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TOMASZEWSKA v. POLAND - 9399/03 [2009] ECHR 614 (14 April 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/614.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 614
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF TOMASZEWSKA v. POLAND
(Application
no. 9399/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14
April 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Tomaszewska v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 March 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 9399/03) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Ms Krystyna
Tomaszewska (“the applicant”), on 14 February 2003.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The applicant was granted leave to use the Polish language
in the proceedings before the Court (Rule 34 § 3 of the Rules of
Court).
On
23 May 2008 the Court
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Łomża.
A. Main proceedings
Facts prior to 1 May 1993
On
7 March 1991 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings. She
sought compensation for the expropriation of her real property which
took place on 16 October 1957 by a decision of the Presidium of the
Regional National Council (Prezydium Wojewódzkiej Rady
Narodowej).
On
11 June 1991 the Director of the Łomża District Office
refused to grant the applicant compensation for the expropriated real
estate. She appealed.
On
25 September 1991 the Łomża Governor upheld the Council's
decision.
On
23 January 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the
applicant's request for compensation. Following a judgment of the
Supreme Administrative Court on 15 May 1994 the applicant requested
that the property in question be returned to her.
Facts after 1 May 1993
On
29 July 1994 the Director of the Łomża District Office
refused to restore the property. It was found that the property had
been used in accordance with the provisions of the original decision
of 16 October 1957.
On
28 September 1994 the Łomża Governor upheld the director's
decision. The applicant appealed.
On
10 February 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the
applicant's appeal.
Subsequently
on an unspecified date in July 1997 the applicant made a request to
the Łomża Governor to have the original decision of 16
October 1957 declared null and void pursuant to Article 156 § 1
of the Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP).
On
6 August 1997 the Łomża Governor dismissed her request. The
applicant appealed.
On
24 June 1998 the proceedings were discontinued by a decision of the
President of the Office for Housing and Town Development. It was
established that after the entry into force on 1 January 1998 of the
Land Administration Act of 21 August 1997 (Ustawa o gospodarce
nieruchomościami) the Łomża Governor was no longer
competent to examine the applicant's appeal. In this decision the
President designated himself as the competent authority and
subsequently on 22 July 1998, at the applicant's request, resumed the
examination of the case.
On
18 October 1999 the President granted the applicant's request to
declare the decision of 1957 null and void and quashed the decision.
On
8 November 1999 the Łomża Administration Board (Zarząd
Miasta) requested to have the case re-examined, contesting the
reasoning given for the President's decision.
On
30 October 2000 the President upheld his decision.
On
16 January 2001 the Łomża Administration Board filed a
cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court.
On
23 August 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the appealed
decision and remitted the case.
On
8 November 2002 the President of the Office for Housing and Town
Development, having re-examined the case, refused to quash the
decision of 16 October 1957.
On
22 November 2002 the applicant filed an application to have her case
re-examined again, enclosing additional documents.
On
31 January 2003 the President upheld his own decision of 8 November
2002. The applicant appealed.
On
20 October 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court decided to
suspend the proceedings in order to establish which authority was
competent to examine the appeal in light of the liquidation of the
Office for Housing and Town Development. The applicant lodged a
complaint against this decision. The proceedings were eventually
resumed on 23 February 2005.
On
21 April 2005 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the
applicant's appeal. On 25 July 2005 she lodged a cassation appeal.
On
27 September 2005 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court rejected
her cassation appeal due to a formal shortcoming, namely failure to
pay court fees.
On
21 December 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a
complaint by the applicant against the decision of 27 September 2005.
The court found that the shortcoming could not be rectified, since
the applicant was represented by a professional legal adviser, of
whom due diligence was required. It was the final decision given in
the case.
On
18 April 2006 the applicant applied to the Supreme Administrative
Court to have her case reinstated. This application was dismissed on
23 August 2006.
B. Proceedings under the 2004 Act
On
18 November 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme
Administrative Court under section 18 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on
complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable
time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania
sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki)
(“the 2004 Act”), alleging excessive length of
proceedings pending before an administrative court.
On
16 December 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed her
complaint. The court found that cases were examined by an
administrative court in the order of the date of their introduction.
In consequence, all cases lodged before the applicant's case had been
introduced had priority over hers. Hence, the delay in recognition of
the applicant's motion by a court was justified by a high number of
cases preceding the applicant's. For this reason the court did not
identify any undue delays in the proceedings resulting in their
length being excessive.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
1. Inactivity of administrative authorities
For
a summary of the relevant domestic law, see Kaniewski v. Poland,
no. 38049/02, 8 February 2006 and Koss v. Poland, no.
52495/99, 28 March 2006.
2. Length of proceedings
The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the
applicable provisions of the 2004 Act, are stated in the Court's
decisions in cases of Charzyński v. Poland no. 15212/03
(dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v. Poland
no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII and the judgment in the case
of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR
2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in her case
had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument. In particular they stressed that
the proceedings for annulment of the original decision of 1957 (see
paragraph 12 above), given their extraordinary character under the
Polish Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP), should be considered
as a separate set of proceedings and not as their continuation.
Accordingly they maintained that the period to be taken into
consideration by the Court was to be reduced.
The
Court reiterates at the outset that the period which falls under its
competence ratione
temporis began only on
1 May 1993, when the recognition by Poland of the right of individual
petition took effect.
The
Court notes that the administrative proceedings commenced on 7 March
1991, when the applicant sought compensation for the expropriation of
her real property by the decision of 16 October 1957 (see paragraph 5
above). Subsequently, on 15 May 1994 the applicant modified her plea
and filed a new application, requesting that the real property in
question be returned to her (see paragraph 8 above). Eventually, in
July 1997 the applicant filed a new application to have the
expropriation decision of 1957 declared null and void (see paragraph
12 above). The Court observes that the administrative proceedings in
question had had the same object throughout their duration, namely
the real property, and were aimed at remedying the expropriation
which occurred in 1957. The Court notes however that, as stressed by
the Government (see paragraph 33 above), the applicant by
modifying the subject matter of the proceedings in July 1997
instituted de facto
a new set of proceedings under Article 156 § 1 of the
Polish Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP).
It follows that for the purposes of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention and having regard to the requirements of the
six-month rule contained in Article 35 §
1 of the Convention, the Court will only consider the length
of the final set of the proceedings – namely the proceedings
initiated in July 1997, which ended on 21 December 2005. The period
in question thus lasted eight years and five months at three levels
of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant had not
exhausted all domestic remedies available to her under Polish law, as
required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In particular,
they maintained that she had
failed to have recourse to a complaint of inactivity on the part of
the administrative authorities as provided by the Polish Code of
Administrative Procedure of 1960 and the 1995 Act on the Supreme
Administrative Court.
The
applicant contested the Government's findings and stressed that she
had filed a complaint of length of proceedings available under the
2004 Act.
The
Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires
applicants first to use the remedies provided by the national legal
system. The rule is based on the assumption that the domestic system
provides an effective remedy in respect of the alleged breach. In
order to comply with the rule, normal recourse should be had by an
applicant to remedies which are available and
sufficient
to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged (see Aksoy
v. Turkey,
judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1996 VI,
pp. 2275–76, §§ 51–52).
39. The
Court notes that the applicant had recourse to the remedy under the
2004 Act in respect of excessive length of proceedings (see
paragraphs 28-29). The Court also notes that it has already examined
this remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention and found it effective in respect of complaints about the
excessive length of judicial proceedings in Poland (see Michalak
v. Poland (dec.) no. 24549/03, §§ 37-43).
In this connection, the Court reiterates that although
Article 35 § 1 requires that the complaints intended to be
brought subsequently before the Court should have been first made to
the appropriate domestic body, it does not require that, in cases
where the national law provides for several parallel remedies in
various branches of law, the person concerned, after an attempt to
obtain redress through one such remedy, must necessarily try all
other means (see, mutatis mutandis, H.D. v. Poland
(dec.), no. 33310/96, 7 June 2001; Kaniewski
v. Poland, no. 38049/02, §§ 32-39, 8 November
2005; and Cichla v. Poland, no. 18036/03, §23-26, 10
October 2006).
The
Court considers therefore that, having exhausted the available remedy
provided by the 2004 Act, the applicant was not required to embark on
another attempt to obtain redress by filing an additional complaint
based on the inactivity of the administrative authorities.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of Article 35
§ 1 of the Convention, the applicant has exhausted domestic
remedies. For these reasons, the Government's plea of inadmissibility
on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be
dismissed.
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It also
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above). Furthermore, the Court
considers that, in dismissing the applicant's complaint that the
proceedings in her case had exceeded a reasonable time, the Supreme
Administrative Court failed to apply standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in the Court's case-law (see
Majewski v. Poland, no. 52690/99, § 36, 11 October
2005).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 716,233 Polish zlotys (PLN)
in respect of pecuniary damage and 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government, referring to the applicant's supplementary letter of 19
October 2008 enclosing a valuation of the real property which was at
stake in the proceedings, maintained that the applicant had only
claimed pecuniary damages in the amount of PLN 716,233 and failed to
make any claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage resulting from the
present complaint. It appears, however, that the Government
overlooked the applicant's observations joined to her claims for just
satisfaction submitted also on 19 October 2008.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it
awards her EUR 2,400 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses involved in
the proceedings.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to
pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the
judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, the following amount, to be converted into Polish
zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 2,400
(two thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall
be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal
lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period
plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 April 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President