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KUCHARCZYK v. POLAND - 3464/06 [2009] ECHR 2022 (8 December 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/2022.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 2022
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KUCHARCZYK v. POLAND
(Application
no. 3464/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 December
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kucharczyk v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 17 November 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 3464/06) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Wiktor
Kucharczyk (“the applicant”), on 29 December 2005.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
10 November 2008 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Kielce.
A. Civil proceedings for reinstatement at work
1. Facts before 1 May 1993
On
6 November 1991 the applicant lodged a claim against a cooperative,
his former employer, with the Kielce District Court, seeking
reinstatement in his job.
On
19 December 1991 the proceedings were stayed because of other
proceedings pending before the Kielce Regional Court.
2. Facts after 1 May 1993
On
4 August 1994 the Kielce District Court, finding the proceedings
before the Kielce Regional Court had been terminated, decided to
resume the proceedings against the applicant's employer.
On
18 August 1994 the defendant cooperative was declared insolvent and
on 29 September 1994 the Kielce District Court again stayed the
proceedings.
On
28 November 1997 the Kielce District Court discontinued the
proceedings, finding that the applicant's claims had been satisfied
in the insolvency proceedings of his former employer.
The
applicant appealed against that decision.
On
30 December 1997 the Kielce Regional Court quashed the challenged
decision.
On
30 January 1998 the Kielce District Court resumed the proceedings and
on 1 April 1998 it stayed them again, finding that the insolvency
proceedings had not yet been terminated.
On
19 December 2000 the applicant requested the court to resume the
proceedings, submitting that the Regional Court had discontinued the
insolvency proceedings.
On
8 January 2001 the proceedings were resumed.
At
a hearing on 24 July 2001 the applicant, taking into consideration
that liquidation proceedings in respect of the defendant cooperative
had been commenced, modified his claim and directed it against the
members of the management board of the cooperative in liquidation.
On
11 October 2001 the Kielce District Court again stayed the
proceedings, because the applicant had failed to provide the court
with the addresses of the defendants.
The
applicant appealed, but the decision of 11 October 2001 was upheld by
the Kielce Regional Court.
On
19 September 2003 the Kielce District Court resumed the proceedings.
On
10 December 2003 the Kielce District Court gave judgment and
dismissed the applicant's claim.
On
15 December 2003 the applicant requested the court to prepare and
deliver the reasoning of the judgment.
The
judgment with reasoning was sent to the applicant on 18 October
2004.
On
10 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal against the
first-instance judgment.
On
6 July 2005 the Kielce Regional Court dismissed the applicant's
appeal.
On
8 July 2005 the legal adviser, G.P., who had represented the
applicant before the courts, sent a letter to the applicant informing
him, that “because the proceedings in this case have lasted
since 1991”, he could no longer act as his representative. The
lawyer's letter went on to explain:
“at the time of my appointment you were a member
of the trade union and as such you were entitled to legal aid
provided for by the union. For several years however, you have no
longer been a member of the union and the Świętokrzyski
Region, which granted me power of attorney, is no longer under
obligation to deal with your affairs.”
The
lawyer failed to submit the letter to the court.
On
12 July 2005 the applicant personally submitted a letter to the
Regional Court informing it that he had revoked the power of attorney
of his lawyer, G.P.
On
the same day, the applicant requested the court to allow him a
legal-aid lawyer to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf. He based
his request on his difficult financial situation and his lack of
legal knowledge.
On
25 July 2005 the Kielce Regional Court dismissed the applicant's
request, relying on the fact that since 1991 the applicant had been
represented before the courts by a legal adviser and that he had
terminated the latter's power of attorney with effect on 12 July 2005
and voluntarily relinquished free legal aid.
The
applicant appealed against that decision.
On
18 August 2005 the Kielce Regional Court rejected the appeal as
inadmissible in law.
B. Proceedings under the 2004 Act
On
an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint under section 5
of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right
to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na
naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu
sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004
Act”), seeking the court's acknowledgement of the unreasonable
length of the proceedings and just satisfaction of 10,000 Polish
zlotys (PLN).
On
1 March 2005 the Kielce Regional Court found that there had been a
period of inactivity on the part of the Kielce District Court between
23 December 2003 and 18 October 2004 and granted the applicant
PLN 2,000 in just satisfaction. The court found that in the
remaining periods the proceedings had been conducted without undue
delays.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government refrained from taking a position on that matter.
The
period to be taken into consideration began only on 1 May 1993, when
the recognition by Poland of the right of individual petition took
effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that
elapsed after that date, the state of the proceedings at the time has
to be taken into account.
The
period in question ended on 18 August 2005. It thus lasted 12 years,
3 months and 20 days, for two levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
In
the present case the Regional Court partly acknowledged a breach of
the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time and
awarded him the equivalent of EUR 512 in respect of the length
of the proceedings (see paragraph 32, above).
The
Court considers, based on the facts of which he complains before the
Court, that the redress provided to the applicant at domestic level
was insufficient (see Czajka v. Poland, no. 15067/02,
§ 56, 13 February 2007). Having regard to the criteria
for determining victim status in respect of length-of-proceedings
complaints as set out in Scordino v. Italy (no.1) ([GC],
no. 36813/97, §§ 193-215, ECHR-2006-...), the Court
concludes that the complaint cannot be rejected as being incompatible
ratione personae with the Convention.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court further reiterates that special diligence is necessary in
employment disputes (see Ruotolo v. Italy, 27 February 1992, §
17, Series A no. 230-D).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LIMITATION OF THE APPLICANT'S ACCESS TO
A COURT
The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
of a violation of his right of access to a court on the grounds that
the Kielce Regional Court had refused to appoint a legal-aid lawyer
to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf.
The
Government contested that argument, suggesting that the complaint
should be declared manifestly ill-founded. In the Government's view,
unlike in the case of Tabor v. Poland (no. 12825/02, judgment
of 27 June 2006), where the decision refusing to appoint a
legal-aid lawyer contained no reasoning, in the present case the
domestic court gave reasons for its decision. They submitted that the
Regional Court had refused to grant legal aid on the grounds that the
applicant had in fact been represented by a professional lawyer, and
that he had failed to inform the domestic court in due time that his
lawyer was no longer representing him, and of the reasons for that.
The
applicant submitted that the Regional Court had been aware that he in
fact had no right to free legal assistance through the trade union.
He considered that the Regional Court's decision of 25 July 2005
amounted to an interference with his right of access to a court
safeguarded by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The
Court notes that on 8 July 2005 the legal adviser who represented the
applicant before the domestic courts, informed him that he would no
longer act on his behalf (see, paragraph 24, above). However, the
lawyer failed to inform the court of this fact. On 12 July 2005, by a
letter submitted personally to the Kielce Regional Court, the
applicant mistakenly informed the domestic court that he had revoked
his lawyer's power of attorney (see, paragraph 26, above). He did not
submit any additional information which would have enabled the court
to understand exactly what had happened. In particular, he failed to
inform the court that it was in fact the lawyer and not he, the
applicant, who had terminated the power of attorney.
The
Court observes that on 25 July 2005 the Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's request, relying on that crucial information which the
applicant himself had submitted to the court, namely the applicant's
decision to revoke his lawyer's power of attorney. The Court further
observes that, unlike in the case of Tabor v. Poland, cited
above, the Regional Court's decision contained reasoning. The
domestic court cannot be held responsible for the fact that it gave
its decision after having been misinformed by the applicant.
In
the light of the foregoing, the Court has no reason to doubt that the
Regional Court's decision was based on a thorough assessment of the
relevant factors.
It
follows that the applicant's complaint concerning the limitation of
his access to a court is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected
in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Relying on Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention, the applicant complained that the proceedings in
which he had been involved were “unfair and partial”.
The
Court has examined these complaints as submitted by the applicant.
Even assuming that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies, the
Court finds that he has failed to substantiate his complaint about
lack of impartiality on the part of the courts. Furthermore, the
complaint concerning the outcome of the proceedings in question is
clearly of a fourth-instance nature. It follows that this part of the
application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 35,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested this claim.
The
Court considers that it should award the full sum claimed.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 7,850 (seven thousand eight hundred and fifty euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 December 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza Registrar President
