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FLUX v. MOLDOVA (no. 7) - 25367/05 [2009] ECHR 1931 (24 November 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1931.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1931
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF
FLUX v. MOLDOVA (no. 7)
(Application
no. 25367/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24
November 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Flux v. Moldova (no. 7),
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Ján
Šikuta,
Mihai
Poalelungi,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and
Fatoş Aracı,
Deputy Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 November 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 25367/05) against the Republic
of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by Flux, a newspaper registered in Moldova (“the
applicant newspaper”), on 28 June 2005.
The
applicant newspaper was represented by Mr V. Gribincea of Lawyers for
Human Rights, a non-governmental organisation based in Chişinău,
and Mr L. Cazan, a lawyer practising in Chişinău. The
Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr V. Grosu.
The
applicant newspaper alleged, in particular, that its right to freedom
of expression had been breached as a result of a sanction imposed on
it by the domestic courts following the publication of an article.
The
application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court. On
7 February 2007 the President of the Section decided to
communicate the application to the Government. Under the provisions
of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention it was decided to examine
the merits of the application at the same time
as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant
newspaper, may be summarised as follows.
In early March 2004 a warehouse belonging to the
Parliament in Chişinău was converted into four apartments.
On 18 March 2004 Mr Vlad Cubreacov, Member of Parliament,
asked the Parliament leadership to allow him access to information on
whether the manner in which deputies from the four parliaments
elected since the date of Moldova's independence had been provided
with accommodation from public money had been correct. He did not
obtain access to that information.
On 9 April 2004 the applicant newspaper published an
article entitled “Four more communists have obtained housing on
our money”. The article informed readers about the four
apartments built in the former Parliament warehouse. The journalists
visited the apartments and saw workers carrying out final repairs in
them. They were almost ready since the pipes and water meters had
already been installed. The author added that:
“According to certain sources in Parliament, who
have asked to remain anonymous, the future owners of the relevant
apartments include V.S., the president of the communist faction in
Parliament, C.G., head of the Parliament apparatus, and M.R., the
president of Floreşti county.”
The
article went on to state that the newspaper had tried to verify this
information by telephoning V.S. on his mobile phone and at work but
could not find him, his secretary answering that he was busy.
Attempts to contact the Speaker of Parliament or her adviser, as well
as the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, had also been unsuccessful. Mr
Ş. Secăreanu, Member of
Parliament, informed the newspaper that he had been told by C.G. and
M.C., another deputy speaker in Parliament, that Parliament had paid
for the apartments.
The article went on to recount further efforts to
discover information about the source of the funding for the four new
apartments from other State officials, including C.G., none of whom
could be contacted. The newspaper concluded that none of the State
officials had given it the opportunity to verify the information
regarding the future owners of the apartments. It also mentioned that
three years earlier E.O., a speaker of parliament and member of the
then ruling party had obtained, in a similar manner, an apartment
measuring 200 square metres in the same former warehouse. The article
then described Mr Secăreanu's efforts
to obtain information on the expenditure of Parliament and the
Presidency from the President of the Court of Accounts, information
which had been made secret by the latter, as well as his efforts to
obtain that information from the Parliament leadership. The article
concluded by referring to Mr Cubreacov's request of 18 March
2004 (see paragraph 6 above) and his attempt in 2002 to obtain
similar information. Two photographs of the exterior and the interior
of the apartments were inserted into the text of the article.
On
5 May 2004 V.S. initiated court proceedings against the applicant
newspaper, claiming that he had been defamed by the article and
notably by the phrase cited above (see paragraph 7 above).
The
applicant newspaper submitted to the first-instance court that it had
published the opinions of third parties on an issue of major public
interest, opinions to which it had not subscribed. It also referred
to the journalist's unsuccessful attempts to verify the information
by telephoning V.S. and other officials, and the refusal of the
Parliament leadership to make public information as to who owned the
apartments. In addition, the plaintiff had proved his bad faith by
failing, at least once, to appear before the court or delegate a
representative, and by failing to ask the applicant newspaper to
publish a correction or reply before initiating court proceedings.
The applicant newspaper finally submitted that V.S. had initiated 15
defamation suits against it, showing little tolerance of criticism
despite his role as a prominent politician.
On
7 June 2004 the Buiucani District Court accepted V.S.'s claims in
full, awarding him 30,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (2,046 euros (EUR) at
the time), and ordered the applicant newspaper to publish an apology.
The court found that the relevant phrase (see paragraph 7 above) was
defamatory of V.S. and that the applicant newspaper had not submitted
any evidence to prove that the information published about V.S. was
true.
The
applicant newspaper appealed, relying on arguments similar to those
formulated earlier. It added that the first-instance court had
rejected its arguments without giving any specific reason, which had
deprived the applicant newspaper of the right to lodge an effective
appeal against the judgment. It also argued that the court had
awarded a significant amount of compensation despite V.S.'s failure
to prove the nature and extent of the damage caused to him, the court
not having heard V.S. or his representative.
At
the same time as it lodged its appeal, the applicant newspaper also
challenged Judge C., who was in charge of the case at the Chişinău
Court of Appeal. The grounds for the challenge were that Judge C. had
already decided three cases between the same parties and had found in
favour of V.S. each time, without giving any relevant reasons. He had
also examined other defamation cases brought by politicians or public
figures against the applicant newspaper, with the same outcome.
Moreover, several of those judgments had subsequently been quashed or
amended by the Supreme Court of Justice. Finally, it claimed that
Judge C. was a relative of a member of the Communist faction in
Parliament and that he had been appointed to his position by the
President of Moldova, who was also the leader of the Communist Party
of Moldova.
Referring
to the lack of proof that Judge C. was a relative of a Member of
Parliament, as claimed by the applicant newspaper, a judge of the
Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the applicant newspaper's
challenge to Judge C.
On
16 September 2004 the Chişinău Court of Appeal, presided by
Judge C., quashed the first-instance court's judgment in the part
concerning the award made, reducing it to MDL 15,000 to reflect the
real level of harm caused to V.S. The court found that the applicant
newspaper had published information which it could not prove to be
true and which was defamatory of V.S.
In
an appeal in cassation against both the decision rejecting its
challenge to Judge C. and the judgment on the merits, the applicant
newspaper repeated the arguments it had raised before the two lower
courts. It added that when its challenge to Judge C. had been
rejected, only one of three grounds invoked had been examined by the
Judge at the Chişinău Court of Appeal. The applicant
newspaper asked for the decision rejecting its challenge to Judge C.
to be quashed since it had proved that its doubts about his
impartiality were reasonably entertained.
On
9 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Justice found that the lower courts
had correctly determined the defamatory and untrue nature of the
statements made about V.S. but reduced the award of compensation to
MDL 5,000 (EUR 300).
The
applicant newspaper submitted to the Court a record of the domestic
court hearings at the first two levels of jurisdiction, which
allegedly showed that the courts had not asked any questions bearing
on the substance of the case, had limited themselves to taking the
mandatory procedural steps and had not attempted to clarify or verify
any of the arguments or evidence submitted by the applicant
newspaper.
According
to the applicant newspaper, C.G., one of the persons mentioned in the
paragraph cited above, is currently living in one of the apartments
discussed in the article. The Government did not comment.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The relevant part of Article 16 of the Civil Code
reads as follows:
“(1) Every person has the right to the respect for
his or her honour, dignity and professional reputation.
(2) Every person has the right to request the
disclaiming of information which affects his or her honour, dignity
and professional reputation if the person circulating such
information cannot prove that it corresponds to reality.
.. (4) Where information which affects a person's
honour, dignity and professional reputation is circulated in a mass
medium, the court shall order it to publish a disclaimer in the same
column, page, programme or series of programmes, within a maximum of
15 days of the date of entry into force of the court judgment.
... (7) A person whose rights and lawful interests have
been violated by a publication in a mass medium has the right to
publish a reply in the medium in question, at the latter's expense.
(8) Every person about whom information has been
published violating his or her honour, dignity and professional
reputation has the right to request compensation for pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage in addition to the publication of a disclaimer.”
Article 18 of the Enforcement Code of 3 March 2005
reads as follows:
“Article 18. Period of submission of enforcement
warrants.
1. A court judgment can be submitted for enforcement
within three years from the date when the judgment became final, if
the law does not provide otherwise. ...”
THE LAW
The
applicant newspaper complained under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention that Judge C's examination of its appeal lacked
impartiality and that the courts had given insufficient reasons for
their judgments. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a]
... tribunal ...”
The
applicant newspaper also complained under Article 10 of the
Convention that its right to freedom of expression had been violated.
Article
10 reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
I. ADMISSIBILITY
The
Court notes that in its initial application the applicant newspaper
had submitted a complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
However, in its observations on the admissibility and merits it asked
the Court not to proceed with the examination of that complaint. In a
letter dated 3 March 2008 the applicant company asked the Court to
examine that complaint. That submission, which was made after the
parties had exchanged their observations on the case, was not
accepted to the file as having been unsolicited. The Court therefore
will not examine that complaint.
The
Court considers that the applicant newspaper's complaint under
Article 10 of the Convention raises questions of fact and law
which are sufficiently serious that their determination should depend
on an examination of the merits, and that no grounds for declaring it
inadmissible have been established. The Court therefore declares this
part of the application admissible. In accordance with its decision
to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention (see
paragraph 4 above), the Court will immediately consider the merits of
this complaint.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
A. The arguments of the parties
1. The applicant newspaper
The applicant newspaper complained of a violation of
its right to freedom of expression. It considered that there had been
an interference with its right, but conceded that it had been in
accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting
the rights of others.
The
applicant newspaper relied on the Court's case-law concerning the
special protection to be afforded to the press, and the wider limits
of acceptable criticism to which politicians knowingly submit
themselves. It also noted the public-interest nature of the matter
discussed in the impugned article, justifying a higher level of
Article 10 protection. The applicant newspaper had acted in
accordance with the rules governing journalists' ethics since it had
published the material in good faith and had not focused on V.S. in
order to victimise him specifically. Moreover, the applicant
newspaper's source was credible, as evidenced by the fact that one of
the four persons mentioned in the article (C.G.) still lives in one
of the four apartments. A reasonable investigation into the matter
had been carried out before the publication of the article, and this
was not denied by anyone during the court proceedings. The applicant
newspaper's own attempts to verify the information, as well as those
of two different Members of Parliament, had been unsuccessful. This
meant that using other avenues, such as lodging a request under the
Law on access to information, was unlikely to succeed. Such a measure
would in any event take too long, in view of the perishable nature of
the information concerned.
The
applicant newspaper also considered that the wording of its article
had been accurate and moderate. No information about the private life
of V.S. had been discussed, and the information about allegations of
his use of public funds had not been presented to the reader as an
established fact. Moreover, the press was allowed a certain degree of
exaggeration. The domestic courts had not analysed any of the
above-mentioned elements in their judgments. They apparently simply
insisted on the strict application of Article 16 § 2 of the
Civil Code (see paragraph 21 above): that the applicant newspaper had
to prove the truth of what they had published. The law was thus so
inflexible as to leave the courts no choice but to adopt judgments
contrary to Article 10 of the Convention.
2. The Government
The Government conceded that there had been
interference with the applicant newspaper's freedom of expression but
submitted that it had been provided for by law (Article 16 of the
Civil Code), had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the
reputation of others and had been “necessary in a democratic
society”.
The
authorities enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation in adopting
their decisions and the courts had adopted reasoned decisions in
which they had taken account of the two competing values - freedom of
expression and protection of reputation - and had found that there
had been a “pressing social need” to impose the fine on
the applicant newspaper. The interference had thus been proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued. In addition, while the applicant
newspaper claimed that it had unsuccessfully tried to contact V.S.,
it had failed to lodge a request under the Law on access to
information.
Finally,
considering the applicant newspaper's financial status and the fact
that it was a national publication, the fine which it had to pay was
not excessive.
B. The Court's assessment
It
is common ground between the parties, and the Court agrees, that the
decisions of the domestic courts and the award of damages made
against the applicant newspaper amounted to “interference by
[a] public authority” with the applicant newspaper's right to
freedom of expression under the first paragraph of Article 10.
Such interference will entail a violation of Article 10 unless
it is “prescribed by law”, has an aim or aims that are
legitimate under paragraph 2 of the Article and is “necessary
in a democratic society” to achieve such aim or aims.
1. “Prescribed by law”
The
Court notes that the interference complained of had a legal basis,
namely Article 16 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 21 above). The
Court considers that this provision is both accessible and
foreseeable in its application. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
in this case the interference was “prescribed by law”
within the meaning of Article 10 § 2.
2. “Legitimate aim”
It
is not disputed by the parties, and the Court agrees, that the
interference served the legitimate aim of protecting V.S.'s
reputation. It therefore remains to be examined whether the
interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.
3. “Necessary in a democratic society”
The
relevant general principles have been summarised in Busuioc
v. Moldova (no. 61513/00, §§ 56-62, 21
December 2004); Timpul Info-Magazin and Anghel v. Moldova,
no. 42864/05, §§ 29-30, 27 November 2007; and Flux
v. Moldova (no. 6), no. 22824/04, § 24-26, 29 July 2008).
The
Court notes that in the present case the article was written by a
journalist and stresses the pre-eminent role of the press in a
democratic society in imparting ideas and expressing opinions on
political matters and other matters of public interest (see Sunday
Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 65,
Series A no. 30). Particularly strong reasons must be
provided for any measure affecting this role of the press and
limiting access to information which the public has the right to
receive (see, amongst many authorities, Oberschlick v. Austria
(no. 1), 23 May 1991, § 58, Series A
no. 204).
The
plaintiff in the domestic proceedings was a politician and president
of the Communist faction in Parliament at the time of the events. As
such, he “inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close
scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the
public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of
tolerance” (see Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986,
§ 42, Series A no. 103). The domestic courts
would have had to find a particularly “pressing social need”
to sanction the newspaper in such circumstances. The Court observes
that the article in question was aimed at criticising Parliament for
alleged lack of transparency, rather than at disparaging V.S.
specifically. The latter's name appeared twice in the entire article.
While not focusing on any particular person, the article mentioned
the names of all the alleged beneficiaries of the four apartments and
described the attempts to verify the information with some of them,
including V.S.
The
Court also notes that the article published by the applicant
newspaper dealt with the issue of whether the Parliament leadership
had spent public money in a non-transparent manner. This was
therefore a matter of genuine public interest, which is also to be
given additional protection under Article 10 of the Convention.
The
Court considers that the expression relied on by the domestic courts
in sanctioning the applicant newspaper (see paragraph 7 above) could
be considered a statement of fact, or at least as implying that four
members of the Communist party, including V.S., were to obtain the
four apartments in question. It reiterates that, in accordance with
its case-law, the existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the
truth of value-judgments is not susceptible of proof (see Jerusalem
v. Austria, no. 26958/95, § 42, ECHR
2001 II). However, it also reiterates that, as part of their
role of “public watchdog”, the media's reporting on
“'stories' or 'rumours' – emanating from persons other
than the applicant – or 'public opinion'” is to be
protected where they are not completely without foundation (see
Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 65,
Series A no. 239, and Timpul Info-Magazin and Anghel,
cited above, § 36).
In
situations such as this, where on the one hand a statement of fact is
made and insufficient evidence is adduced to prove it, and on the
other the journalist is discussing an issue of genuine public
interest, verifying whether the journalist acted professionally and
in good faith becomes paramount (see Flux v. Moldova (no. 6),
cited above, § 26 et seq.).
The Court notes that the article included a number of
factual statements, none of which was challenged as untrue in court.
These included the fact that four apartments had been built and were
in their final phase of renovation in a former Parliament warehouse,
that the Speaker of Parliament had already obtained an apartment
there, and that information about the allocation of the apartments to
Members of Parliament, together with other information concerning the
financial accountability of Parliament, had been withheld by the
Court of Accounts and the Parliament leadership. Even Members of
Parliament could not obtain that information (see paragraphs 6-9
above). These uncontested facts gave a certain degree of credibility
to the source in Parliament who had contacted the journalist.
Moreover,
the applicant newspaper did not just publish what the source had told
it, but verified some of the facts above by actually visiting the
apartments in question and establishing that they were indeed being
prepared for allocation. Furthermore, it attempted to obtain the
opinion of some of those involved. It attempted to contact two of the
four persons to whom the apartments had allegedly been allocated, as
well as a number of Parliament officials, in order to verify the
facts.
The
Court considers that the applicant newspaper acted in a professional
manner and attempted in good faith to verify its facts as far as was
reasonably possible. The fact that news is a perishable commodity
(see Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26
November 1991, § 60, Series A no. 216) made unsuitable any
request for access to information, as suggested by the Government,
since it would have taken too long to obtain an answer. Moreover, it
is difficult to see how a request from a newspaper could have
succeeded where requests made by Members of Parliament had failed
(see paragraph 9 above). In addition, the lack of any official
information on the matter at issue, despite the applicant newspaper's
attempts to obtain such details, plus the other uncontested facts
raising legitimate doubts as to the legitimacy of the distribution of
the apartments (see paragraphs 6-9 and 42 above), could reasonably
have prompted the journalist to report on anything that was
available, including unconfirmed rumours (see Timpul Info-Magazin
and Anghel, cited above, § 36). Significantly, the
applicant newspaper clearly informed its readers in the article
itself that it had been unable to verify the truth of the information
received, and thus avoided presenting the rumours on which it was
reporting as established facts.
The present case must therefore be distinguished from Flux v.
Moldova (no. 6), cited above, in which the same newspaper, while
unable to prove the facts on which it had reported, had not even
attempted to verify them or to give those concerned an opportunity to
comment or reply (see also Rumyana Ivanova v. Bulgaria,
no. 36207/03, §§ 55-71, 14 February 2008).
In view of the above and taking into account the applicant
newspaper's good faith in reporting on an issue of genuine public
interest, the relevant factual background and the lack of any details
on how public money was spent by Parliament, and despite the
applicant newspaper's inability to prove some of the facts which it
had reported, the Court considers that the interference with the
applicant newspaper's right to freedom of expression was not
“necessary in a democratic society”.
There
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary damage
The applicant claimed EUR 312.25 for pecuniary damage,
consisting of the amount of damages it had to pay V.S. in accordance
with the domestic courts' judgments, and the court fees paid.
The Government submitted that no compensation was due
since the applicant newspaper's Convention rights had not been
breached. In any event, no evidence was submitted to the Court that
the sum awarded to V.S. had actually been paid.
The Court considers that the sum claimed by the
applicant newspaper is a direct causal effect of the violation of
Article 10 which it has established. However, it also notes that the
applicant newspaper would only have had to pay that amount if V.S.
had submitted the warrant for enforcement. Since the Court has no
information to that effect, it agrees with the Government that the
evidence submitted is an insufficient ground for an award. It is also
noted that if an enforcement warrant is not submitted within three
years from the date of the award, it can only be enforced thereafter
if the debtor wishes to pay (see paragraph 22 above). It follows that
if the enforcement warrant has still not been submitted, the 2005
warrant can no longer be submitted for enforcement. Therefore, the
applicant newspaper's claim for EUR 300 to cover the damages awarded
to V.S. must be rejected.
At the same time, the court fees (EUR 12.25) had
presumably been paid, since the courts would not have proceeded with
the examination of the case had that not been so. The Court thus
awards EUR 12.25 in this respect.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
The applicant newspaper claimed EUR 5,000 in
compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused. It referred to the lack
of any justification for the award made in V.S.'s favour and the
damage to its reputation as a result of the judgment.
The
Government considered that the applicant newspaper's claims were
unsubstantiated and in any event excessive.
Making
an overall assessment on an equitable basis and taking into account
its case-law in similar cases, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 3,000 (see Savitchi v. Moldova, no. 11039/02, §
64, 11 October 2005, and Flux v. Moldova (no. 3), no.
32558/03, § 32, 12 June 2007).
C. Costs and expenses
The
applicant newspaper claimed EUR 2,199.75 for costs and expenses
incurred before the Court. He submitted a detailed time-sheet and a
contract according to which the lawyer had worked 29.33 hours at an
hourly rate of EUR 75. The fee charged was in any event half the
maximum recommended by the Moldovan Bar Association for
representation before international courts.
The
Government disagreed with the amount claimed and argued that the case
was not very complex in comparison with similar cases, such as
previous applications lodged by the same applicant newspaper.
In
the present case, regard being had to the itemised list submitted and
the complexity of the case, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,800
for costs and expenses.
D. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into Moldovan lei at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
12.25 (twelve euros and twenty-five cents), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR
1,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 November 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
