefully and frequently monitored the applicant's state of
health and provided him with medical assistance appropriate to his
condition. They also maintained that the living and sanitary
conditions of the applicant's detention had been adequate.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
The
Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must
attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope
of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level is, in the
nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of
the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health
of the victim (see Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000-XI, and Peers v. Greece,
no. 28524/95, § 67, ECHR 2001-III). Although the
purpose of such treatment is a factor to be taken into account, in
particular whether it was intended to humiliate or debase the victim,
the absence of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding
that there has been no violation of Article 3 (see Peers,
ibid., § 74).
Article
3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general
obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to transfer him
to a civil hospital, even if he is suffering from an illness that is
particularly difficult to treat (see Mouisel v. France,
no. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002 IX). However, this
provision does require the State to ensure that prisoners are
detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human
dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure
do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding
the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that,
given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and
well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing
them with the requisite medical assistance (see, Kudła
ibid., § 94, and Mouisel, ibid., § 40).
The
Court has held on many occasions that the detention of a person who
is ill may raise issues under Article 3 of the Convention (see
Mouisel, ibid., § 37) and that the lack of
appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to that
provision (see İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93,
§ 87, ECHR 2000-VII; Naumenko v. Ukraine,
no. 42023/98, § 112, 10 February 2004; and
Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672/02, § 51,
2 December 2004). In particular, the assessment of whether the
particular conditions of detention are incompatible with the
standards of Article 3 has, in the case of mentally ill persons, to
take into consideration their vulnerability and their inability, in
some cases, to complain coherently or at all about how they are being
affected by any particular treatment (see, for example, Herczegfalvy
v. Austria, judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A no. 244,
pp. 25-26, § 82, and Aerts v. Belgium, judgment of
30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, p. 1966, §
66).
The
Court observes that there are three particular elements to be
considered in relation to the compatibility of an applicant's health
with his stay in detention: (a) the medical condition of the
prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care
provided in detention, and (c) the advisability of maintaining the
detention measure in view of the state of health of an applicant (see
Mouisel, ibid., §§ 40-42; Melnik v. Ukraine,
no. 72286/01, § 94, 28 March 2006; and Rivière
v. France, no. 33834/03, § 63, 11 July 2006).
(b) Application of these principles to the
present case
The
Court observes that the applicant's medical condition, namely his
chronic and severe mental disorders including schizophrenia, is
undisputed. The applicant suffers from hallucinations, has suicidal
thoughts and in January 2006 he attempted to hang himself (see
paragraphs 6, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19 and 23 above).
The
case therefore raises the issue of the compatibility of the
applicant's state of health with his detention in a facility designed
for healthy detainees where he is not treated or monitored on a daily
basis by specialist medical personnel. The Court must also answer the
question of whether that situation attained the minimum level of
severity to fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.
The
Court notes that the applicant has been detained since April 2005,
with a short break between 28 August and 7 September 2007 when he was
released home. During his nearly three and a half years of detention
the applicant, for the most part, has been detained with healthy
inmates in ordinary detention facilities (see paragraphs 8, 10, 11,
12, 15-17, 23 and 24 above).
As
regards the applicant's medical treatment, the Court observes that
between April and July 2005 and between April and June 2007 he
received in-patient medical treatment in a psychiatric hospital (see
paragraphs 10 and 22 above). On three occasions he received
short-term emergency treatment in a psychiatric hospital (see
paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above). Medical evidence furnished by the
parties revealed that the applicant was under regular pharmacological
treatment, comprising psychotropic drugs. He had access to prison
in-house medical staff and, upon appointment, to specialist doctors,
including psychiatrists.
On the other hand, the Court observes that, except for
the two periods in 2005 and 2007 when the applicant was an in-patient
in a prison psychiatric hospital, he shared his cell with inmates who
were in good health and, except in cases of medical emergency, he
received the same attention as them, notwithstanding his particular
condition. As transpires from the documents, almost all doctors who
examined the applicant during the different stages of his detention
suggested that he should remain under regular psychiatric
supervision. It is therefore clear that the applicant has been in
need of constant and specialised medical supervision, in the absence
of which he faces major health risks. Nonetheless, although he has
had more or less regular access to prison in-house medical staff, he
does not remain under psychiatric supervision and his access to a
psychiatrist has been restricted to emergencies or to the dates when
he has made an appointment.
The Court notes with concern that after the applicant
attempted to commit suicide in Sosnowiec Remand Centre on 23 January
2006 he was examined only by an in-house doctor. It was not until the
following day that he was seen by a psychiatrist, albeit only as an
outpatient. On the very same day he was transferred back to the
remand centre because two psychiatric hospitals had refused to admit
him owing to the lack of places.
Mindful
of the above considerations, the Court finds that while maintaining
the detention measure is not, in itself, incompatible with the
applicant's state of health, detaining him in establishments not
suitable for incarceration of the mentally-ill, raises a serious
issue under the Convention.
In addition the Court has concerns about the living and sanitary
conditions of the applicant's detention. In this regard the parties'
submissions are contradictory; however, it is undisputed that all of
those establishments, at the relevant time, faced the problem of
overcrowding (see paragraphs 27, 33 and 37 above). The Government did
not contest the applicant's submissions that in Zabrze Remand Centre
he had shared his cell of 6.7 square metres with two other inmates,
that in Sosnowiec Remand Centre he had initially been detained in a
cell of sixteen square metres together with four to five other
persons, and finally, that in Herby Stare Prison his cell no. 32
measured eighteen square metres and had been occupied by nine or ten
detainees. The Court also notes that in the detention facilities
concerned the applicant was entitled to merely one hour of outdoor
exercise per day and in reality had a very limited access to a
library and an entertainment room (see paragraphs 29 and 34 above).
Lastly, in the light of the conflicting statements the Court is not
convinced that the hygienic and sanitary conditions in the detention
facilities concerned met the minimum required standards (see
paragraphs 28, 31, 34, 35, 38 and 40 above).
The
Court finds that those conditions would not be considered appropriate
for any person deprived of his liberty, still less for someone like
the applicant with a history of mental disorder and in need of a
specialised treatment. In this connection the Court refers to the
judgment of the Constitutional Court which held that the overcrowding
in itself could be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment and,
if combined with additional aggravating circumstances, as torture
(see paragraph 61 above).
Undeniably, detained persons who suffer from a mental
disorder are more susceptible to the feeling of inferiority and
powerlessness. Because of that an increased vigilance is called for
in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with. While it
is for the authorities to decide, on the basis of the recognised
rules of medical science, on the therapeutic methods to be used to
preserve the physical and mental health of patients who are incapable
of deciding for themselves, and for whom they are therefore
responsible, such patients nevertheless remain under the protection
of Article 3.
The Court accepts that the very nature of the applicant's
psychological condition made him more vulnerable than the average
detainee and that his detention in the conditions described above,
with the exception of the two short periods in 2005 and 2007 when the
applicant was an in-patient in a prison hospital, may have
exacerbated to a certain extent his feelings of distress, anguish and
fear. In this connection, the Court considers that the failure of the
authorities to hold the applicant during most of his detention in a
suitable psychiatric hospital or a detention facility with a
specialised psychiatric ward has unnecessarily exposed him to a risk
to his health and must have resulted in stress and anxiety.
Moreover, the Court finds that the fact that for the most part the
applicant has received the same attention as the other inmates,
notwithstanding his particular state of health, shows the failure of
the authorities' commitment to improving the conditions of detention
in compliance with the recommendations of the Council of Europe. In
particular, the Court notes that the recommendations of the Committee
of Ministers to the member States, namely Recommendation No. R (98) 7
concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in
prison and Recommendation on the European Prison Rules provide that
prisoners suffering from serious mental disturbance should be kept
and cared for in a hospital facility which is adequately equipped and
possesses appropriately trained staff (see paragraphs 62 and 63
above). In recent judgments the Court has drawn the authorities'
attention to the importance of this recommendation, notwithstanding
its non-binding nature for the member States (see Dybeku v. Albania,
no. 41153/06, § 48, 18 December 2007; Rivière,
cited above, § 72; and Naumenko, cited above, § 94).
(c) Conclusion
Assessing
the facts of the case as a whole, having regard in particular to the
cumulative effects of the inadequate medical care and inappropriate
conditions in which the applicant was held throughout his pre trial
detention, which clearly had a detrimental effect on his health and
well-being (see Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99,
§ 98, ECHR 2002 VI), the Court considers that the
nature, duration and severity of the ill-treatment to which the
applicant was subjected are sufficient to be qualified as inhuman and
degrading (see Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873/96, § 77,
ECHR 2000-XII; Labzov v. Russia, no. 62208/00, § 45,
16 June 2005; and Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378/00,
§ 42, 20 January 2005).
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
With regard to the issue of overcrowding vis-à-vis
the applicant's right to respect for his physical and mental
integrity or his right to privacy and the protection of his private
space, the Court considered it appropriate to raise of its own motion
the issue of Poland's compliance with the requirements of Article 8
of the Convention, which in its relevant part reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private ... life ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
However,
having found a violation of Article 3, the Court considers that no
separate issue arises under Article 8 of the Convention with regard
to the conditions of the applicant's detention and the medical
treatment he received.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 46 AND 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 46 of the Convention provides:
“1. The High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to
which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its
execution.”
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicant complained that from 2005 onwards he had been detained in
conditions which failed to meet the standard required for persons in
his state of health. He also alleged that the medical care provided
to him within the penitentiary system was inadequate. He claimed that
he should be detained in a proper psychiatric institution rather than
a detention facility. The applicant also claimed 250,000 euros (EUR)
in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested the applicant's claims as unsubstantiated and
exorbitant.
A. Article 46
The
Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 46 of the
Convention, a finding of a violation imposes on the respondent State
a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded
by way of just satisfaction under Article 41, but also to select,
subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general
and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their
domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the
Court and to redress so far as possible the effects (see Broniowski
v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 192, ECHR 2004-V, and
Dybeku, cited above, § 63).
Mindful
of the fact that the seriousness and the structural nature of the
problem of overcrowding and resultant inadequate living and sanitary
conditions in Polish detention facilities has been acknowledged by
the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 28 May 2008 and by other
State authorities (see paragraphs 27, 33, 37 and 61 above), the Court
considers that necessary legislative and administrative measures
should be taken rapidly in order to secure appropriate conditions of
detention of detained persons, in particular, adequate conditions and
medical treatment for prisoners, who, like the applicant, need
special care owing to their state of health.
As
regards the measures which the Polish State must take, subject to
supervision by the Committee of Ministers, in order to put an end to
the violation that has been found, the Court reiterates that it is
primarily for the State concerned to choose the means to be used in
its domestic legal order in order to discharge its legal obligation
under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are
compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment. This
discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the
freedom of choice attached to the primary obligation of the
Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and
freedoms guaranteed (Article 1). However, by its very nature, the
violation found in the instant case does not leave any real choice as
to the individual measures required to remedy it (see, mutatis
mutandis, Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01,
§§ 201-203, ECHR 2004 II).
In
these conditions, having regard to the particular circumstances of
the case and the urgent need to put an end to the violation of
Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 96 above), the Court
considers that the respondent State must secure, at the earliest
possible date, the adequate conditions of the applicant's detention
in an establishment capable of providing him with the necessary
psychiatric treatment and constant medical supervision.
B. Article 41
1. Damage
As to the pecuniary damage allegedly sustained (see
paragraph 102 above), the Court reiterates that there must be a clear
causal connection between the damage claimed by the applicant and the
violation of the Convention (see Barberà, Messegué
and Jabardo v. Spain, judgment of 13 June 1994 (former
Article 50), Series A no. 285-C, §§ 16-20; see also
Berktay v. Turkey, no. 22493/93, § 215, 1 March
2001; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00,
§ 142, ECHR 2006-XII).
The
Court, having regard to its findings concerning the applicant's
complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, considers that no causal
link has been established between the damage alleged and the
violation it has found (see Kalashnikov, cited above, §
139). It therefore dismisses the applicant's claim for pecuniary
damage.
On
the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant suffered
damage of a non-pecuniary nature as a result of his detention in
inhuman and degrading conditions, inappropriate to his state of
health (see paragraphs 82-83 above), which is not sufficiently
redressed by the finding of a violation of his rights under the
Convention.
For
the foregoing reasons, having regard to the specific circumstances of
the present case and its case-law in similar cases (see, mutatis
mutandis, Melnik, cited above, § 121, and
Kotsaftis v. Greece, no. 39780/06,
§ 65, 12 June 2008) and deciding on an equitable
basis, the Court awards EUR 10,000 under this head, plus any tax that
may be chargeable on that amount.
2. Costs and expenses
The applicant claimed no costs and expenses, either
for the Convention proceedings or for the proceedings before the
domestic courts.
3. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention;
3. Holds that no separate issue arises under
Article 8 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to secure at the earliest possible date
adequate conditions of the applicant's detention in a specialised
institution capable of providing him with necessary psychiatric
treatment and constant medical supervision (paragraph 106);
(b) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten
thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement;
(c) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses
the remainder of the applicant's claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 January 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President