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POPILIN v. UKRAINE - 12470/04 [2009] ECHR 626 (16 April 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/626.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 626
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF POPILIN v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 12470/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16 April
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Popilin v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Rait Maruste, President,
Karel
Jungwiert,
Renate Jaeger,
Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
Stanislav
Shevchuk, ad hoc judge,
and Claudia
Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 March 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 12470/04) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Ukrainian national, Mr Oleg Nikolayevich Popilin, on 15 March 2004.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
On
17 September 2007 the
President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Toronto, Canada.
On
8 August 2000 Mr A. instituted civil proceedings in the Dzerzhinsky
District Court of Kharkiv (“the court”) against the
applicant and Mr D. alleging that he had been humiliated by them. He
claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
On
an unspecified date Mr A. requested the court to secure his claim by
prohibiting the Migration Office of the Kharkiv Department of the
Ministry of Interior (“the Migration Office”) from
issuing the applicant with an authorisation to leave Ukraine to live
permanently abroad. On 18 July 2002 the court granted Mr A.'s
request.
On
23 and 30 September 2002 the court quashed the ruling of 18 July 2002
and attached the applicant's flat.
On
31 October 2002 the applicant went to live permanently in Canada. On
13 December 2002 he came back to Ukraine.
On
25 March 2003 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court
of Appeal”), following Mr A.'s appeal, quashed the rulings of
23 and 30 September 2002 and remitted the case for a new
consideration to the court.
On
21 April 2003 the applicant lodged a counterclaim against Mr A.
claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
In
May 2003 the applicant waived his permanent residence in Canada in
order to restore his right to receive a pension in Ukraine.
In
a letter of 2 October 2003 the court explained to the Head of the
Migration Office that as on 25 March 2003 the rulings of 23 and
30 September 2002 had been quashed, the Migration Office should
abide by the ruling of 18 July 2002.
On
21 July 2004 the applicant again left Ukraine for Canada, where he
lives now.
14. Since
July 2004 he has been represented by his representative before the
domestic courts.
On
22 April 2005 the court rejected Mr. A.'s claim and partly allowed
the applicant's counterclaim.
On
16 December 2005 the Court of Appeal amended the judgment of 22 April
2005 and dismissed the applicant's counterclaim.
On
23 February 2006 Mr A. appealed in cassation before the Supreme
Court. The cassation proceedings are still pending.
According
to the documents provided by the Government, in the course of the
proceedings some forty-nine hearings were listed by the domestic
courts. Nine hearings were adjourned because the judge was involved
in other proceedings, one because he was on holiday and one because
the judge was ill. Some twenty-four hearings were adjourned because
one or more parties to the proceedings or their representatives
failed to appear or at their request. From the documents in the case
file it cannot be seen that the domestic courts took any steps to
ensure the parties' presence in the court. No hearings were adjourned
solely due to the applicant's failure to appear.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government contested the applicant's complaint, stating that there
were no significant periods of inactivity attributable to the State.
They maintained that the case had been complex and that the judicial
authorities had acted with due diligence. The Government contended
that the parties to the proceedings had contributed to the length of
proceedings and that the State could not be held liable for their
behaviour. In particular, they submitted that the parties had failed
to appear in court on numerous occasions. They further averred that
by demanding that witnesses be summoned and additional documents
provided, by lodging various requests and appealing against the
judgment to the higher courts, the parties had also caused certain
delays to the proceedings.
The
applicant disagreed.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court notes that the proceedings in question were instituted in
August 2000 and are still pending before the court of cassation. The
proceedings thus have lasted eight years and five months at three
levels of jurisdiction.
Given
that the court prohibited the Migration
Office from issuing the applicant with an authorisation to leave
Ukraine to live permanently abroad before the case had been
considered on its merits, the outcome of the proceedings was of a
certain importance for the applicant.
Concerning
the question of the complexity of the present case, the Court
observes that it concerned a simple dispute between private persons.
The
Court notes that the applicant has contributed, to a certain extent,
to the length of the proceedings. Nevertheless, he cannot be held
primarily responsible for the overall length of the proceedings in
the instant case.
The Court considers that a number of delays (in particular, lengthy
consideration of the case by the first-instance court, adjournments
of hearings on account of the judge's involvement in other
proceedings, and lengthy consideration of the appeal in cassation)
are attributable to the Government (see Golovko
v. Ukraine, no. 39161/02, §§
61-65, 1 February 2007).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see, for
example, Yakymenko
v. Ukraine,
no. 19142/03, § 39, 29 May 2008; Pavlyulynets v.
Ukraine, no. 70767/01, §
53, 6 September 2005; and Golovko,
cited above,
§ 65).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF
THE CONVENTION
In
his application form the applicant complained under Article 2 of
Protocol No. 4 that he had been unlawfully prevented from leaving
Ukraine. In his further submissions he alleged, without relying on
any Article of the Convention or Protocols thereto, that the courts
which had considered his case were corrupt.
Having
carefully examined the applicant's submissions in the light of all
the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters
complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that
they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to
Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 5,586 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage.
This amount included the costs of plane
tickets for him and his wife and other transport
expenses. The applicant further alleged that he had sustained
non-pecuniary damage; he left this matter to the Court's discretion.
The
Government contested the applicant's claims.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant
EUR 1,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant made no separate claim as to costs and expenses. Therefore,
the Court makes no award under that head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 1,600 (one thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be
converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points.
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 April 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Rait Maruste
Registrar President