European Court of Human Rights

FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 21252/04
by Slobodan STEFANOVSKI
against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 20 January 2009 as a Chamber composed of:

Peer Lorenzen, President,
Rait Maruste,
Karel Jungwiert,
Renate Jaeger,
Mark Villiger,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 26 May 2004,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Slobodan Stefanovski, is a Macedonian national who was born in 1969 and lives in Gevgelija. He is represented before the Court by Mr D. Ajcev, a lawyer practising in Gevgelija.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant worked as a warden in company N. (“the employer”) until 30 July 1998 when he was dismissed. On 8 April 1999 the applicant challenged his dismissal before the Gevgelija Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”).

On 29 September 2000 the first-instance court accepted the applicant’s action, annulled the dismissal decision and ordered his reinstatement. It established that the dismissal decision had not reached the applicant although posted by the employer. It was only on 15 March 1999 that the applicant received this decision by the Employment Bureau (Биро за вработување). The employer’s managing board (“the board”), by a decision of 19 March 1999, rejected the applicant’s objection of 18 March 1999 as out of time. The same day, the employer communicated to the applicant a copy of the dismissal and board’s decisions. It further invited the applicant to the board’s meeting listed for 6 April 1999 to discuss the applicant’s objection of 18 March 1999. This meeting was not held. On 24 March 1999 the applicant lodged a fresh objection which remained undecided.

The court found that the applicant had not violated the rules on working discipline. It further dismissed the employer’s arguments that the applicant’s claim had not been filed in good time. In this connection, it held that the board had accepted jurisdiction to decide on the applicant’s objection of 18 March 1999 and rejected it the next day. The first-instance court held that the employer had failed to prove that the applicant had received the board’s decision on 20 March 1999. The court therefore accepted the applicant’s claim as having been submitted within the statutory time-limit, namely fifteen days following his second objection of 24 March 1999.

The employer appealed, inter alia, that the first-instance court had wrongly considered the applicant’s claim as having been submitted in good time. It provided in support a copy of a Post Office receipt list attesting that the applicant had received a letter from the employer on 20 March 1999 which included the dismissal decision and the board’s decision. It also argued that the dismissal decision should be considered together with the board’s decision.

On 7 March 2001 the Skopje Court of Appeal accepted the employer’s appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It agreed that the employer’s decisions should be considered together and instructed the lower court to order the applicant to specify his claim in that respect. It further found insufficient evidence as regards the alleged breach of working discipline. As to the complaints that the applicant’s claim was out of time, the Court stated that:

“... this court accepts the reasoning of the first-instance court that the applicant’s claim was submitted within the statutory time-limit calculated as of the day of submission of the applicant’s objection in respect of the dismissal decision. In this context the Post Office receipt list does not alter this finding since it is impossible to determine the contents of that letter. This evidence does not substantiate the allegation that the applicant submitted his claim out of time ...”

On 25 March 2002 the first-instance court accepted the applicant’s claim and annulled the dismissal decision of 30 July 1998 and the board’s decision of 19 March 1999. It found, inter alia, that the board had not decided the merits of the applicant’s objection of 18 March 1999 although it should have done so by 3 April 1999. Neither did the board decide on the applicant’s objection of 24 March 1999. The court concluded accordingly that the applicant’s action had been submitted within the fifteen-day time-limit.

On 15 January 2003 the Skopje Court of Appeal accepted the employer’s appeal and overturned the lower court’s decision declaring the applicant’s action as being out of time. It found that:

“... on 19 March 1999 the employer’s second-instance commission decided on the applicant’s objection of 18 March 1999. On the same day, this decision was communicated to the plaintiff (the applicant) so ... the plaintiff could seek protection of his rights before a competent court within fifteen days of the final decision of the party sued, namely ... the second-instance decision.”

In an appeal on points of law, the applicant complained, inter alia, that the first- and second-instance courts, by their decisions of 29 September 2000 and 7 March 2001 respectively, had already accepted his action as having been submitted in good time.

On 4 December 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It stated, inter alia, that:

“ ... According to the second-instance court, it is not in doubt that on 18 March 1999 (the applicant) lodged an objection in respect of the dismissal decision of 30 July 1998. (The employer’s) second-instance body decided on 19 March 1999. The same day, the second-instance decision was submitted to (the applicant) who could claim court protection of his rights within fifteen days of (the employer’s) final decision. The first-instance court accepted that (the applicant) ... objected to the dismissal decision. (The employer’s) second-instance body decided straight away ... The time-limit for challenging a dismissal decision cannot restart because the latter has been served again, but now - by (the employer) ...”

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Appeal and Supreme Courts had wrongly applied the substantive law to the facts established by the first-instance court; that the Court of Appeal’s decision of 7 March 2001 had not been based on the grounds of appeal submitted by the employer; and that the Supreme Court had not given reasons for its decision, in particular in respect of his arguments that the Court of Appeal’s decision of 7 March 2001 had already confirmed the admissibility of his claim. He further complained that his case had not been decided within a reasonable time.

THE LAW

The applicant complained that he had not been given a fair trial and that his case had not been heard within a reasonable time, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

a) The alleged lack of reasons in the Supreme Court’s decision

The applicant complained that the Supreme Court’s decision provided no reasoning as to his complaints that the first- and second-instance courts, in their initial decisions, had already accepted his claim as having been filed in a timely manner and accordingly, that matter had been resolved.

According to the Court’s case law, although Article 6 § 1 of the Convention obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument of the parties involved (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, p. 20, § 61). The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see Higgins and Others v. France, 19 February 1998, § 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 I).

The Court notes that the Supreme Court gave certain reasons for its decision. It took the view, as had the Court of Appeal before it, that the fifteen-day time-limit for challenging the employer’s decision of 19 March 1999 ran from that date, which was the date on which the decision was communicated to the applicant. The Court sees nothing inadequate or arbitrary in that decision.

It is true, as the applicant contends, that the Supreme Court in its decision of 4 December 2003 did not deal specifically with the applicant’s contention that in the first round of proceedings, both the first and the second instance courts had found that the applicant had complied with the time-limit as the applicant had applied to the courts within fifteen days of his second objection (to which the employer never replied). However, at the time when the Supreme Court was deciding the case, the decisions from the first round of proceedings were no longer of legal effect as the case had been remitted to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. There was therefore no need for the Supreme Court to deal with the applicant’s contention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

b) As to the allegedly wrong application of the substantive law and the unlawfulness of the Court of Appeal’s decision of 7 March 2001

As to the applicant’s complaint about the allegedly incorrect application of the substantive law, the Court reiterates that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, 29, ECHR 1999 I). In the present case, the applicant’s contention is precisely that the domestic courts wrongly interpreted domestic law in finding that he had missed the fifteen-day time-limit for challenging his former employer’s decision to dismiss him. The Court notes that, over and above the fact that the applicant does not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeal of 15 January 2003 and the Supreme Court’s decision of 4 December 2003, he has not given details of how the domestic law was wrongly applied, or how any such application could affect the interpretation of Article 6 of the Convention in the case. In the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds no indication of arbitrariness in the decision-making of the domestic courts.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

The applicant’s complaint that the Court of Appeal’s decision of 7 March 2001 had not been based on the grounds of the appealing party was submitted before this Court more than six months after the decision complained of was given.

It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

c) The alleged excessive length of the proceedings

The Court notes that the proceedings complained of started on 8 April 1999 and ended with the Supreme Court’s decision of 4 December 2003. They therefore lasted nearly four years and eight months for three court levels. During this time, the case was reconsidered once; the courts decided reasonably speedily, and there is no period of manifest inactivity given the non-excessive intervals between the decisions of the different instances.

Having regard to the criteria laid down in its case-law for assessing the reasonable-time requirement contained in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Markoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 22928/03, § 32, 2 November 2006), the Court considers on the whole that the proceedings in the present case were conducted within a reasonable time and that the applicant’s complaint concerning their length is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President