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MANNINEN v. FINLAND - 28631/05 [2009] ECHR 610 (14 April 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/610.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 610
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF MANNINEN v. FINLAND
(Application
no. 28631/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14
April 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Manninen v. Finland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 March 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 28631/05) against the
Republic of Finland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Finnish
national, Mr Rainer Kaarlo Tapio Manninen (“the
applicant”), on 8 August 2005.
The
applicant was represented by Mr V. Lehtevä, a lawyer practising
in Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
On
4 June 2008 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to communicate the complaints
concerning the length of the proceedings and the lack of remedies in
that respect to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 3).
The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Helsinki.
The
applicant purchased a company in September 1995. The company was
wound-up on its own initiative in March 1996. A criminal
investigation was started in regard to the financial activities of
the company in February 1997 and the applicant was questioned by
the police for the first time on 21 April 1997. He was, together
with two other persons, suspected of aggravated debtor's dishonesty
and false accounting in 1995 and 1996.
The
pre-trial investigation was finalised on 26 November 1997. On
27 March 1998 the prosecutor waived prosecution due to
insufficient evidence.
On
22 April 1998 the bankruptcy estate requested the State prosecutor to
examine the previous decision not to prosecute. On 23 December 1998
the deputy State prosecutor requested the police to conduct an
additional investigation without delay due to the time that had
already passed since the beginning of the investigation. On
23 December 1999, the local prosecutor was ordered to bring
charges against all the suspects. An additional investigation was
requested. The last investigation was concluded on 13 January
2000.
The
charges were brought against the applicant and the other defendants
on 16 February 2000. The District Court (käräjäoikeus,
tingsrätten) dismissed
all the charges on 1 March 2002.
Following
the prosecutor's appeal and after a two-day oral hearing, the Court
of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) convicted the applicant
on 18 June 2004. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment.
The sentence was amended for reasons of equity in view of two
previous prison sentences dating from 2002 and 2004.
In
his appeal to the Supreme Court the applicant raised the issue of the
excessive length of the proceedings. The Supreme Court (korkein
oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal on 8
February 2005.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Chapter
6, Article 7, point 3, of the Penal Code (rikoslaki, strafflagen;
as amended by Act No. 515/2003 which took effect on 1 January
2004) reads:
“In addition to what is provided above in section
6, grounds for mitigating the sentence that are also to be taken into
consideration are ...
(3) a considerably long period that has passed
since the commission of the offence;
if the punishment that accords with established practice
would for these reasons lead to an unreasonable or exceptionally
detrimental result.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
Admissibility
The
Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that the complaint is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
Merits
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 21 April 1997 when the
applicant was heard by the police for the first time in the course of
the investigation and ended on 8 February 2005 when the Supreme Court
refused leave to appeal. It thus lasted some seven years and ten
months for three levels of jurisdiction.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Government pointed out that the case was complex since it concerned
economic crime. It involved three defendants, three consecutive
pre-trial investigations, several witnesses and a considerable number
of documents produced in evidence. However, the Government conceded
that the proceedings before the Court of Appeal had taken more than
the average time, maintaining at the same time that the overall
length was still reasonable in the applicant's case.
The
Court observes that the investigation stage and the preparation of
the charges lasted some two years and ten months and the proceedings
before the District Court two years and one month. The Court of
Appeal gave its judgment about two years and four months after the
District Court's judgment and the proceedings came to an end less
than eight months later, when the Supreme Court refused leave to
appeal.
The
Court further observes that there is no indication that the applicant
contributed to the length of the proceedings at any stage.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that he did not have an effective remedy
against the excessive length of the proceedings. He relied on Article
13 of the Convention.
Article
13 of the Convention reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The
Government contested that argument.
Admissibility
The
Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It is
not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
Merits
The
Government argued that the applicant did not raise the length issue
until his appeal to the Supreme Court. The possibility to mitigate a
sentence due to the lapse of a considerably
lengthy period since the commission of the offence was
available to him under Chapter 6, section 7 of the Penal Code already
at the stage of the proceedings before the Court Appeal. According to
the Government, this remedy fulfilled the requirements of Article 13
of the Convention and by actually invoking the issue before the
Supreme Court the applicant had accepted the availability of an
effective remedy.
The
applicant contested that argument and noted that only at the last
stage of the proceedings – in his appeal to the Supreme Court –
could he look back and assess the length of the proceedings in total.
Furthermore, the applicant did not consider the aforesaid remedy
effective.
As
the Court has held on many occasions, Article 13 of the Convention
guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce
the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form
they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect
of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy
to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint”
under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of
the Contracting States' obligations under Article 13 varies depending
on the nature of the applicant's complaint; however, the remedy
required by Article 13 must be “effective” in practice as
well as in law (see, among other authorities, Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, § 157, ECHR 2000-XI, Kangasluoma v.
Finland, no. 48339/99, § 46, 20 January 2004, Cocchiarella
v. Italy
[GC], no. 64886/01, § 74-79, ECHR 2006 ...).
The
Court notes that the provisions on sentencing in Chapter 6 of the
Penal Code have been amended with effect from 1 January 2004, so that
the lapse of a considerably lengthy period since the commission of
the offence may be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor
which may result in the reduction of the sentence imposed.
The
Court notes that the applicant complained about the length of the
proceedings in his appeal to the Supreme Court. However, no leave to
appeal was granted. The Court can accept that had the Supreme Court
upheld the applicant's complaint and reduced his sentence in a manner
which provided express and quantifiable redress for the breach of the
reasonable time requirement, an issue might arise as to the
applicant's victim status (see, for example Beck v. Norway,
no. 26390/95, §§ 27-29, 26 June 2001 and Uoti
v. Finland (just satisfaction), no. 61222/00, § 14,
13 January 2009). However, the Court is not persuaded that the
domestic law provisions relied on by the Government constitute an
effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention.
It notes that the provisions do not address the situation of an
applicant who is ultimately acquitted of an offence. Moreover, an
applicant is left in a state of uncertainty as to the time of
application of the provisions given that he must await the stage of
sentencing before any consideration can be given to reducing the
length of the sentence in the light of the length of the criminal
proceedings.
Furthermore,
under Finnish law, an applicant at no stage of the proceedings is
able to request a domestic court to expedite the conduct of the
proceedings or to file a claim for compensation either during their
course or following their termination (see, for example, Scordino
v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 186,
ECHR 2006 ... ).
Consequently,
since the Government have not shown that any form of relief –
either preventive or compensatory – was available to the
applicant, there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention
in that the applicant had no domestic remedy whereby he could enforce
his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as guaranteed by
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Kangasluoma v. Finland,
no. 48339/99, §§48-49, 20 January 2004).
III. REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION
The
applicant claimed under Article 8 of the Convention that his prison
sentence had interrupted his family life and prevented him from
taking care of his sick wife. He further claimed that his
unconditional prison sentence in the current case meant that he also
had had to serve two-thirds of his other two sentences and this had
resulted in increased time in prison.
Having
regard to the case-file, the Court finds that
the matters complained of do not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the applicant's rights under the Convention.
Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of
the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
Damage
The
applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) with interest from the beginning
of the proceedings in respect of non-pecuniary damage for mental and
physical suffering.
The
Government considered the applicant's claims excessive as to quantum.
However, should the Court find a violation of Article 6 § 1
and/or 13 of the Convention, the Government conceded that the
applicant should be awarded compensation which should not exceed
EUR 3,500.
The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 4,000
under that head.
Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the length of
the criminal proceedings and lack of an effective remedy in this
connection admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four
thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 April 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President