European Court of Human Rights

FIRST SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 14330/07 and 15 other applications
by Aleksandr Vasiliyevich BELKIN and Others
against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 5 February 2009 as a Chamber composed of:

Christos Rozakis, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the applications listed in the Annex,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicants are 16 Russian nationals, whose names and dates of birth are shown in the Annex. The Russian Government (“the Government”) are represented by Mr A. Savenkov, First Deputy Minister of Justice, and Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicants are victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster who live in the Rostov Region of Russia. Under domestic law they were entitled to social benefits. Because the authorities had failed to pay the benefits in full or in time, the applicants sought relief in courts of the Rostov Region. The courts held for the applicants, the judgments became binding, but their full enforcement was delayed. Details of the judgments are shown in the Annex.

COMPLAINTS

THE LAW

Article 6 § 1

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the loss of victim status, the full enforcement of the judgments, and the reasonableness of the periods of enforcement.

The applicants maintained their complaints. Several applicants expanded their applications by complaining about non-enforcement of newer judgments. Several applicants contested the fact of the full enforcement of the judgments.

With regard to the applicants’ complaints concerning newer judgments, the Court notes that these complaints were made after the communication of the applications to the Government and hence fall outside the scope of the present case.

The Court considers it possible to leave the questions of domestic remedies and victim status open, because the applications are in any event inadmissible as follows.

An unreasonably long delay in the enforcement of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, ECHR 2002 III). To decide if the delay was reasonable, the Court will look at how complex the enforcement proceedings were, how the applicant and the authorities behaved, and what the nature of the award was (see Raylyan v. Russia, no. 22000/03, § 31, 15 February 2007).

In the present applications, the periods of enforcement were up to one year. In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that these periods complied with the requirements of the Convention. Insofar as several applicants contest the fact of the full enforcement of their judgments, the Court lends credence to the Government’s statement because the applicants have not submitted this argument to domestic courts (see Sirotin v. Russia (dec.), no. 38712/03, 14 September 2006).

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible because the applicants did have at their disposal several effective remedies. The applicants maintained their complaint.

The Court reiterates that Article 13 requires domestic remedies only with regard to complaints arguable in the terms of the Convention (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131). Since the Court has found above that the applicants’ complaint about the delayed enforcement is manifestly ill-founded, Article 13 has no application in the present case.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

It follows that this part of the applications is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to join the applications;

Declares the applications inadmissible.

Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President

ANNEX