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KUPIEC v. POLAND - 16828/02 [2009] ECHR 199 (3 February 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/199.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 199
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KUPIEC v. POLAND
(Application
no. 16828/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 February 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kupiec v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Ján Šikuta,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
Nebojša Vučinić,
judges,
and Lawrence Early,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 January 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 16828/02) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Michał Kupiec (“the
applicant”), on 2 April 2001.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wolasiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been deprived of his
right of access to a court, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention.
On
5 September 2006 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Kraków.
On
19 June 2000 the applicant sued three professors from the Cracow
University of Science and Technology (Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza)
before the Cracow Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy)
alleging professional misconduct on their part and seeking protection
of his personal rights. He submitted that the professors had
deliberately made him fail his fourth year of studies. They allegedly
prohibited him from participation in lectures and the examinations.
In this respect he claimed PLN 400,000 in compensation from the
professors and PLN 1,000,000 from the University.
On
8 October 2000 the applicant submitted information concerning his
financial situation. He maintained that he received a family pension
in the amount of PLN 322. He further stressed that he was a student,
that he did not work and that he had incurred huge debts on his bank
account (several thousand Polish zlotys).
On
20 October 2000 the Regional Court asked the applicant to submit a
copy of his bank statement and the contract for the purchase of his
car. In reply, on 23 October 2000 the applicant sent a letter to the
court, claiming that his debts amounted to PLN 17,323. However, he
could not ask the bank for a statement because the bank would have
discovered his debts. He was also not able to submit the contract for
the purchase of his car (Renault Clio) as it had been bought with his
mother's money.
On
3 November 2000 the Krakow Regional Court refused to exempt the
applicant from the payment of court fees. The court held that the
applicant had failed to submit evidence i.e. his bank statement in
support of his allegations that he had substantial debts. According
to the court, the fact that the applicant owned a Renault Clio was an
indication that his financial situation was sound. The court stressed
that it was impossible to cover the costs of the car maintenance with
the applicant's pension.
On
13 December 2000 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal. He
stressed that the court fee for lodging his claim exceeded
PLN 75,000, which he was unable to pay. He further maintained
that he did not own any real estate and that he rented his apartment
under the rent-control scheme. Moreover, he was not even able to pay
the reduced rent and he already owed PLN 3,670.45 to the housing
co-operative. He further claimed that the fact that he owned a car
was of no relevance as he had bought it two years ago when his
financial situation had been better, given that he had had a
part-time job at the time. He did not have a copy of the contract for
the purchase of the car. However, he maintained that he had bought a
new car and had paid PLN 30,900 for it.
On
14 December 2000 the Regional Court again refused the applicant's
request. The court stressed that the fact that the applicant owned a
car worth PLN 40,000 and at the same time his only income was a
family pension of PLN 323 indicated that his financial situation was
good and that he must have had some hidden resources. Otherwise, he
would not be able to support himself and to maintain his car.
According to the court, the applicant was trying to conceal his real
financial situation.
On 4 January 2001 the applicant lodged an
interlocutory appeal against this decision. He claimed that the
court's refusal to exempt him amounted to a violation of his right of
access to a court.
On
22 January 2001 the Krakow Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
interlocutory appeal. The court held that a person applying for legal
aid should not take out a loan in a situation when he still had
assets (a car). In addition, the applicant had failed
to provide a detailed statement about his financial situation.
On
15 February 2001 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay PLN
29,100 as a fee for lodging his statement of claim on pain of having
his claim returned.
On
25 February 2001 the applicant again asked to be exempted from the
court fees. He claimed that he was unable to pay that amount. He owed
PLN 20,000 to the bank and had no savings. In addition, his claim
related to the protection of personal rights. As regards his car, he
could not sell it since a different set of civil proceedings
concerning it was pending. Lastly, he maintained that apart from the
family pension - PLN 326 - he did not have any other income. He had
no possessions and the car was his only asset.
On
3 April 2001 the Regional Court refused the applicant's request. The
court held that the applicant should have sold his car in order to
obtain money for court fees.
On
18 April 2001 the applicant again lodged an interlocutory appeal
against this decision. The applicant repeated his earlier arguments
and referred to the right of access to a court.
On
21 May 2001 the Court of Appeal gave a decision and exempted the
applicant from 80 % of the court fees for lodging his statement of
claim. The court found that the court fee in the amount of PLN 29,100
constituted a limitation on the applicant's right of access to a
court and that the amount had to be reduced. At the same time, it
held that a court fee in the amount of 5,820 PLN could not be
considered excessive for the applicant.
On 13 July 2001 the applicant again made an
interlocutory appeal and submitted that PLN 5,820 was too much and he
was unable to pay it.
On 16 July 2001 the Regional Court refused to grant
the applicant any further exemption from court fees. Upon the
applicant's further appeal, the Krakow Court of Appeal upheld the
decision on 23 October 2001. The court held that the applicant had
not submitted any new arguments which would have justified a further
exemption from court fees.
On
7 January 2002 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay a
court fee of PLN 5,820 for lodging his statement of claim on pain of
having the claim returned.
On
14 January 2002 the applicant lodged yet another motion for an
exemption from court fees. He stated among other things that he had
lost the right to a family pension.
On
18 January 2002 the Regional Court returned the statement of claim to
the applicant as he had failed to pay the required court fee. On
4 March 2002 the Regional Court quashed the decision to
return the statement of claim to the applicant. On the same date it
dismissed the applicant's motion for an exemption. It held that there
were no new circumstances which would argue in favour of allowing the
applicant's request. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
On
15 May 2002 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
interlocutory appeal. The court held that the applicant had already
been exempted from the greater part of the fees due in his case (80
%) and that he only had to pay PLN 5,820. Furthermore, despite his
allegedly bad financial situation, the applicant had been able to
maintain a car. The court acknowledged that the car was the subject
of enforcement proceedings. However, since the applicant had not been
able over a two-year period to set aside the sum required for court
fees, his application for an exemption had to be dismissed.
On
31 July 2002 the Regional Court returned the statement of claim to
the applicant since he had failed to pay the required court fee. The
applicant appealed.
On
13 September 2002 the court ordered the applicant to pay the court
fee of PLN 1,164 for lodging an interlocutory appeal. On
30 September 2002 the applicant asked to be exempted from
payment of this fee.
On
2 October 2002 the court asked the applicant to submit a detailed
statement about his financial situation.
On
19 November 2002 the Cracow Regional Court exempted the applicant
from the fee for lodging his interlocutory appeal.
On
6 March 2003 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
interlocutory appeal against the decision to return the statement of
claim to him.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The
legal provisions applicable at the material time and questions of
practice are set out in paragraphs 23-33 of the judgment delivered by
the Court on 19 June 2001 in the case of Kreuz v. Poland (no.
28249/95, ECHR 2001-VI; see also Jedamski and Jedamska v.
Poland, no. 73547/01, §§ 29 39).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that the excessive
amount of court fees required from him in order to proceed with his
claim had been in breach of his right of access to a court for the
determination of his civil rights. The relevant part of Article 6 §
1 provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal established by law. ...”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant maintained that the sum required from him for proceeding
with his claim had been excessively high and disproportionate to his
means. Even after partial exemption, it had been 18 times higher than
his monthly income.
The
applicant concluded that his right of access to a court had been
breached.
(b) The Government
The
Government firstly recapitulated the general rules concerning
exemption from court fees.
They
secondly noted that the court fee was calculated with reference to
the value of the claim. The applicant should have realised that the
value of his claims would have influenced the amount of court fees
required from him.
They further stressed that the applicant was exempted
from 80 % of the fees required from him. In their opinion, the
requested sum had not been excessive since the applicant had a source
of income and also had owned a relatively new car.
They
maintained that the decisions of the domestic authorities which
assessed the applicant's liability to pay court fees had not been
disproportionate or arbitrary bearing in mind the applicant's
financial status and the value of his claim: PLN 1,500,000.
In
addition, the applicant's claims were not subject to prescription in
so far as they concerned his personal rights. If the applicant were
to submit his claim to the court again there would be no formal
obstacles to its examination.
In
sum, the Government invited the Court to find that there had been no
violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Principles deriving from the Court's
case law
The
Court observes that in its judgment in Kreuz v. Poland
(cited above, § 60) it dealt with the question whether
the requirement to pay substantial fees to civil courts in connection
with claims could be regarded as a restriction on the right of access
to a court.
In
this connection the Court held that the amount of the fees assessed
in the light of the particular circumstances of a given case,
including the applicant's ability to pay them, and the stage of the
proceedings at which that restriction had been imposed were factors
which were material in determining whether or not a person had
enjoyed his right of access and had “a ... hearing by [a]
tribunal”.
(b) Application of the above principles to
the present case
The
Court will now determine whether, in the particular circumstances of
the present case, the fee actually required constituted a restriction
that impaired the very essence of the applicant's right of access to
a court.
The
Court firstly notes that the case concerned the applicant's action
for protection of his personal rights and his claim for PLN 1,400,000
in compensation. The court fees which he was required to pay were
determined as a fraction of the value of the claim, namely the amount
of compensation sought.
The
Court observes that the applicant was first ordered to pay
PLN 29,100. Following a partial exemption he was ordered to pay
PLN 5,820 (see paragraphs 14 and 18 above, for the relevant
domestic law, see Kreuz v. Poland (cited above §§
23-33).
The Court reiterates that a
claim submitted to a tribunal for determination must be presumed to
be genuine and serious unless there are clear indications to the
contrary which might warrant the conclusion that the claim
is frivolous
or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation (see Rolf
Gustafson v. Sweden, judgment of 1
July 1997, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-IV, § 38). Even
assuming that the dispute in the present case was “genuine
and serious” within the meaning of the Court's case-law (see
Kaukonen v. Finland, no. 24738/94, Commission decision of
8 December 1997) the Court finds, in view of the facts of the
case, that the applicant's compensation claim appears grossly
exaggerated and unrealistic. Had the applicant claimed a more
reasonable amount the court fees would have been smaller.
In
addition the Court notes that despite the exaggerated amount of
compensation claimed by the applicant, the domestic authorities
nevertheless exempted him from the greater part of the court fees due
(see paragraphs 14 and 18 above).
For
the Court, applicants who deliberately inflate the value of their
claims for compensation cannot be expected to be exempted entirely
from the payment of court fees or from the requirement to contribute
in a reasonable amount to the costs of taking the action.
In
the circumstances, the Court considers that the amount of fees
required from the applicant in the present case cannot be considered
disproportionate.
The
Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 AND 13 OF
THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained of a violation of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 13
of the Convention.
The
Court finds that the facts of the case do not disclose any appearance
of a violation of the above-mentioned provisions. It follows that
these complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to
Article 35 § 4.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning lack of access
to a court admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 February 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President