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HORSTI v. FINLAND - 39509/08 [2009] ECHR 1866 (10 November 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1866.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1866
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF HORSTI v. FINLAND
(Application
no. 39509/08)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10
November 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Horsti v. Finland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Giovanni Bonello,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić, judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 October 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 39509/08) against the
Republic of Finland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Finnish national, Mr Anssi
Horsti (“the applicant”), on 11 August 2008.
The
Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
On
5 March 2009 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government as concerned the length of the
proceedings. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and
merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Tallinn.
The
first set of proceedings
The
applicant's father died in 1989. On 16 March 2001 a lawyer carried
out the distribution of the estate, the applicant and his brother
being its beneficiaries.
On
17 September 2001 the applicant lodged a civil action against his
brother with the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus,
tingsrätt) contesting the distribution.
On
8 October 2001 the court requested the applicant to supplement his
application for a summons to be issued. It urged the applicant to
give further particulars of his claims and the circumstances on which
they were based and to indicate the evidence that he wished to
present and what each piece of evidence was intended to prove, as
required by Chapter 5, Article 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure
(oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken, 4/1734
with later amendments). The court further referred to Chapter 5,
Article 6 of the Code, noting that in case of failure to comply with
the request, the court could declare the action inadmissible or
dismiss it.
The
applicant filed two submissions, dated 22 October 2001 and
2 April 2002.
On
7 March 2003 the court sent the applicant another request, finding
his submissions to be so incomplete and unclear that the defendant
would not be able to respond to his action in an appropriate manner.
The
applicant filed two submissions, dated 31 March and 17 April 2003.
On
23 July 2003 the defendant filed with the court his response to the
action. He requested that it be declared inadmissible or dismissed
stating, inter alia, that he was unable to respond to the
claims due to the obscurity of the applicant's submissions.
On
8 August 2003 the court requested the applicant to submit a detailed
statement in reply to the defendant's pleading. It further urged the
applicant to consider employing the services of a lawyer.
The
applicant filed five submissions between 18 August and
7 September 2003.
On
9 September 2003 the District Court ruled that the applicant's action
was inadmissible as his submissions to the court were so incomplete
that they could not form a basis for the proceedings. The court
referred to Chapter 5, Article 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure in
that connection.
The
applicant appealed against the decision to the Helsinki Court of
Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). In its decision of 1 July
2004 the appellate court stated, inter alia, that the
applicant's application for a summons and his supplementary
submissions thereto were confused in several parts and difficult to
understand. However, it could be deduced from his submissions that
his claims concerned an alleged advance on the inheritance received
by his brother and compensation due to the applicant for his own work
in the interests of the estate. The court found that the applicant
had sufficiently explained those circumstances which formed the
grounds for his action and that he had even submitted monetary claims
with accompanying explanations. The court concluded that the District
Court should not have ruled the action inadmissible and remitted the
case to that court. It ordered the District Court to open the
examination of the case of its own motion after one month had elapsed
from the date when the Court of Appeal's decision had gained legal
force.
On
3 February 2005 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta
domstolen) refused the defendant leave to appeal and the above
decision became legally binding.
On
5 May 2006 the Helsinki District Court dismissed the applicant's
action mainly for lack of evidence in support of his claims.
On
19 June 2007 the Helsinki Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
appeal endorsing the lower court's reasoning for the most part.
On
26 February 2008 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
The
second set of proceedings
The
applicant's mother died in 1999. The distribution of the estate, of
which the applicant and his brother were the beneficiaries, was
carried out by a lawyer on 27 December 2001.
On
11 January 2002 the applicant lodged a civil action against his
brother and the lawyer with the Helsinki District Court contesting
the distribution. On 2 April 2002 he filed another submission
regarding the same issue.
On
7 March 2003 the court ordered the applicant to supplement his
application for a summons to be issued much in the same manner as in
the two requests concerning the applicant's first action.
The
applicant filed three submissions between 19 March and 17 April 2003.
The
defendants submitted their responses to the court on 23 and
28 July 2003. They both requested that the action be
declared inadmissible or dismissed stating, inter alia, that
they were unable to respond to the subject matter due to the
obscurity of the applicant's submissions.
On
8 August 2003 the court requested the applicant to submit a detailed
statement in response to those pleadings.
The
applicant filed three submissions between 18 August and 7 September
2003.
On
9 September 2003 the District Court ruled that the applicant's action
was inadmissible on similar grounds as in the case concerning his
father's estate.
The
applicant appealed against the inadmissibility decision to the
Helsinki Court of Appeal as regarded the claims against his brother.
As to the lawyer, his appeal only concerned the costs and expenses
incurred in the lower court proceedings. On 1 July 2004 the appellate
court found that the applicant's action had not been so incomplete as
to allow the District Court to declare it inadmissible. This case was
also remitted to the District Court for examination on the merits.
On
3 February 2005 the Supreme Court refused the applicant's brother
leave to appeal and the Court of Appeal's decision concerning
remittal became legally binding.
On
5 May 2006 the Helsinki District Court dismissed the applicant's
action mainly for lack of evidence in support of his claims.
On
19 June 2007 the Helsinki Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's
appeal endorsing the lower court's reasoning for the most part.
On
26 February 2008 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the two sets of proceedings
had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
As
regards the first set of proceedings, the period to be taken into
consideration began on 17 September 2001 and ended on 26 February
2008. It thus lasted six years, five months and eleven days for three
levels of jurisdiction. As to the second set of proceedings the
period to be taken into consideration began on 11 January 2002 and
ended on 26 February 2008. It thus lasted six years, one month and
sixteen days for three levels of jurisdiction. Both cases passed
through each level twice.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Government argued that the applicant had been responsible for the
length of both sets of proceedings because he had not employed the
services of a lawyer and he lacked legal skills. He had made a
considerable number of confused submissions to the courts, which
rendered the cases complex.
The
applicant contested those arguments. Owing to previous negative
experiences, he did not have confidence in the services provided by
lawyers.
In
the light of the facts of the case, the Court can accept that the
proceedings were made more complex by the lack of clarity and
precision in the applicant's submissions. However, the Court does not
find that the applicant's conduct alone contributed to the prolonged
length of the proceedings. In this connection, the Court notes that
the use of an advocate in civil proceedings is not obligatory under
the Finnish law, and it is therefore possible for any legally
competent person to bring a civil action and pursue his or her own
case before the court. Further, the Court notes that there appear to
have been certain periods of inactivity while the cases were pending
before the District Court. In this respect the Court observes the
period of some eleven months which elapsed before the District Court
between the applicant's submissions of 2 April 2002 and the court's
requests of 7 March 2003 for clarification of his claims, as well as
the time taken by that court, one year and three months, to deliver
its judgment after the appellate court's decision to remit the case
had gained legal force.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of both sets of proceedings was
excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time”
requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 in respect of
both sets of proceedings.
II. REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION
The
applicant also complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the
courts had a preconceived idea of the outcome of the two sets of
proceedings and thus avoided relevant issues.
The
Court finds that, in essence, this complaint concerns the assessment
of evidence, which is a task of the national courts. Having regard to
its subsidiary role in that respect, the Court rejects this complaint
as manifestly ill-founded in accordance with Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
The
applicant further complained that the outcome of the proceedings
violated his rights under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
The
Court notes that Article 8 of the Convention guarantees the right to
respect for private and family life. The case file does not disclose
any appearance of a violation by the State under that Article. As to
protection of property, guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention, the Court observes that the impugned civil
proceedings involved a dispute between private individuals. The mere
fact that the judicial authorities provided a forum for the
determination of such a dispute, in which the applicant was
unsuccessful, does not of itself amount to an interference by the
State of the right invoked. It follows that this complaint must also
be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 150,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested the claim. As to pecuniary damage they
considered the claim unsubstantiated. In respect of non-pecuniary
damage, the Government submitted that any compensation should not
exceed EUR 3,000.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, having regard to the circumstances of the case and
ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 1,000 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 14,790.58 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the domestic courts and an unspecified amount for
those incurred before the Court.
The
Government contested these claims. In their view, the amount claimed
in respect of costs and expenses before the domestic courts did not
relate to the complaint communicated to the Government. They further
considered the applicant's claim for costs and expenses before the
Court unsubstantiated.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings
and considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was not
represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 100 under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the two sets of proceedings admissible and the remainder of
the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of both sets of proceedings;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i)
EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,
in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii)
EUR 100 (one hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 November 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
