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Cite as: [2009] ECHR 1731
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THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.
76657/01
by Silva Marija LAČEN
against Slovenia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 6 October 2009 as a Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet Fura,
Boštjan M.
Zupančič,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Egbert
Myjer,
Luis López Guerra,
Ann Power,
judges,
and Stanley Naismith,
Deputy Section
Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 September 2001,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having regard to the additional observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, both requested by the President of the Chamber,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Silva Marija Lačen, is a Slovenian national who was born in 1944 and lives in Ptuj. She was represented before the Court by Mr B. Resnik and Mr T. Alič, lawyers practising in Ptuj. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr L. Bembič, State Attorney-General.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. On 6 December 1993 the applicant, a teacher, was injured at work while accompanying a group of schoolchildren on a skiing excursion to the Pohorje mountain plateau.
2. On 27 June 1994 she submitted a claim to the Z.M. insurance company (“the insurance company”), with which her employer had taken out liability insurance, for payment of compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The insurance company refused the payment.
3. On 8 December 1994 the applicant instituted compensation proceedings in the Maribor Basic Court, Ptuj Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Mariboru, Enota na Ptuju), claiming a total amount of 4,700,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT – approximately 55,230 euros (EUR)) for the non-pecuniary damage sustained, and default interest with effect from the date of the judgment.
4. On 1 January 1995 the Ptuj District Court (OkroZno sodišče na Ptuju) gained jurisdiction in the present case further to the reform of the Slovenian judicial system.
5. On 6 June 1995 a hearing was held in the absence of the defendant, who had been properly summoned, and the applicant gave evidence. At the hearing the applicant reduced the amount of her claim to SIT 2,160,000 (approximately 25,380 EUR) since the insurance did not provide for a higher cover.
6. On 5 September 1995 the first-instance court upheld the applicant’s reduced claim in the amount of SIT 2,160,000. It also awarded the applicant default interest with the effect from the date of its judgment. The insurance company appealed.
7. On 17 May 1996 the Maribor Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Mariboru) upheld the appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination.
8. On 6 February 1997 the court held a hearing, at which the applicant modified her claim and requested the payment of default interest with effect from the day the damage had occurred, more precisely from 12 July 1994, the date of the expiry of the deadline within which the applicant considered that the insurance company was required to fulfil its obligations under the insurance contract.
9. On 24 April 1997 the court allowed the claim in the amount of SIT 2,160,000 for non-pecuniary damage and default interest from the day of the judgment, but rejected the part of the claim concerning the payment of default interest from 12 July 1994 to 24 April 1997. Both parties appealed.
10. On 3 April 1998 the second-instance court dismissed both appeals. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court.
11. On 31 March 1999 the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and awarded the applicant default interest also for the period from 5 September 1995 until 24 April 1997, that is, with effect from the date on which the first-instance court had delivered its first judgment in the case. However, it rejected the claim for default interest from 12 July 1994 to 5 September 1995.
In this connection it referred to well-established jurisprudence, which in the case of compensation for non-pecuniary damage did not allow default interest to be calculated from the date on which the damage had occurred, but only from the date of the first-instance court judgment. The court also referred to the Statutory Default and Basic Interest Rate Act, which was in force at the material time and which, in the opinion of the court, formed the current legal basis for this practice. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recapitulated the reasons for adopting such an approach. It argued that it had been adopted since 1987 owing to the unstable economic situation in the country and the high inflation rate and monetary depreciation in particular. In order to preserve the real value of a pecuniary obligation, default interest had also included interest for adjustment of a debt. However, since in the case of claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage the preservation of the real value of the debt had already been ensured by determining the amount of compensation only on the date of the judgment, the compensation due to the applicant would have been adjusted twice if she were also awarded default interest for this period of time, which in the opinion of the court was unacceptable. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the current economic circumstances did not yet warrant a change in the case-law in question (see also “Relevant domestic law and practice” below). The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče).
12. On 7 May 2001 the Constitutional Court declared the appeal by the applicant inadmissible as being of a fourth-instance nature. It held that the Supreme Court had given a sound and detailed explanation of why the contested jurisprudence had been adopted and followed up to the present day, and that there was no appearance of arbitrariness whatsoever in the Supreme Court’s decision or in the decisions of the lower courts. Since it did not find any violation of human rights, it dismissed the constitutional appeal.
13. On 29 May 2001 the Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
COMPLAINTS
16. The applicant also invoked Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 14. She argued, firstly, that the differences in the length of time that persons claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage had to wait for the court judgment put some of them in a discriminatory position in relation to others. Secondly, she claimed that since in respect of claimants seeking compensation for pecuniary damage the jurisprudence did allow for default interest to be payable from the day the damage had occurred, such jurisprudence amounted to discrimination against claimants seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The applicant also complained, thirdly, that the change in the jurisprudence in 2002, which eventually provided that default interest was payable from the day the damage had occurred also in the case of those seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage, resulted in a new violation of Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 14. Since the new jurisprudence did not provide for the change to apply retroactively as well, it allegedly discriminated between claimants seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage before 2002 and claimants seeking such compensation after the relevant date.
17. Finally, the applicant complained that since she had not also been awarded default interest for the period between the day on which the damage had occurred and the day the judgment had been delivered, she had been deprived of her property. She thus in substance also raised a complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION, READ SEPARATELY AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14
18. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the compensation proceedings before the domestic courts had been unfair, in that the default interest on compensation for non-pecuniary damage had been arbitrarily awarded only from the date on which the first-instance court judgment had been delivered. The applicant also complained, under Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 14, that by not indemnifying persons claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage for the time they had to wait for the court award, the impugned jurisprudence discriminated against such claimants, in particular against those who had to wait longer for such an award.
The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 14 reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
19. The Government alleged that the applicant had not exhausted all the domestic legal remedies at her disposal, since she had not raised her complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the proceedings before the domestic courts. Moreover, the applicant had allegedly also had at her disposal the remedy of a claim for compensation, which could be lodged under Article 26 of the Constitution against the State by a claimant whose human rights had been violated by a State authority, or of settling the dispute in a friendly manner by applying for the preliminary settlement of a disputed relationship under section 14 of the State Attorney Act.
20. The Government further argued that the applicant had had a fair hearing and that all relevant procedural guarantees had been observed throughout the proceedings. Both parties had been given the possibility of equal treatment in the proceedings, the main hearing had been conducted in open court before the first-instance court, the applicant had been represented by a lawyer, she had also been given the opportunity to present her arguments orally and in writing, and she had been able to adduce evidence and rebut the evidence submitted by the opposing party. In this context, the Government stated in particular that all the applicant’s proposals for evidence-taking had been accepted and all the evidence had been heard and taken into consideration in the judgment. Last but not least, the Government emphasised that the proceedings had clearly not lasted an unreasonably long time, since they had ended within three years and five months, after having been dealt with by four levels of jurisdiction.
21. The Government also argued that in any event the domestic legislation applicable at the time at which the impugned court decisions had been delivered – that is, before the legislative reform in 2002 – was profoundly different from the legislation applicable at present. In relation to the 1992 Default Interest Rate Act and the 1995 Statutory Default and Basic Interest Rate Act, which had governed default interest until 2002, the main difference was that default interest had not only served as payment for the use of capital (money) and as a penalty for an overdue debt, but had also had a function of adjustment of the main claim (the principal) in accordance with inflation at the material time. Such regulation had been necessary in order to preserve the real value of pecuniary obligations in unstable economic circumstances in the country and periods of high inflation in particular. For instance, in 1992 the default interest rate had amounted to up to 345% per year until it had dropped to 24% in 1995, therefore exceeding by far the default interest rate prescribed after 2002, by which time the economic situation had stabilised.
22. However, with respect to claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage before 2002, such adjustment of a debt in accordance with inflation had not been needed. Since the damage sustained and the sum owed as compensation had only been established on the day the first-instance court judgment had been delivered, taking into account the circumstances prevailing at that particular time, claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage had not been affected by inflation. Moreover, when determining just compensation, the courts were also required to take into account the time that had elapsed since the damage had occurred.
23. In their additional observations, the Government maintained that a higher amount of compensation was not to be awarded solely on the basis of the fact that a case had been decided after a longer period of time, but that the courts could award a higher amount only if the length of the proceedings was excessive, for example on account of delays caused by one of the parties to the proceedings, or perhaps even abuses of a party’s procedural rights.
24. The Government also indicated that a higher amount of compensation on account of the length of time that had elapsed since the damage had occurred could have been awarded only at the request of a claimant. They referred to section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act, which provided that the court could only decide within the boundaries of the claims filed (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” above).
25. Lastly, the Government stated that even if in the present case the applicant had claimed a higher amount of compensation on account of the length of time that had elapsed since the damage had occurred, she would not have succeeded with her claim, since the first-instance court judgment had been given ten months after she had instituted compensation proceedings, which was a relatively short period of time. She therefore did not have a right to a higher amount of compensation than the award covering the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage she had sustained.
2. The applicant
26. With regard to the objection raised by the Government that she had not exhausted domestic remedies, the applicant maintained that she had raised all her complaints, at least in substance, in her complaint to the Constitutional Court. She also alleged that a claim for compensation, which the Government had argued could be lodged against the State where a claimant’s human rights were violated by a State official, would not be effective. As she argued, it was not likely that the court which had violated her rights in the main proceedings would confirm the existence of that violation in the subsequent proceedings.
27. The applicant also alleged that the relevant legislation applicable at the material time did not differ from the new legislation to an extent that would allow different systems of compensation for the time claimants had to wait for the court judgment. She maintained that under the old regime too, she had been entitled to default interest with effect from the date on which the damage occurred.
28. The applicant further maintained that the contested jurisprudence had indeed been established for the benefit of creditors in order to preserve the real value of their claims, but argued that after inflation had dropped below 100% there had no longer been any need for such jurisprudence to be maintained. Moreover, such a system had begun to work in favour of debtors owing compensation for non-pecuniary damage and in favour of insurance companies in particular. Since the insurance companies did not pay any default interest until the first-instance court judgment had been delivered, the prompt resolution of cases was not in their interest, a factor which resulted in protracted proceedings.
B. The Court’s assessment
29. As to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to the present case, the Court notes that it was not disputed between the parties that Article 6 § 1 could be applied to the case. Having in mind its established case-law (see, among many other authorities, Voggenreiter v. Germany, no. 47169/99, ECHR 2004 I, and Loiseau v. France (dec.), no. 46809/99, ECHR 2003 XII), the Court therefore sees no reason to dissent.
30. With regard to the Government’s preliminary objection that the applicant did not exhaust all domestic legal remedies at her disposal, the Court firstly notes that in respect of applications lodged against Slovenia the applicants are, according to the Court’s case-law, in principle required to exhaust remedies before the domestic courts and ultimately to lodge a constitutional appeal. In this regard it notes that the applicant pursued her claims at all levels of domestic jurisdiction, including the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, raising at least in substance all the complaints she brought before the Court. Secondly, the Court observes that the two remedies to which the Government referred as not having been used by the applicant, that is, a claim for compensation against the State and an application for a preliminary settlement, would require the State authorities competent to deal with such remedies to review the jurisprudence upheld by the Constitutional Court on several occasions. In this connection, the Court takes into account the fact that the decisions of the Constitutional Court have an erga omnes effect and are also legally binding upon the authorities competent to deal with the two above-mentioned remedies. Furthermore, it particularly takes into account the fact that on 7 May 2001 the Constitutional Court ruled that no human rights had been breached in the applicant’s case. The Court is therefore not persuaded by the Government’s allegation that these authorities could effectively review the impugned jurisprudence and the court decisions taken in the present case. Since the Government did not provide any evidence to show that the two remedies could be regarded as effective in the present case, the Court concludes that the Government’s preliminary objection has to be dismissed.
31. The Court further notes that the applicant challenged the decisions of the domestic courts, in particular the Supreme Court’s judgment of 31 March 1999, by which she was awarded default interest from 5 September 1995 onwards, that is, the date on which the first-instance court had given judgment for the first time. The Court also notes that it was undisputed by the parties that the impugned court decisions adhered to the jurisprudence concerning default interest on compensation for non-pecuniary damage as established until 2002, but that they disagreed as to whether this approach was consistent with the applicable legislative provisions. The Court therefore considers that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerns the interpretation and application of the legislation concerning default interest on compensation for non-pecuniary damage as in force at the material time. More generally, since the applicant challenged the manner in which she should have been indemnified for the period during which she had been waiting for the court award, her complaint essentially amounts to an objection to the outcome of the proceedings before the Slovenian judicial authorities and to the errors allegedly committed by them in the interpretation and application of domestic law.
32. The Court reiterates that while its duty, according to Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, it is primarily for the national administrative and judicial authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, inter alia, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], nos. 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98, § 49, ECHR 2001-II, and Houfova v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 58177/00, 1 July 2003).
33. The Court would also emphasise, on the other hand, that the principle of subsidiarity does not mean renouncing all supervision of the result obtained from using domestic remedies; otherwise, the rights guaranteed by Article 6 would be devoid of any substance. In that connection it should be reiterated that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and effective (see Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, § 45, ECHR 2001-VIII). However, the Court will not question the national courts’ interpretation of domestic law unless there has been a flagrant failure to observe the provisions in question or arbitrariness in their application (see, inter alia, Laudon v. Germany, no. 14635/03, § 56, 26 April 2007; Société Colas Est and Others v. France, no. 37971/97, § 43, ECHR 2002-III; and also mutatis mutandis, Lavents v. Latvia, no. 58442/00, § 114, 28 November 2002).
34. In the present case, the impugned jurisprudence was based on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 1978 Obligations Act as established since 1987, when the SFRY Federal Court, the Supreme Courts of the Republics and Regions of the SFRY and the Federal Military Court adopted a legal opinion concerning default interest on compensation for non-pecuniary damage. As follows from that opinion, such damage was to be considered to have been established only on the date on which the first-instance court judgment was delivered and according to the prices valid on that day, and it was only from that day onwards that default interest was to be awarded. It further follows from that opinion that the national courts were required, when assessing a just amount of compensation, to take into account the time that had elapsed from the date on which the damage had occurred until the delivery of the first-instance court judgment. It was not disputed in the present case that this interpretation had been adopted in times of high inflation and monetary depreciation, with the aim of preserving the real value of a claim for non-pecuniary damage, while still indemnifying claimants for the time they had to wait for compensation.
35. The Court notes that after the independence of the Republic of Slovenia in 1991, the 1978 Obligations Act remained in force, and that the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia adhered to the established interpretation of its relevant provisions owing to the continuing inflation in the country. The Court notes in addition that this interpretation of the 1978 Obligations Act was also upheld by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions are legally binding. The Court further observes that the economic stabilisation in Slovenia in the years following the country’s independence, and the change of legislation in 2002 in particular, led the Supreme Court to adopt in 2002 a new legal opinion, according to which default interest for non-pecuniary damage could now be awarded from the day the damage had occurred.
36. The Court considers that the Supreme Court’s adherence to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 1978 Obligations Act as established since 1987 cannot be considered manifestly erroneous, arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Convention. Indeed, its interpretation, though not based on the express terms of the 1978 Obligations Act, had been consistently applied and was in accordance with the latter’s object and purpose, which was to indemnify claimants for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, as well as for the length of time they had to wait for compensation (see Grušovnik v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 75201/01, § 51, 9 June 2009, and, mutatis mutandis, Melchior v. Germany (dec.), no. 66783/01, ECHR 2006 II).
37. The Court also observes that, in accordance with section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act, it was for the claimants to submit their claim for compensation, and to seek an amount which took into account all the circumstances of the case relevant for the court to award a just amount of compensation. In this connection, the Court notes that the applicant did not claim any higher amount of compensation on account of the time that had elapsed since the damage had occurred. Instead, she sought to be indemnified for the relevant period of time through an award of default interest. The Court also notes that a case where a court decided extra petitum and made an award that was higher than or did not correspond to what was claimed would result in a major violation of procedural law, pursuant to sections 350, 375 and 381 of the Civil Procedure Act. In the Court’s assessment, it therefore cannot be considered manifestly erroneous or arbitrary if the domestic courts awarded the applicant neither default interest from the day the damage had occurred nor a higher amount of compensation on account of the time that had elapsed since then.
38. The Court therefore concludes that the national judicial authorities gave reasoned decisions, addressing all the relevant submissions by the applicant. They adhered to the jurisprudence as established since 1987 with regard to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 1978 Obligations Act, and to the Statutory Default and Basic Interest Rate Act as interpreted and applied since its entry into force in 1995. In the Supreme Court’s judgment of 31 March 1999 the applicant was also provided with the underlying reasons for the approach adopted.
39. Moreover, the Court observes that it was not contested in the present case that the applicant had a public hearing before the first-instance court, that throughout the proceedings her case was considered by an independent and impartial court established by law, that she was legally represented at all stages of the proceedings, that she was able to submit all the necessary arguments in her favour and to contest the submissions of the defendant, orally and in writing, and that all other procedural guarantees were observed. There is therefore nothing to show that the conclusion of the national judicial authorities was arbitrary or contrary to the provisions of domestic law applied by them.
40. It follows that the complaint relating to Article 6 § 1 must be considered manifestly ill-founded under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
41. As regards the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 14, the Court refers to its previous findings to the effect that before 2002 the national courts were entitled, when determining a just amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage, to take into account the time that had elapsed from the date on which the damage had occurred until the date on which the judgment was delivered. This was, on the other hand, not the case for claimants who sought compensation for pecuniary damage, nor for claimants who sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage after 2002. Such claimants were indeed able to claim default interest from the day the damage had occurred, but the national courts were not entitled to also assess at the same time the amount of compensation in the light of the length of the period the claimant had had to wait for the court award. In this connection the Court again observes that the applicant did not claim any higher amount of compensation on account of the length of time she had to wait for the award. The Court therefore considers that the applicant did not suffer any discrimination on account of not having also been awarded default interest for this period of time (see also Grušovnik, cited above, § 56).
42. It follows that the complaint relating to Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 14 must likewise be dismissed, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as manifestly ill-founded.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
43. The Government maintained that the decision of the domestic courts had not resulted in the deprivation of any of the applicant’s property rights or the diminution of any of her claims. They argued that the applicant’s claim for default interest from the date on which the damage had occurred could not be interpreted as “possessions” within the meaning of the Convention, as she could not even have had a “legitimate expectation” of realising the claim in accordance with the law and the domestic courts’ jurisprudence applicable at the material time.
2. The applicant
44. The applicant alleged that the impugned jurisprudence of the Supreme Court amounted to a systemic deprivation of property for all those seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage before 2002, when the Supreme Court had finally changed its legal opinion. The very fact that the Supreme Court had changed its opinion was, in the applicant’s view, evidence that its previous opinion had been erroneous.
B. The Court’s assessment
45. The Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee, as such, a right to acquire property. An applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his “possessions” within the meaning of this provision. “Possessions” can be either “existing possessions” or “assets”, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, §35, ECHR 2004-IX; Sirc v. Slovenia, no. 44580/98, § 272, 22 June 2006; and Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99, § 121, ECHR 2002-II).
46. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court considers it clear that at the time the applicant instituted compensation proceedings at the Maribor Basic Court, Ptuj Unit on 8 December 1994, she could not be said to have had “existing possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since the default interest she was claiming in addition to compensation for non-pecuniary damage was yet to be awarded, together with any compensation if appropriate. It thus remains to be examined whether at that time she could have had any “legitimate expectation” of realising her claim to default interest with effect from the date on which she had instituted compensation proceedings.
47. The Court notes that at the material time, default interest on compensation for non-pecuniary damage was governed by the 1978 Obligations Act and the 1992 Default Interest Rate Act, which were interpreted and applied by the courts in accordance with the joint legal opinion of the SFRY Federal Court, the Supreme Courts of the Republics and Regions of the SFRY and the Federal Military Court, adopted in 1987. As follows from that opinion, the courts were required to determine a just amount of compensation by also taking into account, inter alia, the time that had elapsed from the day the non-pecuniary damage had occurred until the date on which the first-instance court judgment was handed down. Default interest was to be awarded, on the other hand, only from the date of the first-instance court judgment. The Court further notes that the 1995 Statutory Default and Basic Interest Rate Act, which replaced the 1992 Default Interest Rate Act, did not entail any changes in the interpretation and application of the procedure by which claimants were to be compensated for the time they had to wait for an award.
48. The Court also observes that in the present case it was not disputed between the parties that such an approach in awarding default interest had prevailed since 1987, that it had also remained well-established jurisprudence after the Republic of Slovenia had established its independence, and that it had only changed after the new legislation entered into force in 2002. Persons claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage were consistently awarded default interest only from the date on which the first-instance court delivered the judgment until the date on which the debtor actually paid the debt.
49. The Court therefore finds that at the time the applicant instituted compensation proceedings in the Maribor Basic Court, Ptuj Unit, on 8 December 1994, she could not legitimately have expected that if her claim for compensation was granted, she would also be awarded default interest for the period from 6 December 1993, when the damage had occurred, or from 12 July 1994 at the latest, on the expiry of the deadline within which the insurance company was required to fulfil its obligations under the insurance contract, until 5 September 1995, the date on which the first-instance court gave judgment (see also Grušovnik, cited above, § 66).
50. Since the applicant’s claim for default interest on compensation for non-pecuniary damage for the period from the day when the damage had occurred until the delivery of the first-instance court’s judgment does not constitute either “existing possessions” or “a legitimate expectation” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 3 and § 4 of the Convention.
51. The application must therefore be rejected as a whole in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Stanley Naismith Josep Casadevall
Deputy Registrar President