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DAUTI v. ALBANIA - 19206/05 [2009] ECHR 196 (3 February 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/196.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 196
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF
DAUTI v. ALBANIA
(Application
no. 19206/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 February
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Dauti v. Albania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 January 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 19206/05) against the Republic
of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by an Albanian national, Mr Ramiz Dauti
(“the
applicant”), on 12 May 2005.
The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr G.
Terpo and Mr R. Islami, lawyers practising in Tirana and Diber,
Albania. The Albanian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ms S. Meneri.
The
applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the
Convention of a violation of his right of access to a court in order
to challenge decisions given by administrative bodies.
On
23 June 2005 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided
to give notice of the application to the Government. Under the
provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was decided
to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Tirana.
On
14 April 1992 the applicant suffered a serious accident at work and
was unable to continue working. There is no documented information
concerning the applicant's state of health from 1992 to 2001.
A. Procedure before the Medical Examination Commission
on Capacity for Work
The
applicant was admitted to hospital on an unspecified date. On 13
March 2001 he was released from hospital with a medical report
recommending that he apply for recognition of his incapacity to work
(fletë drejtimi për K.E.M.P.) and for the
corresponding benefits.
On
14 March 2001 the applicant applied to the District Medical
Examination Commission on Capacity for Work (Komisioni Mjekësor
i Caktimit të Aftësisë për Punë (K.M.C.A.P.
Dibër) – “the District Commission”)
seeking to have his degree of incapacity determined and to be awarded
benefits. By decision of 28 September 2001, the Commission recognised
the applicant's incapacity for work with effect from 14 April 1992.
However, it decided that he would be eligible for the corresponding
benefits only for the period from 16 March 2001 to 30 March
2002, and granted him Category 4 incapacity status on the grounds
that he was considered to have suffered an accident outside work.
On
1 October 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Medical
Examination Appeals Commission on Capacity for Work (K.M.C.A.P.
Epror –“the Appeals Commission”) contesting the
District Commission's decision in part. He argued that, in
considering that he had suffered an accident outside work, the
District Commission had erroneously assessed the circumstances of the
case. He claimed that he should have been granted Category 2
incapacity status instead of Category 4.
On
30 January 2003 the Appeals Commission revoked the District
Commission's decision in its entirety. It declared the applicant fit
for work and ineligible for incapacity benefits.
B. Judicial proceedings
1. Proceedings relating to official recognition of the accident
On
an unspecified date the applicant requested the Dibra District Court
to verify and recognise that the accident of 14 April 1992 had
occurred at his place of work.
On
30 May 2003, on the basis of witness statements and medical reports,
the Dibra District Court found that the applicant had suffered an
accident on 14 April 1992 during working hours. The judgment became
final and binding on 16 July 2003.
2. Proceedings concerning the lawfulness of the Appeals
Commission's decision
On
an unspecified date the applicant initiated civil proceedings with
the Tirana District Court to challenge the lawfulness of the Appeals
Commission's decision.
On
9 June 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant's action on
the grounds that, pursuant to section 35 of the Social Security Act,
the decisions of the Appeals Commission were final and binding and
not subject to scrutiny by the courts (see paragraph 24 below).
The
applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal. He claimed a violation of
his right of access to a court in order to challenge the fairness of
the proceedings before the Appeals Commission. In addition, the
applicant argued that by refusing to exercise jurisdiction in the
matter, the District Court had discriminated against him vis-à-vis
other claimants who, having challenged the unfairness of the
proceedings before the Appeals Commission, had obtained redress from
the courts (see paragraphs 34 and 35 below).
On
9 October 2003 the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's
decision, confirming that the outcome of the procedure before the
Appeals Commission was final and not subject to challenge before the
courts. In so far as the applicant's complaint that he had been
discriminated against was concerned, it found that the District Court
had based its decision on the law and not on precedents. Lastly, the
court disagreed with the applicant's argument about the alleged
incompetence of the Appeals Commission's members and found that their
professional abilities were satisfactory.
On
5 March 2004 the Supreme Court's Civil Bench dismissed an appeal by
the applicant.
On
an unspecified date the applicant appealed to the Constitutional
Court, challenging the lower courts' decisions. He claimed an
infringement of his right of access to a court in order to challenge
the Appeals Commission's decision before the domestic courts and
obtain redress for the alleged unfairness of the proceedings before
the Appeals Commission. Moreover, he contested the competence of the
Appeals Commission's members.
On
23 December 2004 the Constitutional Court upheld the lower courts'
decisions. The Constitutional Court did not address the applicant's
complaint about the lack of judicial control of the Appeals
Commission's decision. It pointed out that the Court of Appeal had
nevertheless ruled on the issue of the impartiality of the
Commission's members. It had concluded that they were appointed by
the Ministry of Health on the basis of their professional qualities,
qualifications and experience. Hence, the applicant's appeal was
unsubstantiated.
C. Recent developments
On
10 June 2005 the applicant was issued with a medical report
recommending that he apply for Category 2 incapacity status (fletë
drejtimi për K.E.M.P.). On 22 July 2005 the Dibër
District Commission found the applicant fully unfit for work with
effect from 16 March 2001 and awarded him incapacity benefits for the
period between 30 June 2005 and 30 June 2006. The Appeals Commission,
following an appeal by the applicant, modified the period so that it
ran from 20 November 2005 to 30 May 2006.
On
29 June 2006 the Appeals Commission extended the applicant's
incapacity status from 1 June 2006 to 1 January 2007.
By
a certificate of the District Commission of 21 June 2007, the
applicant's incapacity was extended for the period from 1 January
2007 to 1 January 2008.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The Social Security Act (Law no. 7703 of 11 May 1993, as amended
by Law no. 7932 of 1995, Laws nos. 8286 and 8392 of 1998, Law no.
8575 of 2000, Laws nos. 8776 and 8852 of 2001, Law no. 8889 of 2002,
Laws nos. 9058 and 9114 of 2003 and Law no. 9498 of 2006)
The
Social Security Act established the Medical
Commission on Capacity for Work, (KMCAP),
which determines claimants' incapacity for work. Section 35 of the
Act provides that “the [Commission's] decision shall indicate
the causes of incapacity for work, its starting date and the degree
of incapacity. A claimant may lodge an appeal with the Appeals
Commission against the District Commission's decision. The Appeals
Commission's decision as regards the assessment of incapacity for
work shall be final.”
Section
71 provides for the establishment of the Institute of Social Security
(“the ISS”) which governs and administers social security
in the country. The ISS comprises two main organs: the administrative
council and the director general. The administrative council is the
highest executive body and is composed of twelve members (six
representatives from the Council of Ministers – from the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Health,
the Ministry of Justice, the ISS and the Savings Bank –, three
representatives from employers' organisations and three
representatives from the trade unions). The director general is
appointed (zgjidhet)
by the administrative council.
Section
77 provides that the administrative council must submit to the
Council of Ministers, through the Ministry of Finance, an annual
financial report (income and expenditure) and a budget sheet for the
ISS.
Section
86 states that appeals against decisions on benefits may be lodged
with the regional directorates. Appeals against decisions of the
regional offices may be lodged with the headquarters of the ISS and
subsequently with the domestic courts.
1. Joint Regulation of 13 July 1995 of the ISS and the Ministry of
Health on the organisation, rights, duties and functioning of the
Medical Commission on Capacity for Work (KMCAP – “the
Commission”)
The
Joint Regulation supplements, amongst other provisions, section 35 of
the Social Security Act. The Commission is run by and reports to the
ISS. It operates at regional level (“the District Commissions”)
and at national level (“the Appeals Commission”).
The
District Commissions (KMCAP e
rajonit)
are composed of three or five
specialised medical doctors from the fields of cardiology, neurology,
psychiatry, pathology, etc., who possess at least five years'
experience, in addition to the ISS doctor. They are appointed for an
undefined period by the ISS regional directorates. The appointment is
endorsed by the head of the health unit under whose supervision the
appointed doctors work. Any change to the membership of one of the
District Commissions must be approved by the ISS. Members' work is
remunerated in proportion to their attendance. The District
Commission examines the claimant's request, the medical and financial
documents, the person's incapacity for work and the level of
incapacity. It decides on the cause of incapacity for work, the
starting time and duration and the possibility of
re-examination/review and physical and occupational training. The
Commission considers persons who are unable to work to be entitled to
full incapacity benefits if the level of incapacity is equal to or
exceeds 67%.
The
Appeals Commission (KMCAP epror)
deals with appeals against decisions of the District Commissions. The
Appeals Commission is composed of specialised medical doctors from
the fields of cardiology, neurology, psychiatry and pathology. The
membership is determined by the ISS and approved by the Ministry of
Health. Members are appointed for an undefined period of time. As a
rule of thumb, the Appeals Commission is chaired by the head of a
health unit. Members' work is remunerated in proportion to their
attendance. Decisions are final and binding.
The
joint regulation does not contain any provisions concerning the
dismissal or resignation of members of either the District
Commissions or the Appeals Commission.
B. Code of Civil Procedure
Articles
324-333 of the Code of Civil Procedure regulate the adjudication of
administrative disputes. Article 324 provides that a party may bring
an action before a court with a view to revoking or amending an
administrative decision. The party should argue that the decision is
unlawful and that his or her own interests and rights have been
violated directly or indirectly, individually or collectively. An
appeal may be lodged against a court decision with a higher court.
C. Code of Administrative Procedure
Articles
18 and 137 of the Code of Administrative Procedure sanction the
principle of judicial control over administrative decisions, provided
that all domestic administrative remedies have been exhausted.
D. Domestic practice
The
Tirana District Court, by decision no. 1522 of 30 April 2001, upheld
a claimant's civil action seeking annulment of the decisions of the
District Commission and the Appeals Commission, which had revoked the
claimant's incapacity for work after nine years of recognition (from
1991 to 2000). The court appointed an expert group to medically
examine the claimant and finally rejected the Appeals Commission's
decision.
Following
an appeal by the ISS, relying on section 35 of the Social Security
Act, the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's decision on 6
November 2001. The Court of Appeal circumvented the wording of
section 35 of the Social Security Act by relying on section 86 of the
Act.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that
he had been denied his right of access to a court in that the
domestic courts had failed to examine his complaint that the Appeals
Commission's decision should be declared null and void.
The
relevant parts of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provide:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal ...”
Admissibility
Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
Neither
the Government nor the applicant contested the applicability of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the instant case. It has not
been argued, nor is there anything to suggest, that this case
relating to the applicant's claim for disability benefits did not
concern a dispute (contestation) over a “right”
which could be said, on arguable grounds, to be recognised under
domestic law. In particular, it cannot be said that the applicant's
claim was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise lacking in foundation.
Nor
is it disputed, and the Court is satisfied, that the right in
question was “civil” in character in the autonomous sense
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that it
has previously determined that welfare benefits and rights to social
insurance are “civil rights” within the meaning of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which applies to proceedings in
relation thereto (see, for example, Salesi v. Italy, 26
February 1993, § 19, Series A no. 257 E).
The present case concerned the applicant's right to welfare benefits,
namely a disability allowance arising in connection with his
incapacity for work.
The
Court therefore concludes that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
applies in the instant case.
The
Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded. It
further finds that no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible
have been established and therefore declares it admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
The
applicant submitted that administrative decisions were subject to
judicial review in accordance with section 86 of the Social Security
Act and Article 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his view, the
domestic courts were also legally bound to accept his complaints on
the basis of previous domestic court rulings (see paragraphs 34 and
35 above).
As
regards the applicant's argument that the domestic courts had
previously reviewed Appeals Commission decisions, the Government
submitted that the applicant's case had been adequately and
reasonably examined by the Appeals Commission. In the Government's
view, the applicant's position differed from that of the claimant in
a previous domestic court ruling, in that the other claimant's
incapacity for work and the corresponding benefits had been revoked
after ten years of recognition.
The
Government contended that the applicant's claims had been examined by
the domestic courts. Hence, the Court of Appeal had found that the
composition of the Appeals Commission was in accordance with the law
and its members were appointed by the Ministry of Health. Moreover,
the Constitutional Court had found that the decision determining the
incapacity category of the applicant lay with the lower courts.
In
so far as the applicant's claim should be interpreted as relating to
the assessment of evidence, the Government maintained that Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention did not lay down any rules concerning the
admissibility of evidence. Such matters, including their assessment,
were primarily for the domestic courts.
2. The Court's assessment
Since
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has been found to be applicable,
it follows that the applicant was entitled to have his case heard by
“a tribunal” satisfying the conditions laid down in that
Article.
While
Article 6 § 1 embodies the “right to a court”, it
nevertheless does not oblige the Contracting States to submit
“contestations” (disputes) over “civil
rights and obligations” to a procedure conducted at each of its
stages before “tribunals” meeting the Article's various
requirements. Demands of flexibility and efficiency, which are fully
compatible with the protection of human rights, may justify the prior
intervention of administrative or professional bodies and, a
fortiori, of judicial bodies which do not satisfy the said
requirements in every respect. The “right to a court”
covers questions of fact just as much as questions of law (see Le
Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23
June 1981, § 51, Series A no. 43).
The
Court points out that under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention it
is necessary that decisions of administrative authorities which do
not themselves satisfy the requirements of that Article should be
subject to subsequent control by a “judicial body that has full
jurisdiction” (see, for example, Ortenberg v. Austria,
25 November 1994, § 31, Series A no. 295 B,
and Crişan v. Romania, no. 42930/98, § 24,
27 May 2003).
The
Court notes that at least in one instance, the domestic
courts, whose final decisions were not disputed by the Government,
reviewed the Appeals Commission's decision (see paragraphs 34 and 35
above). In the instant case, on the basis of domestic practice, the
applicant lodged appeals with the domestic courts, which rejected his
claims on the ground that the Appeals Commission's decision was final
and not subject to judicial control. Moreover, the Constitutional
Court failed to address the applicant's complaint about the lack of
judicial control of the Appeals Commission's decision (see paragraph
20 above).
The
Court is not convinced by the Government's argument that the
applicant's case was materially different from that of the other
claimant (see paragraph 42 above). The essence of the applicant's
complaints related to the nullity of the Appeals Commission's
decision, just as much as did that of the other claimant. The Court
concludes that the domestic courts could have acted in the same way
in the present case and examined “questions of fact just as
much as questions of law”.
It
is therefore necessary to determine whether the Appeals Commission
constituted an “independent and impartial tribunal”
within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
In
order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as
“independent”, regard must be had, inter alia, to
the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office,
the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the
question whether the body presents an appearance of independence
(see, amongst others, Morris v. the United Kingdom,
no. 38784/97, § 58, ECHR 2002 I).
The Court notes that the Appeals Commission is wholly composed of
medical practitioners, appointed by the ISS and ultimately approved
by the Ministry of Health, under whose authority and supervision the
doctors work. No legally qualified or judicial members sit on the
Appeals Commission (see, by contrast, Le Compte, Van
Leuven and De Meyere, cited above, § 58.)
The law and the domestic regulations contain no rules governing the
members' term of office, their removal, resignation or any guarantee
for their irremovability. The statutory rules do not provide for the
possibility of an oath to be taken by its members. It appears that
they can be removed from office at any time, at the whim of the ISS
and the Ministry of Health, which exercise unfettered discretion. The
position of the Appeals Commission members is therefore open to
external pressures. Such a situation undermines its appearance of
independence.
In
the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Appeals
Commission cannot be regarded as an “independent and impartial
tribunal” as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Having
regard to the fact that the Appeals Commission does not constitute an
“independent and impartial tribunal” and that its
decisions, according to the law in force at the material time, could
not be challenged before a domestic court, the Court concludes that
there has been a breach of the applicant's right of access to a court
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that there was no effective remedy by which to
challenge the Appeals Commission's decision before the domestic
courts. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded. It
further finds that no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible
have been established and therefore declares it admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that in so far as the Convention right asserted by
the applicant is a “civil right”, Article 6 § 1 is
deemed to constitute a lex specialis in relation to Article
13. Its safeguards are stricter than, and absorb, those of Article 13
(see Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, § 105,
ECHR 2006 ...).
The
Court thus considers that it is not necessary to examine the
applicant's complaint under the less stringent requirements of
Article 13.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in pecuniary damage and
EUR
500,000 in non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested the applicant's claims. They submitted that in
the event that the Court should decide to award pecuniary damage to
the applicant, it should do so for the period between 16 March 2001
and 30 March 2002 only. They stressed that the 2003, 2004 and
2005 decisions recognising the applicant's invalidity status had not
been challenged. The Government contended that the applicant's claim
for non-pecuniary damage was excessive.
The
Court has found a violation of the applicant's right of access to a
court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention with a view to
challenging the Appeals Commission's decision which examined the
applicant's “civil rights”. It is not for the Court to
speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings would have been
if they had been in conformity with the requirements of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention. It consequently makes no award for pecuniary
damage.
The
Court accepts that the applicant must have been caused a certain
amount of stress and frustration as a result of the denial of his
right of access to a court. Making its assessment on an equitable
basis, it awards the applicant an amount of EUR 6,000 for
non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant claimed EUR 20,000 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and those incurred before the Court.
The
Government contested the applicant's claim.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum (see, for example, Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC],
no. 23118/93, § 62, ECHR 1999-VIII).
In
the present case, regard being had to the lack of supporting
documents, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the
domestic proceedings and the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that it is not necessary to examine the
applicant's complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 6,000 (six
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 February 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President