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PALIGA AND ADAMKOWICZ v. POLAND - 23856/05 [2009] ECHR 615 (14 April 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/615.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 615
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF PALIGA AND ADAMKOWICZ v. POLAND
(Application
no. 23856/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 April
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Paliga and Adamkowicz v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Ján Šikuta,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
Nebojša Vučinić,
judges,
and Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 March 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 23856/05) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by two Polish nationals, Ms Elżbieta Paliga and Ms Alicja
Adamkowicz (“the applicants”), on 20 June 2005.
Ms
Elżbieta Paliga was represented
by Mr G. Długi, a lawyer practising in Katowice. The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
30 August 2007 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicants were born in 1937 and 1934 respectively
and live in Katowice.
A. Background of the case
The applicants' father owned a plot of land with a
surface area of 1,035 square metres, situated in Warsaw, in
Grabowa Street.
By
virtue of the Decree of 26 October 1945 on the Ownership and Use of
Land in Warsaw (Dekret o własności i użytkowaniu
gruntów na obszarze miasta stołecznego Warszawy)
(“the 1945 Decree”), the ownership of all private land
was transferred to the City of Warsaw.
On
14 February 1949 the applicants' father filed an application for the
grant of the right of temporary ownership (własność
czasowa) of the plot of land, pursuant to section 7 of the 1945
Decree (“the 1949 application”).
On
28 July 1983 the Head of the Warszawa-Wola District Office (Naczelnik
Dzielnicy Warszawa-Wola) refused his application (“the 1983
decision”).
In
the meantime, the Law of 20 March 1950 on the Local State
Administration entered into force on 13 April 1950, according to
which the ownership of all property previously held by the local
government was transferred to the State. By virtue of certain
decisions of 12 January 1976 and 11 June 1982, the property in
question had been designated for construction of an underground.
By
a decision of 25 January 1984, given on behalf of the Mayor of Warsaw
(Prezydent Warszawy), the applicants' father was granted
compensation for the property and subsequently it was paid to him.
On
the applicants' father's death, the applicants' status as heirs was
confirmed by the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy)
on 24 November 1989.
Following
the re-establishment of the local government in Poland in the 1990s,
the ownership of the plot was transferred to the City of Warsaw. The
above was confirmed by decisions of the Warsaw Governor (Wojewoda
Warszawski) given on 2 February 1992 and 31 May 2000.
B. Proceedings for the annulment of the 1983 decision
On
23 March 1998 the applicants instituted administrative proceedings
before the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal (Samorządowe
Kolegium Odwoławcze) and applied for the annulment of the
1983 decision.
On
9 October 2000 the applicants filed complaints, alleging inactivity
on the part of the first-instance authority.
In
the meantime, the case file circulated among the Warsaw Government
Board of Appeal, the President of the Office for Housing and Town
Development (Prezes Urzędu Mieszkalnictwa i Rozwoju Miast)
and the Mazowiecki Governor's Office (Mazowiecki Urząd
Wojewódzki). However, no decision was taken in the
applicants' case.
On
20 July 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd
Administracyjny) dismissed their complaint of 9 October 2000
about the inactivity of the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal.
On
22 May 2002 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal gave a
decision declaring the 1983 decision null and void.
On
an unspecified date an appeal against the decision of 22 May 2002
was lodged by the Board of the City of Warsaw (Zarząd Miasta
Warszawy).
On
3 December 2002 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Supreme
Administrative Court, complaining of the inactivity of the Warsaw
Self-Government Board of Appeal.
On
18 March 2003 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal gave a
decision and discontinued the appellate proceedings. It was found out
that the City of Warsaw was not a party to the proceedings. As a
consequence of that decision, the 1949 application had still to be
examined.
By
a letter of 26 May 2003 the applicants withdrew their complaint about
the inactivity of the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal, which
had been lodged on 3 December 2002.
C. Proceedings concerning the grant of the right of
perpetual use of the plot owned by the City of Warsaw
On
8 December 2003 the Mayor of Warsaw, after examination of the 1949
application, decided to discontinue the proceedings. He considered
that they had become devoid of purpose. He observed that by virtue of
another decision given on 25 January 1984 on behalf of the Mayor of
Warsaw, the applicants' father had been granted and paid compensation
for the property. He underlined that the 1945 Decree had provided
either for the grant of the right of perpetual use (which replaced
the former temporary ownership), or for the payment of compensation.
As such had been paid to the applicants' father, their claims in this
respect had already been satisfied.
The
applicants contested that decision on 23 December 2003. They alleged,
in particular, that the amount of the compensation paid in the 1980s
had been disproportionately low in comparison with the market value
of the property.
On
13 February 2004 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal quashed
the first-instance decision and remitted the case.
On
12 November 2004 and 25 April 2005, the applicants' lawyer wrote a
letter to the Office of the City of Warsaw (Urząd Miasta
Stołecznego Warszawy), inquiring about the progress in the
proceedings following the decision of the Warsaw Self-Government
Board of Appeal. He underlined that since the remittal of the case no
action had been taken by the first-instance authority.
On
19 October 2004 the applicants' lawyer lodged with the Office of the
City of Warsaw a complaint about the inactivity of the first-instance
authority, to no avail.
Further
complaints in this respect were lodged with the Board of the City of
Warsaw (Rada Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy) on 7 July and
the Mazowiecki Governor on 4 November 2005.
On
18 November 2005 the Mazowiecki Governor transferred the applicants'
complaint of 4 November to the Warsaw Self-Government Board of
Appeal. On the same date he instructed the Board of the City of
Warsaw to examine the applicants' inactivity complaint of 7 July.
On
30 November 2005 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal
instructed the Mayor of Warsaw to give explanations for his excessive
delay in delivery of the first-instance decision. As no answer was
given, on 30 January 2006 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal
renewed its request.
On
13 February 2006 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal ordered
the Mayor of Warsaw to examine the applicants' case by no later than
30 June 2006. At the same time it confirmed that the Mayor of Warsaw
had breached the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure
laying down time-limits for dealing with a case. It also reprimanded
him for the failure to notify the applicants about the delay in the
proceedings and the extension of the statutory time-limit for dealing
with their case.
As
no decision was given, on 21 July 2006 the applicants' lawyer filed
with the Warszawa Regional Administrative Court (Wojewódzki
Sąd Administracyjny) a complaint about the inactivity of the
Mayor of Warsaw. Subsequently he asked the Mayor of Warsaw to
institute disciplinary proceedings against those responsible for the
delay in examination of the applicants' case.
On
9 August 2006 the Mayor of Warsaw issued his decision in the case. He
refused the application, observing that the property in question
constituted part of a bigger plot of 11,434 square meters. He found
that the plot in question had been designated partly for local
housing and service facilities. He stated that on part of the
property underground facilities had already been developed. Lastly,
the Mayor considered that it was not feasible to detach from the
existing larger plot the part which had been owned by the applicants'
father.
On
24 August 2006, the applicants' lawyer appealed against the decision
of the Mayor of Warsaw to the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal.
On
1 February 2007 the Warszawa Regional Administrative Court
discontinued the proceedings in respect of the inactivity complaint
lodged on 21 July 2006. It doing so, it relied on the fact that on 9
August 2006 the Mayor of Warsaw had given the decision as to the
merits. A cassation appeal against that decision was lodged on 28
March 2007.
On
21 May 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the
applicants' cassation appeal.
The
proceedings in the applicants' case are pending.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The relevant domestic law concerning inactivity on the
part of administrative authorities is stated in the Court's judgments
in cases Kaniewski v. Poland, no. 38049/02, 8 February
2006, and Koss v. Poland, no. 52495/99, 28 March 2006.
The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the
applicable provisions of the Law of 17 June
2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a
reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na
naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu
sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki)
(“the 2004 Act”), are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland, no.
15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12 23, ECHR 2005-V and
Ratajczyk v. Poland, no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR
2005-VIII, and the judgment in the case of Krasuski v. Poland,
no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THE 1983 DECISION
The
applicants complained that the length of the proceedings for the
annulment of the decision refusing the grant of the so-called
temporary ownership had been incompatible with the “reasonable
time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
However,
pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention:
“1. The Court may only deal with the matter
... within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken...”
The Court notes that the final decision in this
respect was given by the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal on 18
March 2003, thus more than six months before the date on which this
complaint was submitted to the Court.
It
follows that this part of the application has been introduced out of
time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1
and 4 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
CONCERNING THE GRANT OF THE RIGHT OF PERPETUAL USE
The
applicants complained that the length of the proceedings, which
concerned the grant of the right of perpetual use, had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 8 December 2003 and
has not yet ended. It has thus lasted 5 years and 3 months for two
levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicants had not
exhausted all domestic remedies available to them under the Polish
law, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They
maintained that the applicants had failed to lodge a compensation
claim with a civil court in order to seek redress for the alleged
damage which had resulted from the inactivity of the administrative
authorities. They relied on Article 417¹ § 3 of the
Civil Code. In addition, they maintained that the applicants could
have filed an action for damages under Article 417 of the Civil
Code.
The
Government further argued that from 21 July 2006, the date of lodging
a complaint about the inactivity of the Mayor of Warsaw with the
Regional Administrative Court, the applicants had a possibility of
filing a complaint under the 2004 Act.
The
applicants contested the Government's submissions.
With
regard to the Government's submissions that the applicants failed to
institute proceedings for damages under Article 417¹ § 3 or
Article 417 of the Civil Code, the Court reiterates that although
Article 35 § 1 requires that the complaints intended to be
brought subsequently before the Court should have been made to the
appropriate domestic body, it does not require that, in cases where
the national law provides for several parallel remedies in various
branches of law, the person concerned, after an attempt to obtain
redress through one such remedy, must necessarily try all other means
(see, mutatis mutandis, H.D. v. Poland
(dec.), no. 33310/96, 7 June 2001; Cichla v. Poland,
no. 18036/03, §23-26, 10 October 2006).
The
Court considers therefore that, having exhausted the available
remedies provided by the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure of
1960 (see paragraphs 26-30 above), the applicants were not required
to embark on another attempt to obtain redress by bringing an
additional civil action for compensation.
Regarding the remedy provided by the 2004 Act the
Court notes that the law in question provides for a complaint about
the unreasonable length of judicial proceedings and that proceedings
before administrative authorities other than administrative courts
are not covered by its provisions. The Court reiterates that the
applicants had resorted to remedies designed to accelerate the
process of obtaining an administrative decision, such as an appeal
under Article 37 § 1 of the Code of Administrative
Procedure and a complaint lodged with the Supreme Administrative
Court about the inactivity of the administrative authorities (see
paragraphs 26-31 above). Moreover, the Court observes that the
proceedings complained of lasted over five years. After the entry
into force of the 2004 Act the proceedings were conducted by the
Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court in
a period which did not exceed eleven months (see paragraphs 31 and
34-35 above). Therefore, a domestic court dealing with a complaint
under the 2004 Act would not be able to take into account the whole
period of the administrative proceedings for the purposes of the
alleged violation of the applicants' right to a trial within a
reasonable time. Consequently, in the present case a complaint under
the 2004 Act cannot be regarded as an effective remedy with a
sufficient degree of certainty.
It
follows that the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed. The Court
further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings concerning the
grant of the right of perpetual use was excessive and failed to meet
the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicants submitted that because of the
inactivity of the first instance authority and its failure to
issue an administrative decision within the statutory time-limit,
they could not use domestic remedies and lodge an appeal against such
a decision. They relied in substance on Article 13 of the
Convention.
The Court reiterates that, according to its settled
case-law, there exist in the Polish legal system remedies for the
excessive length of administrative proceedings (see, mutatis
mutandis, Bukowski v. Poland (dec.), no.
38665/97, 11 June 2002).
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicants claimed 5,000,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of
pecuniary damage and PLN 1,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government contested these claims.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards to each applicant EUR 2,400 in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicants did not make any claim for costs and expenses involved in
the proceedings.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings for the right of perpetual use admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 April 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President