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DOVIDYAN v. RUSSIA - 42277/04 [2009] ECHR 1561 (15 October 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1561.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1561
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF
DOVIDYAN v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 42277/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15
October 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Dovidyan v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik
Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou,
judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 September 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 42277/04) against the
Russian Federation lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Russian national, Mr Aleksandr
Avitokovich Dovidyan (“the applicant”), on 3 November
2004.
The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially
represented by Ms V. Milinchuk, former Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and subsequently by
their Representative, Mr G. Matyushkin.
On
13 February 2008 the
President of the First Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
The
Government objected to the joint examination of the admissibility and
merits of the application. Having considered the Government's
objection, the Court dismissed it.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1918 and lives in St Petersburg.
On
15 October 2001 the applicant brought proceedings before the
Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District
Court”) against the St Petersburg Fuel and Energy Complex, a
State energy supply enterprise, for damages. He complained that the
defendant had deprived him of his right to a reduced price for
heating, to which he was entitled as a disabled veteran of the Second
World War.
In
a judgment of 14 May 2002 the District Court granted the applicant's
claim in part and ordered the defendant to repay the sums overpaid by
the applicant between December 1998 and November 2001.
On
12 February 2003, upon the defendant's appeal, the St Petersburg City
Court (“the City Court”) quashed the judgment in part and
ordered a fresh examination by the first-instance court.
On
31 March 2003 Judge K. of the District Court took up the case and
fixed a hearing for 26 June 2003.
According
to the Government, the applicant modified his claims on 26 May
2003.
During
the hearing on 26 June 2003 the applicant waived part of his claims
and lodged claims against new defendants, with the result that the
hearing was postponed until 13 November 2003.
In
the Government's submission, the applicant modified his claims on
13 October 2003.
According to the Government, the hearing scheduled for
13 November 2003 was not held owing to the fact that Judge K.
had resigned from office, with the result that on 30 September 2003
the case was transferred to Judge P. The latter was on sick
leave between October 2003 and January 2004. Subsequently all cases
assigned to Judge P. were transferred to Judge I., who fixed a
hearing in the applicant's case for 16 December 2004. On the
latter date the hearing was postponed until 7 July 2005 as the
judge was engaged in unrelated proceedings.
In
the Government's submission, the applicant modified his claims on 7
and 11 July 2005.
On 7 July 2005 the hearing was adjourned until 11
August 2005 because the defendants and a third party had failed to
appear, and then until the following day because the judge was
engaged in unrelated proceedings. Then the hearing was postponed
until 4 October 2005 in view of the defendant's failure to appear.
On 4 October 2005 the hearing was adjourned until 17
November 2005 at the applicant's request; he asked for more time to
adduce some evidence and consult his lawyer, and then until 22
December 2005 as the judge was on leave. In the Government's
submission, on 22 December 2005 the applicant modified his claims. On
the same date the hearing was postponed until 1 February 2006, as the
defendants had failed to appear and there was no evidence in the case
file that they had been duly notified of the hearing.
By
a judgment of 1 February 2006 the District Court dismissed the
applicant's claims. The applicant's appeal against this judgment was
stayed on 3 February 2006 owing to his failure to comply with certain
formal requirements and he was invited to remedy the shortcomings by
15 March 2006. On the latter date the applicant lodged an amended
appeal.
On
17 May 2006 the City Court upheld the judgment of 1 February 2006 on
appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... , everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
The
applicant maintained that he had not in any way contributed to the
protraction of the proceedings and that significant delays had been
imputable to the State.
The
Government argued that delays in the examination of the applicant's
case had been caused by the complexity of the case and the
applicant's conduct. According to them, the applicant had repeatedly
amended and supplemented his claims with the result that the
first-instance court had had to spend time on studying new materials.
Moreover, on 26 June 2003 the applicant altered his claims so
significantly that, in the Government's opinion, the proceedings
could be regarded as having commenced anew, and therefore the period
to be taken into account should start on this date. The Government
also pointed out that on several occasions court hearings had been
postponed due to the defendants' failure to appear, for which the
State was not responsible. The Government further conceded that a
period of inactivity between 13 October 2003 and 22 December
2005, totalling one year, eight months and twenty-six days, could be
imputed to the authorities; however, they gave objective reasons for
this, namely judges' sickness, annual leave, dismissal from service
and their exceptional caseload. In the Government's opinion, apart
from the aforementioned period, the examination of the applicant's
case was rather expeditious and conformed with the requirements of
Article 6 of the Convention.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 15 October 2001 and
ended on 17 May 2006. The proceedings thus lasted four years seven
months and two days during which period the case was examined twice
at two levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court observes that the applicant's civil case does not appear to be
particularly complex as, in so far as appears from the parties'
submission on the facts, it did not involve any complex expert
examinations, questioning of numerous witnesses or study of any
voluminous evidence. As regards the Government's argument that the
case was complicated by the fact that the applicant repeatedly
altered his claims, it was only on two occasions, and namely on 26
June 2003, when the applicant modified his claims, and on 4 October
2005, when the applicant requested additional time for submission of
evidence, that the court postponed the hearings because of the
applicant. The Court reiterates in this respect that the applicant
cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded
by national law in the defence of his interest (see, for instance,
Kutsenko v. Russia, no. 12049/02, § 50, 1 June 2006).
The
Court further notes that the proceedings were mostly protracted
during the second examination of the applicant's case and, in
particular, almost three years elapsed between the quashing on appeal
of the first-instance judgment on 12 February 2003, and delivery by
the first-instance court of a new judgment on 1 February 2006. As it
has been noted above, during this period a court hearing was
postponed twice due to the applicant's conduct. The aggregate delay
totalled to approximately five months. As regards the conduct of the
authorities, the Court notes that out of ten hearings fixed during
the aforementioned period, six hearings were postponed because the
judges to whom the applicant's case was assigned were unavailable for
various reasons (see paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 above), which
protracted the proceeding for overall period of approximately one
year and nine months. The Court finds that this period of inactivity
is imputable to the State, as it is the States' duty to organise
their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet the
obligation to decide cases within a reasonable time (see, among other
authorities, Löffler v. Austria, no. 30546/96, § 21,
3 October 2000).
In
the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law and having regard
to the circumstances of the present case, and in particular to the
fact that during the second examination of the applicant's case the
proceedings were pending for almost three years before the first
instance court, out of which at least one year and nine months
directly imputable to the authorities, the Court considers that the
length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government contested the claim as excessive stating that the
reasonable amount of just satisfaction in the present case would
range between EUR 1,500 and EUR 3,000.
Having
regard to the particular circumstances of the case and making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 1,500, together with any tax that may be chargeable to him
on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not submit any claim under this head. Accordingly, the
Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that
account.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,500 (one thousand
five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect
of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the Russian roubles at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 15 October 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Christos
Rozakis
Deputy Registrar President
