British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
RAMISHVILI AND KOKHREIDZE v. GEORGIA - 1704/06 [2009] ECHR 153 (27 January 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/153.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 153
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF
RAMISHVILI AND KOKHREIDZE v. GEORGIA
(Application
no. 1704/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27 January
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It
may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise
Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu
Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė
Jočienė,
Dragoljub
Popović,
András
Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
judges,
and
Sally Dollé, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 6 january2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 1704/06) against Georgia
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by two Georgian nationals, Mr Shalva Ramishvili
(“the first applicant”) and Mr Davit Kokhreidze
(“the second applicant”), on 9 January 2006.
The
applicants' initial representatives, Mr Aleksandre
Baramidze and Mr Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg, were replaced on
23 February 2007 by Ms Lia Mukhashavria and Mr
Vakhtang Vakhtangidze, lawyers practising in Tbilisi. The
Georgian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr M. Kekenadze of the Ministry of Justice.
On
8 February 2006 urgent notice of
the introduction of the application was given to the Government in
accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. On 16 February 2006
priority treatment was granted to the application under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court. On 3 April 2006 the application
was communicated to the Government under Rule 54 § 2 (b) of
the Rules of Court.
The
applicants alleged that their treatment in the courthouse during
their remand hearings and trial had been degrading within the meaning
of Article 3 of the Convention. The first applicant further
challenged the conditions of his confinement in a punishment cell,
whilst the second applicant complained of overcrowding in his
ordinary cell. Under Article 5 §§ 1 (c)
and 4 of the Convention, the applicants complained that their
pre-trial detention between 27 November 2005 and 13 January 2006
had been unlawful and challenged the fairness and speediness of the
judicial proceedings bearing on the detention issues.
On
30 June 2006 the Government filed their observations on admissibility
and merits. The applicants replied on 29 August and 19 September
2006. Another set of observations was submitted by the Government and
the applicants on 9 and 30 November 2006 respectively.
By
a decision of 26 June 2007, the Court declared the application partly
admissible.
Neither
of the parties availed themselves of the right to submit further
written observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1 of the Rules of
Court). The applicants filed their claims for just satisfaction on 3
September 2007. Despite the Court's invitation, the Government did
not submit comments in reply.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The first and second applicants were born in 1971 and
1961 respectively and live in Tbilisi.
A. As the case stood prior to its communication on 3
April 2006
The
applicants were co-founders of and shareholders in a private media
company (“the media company”) which owned the television
channel “TV 202” (“the channel”),
broadcasting in Tbilisi. The first applicant, as an anchorman of the
popular talk show “Debatebi” (Debates), often
addressed politically sensitive issues.
Under
a service agreement of 25 April 2005, the media company undertook to
air several documentary films made by “Studio Reporter”,
a private film-production company (“the production company”).
Consequently, in May 2005, the latter started working on a
documentary concerning certain business activities of Mr B., a
parliamentarian from the presidential political party (“the
ruling party”), which held at that time the majority of seats
in Parliament. The object of the documentary was to expose Mr B.'s
allegedly illegal commercial activities. According to the Government,
except for the applicants, nobody within the media company knew about
the making of the compromising film.
After
Mr B. had tried in vain to persuade the journalists of the production
company to drop the project, he contacted the first applicant. From
May to August 2005 the parliamentarian placed numerous telephone
calls, asking Mr Ramishvili to block the film. Eventually, they
agreed to meet and discuss the issue.
During
their first meeting, which took place in the morning of 26 August
2005, an agreement was reached whereby the first applicant would not
allow the airing of the film on his channel in exchange for
USD 100,000 (EUR 80,000).
Immediately after this meeting, Mr B. complained to the Minister
of the Interior that the first applicant had been blackmailing him.
He reported to the authorities that, in the event of the compromising
film being aired, it could have disastrous consequences not only for
him personally but also for the image of the ruling party.
The
same day, the Ministry of the Interior initiated criminal proceedings
on suspicion of extortion for the purpose of gaining vast profits.
Later that day, Mr B. met the first applicant again. They agreed that
the latter would accept the sum in two instalments: USD 30,000 and
70,000 (EUR 24,010 and 56,000).
In
the morning of 27 August 2005, Mr B. informed the prosecution service
that he would hand over the first instalment to the first applicant
around noon. The 100 US dollar notes were consequently processed with
invisible chemicals and marked with a special pencil, while their
serial numbers were recorded by the investigation authorities. The
Prosecutor General's Office (“the PGO”) issued a ruling,
dated 27 August 2005, at 11.00 a.m., authorising the secret videoing
of the meeting without a court order, due to “urgent
necessity”. The camera was hidden on the parliamentarian's
person.
The
meeting during which Mr B. handed over the money to the first
applicant took place on 27 August 2005 at noon, in the apartment of a
mutual friend of theirs. It was also attended by the second
applicant. The conversation and the handing over of the money were
videoed secretly (“the video recording of 27 August 2005”)
by the parliamentarian. When the applicants left the meeting and got
into the second applicant's car, they were arrested and searched. USD
30,000 and the car in which the money was found were seized. On the
same day the Tbilisi City Court legalised the secret video recording.
On
28 August 2005 Mr B. was recognised by the investigation as a victim
and both applicants were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion.
They pleaded “not guilty” and refused to testify at that
time.
On
29 August 2005 the Tbilisi City Court granted the prosecutor's
motions and remanded the applicants in custody for three months. The
order noted that the collected evidence – the parliamentarian's
statements, the results of the on-the-spot search of the applicants,
the seized materials and the video recording of 27 August 2005 –
substantiated the suspicion that the applicants had committed the
offence with which they had been charged. The court dismissed the
prosecutor's argument that the applicants might abscond in view of
the gravity of the charge as unsubstantiated. However, it endorsed
the fear that they could interfere with the establishment of the
truth by exerting pressure on those witnesses who were under their
hierarchical authority in the media company.
On
31 August 2005 the applicants appealed against this decision,
complaining that their detention was not lawful within the meaning of
Article 5 of the Convention, since the prosecution had failed to
prove the reasonableness of the imposition of such a measure. They
complained in particular that, apart from the parliamentarian's
statements, the prosecution had not submitted any other evidence
substantiating the suspicion that a crime had been committed.
Further, they alleged that, contrary to Article 18 of the
Convention, they had been detained not for the purpose of bringing
them before the competent legal authority but in order to silence
their television channel.
On 31 August 2005 the investigator issued a ruling,
incorporating as evidence into the criminal case file the seized US
dollar notes, the second applicant's car and the traces of chemicals
found there, as well as the applicants' fingerprints and some other
results of their search and arrest on 27 August 2005.
On
2 September 2005 the Tbilisi Regional Court dismissed the applicants'
appeal at an oral hearing. The case file contained photographs of
that hearing showing that the applicants had been kept in a barred
dock, surrounded by several guards. The photographs further showed
that the court room was extremely overcrowded (for a detailed
description of the hearing, see paragraphs 52-65 below).
The
decision of 2 September 2005 endorsed the reasoning of the lower
court concerning the applicants' managerial positions in the media
company as a ground supporting the risk that they might influence the
witnesses. It reiterated that the collected evidence – the
parliamentarian's statements, the results of the on-the-spot search
of the applicants, etc. – suggested “with a
high degree of probability” that the applicants had committed
the crime.
On
6 September 2005 the investigator incorporated the video recording of
27 August 2005 and its verbatim transcript as evidence into the
criminal case file. On 29 September 2005 the investigator presented
the transcript to the applicants. Calling its authenticity into
question, the applicants requested leave to watch the recording.
On
19 October 2005 the investigator informed the applicants in writing
that the preliminary investigation had been terminated. On
11 November 2005 the case materials were presented to the
applicants in prison. However, because at that time no appropriate
equipment had been provided, it was only on 14 and 16 November 2005
that the applicants, in the presence of their advocates, watched the
video recording of 27 August 2005 for the first time.
On
22 November 2005 the prosecutor sent the criminal case, along with
the bill of indictment of 19 November 2005, to the Tbilisi City
Court for trial.
On
27 November 2005 the three month pre-trial detention period expired
without the court ordering its extension.
On
6 December 2005 the applicants filed a complaint with the Tbilisi
City Court, demanding their immediate release. They claimed that they
had been deprived of their liberty in breach of Article 159 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Article 5 of
the Convention, since no judicial decision had authorised their
detention since 27 November 2005. No immediate response from the
court was forthcoming.
On
11 January 2006 the administration of Tbilisi No. 5 Prison,
where the first applicant was provisionally detained, transferred the
latter from his ordinary cell to the punishment cell (karceri),
which measured 5.65 square metres and was intended for
solitary confinement, as a disciplinary punishment for using a mobile
telephone, the latter incident occurring for the first time.
According to the first applicant, in Soviet times, this type of cell
was used for the confinement of those on death row. There was another
person sharing the cell with the applicant (“the second
inmate“).
On
13 January 2006, the applicants were taken to the admissibility
hearing before the Tbilisi City Court. The City Court decided to
commit the applicants for trial under Article 417 § 1 of the
CCP. In addition, it rejected their motion of 6 December 2005 to
be released or to have their detention pending trial replaced by a
more lenient measure of restraint, ruling in the following terms:
“The defence incorrectly alleges a violation of
the Convention as regards the fact that, after the three month
detention period expired, [the applicants] were not immediately
brought before a court. [In fact] the criminal procedural law does
not require that, once the case is referred to the court for a
hearing on the merits, any procedural decision be taken on the
measure of restraint applied to the accused. According to the
Convention, the [national] court ought to decide on a case within a
reasonable period of time. 'Reasonable period of time' is defined by
Article 680(4) § 8
of the CCP as follows. 'In the course of the hearing of a criminal
case by a District (Regional) Court, the period of detention must not
exceed 12 months from the date on which the case is sent to the
court.' Consequently, the [applicants'] detention pending trial has
not exceeded its legal term.”
In
the operative part of the decision of 13 January 2006, it was noted
that there was no appeal possible.
The
case file contained photographs showing that the applicants had been
kept in a barred dock during the hearing of 13 January 2006 and that
there had been security guards armed with machine guns and wearing
hood like black masks in the court room.
On
14 January 2006 at about 11.00 p.m., some toxic smoke (later
explained by the authorities to have been caused by the burning of a
mattress in the adjacent cell, see paragraphs 44 and 74 below) leaked
into the first applicant's punishment cell. Owing to the lack of
ventilation, the smoke filled the cell quickly, causing the applicant
and the second inmate to suffer from smoke inhalation, an inability
to breathe and eye watering. According to the first applicant, they
shouted and knocked on the door for half an hour before the prison
guard opened the door and let both inmates out until the smoke was
gone.
On
15 January 2006 the first applicant was returned from the punishment
cell to his ordinary cell.
On
19 January 2006 the second applicant, also provisionally detained in
Tbilisi No. 5 Prison, was moved from his six-bed cell, with six
inmates in it, to another cell with twelve beds, where twenty-nine
prisoners were kept. The inmates were obliged to take turns to sleep.
On
20 January 2006 the first applicant filed a complaint with both the
PGO and the Ministry of Justice (“the MJ”), the authority
in charge of the penitentiary system, challenging the conditions in
the punishment cell and the lawfulness of his confinement there.
According to the complaint, the punishment cell had no window or
ventilation and was extremely damp. Tap water ran non-stop and
noisily 24 hours a day. A narrow pipe in the corner, located
just one metre away from the bed, was designated as a toilet. It was
so narrow that it was difficult for the inmates to pass urine and
excrement straight into the hole; there was no partition separating
“the toilet” from the rest of the cell and a stench hung
in the air all the time. One inmate could not avoid seeing what the
other was doing. The cell was infested with cockroaches and rats
occasionally ran through it. The only bed, infested with vermin, was
not wide enough to accommodate two persons.
In
such conditions, the first applicant claimed that he had not been
able either to have any normal sleep or to eat properly. During the
whole period of his confinement in the punishment cell, he was
never let out for a walk or other physical exercise. He alleged that
he was never visited by a doctor or provided with any other care.
From
20 January 2006 hearings were held almost daily. In the hearing
rooms, the applicants were always kept in the same conditions as
those on 13 January 2006: being displayed to the public in the barred
dock, in the presence of hooded guards with machineguns.
At
a hearing on 23 February 2006, the second applicant announced that he
had been continuously deprived of necessary medical care and of
drinking water in prison. He declared that he intended to begin a
hunger strike. The judge did not respond. Shortly afterwards, six
more inmates were placed in the second applicant's already
overcrowded 12 bed cell, increasing the total number of
prisoners there to 35.
On
25 February 2006 the PGO informed the first applicant that it had
taken note of his complaint of 20 January 2006. It also advised him
that, according to the MJ Penitentiary Department, the conditions in
the punishment cell fully complied with “international
standards”.
On
27 February 2006, after the prosecution had finalised its submissions
before the court, the applicants requested, on the basis of Article
140 § 17 of the CCP, that their detention pending trial be
replaced by a more lenient measure of restraint in view of newly
discovered circumstances. In that connection the applicants referred
to the fact that none of the witnesses questioned by the prosecution
appeared to be under their hierarchical authority, but were rather
co-founders of the media company. The Tbilisi City Court dismissed
that request on the same day. The judge acknowledged that this fact
was indeed “a newly-discovered circumstance...”, but
ruled that it was “not a significant new circumstance which
could justify revision of the imposed restraint measure”. The
judge went on to say, “This is especially true since the
accused have not yet presented their submissions and have not been
examined; nor has the collected evidence been assessed...”
The
applicants then challenged the judge for bias, questioning her
impartiality, but this challenge was dismissed as unsubstantiated by
the same judge of the Tbilisi City Court that same day. An appeal
against both decisions of 27 February 2006 lay only in connection
with an appeal against the final verdict.
On
29 March 2006 the Tbilisi City Court, convicting them of conspiracy
to commit extortion, sentenced the first applicant to four and the
second applicant to three years in prison. On 30 June 2006 the
Tbilisi Appellate Court upheld the verdict.
After
conviction the applicants were transferred from Tbilisi No. 5
Prison to Rustavi No. 6 Prison. They challenged the appellate
decision of 30 June 2006 in the Supreme Court. The case file did
not contain information on any further developments in the criminal
proceedings.
B. Subsequent developments in the case, as disclosed by
the parties' observations
1. Proceedings with regard to the first applicant's
confinement in the punishment cell
On
3 July 2006 the PGO informed the first applicant that on 18 May
2006 it had opened a criminal case with regard to his complaint of
20 January 2006 concerning his confinement in the punishment
cell but, after a preliminary investigation, had decided on 26 June
2006 to close it as no elements of a crime had been disclosed.
The
PGO decision of 26 June 2006 noted that the first applicant's
transfer to the punishment cell had been, under Rule 22 § 1 (b)
of the Prison Rules, a lawful disciplinary punishment for the use of
a mobile telephone, such an act representing a grave violation of
detention rules. Based on the statements of the administrative staff
of Tbilisi No. 5 Prison, as well as the prison doctor and the
second inmate, the decision stated that the first applicant had
been visited by the doctor daily and offered food identical to that
provided in the ordinary cells. It noted however that, according to
the first applicant's statements, he had refused to consume the food
due to the unsanitary conditions in the punishment cell. As to the
fire incident created by the inmate in the adjacent cell on 14
January 2006, the PGO, relying on witness testimonies, stated that
the first applicant had immediately been taken out of his cell until
the smoke was gone and that there had been no danger to his life.
The
Government submitted the minutes of the interview with the second
inmate on 21 May 2006. The latter specifically mentioned that the
food in the punishment cell had been of a satisfactory quality and
that, in any case, he and the first applicant had had ample supplies
because of their relatives' food parcels, which they had brought with
them from their ordinary cells.
Relying
on the examination of the punishment cell carried out by an
investigative commission on 23 May 2006, the PGO's decision of
26 June 2006 further stated that the cell had been equipped with
an appropriate system of “air filtration” and inside
artificial lighting, and that there had been a toilet, partitioned by
a special wall from the rest of the cell.
According
to the minutes of the punishment cell inspection of 23 May 2006,
submitted by the Government, it was conducted without the first
applicant or his advocates' participation. They further disclosed
that the punishment cell had been located in the basement of Tbilisi
No. 5 prison, its length and width being 276 cm by 205 cm, and
the bed had been 120 cm wide. As to the toilet, it consisted of
a hole in the ground and two cemented bricks for placing the feet.
There was no sink, and the water tap was set just above the toilet
hole. The only source of lighting was an electric bulb. According to
the minutes of the inspection and the attached plan of the cell,
there was no window with access to daylight.
With
due regard to the above findings, the PGO decided on 26 May 2006
that the prison officials had not exceeded or abused their powers
when transferring the first applicant to the punishment cell.
On
18 July 2006 the first applicant filed a complaint against this
decision, claiming that the investigation had not been effective or
objective. He complained that, whilst he had filed his complaint on
20 January 2006, the PGO had opened proceedings only five months
later on 18 May 2006. This lapse of time, in his view, had been
more than sufficient for the prison administration to renovate the
cell completely with a view to hiding the appalling conditions in
which he had been held. In this regard, he challenged the PGO's
failure to enquire as to when exactly the ventilation, lighting and
the toilet partition had been installed in the punishment cell. The
first applicant further complained that the PGO had inexplicably
disregarded his assertions that none of the above-mentioned
conditions had existed during his confinement and had arbitrarily
endorsed those of the prison staff who, being potential suspects in
the case, could not be said to have been impartial witnesses. He
challenged the fact that, despite his statement that he had never
been provided with medical care, the PGO had trusted the statements
of the prison doctor, another potential suspect, without having
examined any other source of information (i.e. the relevant prison
logbook of medical visits). He further claimed that the second
inmate, being under the complete control of the authorities who were
well known for abuses in prisons, might easily have been
threatened or forced to make false statements. Finally, the first
applicant complained that he and his advocates had learnt about the
initiation of the criminal proceedings against the prison
administration only after they were terminated on 26 June 2006.
Consequently, they had not been given a chance to participate in the
investigation so as to ensure its objectivity.
On
24 July 2006 the first applicant's complaint of 18 July 2006 was
dismissed by the Tbilisi City Court. In reply to his complaint that
the criminal proceedings had commenced only four months after his
complaint of 20 January 2006 had been lodged, the decision noted that
“the case materials do not support the suspicion that the cell
has been renovated since the proceedings were opened on 18 May 2006.”
It further stated that the PGO had duly assessed the witnesses'
statements, including those of the prison staff and the first
applicant, and that nothing in the case file suggested that the
second inmate might have been forced to testify against the first
applicant.
The
decision of 24 July 2006 was adopted without an oral hearing and
pronounced in absentia.
2. Hearing of 2 September 2005
(a) The video recording submitted by the
Government
As part of their observations on the admissibility and
merits of the application, the Government submitted a video recording
of the proceedings concerning the applicants' appeal against their
detention on remand held at the Tbilisi Regional Court on 2 September
2005. The applicants replied that this recording did not include the
scenes of greatest turmoil and had been considerably edited to
portray a more favourable image of the hearing, excluding, for
example, images of armed men inside the court room. They agreed
however that this recording should be accepted and relied on as a
source of information about the hearing. The applicants additionally
provided annotations to some of the scenes.
The opening scenes of the Government's recording
showed an overcrowded court room before the start of the hearing. A
large number of media personnel and cameras on tripods were situated
in the middle of the room. The dock was a metal cage with a barred
ceiling, located at the far end and separated from the rest of the
court room. The audience was comprised of civilians, with a large
number of women most of whom could be identified as the applicants'
supporters. However, there were some fifteen men in plain clothes who
were undercover police agents, according to the applicants. Moreover,
many of those men were openly identified as agents by the applicants'
supporters on the spot. The supporters engaged in heated argument
with several men in plain clothes, complaining about the lack of
space and the State's inability to provide a larger court room for
the hearing.
The four uniformed guards and several men in plain
clothes escorted the handcuffed applicants into the court room. When
the judge was seated, the crowd was still pressing into the room. The
entrance door was blocked by the plain-clothes men from inside, while
several hooded and armed guards could be seen forcing the door closed
from the outside. The judge requested the people in the room to calm
down. The judge specifically reproached the media representatives for
their disorderly behaviour.
The general noise level in the court room remained
unabated even after the hearing was declared open. The judge offered
the applicants the possibility of conducting the hearing in camera
but they refused. Loud male voices could be heard in the court room
bitterly arguing and uttering vulgar curses. The body language of the
judge betrayed resignation and frustration, as he was unable to
establish order.
When the advocates spoke they were dazzled by camera
flashes and halogen camera lights of the journalists. During their
speech there were continual interruptions by the judge and the
public, and relentless banging on the entrance door from the outside,
as well as the sound of construction works nearby. Now and then
mobile telephones rang and persons conducted conversations.
Communication between the defence, the prosecution and the judge,
constantly hampered by the unsolicited interruptions of journalists,
was made possible by repeatedly requesting other people to move aside
or sit down on the floor. The temperature in the court room was high,
judging by the sweat on people's faces. The persons presumed to be
undercover agents, and some court personnel, could be seen constantly
entering and leaving the judge's deliberation room.
In order to see what was happening, respond to the
judge or be heard, the applicants had to stand on the chair in the
barred dock, hanging on to the metal side bars, and shout. They
repeatedly asked the judge and the prosecutors to speak louder as
they could not hear them. When answering one of the judge's
questions, the first applicant, hanging on the bars and grimacing as
if to emphasise by body language his resentment at the situation,
made the following remark:
“...The Government might have something against
me...this I can [more or less understand]...but [I cannot] understand
why it is necessary to detain [the second applicant] ... [unless,] of
course, the Government wish to fill up the prisons
[cixeebi]!...[Well,]
I have been there [in the prison]; unimaginable things happen
there!...There is no need for [the second applicant]...no place for
him to be with me, here, in this cage! [galiaSi]...This
is my declaration!”
The immediate proximity of the prosecutor to the judge
presented no obstacle of audibility for them. The dialogue of
questions and answers between judge and prosecutor was unaffected.
Several persons alleged to be undercover agents in plain clothes were
shown behind the prosecutor and investigator.
There were episodes when the prosecutor refused to
reply to the second applicant's questions regarding specific
circumstances of the case, and instead made fun of him. Thus, for
example, when the second applicant asked the exact time of his
arrest, the prosecutor answered: “How should I know?!...I was
not there when they arrested you!” To another question of the
second applicant, the prosecutor answered: “That is a
ridiculous question... go and ask the parliamentarian about that!”,
and the question was then dismissed by the judge.
In another episode, when the second applicant asked,
“Could you, please, indicate the page and the paragraph in the
case materials which prove that the parliamentarian...has testified
against me?”, the prosecutor started laughing in reply and
answered in a sarcastic tone, “Which case materials?! Which
page?! Which paragraph?!” and then murmured “This man is
not sane...” The judge intervened and rephrased the question as
follows, “Do the parliamentarian's testimonies incriminate [the
second applicant]?” The prosecutor's “yes” was
endorsed by the judge as a reply to the question.
In some episodes, when the applicants or their
advocates asked questions which perplexed the prosecutor, the judge
either directly replied instead (i.e. by locating the necessary
pieces of evidence in the case file) or rephrased the questions in a
leading manner, thereby suggesting a suitable answer for the
prosecutor. Thus, one of the advocates asked the prosecutor why it
was necessary to impose detention on remand for three months, when
there were only 8-12 witnesses who remained to be examined. As the
prosecutor was unable to answer, the judge interrupted with,
“[Because] the criminal procedural legislation does not
envisage the imposition of detention for a lesser term”.
As the judge retired for deliberations, the public
were ushered out of the court room by the guards and plain-clothes
men. After the deliberations, the room contained many fewer people
than before. The composition of the public had changed to an almost
all-male audience, avoiding the camera by ostentatiously turning
their backs towards it and the judge. As the judge read the decision,
the plain-clothes men stood next to him. Strangers constantly entered
and left the judge's deliberation room. There were brief glimpses of
one or two guards wearing black hood-like masks inside the court room
in front of the closed door.
The closing scenes briefly showed the large number of
presumably undercover plain-clothes agents leaving the court room,
not hiding their irritation when filmed. A few of the applicant's
supporters, readmitted to the room after the deliberations,
complained that the agents had occupied almost all of the seats. They
asked the cameraman to film the presence of the agents. The first
applicant then stated, “Look, there they are ...the agents
(TanamSromlebi)!”
and pointed to the plain-clothes men. The following remarks could be
heard: “Their presence was overwhelming! ...More agents than
family or friends!”
In the last scene, a hooded, armed man inside the
court room nodded to the cameraman, apparently requesting the latter
to stop recording.
(b) The video recording submitted by the
applicants
The case file also contained a video recording,
submitted by the applicants, showing how around 30-34 plain-clothes
men, identified in the Government's video as undercover agents,
attending the hearing of 2 September 2005, left the Tbilisi City
Court through the same back door exit as the handcuffed applicants.
The agents were shown being greeted with familiarity in the backyard
by the special security forces waiting for the applicants. Some of
the undercover agents were filmed changing from their civil clothes
into police jackets. The applicants were escorted from the courthouse
in the presence of a great number of guards carrying machine guns and
wearing black, hood-like masks.
3. Early release of the second applicant
In
a letter of 11 July 2007, the second applicant informed the Court of
his early release from prison on the basis of a Presidential pardon
of 26 May 2007. He maintained his intention to pursue the Court
proceedings.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
67. The Code of Criminal Procedure
(“CCP”), as it stood at the material time
Article 12 § 7 “Security of the person,
respect for human dignity...”
“In the course of an investigative or judicial
action, it is prohibited to exert upon a person physical or
psychological pressure...or to subject a detained person to
conditions that encroach upon his or her human dignity.”
Article 159 §§ 1 and 2 “Detention”
“1. No one may be
arrested without a court order or other judicial decision.
2. Courts, prosecutors and investigators
are obliged to immediately release any person who is detained
unlawfully.”
Article 417 §§ 1 and 3
“Committal for trial”
“1. Where there is a
sufficient basis for hearing the case, the judge (court), without
prejudging the merits of the case, shall commit the accused for
trial...
3. During the admissibility
hearing, in addition to deciding whether to commit the accused for
trial..., the judge (court) shall decide whether to impose a measure
of restraint on the accused.”
Article 419 “Time-limits for
committal decisions”
“The judge (court) shall decide
whether to commit the accused for trial within 14 days or, in
complicated cases, within a month of the date of delivery of a final
judgment on the last criminal case registered with the same judge
(court).”
Article
437 §§ 2 and 3 provided that the presiding judge was the
authority in charge of a hearing. He or she was responsible for
maintaining order in the court room and carried out all kinds of
procedural actions envisaged by the Code. In addition, Article 442
stated that, during a hearing, the judge had to abide by all the
general legal principles contained in Chapter II of Part I of
the Code, of which Article 12, cited above, formed a part.
68. The Criminal Code
Article 181 § 1 - “Extortion”
“Extortion is claiming another
person's object or property right or property use under threat of
using violence against the victim, or the victim's close relative,
destroying or damaging the object, or of making public information
which may impair the victim's reputation, or of spreading such
information as may substantially prejudice the victim's rights...”
69. The Prison Rules, adopted by Order
No. 367 of 28 December 1999 (as it stood at the material time)
Under
Rule 29 § 3 of the Prison Rules, in the event of a violation of
prison regulations, a detainee could be subjected by the prison
administration to disciplinary sanctions. Rule 29 § 8
listed the disciplinary sanctions as follows:
(a) a
warning;
(b) a
reprimand;
(c) a
short-term or long-term ban on visits;
(d)
confinement from 3 to 20 days in a punishment cell;
(e)
prohibition to receive parcels.
Rule
30 § 1 explicitly prohibited detainees from taking food to a
punishment cell from their ordinary cells.
Under
Addendum No. 1 to the Prison Rules, detainees were forbidden to use
telephones in prison.
70. The Report
of 30 June 2005 (CPT/Inf (2005) 12) on the visit to Georgia
carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”)
from 18 to 28 November 2003 and from 7 to 14 May 2004
The
relevant parts of the Report read as follows:
“a. Prison No. 5, Tbilisi
67. At the end of the visit in 2001, the
CPT's delegation asked the Georgian authorities to take out of use
all cells located in the basement of the main detention block (i.e.
quarantine, transit and disciplinary cells). This measure was
reportedly taken soon after the 2001 visit. However, as a result of
the increasing number of prisoners sent to Prison No. 5, it became
necessary to start using the basement cells again. In May 2004, some
170 prisoners were being held in the basement... The cells were dark,
badly ventilated, damp and disgustingly filthy. Further, in some
cells, prisoners were sharing beds.
68. Conditions on the other levels of the
main detention block remained extremely poor. Many of the dormitories
were grossly overcrowded, with as little as 1 m² of living
space per prisoner. The number of inmates often exceeded the number
of beds, thereby compelling prisoners to sleep in two and
occasionally even three shifts (for example, 46 prisoners in a cell
measuring 45 m² which was equipped with 28 beds). The
situation was exacerbated by poor ventilation and lack of natural
light...The sanitary arrangements were also completely inadequate: up
to 50 prisoners might be sharing the same dilapidated and generally
filthy toilet facility inside a dormitory. Further, there was no
heating, and exposed electrical wires throughout the accommodation
areas created a high risk of accidents...
...
72. The situation with regard to food had not
changed since the 2001 visit; in practice, prisoners relied to a
great extent on food parcels from their families.
Further, as in 2001, prisoners did not receive any
personal hygiene items and there were no laundry facilities. The
prison had relinquished responsibility for providing prisoners with
bedding and many prisoners slept in what could only be described as
rags...
74. ...at the end of the visit in November 2003 the
delegation made three immediate observations in respect of Prison
No. 5 in Tbilisi, requesting the Georgian authorities to:
...(ii) definitively take out of service all cells located in the
basement of the main detention building (including the isolation and
“karzer” cells); (iii) ensure that all prisoners,
including those in the “quarantine” section and
disciplinary isolation cells, are guaranteed outdoor exercise of at
least one hour per day.
In view of the deteriorated situation observed in May
2004, the delegation reiterated the above-mentioned immediate
observations...
75. At the end-of-visit talks in May 2004, the
Minister of Justice acknowledged that Prison No. 5 was
substandard in all the key aspects...
...
c. Discipline
138. ...At Prison No. 5 in Tbilisi, the disciplinary
cells criticised in the report on the visit in 2001 had been taken
out of service and replaced with nine other cells, located in a
different part of the basement of the main detention block.
Admittedly, the cells in question were larger and equipped with
sleeping platforms. However, the cells were substandard in all other
respects; in particular, they had no access to natural light and were
unventilated, humid and dilapidated...
139. During the second periodic visit, the
delegation was concerned to note that prisoners undergoing
disciplinary confinement in the establishments visited were still not
offered outdoor exercise ... at the end of the visit in November
2003, the delegation made an immediate observation, requesting the
Georgian authorities to ensure that inmates placed in disciplinary
cells in all penitentiary establishments in the country are
guaranteed at least one hour of outdoor exercise per day...The
CPT reiterates [that] recommendation...”
71. Human Rights Watch Report “Undue Punishment:
abuses against prisoners in Georgia.” (Volume 18, No. 8(D)
September 2006)
The
relevant parts of the Report read as follows:
“...The space allocated for prison cells in
Georgia—both in law and in practice—is significantly less
than that required by regional human rights standards... In its 2001
recommendations to the Georgian government, the CPT lowered this
standard suggesting, “A standard of 4 m² per prisoner
should be aimed at.” Georgia's Law on Imprisonment
requires that the living space for each convict in the cells of the
Penitentiary Department must be not less than two square meters.
Detainees should each be provided with a separate bed...
Tbilisi Prison No. 5 dates from 1912...In many parts of
Tbilisi Prison No. 5, the walls and floors are crumbling and in
a state of disrepair. Electrical wires are exposed in the cells and
corridors. The regular detention cells are filled with as many
two tier metal bunk beds as the rooms will hold. There were no
tables or chairs in the rooms at the time of Human Rights Watch's
visit. Detainees must sit on beds or on the floor when they are not
sleeping. The toilets are partitioned from the rest of the cell by
only a short wall or sometimes with a piece of fabric or shower
curtain that the inmates have put up themselves. This design allows
for very little privacy for those using the sanitary facilities.
Because of the overcrowding, beds are often placed very close to the
toilets. The toilets are decaying and filthy. In several cells Human
Rights Watch found piles of garbage near the door. Human Rights Watch
considers the conditions in which detainees are housed in this
facility violate the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment.
All of the cells in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 visited by
Human Rights Watch smelled strongly of human sweat, human excrement,
and cigarette smoke. Detainees spend consecutive days and weeks in
these cells without being allowed outside... The cells were also
unreasonably hot, due to the overcrowding and lack of ventilation.
Many prisoners were reduced to wearing very little clothing in an
effort to stay cool...
Human Rights Watch found the most appalling conditions
to be in the basement “quarantine” cells in Tbilisi
Prison No. 5...The cells visited by Human Rights Watch had no natural
light or ventilation, owing to their location in the basement, and
only one tiny window covered with screens. Artificial light was
provided by a bright light over the door. There was no running water
in the sinks. There was standing water on the floor in one cell. The
bed frames consisted of bare iron planks, and there were no
mattresses and only a few tattered blankets...
The deputy director of Tbilisi Prison No. 5 claimed
that detainees “wash once per week.” However,
detainees stated that they do not shower once per week because
“[t]here are too many people.”...
In Tbilisi Prison No. 5, Human Rights Watch found
the kitchen building to be decaying. Water was overflowing some of
the food preparation containers resulting in standing water on the
floor...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
Under
Article 3 of the Convention, the first applicant challenged the
conditions of his confinement in the punishment cell of Tbilisi No. 5
Prison, whilst the second applicant complained of the overcrowding in
the same prison. Both applicants also submitted that their treatment
in the courthouse – being kept in “metal cages”,
surrounded by intimidating, hooded, armed guards, being exposed to an
independent observer as “criminals” – had been
degrading.
Article
3 of the Convention provides:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. The first applicant's confinement in the punishment
cell
1. The parties' arguments
The
Government submitted that the first applicant's confinement in the
punishment cell from 11 to 15 January 2005 had been a lawful
disciplinary sanction under Rule 29 §§ 3 and 8 of the
Prison Rules and Addendum I thereto. They claimed that the
prosecution authorities had opened a criminal case on 18 May
2006 and conducted a comprehensive domestic inquiry, the conclusions
of which, based on the statements of the prison staff and the second
inmate, showed that the conditions in the punishment cell had been
fully satisfactory (see paragraphs 44-46 above). They went on to
emphasise that the first applicant's health had been examined by the
doctor daily and that the food provided had been of the same quality
as that provided in ordinary cells. In addition, the Government
stated, the first applicant had been allowed to receive food parcels
from his relatives, which had helped him to maintain adequate
nutrition in the punishment cell. As to the fire incident of 14
January 2006, the Government alleged that the authorities had acted
with due diligence by immediately taking the first applicant out of
the punishment cell until the smoke had gone.
The
Government submitted that the limited duration of confinement in the
punishment cell, the objective it pursued and the effect it had on
the first applicant should be taken into account when assessing
whether that measure had amounted to ill-treatment within the meaning
of Article 3 of the Convention.
The
first applicant replied that the authorities' internal investigation
could not be regarded as “effective” because it had only
been launched four months after his complaint of 20 January 2006, and
after the Court had given notice of his application to the
Government. The fact that the investigation was terminated on 26 June
2006, that is shortly before the Government submitted their initial
observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, on
30 June 2006, proved that the prosecution authorities had been guided
not by the duty of due diligence to provide the first applicant with
a reasonable possibility of redress, but rather to equip the
Government with an additional argument in the proceedings before the
Court. The first applicant further stated that, owing to the belated
nature of the investigation, the prison administration had had plenty
of time to improve the conditions in the punishment cell. For
example, the administration might have built a partition wall between
the toilet and the rest of the cell or fixed a water tap. Since
neither he nor his advocates had been afforded an opportunity to
visit the punishment cell after his confinement there, he was not in
a position to provide any further comments. The first applicant
particularly condemned in this regard the fact that neither he nor
his advocates had been offered the opportunity to take part in the
relevant criminal proceedings and investigation measures, and that
the prosecution authorities had relied only on the statements of the
prison administration and the second inmate – whose
impartiality could reasonably be questioned.
The
first applicant further submitted that some of the findings of the
domestic inquiry still disclosed unacceptable conditions of his
confinement in the punishment cell. Thus, the authorities
acknowledged that the cell had no window with access to the daylight,
that there was no sink and that the inmates had to wash their face
and body above the toilet hole. In addition, a 120 cm bed, the
existence of which was confirmed by the authorities, could not
accommodate two grown men. The first applicant noted that the
Government had not commented on his complaint about the inability to
have outdoor exercises throughout his confinement.
Lastly,
the first applicant alleged that the placement in the punishment cell
was not proportionate to the impugned breach of the prison rules,
especially since the trial was due to begin two days later.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court reiterates that, under Article 3 of the Convention, the State
must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are
compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method
of the execution of the measure do not subject the individual to
distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level
of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical
demands of imprisonment, the person's health and well-being are
adequately secured (see Valašinas v. Lithuania, no.
44558/98, § 102, ECHR 2001 VIII; Kudła v.
Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000 XI).
When assessing conditions of detention, one must consider their
cumulative effects as well as the applicant's specific allegations
(see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR
2001 II).
Most
of the Government's arguments are based on the results of the
internal criminal investigation, to the effect that the first
applicant's complaints about the conditions in the punishment were
untrue. However, the Court is not convinced by that conclusion.
First, the investigation cannot be considered to have been effective
because it was launched only four months after the first applicant
complained to the prosecution authorities, thus giving the prison
administration sufficient time to renovate the cell in question.
Secondly, the investigation could not reasonably be considered to
have been objective, in so far as it was conducted without the
participation of the first applicant's advocates, and its conclusions
were mostly based on the statements of the prison administration
complained of (see, amongst many others, Gharibashvili v. Georgia,
no. 11830/03, §§ 60-63, 29 July 2008;
Barbu Anghelescu v. Romania, no. 46430/99, § 66,
5 October 2004; Corsacov v. Moldova, no. 18944/02,
§ 70, 4 April 2006).
The
Court further notes that some of the first applicant's allegations
were either undisputed by the Government or even confirmed by the
results of the above-mentioned internal investigation. Thus, for
example, the Government said nothing about the lack of access to
outdoor exercise and conceded that the punishment cell, located in
the basement, did not receive any daylight. Further corroboration of
the first applicant's description of his punishment cell is to be
found in the Reports on the visits to Tbilisi No. 5 Prison made
by the CPT and Human Rights Watch at the material time (see
paragraphs 70 and 71 above; Dougoz
v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II;
Kehayov v. Bulgaria, no. 41035/98, § 66, 18
January 2005; Ostrovar v. Moldova, no. 35207/03, § 80,
13 September 2005).
As
to the Government's argument that the first applicant's confinement
in the punishment cell was in compliance with the relevant internal
regulations, the Court reiterates that the
subject matter of the first applicant's complaint under Article 3 of
the Convention is not an illegal use of power by the prison staff,
nor the lawfulness of the imposition of that disciplinary sanction,
but rather the compatibility of the general conditions in the
punishment cell of Tbilisi No. 5 Prison with the requirements
of Article 3 (cf. Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec),
no. 1704/06, 26 June 2007). A measure of disciplinary confinement may
not in itself be in breach of those requirements. It is rather the
proportionality of its imposition and the conditions of the
confinement which may be questionable under the above provision (see,
mutatis mutandis, Rohde v. Denmark, no. 69332/01,
§§ 96-98, 21 July 2005, and Mikadze v. Russia,
no. 52697/99, §§ 110-127, 7 June 2007).
Nevertheless,
the Court observes that, amongst the several available disciplinary
sanctions envisaged for a breach of prison regulations (see paragraph
69 above), the administration chose the most severe one –
confinement in a punishment cell. No consideration was apparently
given to such facts as, for example, the nature of the first
applicant's wrongdoing, his personality and the fact that it was his
first such breach. The Court recalls in this connection that the
proportionality of an additional punitive measure imposed upon a
prisoner is of importance when assessing whether or not the
unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention has been
exceeded (see, mutatis mutandis, Renolde v. France,
no. 5608/05, §§ 120-129, 16 October 2008, and
Mathew v. the Netherlands, no. 24919/03, §§ 197 205,
ECHR 2005 IX).
84. As to the conditions in the
punishment cell, the Court observes that, as acknowledged by the
Government, the space in the cell was 5.65 square metres for two
inmates (see paragraph 47 above). The Court notes in this connection
that, as early as 2001, the CPT recommended the Georgian Government
to aim at a minimum standard of 4 square metres per prisoner (see
paragraph 71 above). It is to be recalled that the lack of personal
space afforded to detainees can be so extreme as to justify, in
itself, a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
Thus, for example, in a number of cases, the Court has found
violations of that provision solely on the basis of the fact that the
applicants were afforded less than 3 square metres of personal space
(see, for example, Lind v. Russia, no. 25664/05, § 59,
6 December 2007; Kantyrev v. Russia, no. 37213/02,
§§ 50-51, 21 June 2007; Andrey Frolov v.
Russia, no. 205/02, §§ 47-49, 29 March 2007;
Labzov v. Russia, no. 62208/00, § 44, 16
June 2005; Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378/00, § 40,
20 January 2005).
85. In
the Peers case, an
even bigger cell (7 square metres for two inmates) was considered a
relevant factor in finding a violation, coupled, as in the present
case, with a lack of ventilation and daylight (see Peers v.
Greece, no. 28524/95, § 70-72,
ECHR 2001 III, and Trepashkin v Russia,
no. 36898/03, § 94, 19 July 2007).
The Court further notes that, during his confinement, the
applicant was not allowed to take outdoor exercise. That factor adds
to the problem of the insufficient cell space per detainee (see
Karalevičius v. Lithuania, no. 53254/99, § 36,
7 April 2005).
The
requirement of sufficient personal space also presupposes, under
Article 3 of the Convention, that a detainee should be able to enjoy
basic privacy in his or her everyday life (see, mutatis mutandis,
Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967/01, §§ 73-79,
1 March 2007; Valašinas, cited above, § 104;
Khudoyorov, cited above, §§ 106 and 107; Novoselov
v. Russia, no. 66460/01, §§ 32, 40-43, 2 June
2005). As the first applicant was obliged to share a 120 cm bed with
a stranger and could not even relieve himself in “the toilet”
without being observed by the latter, the conditions obviously did
not allow any elementary privacy (see Kalashnikov v. Russia,
no. 47095/99, § 99, ECHR 2002 VI).
Nor could the sanitary conditions in the punishment
cell (see paragraph 34 above) be deemed to have been acceptable. As
acknowledged by the Government, the first applicant had even refused
to consume the food on account of the unhygienic conditions in the
cell (see paragraphs 34, 35 and 44 above). As regards the nutrition
problem, the Court further notes that the Government were apparently
content to acknowledge that the first applicant had been able to rely
on his relatives' food parcels in the punishment cell (see paragraph
74 above). However, the permission to consume one's own food cannot
be a substitute for appropriate catering arrangements, because it
remains the State's obligation to ensure the well-being of persons
deprived of their liberty (see Stepuleac v. Moldova,
no. 8207/06, § 55, 6 November 2007; Kadiķis
v. Latvia (no. 2), no. 62393/00, § 55, 4 May
2006; Valašinas, cited above, § 109).
The above factors are sufficient for the Court to
conclude, without exploring other aspects of the complaint, that,
when confined to a punishment cell in Tbilisi No. 5 Prison from 11 to
15 January 2006, the first applicant was held in inhuman and
degrading conditions, in violation of Article 3 of the
Convention.
B. The conditions of the second applicant's detention
1. The parties' arguments
Despite
the Court's invitation, the Government did not comment on the
admissibility and merits of the second applicant's complaints
concerning the conditions of his detention.
In
reply, the second applicant maintained his complaints and stated that
the Government's silence amounted to the tacit acknowledgment of a
violation.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court notes that the Government did not dispute the second
applicant's complaint about the conditions of his detention in
Tbilisi No. 5 Prison. The latter's description of these conditions
coincides with the relevant accounts of the CPT and Human Rights
Watch (see paragraphs 70 and 71 above).
The
focal point here is the second applicant's transfer to an overcrowded
cell on 19 January 2006. Initially, he shared with 29 inmates a cell
where there were only 12 beds. After he had raised this issue before
a court on 23 February 2006, six more inmates were placed in his
cell, increasing the total number of prisoners to 35. The inmates
were obliged to take turns to sleep (see paragraphs 33 and 37 above).
Such overcrowding was in itself a breach of Article 3 (see, among
many others, Kalashnikov, cited above, §§ 96-97),
the more so since the restricted space for sleeping was not
compensated by freedom of movement during the daytime with outdoor
exercise (see, a contrario, Valašinas, cited
above, §§ 103
and 107, and Nurmagomedov v. Russia (dec.), no. 30138/02,
16 September 2004). The second applicant's detention in such
overcrowded conditions lasted, according to the case file, at least
until 29 March 2006, the date of his conviction, after which he was
transferred from Tbilisi No. 5 Prison to Rustavi No. 6 Prison
(see paragraphs 41 and 42 above).
In
the light of the above observations, the Court concludes that there
has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the
second applicant's detention in an overcrowded cell at Tbilisi No. 5
Prison.
C. The applicants' treatment in the courthouse
1. The parties' arguments
Although
invited to do so by the Court, the Government did not provide an
explanation or justification for the applicants' placement in a
barred dock during the public hearings. They limited their
observations to the submission of a video recording of the judicial
review of the applicants' detention on 2 September 2005 (see
paragraph 52 above), in support of the assertion that there had been
only four uniformed guards in the court room, excluding the presence
of “special forces”.
The
applicants replied, first, that the Government's silence with respect
to their complaint about being placed in the cage-like dock should be
interpreted as tacit acceptance that they had been. Secondly, the
applicants stated that even the Government's video recording, despite
having been edited, still showed armed and hooded men present inside
and outside the court room. Moreover, relying on another video
recording showing the premises of the courthouse on 2 September 2005,
the applicants reiterated their complaint that there had been many
other hooded and armed men waiting outside the court room, which
instilled feelings of fear and tension in the courthouse (see
paragraphs 52-65 above).
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court reiterates that a measure of restraint does not normally give
rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where this measure
has been imposed in connection with a lawful detention and does not
entail a use of force, or public exposure, exceeding that which is
reasonably considered necessary. In this regard it is important to
consider, for instance, whether there is a danger that the person
concerned might abscond or cause injury or damage (see, among many
others, Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, § 56,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 VIII).
The
Court recalls that a violation of Article 3 of the Convention was
found in a case where the applicant, who was not a
public figure, was unjustifiably handcuffed, the latter restraint
measure being less stringent than those complained of in the present
case, during public hearings (see Gorodnichev
v. Russia, no. 52058/99,
§§ 105-109, 25 May 2007). Even in the absence of
publicity, a given treatment may still be degrading if the victim
could be humiliated in his or her own eyes (see Tyrer v.
the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 32, Series A
no. 26). Thus, handcuffing the applicant in
a private setting still gave rise to a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention in a situation where no serious risks to security could be
proved to exist (see Henaf v. France, no. 65436/01, §§
51 and 56, ECHR 2003 XI; Istratii and Others v. Moldova,
nos. 8721/05, 8705/05 and 8742/05, §§ 57 and 58,
27 March 2007).
Returning
to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes
that the applicants were people enjoying social esteem; they were
co-founders and shareholders of a television channel. The first
applicant enjoyed a wider reputation as anchorman of a popular TV
talk-show which had been on the air almost daily. Both applicants
were on trial for the first time and for the offence of
extortion – payment in exchange for not disclosing an
embarrassing documentary about an allegedly corrupt parliamentarian.
Having
examined the relevant photo and video materials, the Court notes
that, during the judicial review of the issue of their detention on
2 September 2006, the public watched the applicants in a barred
dock, which looked very much like a metal cage, separated from the
rest of the court room and having a barred ceiling. Heavily armed
guards wearing black hood-like masks were always present in the
courthouse. Several photographs show such guards inside the court
room. As acknowledged by the Government, the hearing was broadcast
live throughout the country (see paragraph 119 below).
The
Court shares the applicants' concern that such a harsh and hostile
appearance of judicial proceedings could lead an average observer to
believe that “extremely dangerous criminals” were on
trial. Apart from undermining the principle of the presumption
of innocence, the disputed treatment in the court room humiliated the
applicants in their own eyes, if not in those of the public. The
Court also accepts the applicants' assertion that the special forces
in the courthouse aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and
inferiority (see V. v. the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR 1999 IX; Tyrer,
cited above, § 32). Such harsh treatment could easily have had
an impact on the applicants' powers of concentration and mental
alertness during the proceedings bearing on such an important issue
as their physical liberty, thus calling for very close scrutiny by
the Court (see Khudoyorov, cited above, § 119).
The
Court notes that, against the applicants' status as public figures,
the lack of earlier convictions and their orderly behaviour during
the criminal proceedings, the Government have failed to provide any
justification for their being placed in a caged dock during the
public hearings and the use of “special forces” in the
courthouse. Nothing in the case file suggests that there was the
slightest risk that the applicants, well-known and apparently quite
harmless persons, might abscond or resort to violence during their
transfer to the courthouse or at the hearings (see Sarban v.
Moldova, no. 3456/05, §§ 88 and 89, 4 October
2005).
In
the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the
imposition of such stringent and humiliating measures upon the
applicants cannot be justified in the present case. There has
accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on
account of the applicants' treatment during the hearing of 2
September 2005.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 (c)
OF THE CONVENTION
Under
Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, the applicants challenged
the lawfulness of their detention after the court order of 29 August
2005 expired on 27 November 2005. The provision relied on reads, in
its relevant part, as follows:
“1. ... No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law: ...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so...”
1. The parties' arguments
The
Government submitted that there was no need for a court to authorise
the applicants' pre-trial detention after the three month detention
period had expired on 27 November 2005, in so far as by that time
their case had already been referred for trial. The Government stated
that, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the CCP, the fact that
the case had been transmitted to the trial court already sufficed for
the detention to fall under “judicial scrutiny” and thus
to be fully compatible with Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention.
The
applicants replied that their detention from 27 November 2005 to 13
January 2006 had been unlawful because it was not covered by any
valid court decision.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court notes that a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c)
of the Convention has been found in a number of cases concerning the
practice of holding defendants in custody solely on the basis of the
fact that a bill of indictment had been filed with a trial court.
Detaining defendants without a specific legal basis or clear rules
governing their situation – with the result that they may be
deprived of their liberty for an unlimited period of time without
judicial authorisation – is incompatible with the principles of
legal certainty and the protection from arbitrariness, which are
common threads throughout the Convention and the rule of law (see,
amongst others, Gigolashvili v. Georgia,
no. 18145/05, §§ 32-36, 8 July 2008;
Ječius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, §§ 60-64,
ECHR 2000 IX; Grauslys v. Lithuania,
no. 36743/97, §§ 39-41, 10 October 2000;
Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, §§ 53-58,
ECHR 2000 III; Khudoyorov, cited above, §§ 146-147).
The
Court notes that the present application is no different from the
Gigolashvili or Ječius cases cited above, owing to
the similar deficiencies in Georgian criminal procedural law and
practice at the material time.
Notably,
under Article 417 §§ 1 and 3 of the CCP, once the
prosecution had terminated the investigation and transmitted the
criminal case file to the court with jurisdiction, the latter could
hold an admissibility hearing and decide whether to commit the
accused for trial and whether it was necessary to impose a measure of
restraint on that individual.
However,
a problem arose with the timing of such a hearing. Pursuant to
Article 419 of the CCP, an admissibility hearing was required to be
held within fourteen days or, for “complicated cases”,
within a month of the delivery of a final judgment on the last,
unrelated criminal case brought before the same judge, but the latter
had no time constraints in deciding that “last” case. The
CCP neither required that, in the meantime, a judicial order
authorising the defendant's detention should be issued, nor did it
specify any statutory limits for this phase of detention.
Such statutory lacunae resulted in the practice of detaining
defendants without any judicial decision for months (see also
Absandze v. Georgia (dec.), no. 57861/00, 20 July 2004).
It follows that, between 27 November 2005 and
13 January 2006, for one month and seventeen days, there was no
judicial decision authorising the applicant's detention. The fact
that the criminal case file was sent, together with the bill of
indictment, to the trial court did not render the remaining period of
detention “lawful” within the meaning of Article 5
§ 1 of the Convention (see Gigolashvili, cited
above, § 36, and Nakhmanovich v. Russia,
no. 55669/00, § 68, 2 March 2006).
There
has thus been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention
in respect of that period of detention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that the judicial review of the lawfulness of
their detention on 27 August and 2 September 2005 and 13 January
2006 had breached the guarantees afforded by Article 5 § 4.
113. In
particular, they complained that the prosecution had not made
available to their lawyers, prior to the initial review of their
detention on 27 August and 2 September 2005, a copy of the video
recording of 27 August 2005.
114. Specifically
referring to the manner in which the hearing of 2 September 2005
had been held, and assessing it against the situation in the
judiciary obtaining in the respondent State at that time (cf.
Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia, decision cited above),
the applicants asserted that the issue of their detention had not
been the object of a fair hearing by an impartial and independent
tribunal. The applicants also alleged that, having been placed in
“metal cages” during that hearing, they would have been
presumed guilty on the basis of their appearance by any independent
observer. Moreover, the judge might have had difficulty in remaining
impartial in the presence of such a high number of undercover agents
and hooded, armed men in the courthouse.
115. As
to the review of 13 January 2006, the applicants complained that it
was not a speedy reply to their complaint of 6 December 2005.
They also submitted that their advocates had been notified about that
hearing only two days in advance.
116. Article
5 § 4 of the Convention reads as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
1. The parties'
arguments
The
Government submitted that the judicial review of 29 August 2005
had been conducted within the statutory time-limit of 72 hours
following the applicants' arrest on 27 August 2005. Consequently, the
proceedings had been speedy. As to the review of 13 January 2006, the
fact that the Tbilisi City Court examined the applicants' complaint
of 6 December 2005 satisfied, in the Government's view, the
requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
In
response to the complaint about the absence of the video recording of
27 August 2005 from the criminal case file at the beginning of the
criminal proceedings, the Government stated that the applicants had
been given access to its verbatim transcript on 29 September 2005,
that they had watched the recording on 16 November 2005 and
that, in any case, the video had been shown to the parties during a
hearing on the merits.
As
to the review of detention on 2 September 2005, the Government
reiterated their argument under Article 3 of the Convention, namely,
that there had been only four uniformed guards in the court room,
excluding the presence of any hooded, armed men. They claimed that
the presence of four guards had been necessary to secure order and
did not render the proceedings unfair. With regard to the
overcrowding in the court room, the Government noted that the judge
had offered the applicants the possibility of conducting the hearing
in camera but they had refused. In any case, the
Government claimed, communication between the accused applicants and
the judge had not been hampered by the turmoil in the court room.
Moreover, the applicants could make applications to the judge in
writing. The Government added that, whilst at the material time there
had been a shortage of court rooms of appropriate size due to the
reconstruction of the courthouse, the authorities had not been under
an obligation to provide larger premises. Noting that the hearing had
been broadcast live throughout the country, the Government added that
the principle of publicity had been respected.
Finally,
the Government stated that the applicants' reliance on the statements
of former judges of the Supreme Court of Georgia in support of their
allegation concerning the ineffectiveness of the judiciary in Georgia
was unconvincing (cf. Ramishvili and Kokhreidze, decision
cited above). Those judges had been dismissed from office for
“flagrant violations of the law” and, consequently, their
comments could not be deemed impartial.
The
applicants replied that the Government's own video recording proved
the fact that on 2 September 2005 they had been denied a fair hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal. Despite the great number of
security personnel at the beginning, and an even greater number at
the end of that hearing, the court had been unable to maintain order.
The prosecution was seated significantly closer to the judge than the
defence. As for the applicants, they had been placed in a cage at the
far end of the court room. They had had to stand on a chair in the
cage and even suspend themselves from the bars in order to follow the
proceedings at least visually. The ability of the advocates to listen
to the prosecutor's address was severely diminished and it was at
times entirely impossible for the applicants in their remote
location. The authorities could not be expected to designate large
court rooms but they did have the obligation to secure the applicants
and their advocates' effective and fair participation at the hearing.
Referring to the relevant episodes of the video recordings, the
applicants stated that, in the presence of the authorities' machine
guns in and outside the court room and numerous uniformed and
plain-clothes agents freely entering and leaving his deliberation
room, the hearing judge could not possibly have been uninfluenced in
reaching his decision on 2 September 2005.
As
to the hearing on 13 January 2006, even though their complaint of
6 December 2005 had been heard, this could not be said to
constitute a speedy reply and was likewise not protected by the
safeguards of a fair hearing.
Lastly,
the applicants noted that the situation in the judiciary had been
deplored not only by former judges of the Supreme Court of Georgia
but also by independent and competent international observers, such
as the European Judges and Public Prosecutors for Democracy and
Fundamental Rights (“Magistrats européens pour la
Démocratie et les Libertés – MEDEL”)
(cf. Ramishvili and Kokhreidze, decision cited above).
2. The Court's assessment
(a) As to the inability to have access to
the video recording of 27 August 2005 during the initial review
of the applicants' pre-trial detention
The
Court recalls that, under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the
concept of lawfulness of detention is not limited to compliance with
the procedural requirements set out in domestic law but also concerns
the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest, the
legitimacy of the purpose pursued by the arrest and the justification
of the ensuing detention. Therefore, information which is essential
for the assessment of the lawfulness of a detention should be made
available in an appropriate manner to the suspect's lawyer (see,
amongst other authorities, Lamy v. Belgium, 30 March
1989, § 29, Series A no. 151, and
Garcia Alva v. Germany, no. 23541/94,
§§ 39-43, 13 February 2001).
In
the present case, the Court notes that the applicants were caught
red-handed with the parliamentarian's money. This fact alone was
sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that extortion had been
committed. Furthermore, even without a copy of the video recording of
27 August 2005, the criminal case file contained many other
relevant pieces of evidence – the US dollar banknotes, the
results of the search, the second applicant's car, fingerprints, etc.
– by the time the detention order of 29 April 2005 was
reviewed by the appellate and final instance court on 2 September
2005 (cf. Ramishvili and Kokhreidze, decision cited above).
Thus,
the absence of the video recording of 27 August 2005 from the
criminal case file at the beginning of the criminal proceedings,
which fact might well have been conditioned by the considerations of
the efficiency of investigation and/or speediness of the habeas
corpus procedure (see, Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no. 38822/97,
§ 77, ECHR 2003 I (extracts); cf. Galuashvili v.
Georgia (dec.), no. 40008/04, 24 October 2006), cannot
be said to have rendered it impossible for the domestic courts to
review the lawfulness of the applicants' pre-trial detention.
The
Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 5 § 4
of the Convention in connection with the above-mentioned complaint.
(b) As to the hearing of 2 September 2005
The
Court recalls that, although it is not always necessary that the
procedure under Article 5 § 4 be attended by the same
guarantees as those required by Article 6 of the Convention for
criminal or civil litigation, it must have a judicial character and
provide guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty
in question (see, for instance, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria,
28 October 1998, § 162, Reports 1998 VIII;
Włoch v. Poland, no. 27785/95,
§ 125, ECHR 2000 XI; Megyeri v. Germany,
12 May 1992, § 22, Series A no. 237 A).
In view of the dramatic impact of the deprivation of liberty on the
fundamental rights of the person concerned, proceedings conducted
under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention should in principle meet,
to the largest extent possible under the circumstances of an on-going
investigation, the basic requirements of a fair trial (see Shishkov,
cited above, § 77). The proceedings must be adversarial and
must always ensure “equality of arms” between the parties
(see, among others, Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96,
§ 58, ECHR 1999-II, and Schiesser v. Switzerland,
4 December 1979, §§ 30-31, Series A no. 34).
Having
examined the relevant photographic and video materials, the Court
deplores the manner in which the hearing of 2 September 2005 was
held. It notes that the applicants were placed in a caged dock at the
far end of the court room in complete disorder and surrounded by
guards. They could hardly communicate with their lawyers, could not
properly hear the prosecutor and the judge and could hardly make
their submissions audible due to the turmoil in the room. In order to
participate in the hearing, the applicants had to stand on a chair in
the barred dock, hanging on to the metal side bars, and shout.
Communication in the court room was constantly hampered by the
unsolicited interruptions of journalists, unabated ringing of mobile
telephones, persons vehemently arguing with each other and uttering
vulgar curses, etc., and the judge was either unwilling or unable to
establish order.
The
Court further notes that, unlike the prosecutor, the applicants'
advocates, when making their defence statements, were dazzled by
camera flashes and halogen camera lights. Their statements were
hardly audible. By contrast, due to the immediate proximity of the
prosecutor's seat to the judge, the dialogue of questions and answers
between them was unaffected and presented no comparable obstacle of
audibility (see paragraphs 52-64).
The
Court considers that an oral hearing in such chaotic conditions can
hardly be conducive to a sober judicial examination. It cannot accept
the Government's argument that the possibility of written
applications could have palliated the above-mentioned turmoil in the
court room. It notes that oral hearings should create such conditions
that verbal responses and audio visual exchanges between the
parties and the judge in a court room flow in a decent, dynamic and
undisturbed manner.
The
Court reiterates that the applicants' confinement inside the barred
dock, which looked like a metal cage, and the presence of “special
forces” in the courthouse were detrimental to their powers of
concentration, powers which are indispensable for conducting an
efficient defence (see paragraph 100 above). The Court further agrees
with the applicants that such humiliating and unjustifiably stringent
measures of restraint during the public hearing, the latter being
broadcast throughout the country, tainted the presumption of
innocence, the respect for which principle is of paramount importance
at every stage of criminal proceedings, including proceedings bearing
on the lawfulness of detention pending trial (see, for example,
Iłowiecki v. Poland, no. 27504/95, §
76, 4 October 2001, and Lebedev v. Russia,
no. 4493/04, § 95, 25 October 2007).
The
Court recalls that, even without an explicit stipulation of these
requirements in Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, it would be
inconceivable to suppose that this provision, which enshrines the
right “to take proceedings [in] a court”, did not
envisage, as a fundamental requisite, the independence and
impartiality of that court (see Neumeister
v. Austria, 27 June
1968, § 24, Series A no. 8; D.N.
v. Switzerland
[GC], no. 27154/95, § 42, ECHR 2001 III; Bülbül
v. Turkey, no.
47297/99, §§ 26-28, 22 May 2007).
134. In
the present case, the personal conduct of the judge presiding over
the hearing on 2 September 2005 could not be said, in the eyes of the
Court, to have been devoid of bias. Thus, the Court cannot escape the
observation that the judge was obviously aiding the prosecutor during
the hearing, by either directly responding to the questions of the
defence instead of the latter or rephrasing these questions in a
manner more advantageous to the prosecutor (see paragraphs 60-61
above).
As
to the requisite “independence”, it was undoubtedly
tainted by the high number of under-cover government agents and even
“special forces” present during the hearing of 2
September 2005. The court cannot be said to have given the appearance
of independence when the government agents seemed to be more in
control of the situation in the court room than the hearing judge
himself and when the latter's deliberation room, which should be
private and inviolable, was easily accessed by strangers (see
paragraphs 53-54 and 62-65 above).
The
above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that
the judicial review of 2 September 2005 lacked the fundamental
requisites of a fair hearing. The review was thus held in violation
of the applicants' rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
(c) As to the hearing on 13 January 2006
The
Court notes that, whilst the applicants filed a complaint alleging
the unlawfulness of their detention without a valid court order on
6 December 2005, the Tbilisi Regional Court replied only on 13
January 2006, i.e. 38 days later. The
Government did not explain that inordinate delay. Nothing suggests
that it could be attributable to the applicants.
138. In
such circumstances, the Court concludes that the judicial review of
13 January 2006 cannot be regarded as a “speedy” reply to
their complaint of 6 December 2005. There has thus been a violation
of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see, for
example, Kadem v. Malta, no. 55263/00,
§§ 43-45, 9 January 2003, where the Court found a
period of seventeen days for examining an appeal against detention to
be too long, and Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462/95, §§
82-86, ECHR 2000 XII, where two such periods of twenty-three
days were considered excessive).
As
disclosed by the applicants' post-communication submissions, their
complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention about the
hearing on 13 January 2006 was aimed at challenging the absence
of a speedy judicial response (see paragraph 122 above). In view of
its finding above, the Court does not deem it necessary to examine,
within the same context of “speediness”, the applicants'
undeveloped allegation that their lawyers had been given notice of
that review only two days in advance (see, mutatis mutandis,
Mitev v. Bulgaria, no. 40063/98, §§ 125 and
126, 22 December 2004).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
1. Pecuniary damage
The
first applicant did not submit a claim in respect of pecuniary
damage. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to
award him any sum on that account (see Fadıl Yılmaz v.
Turkey, no. 28171/02, § 26, 21 July 2005).
The
second applicant submitted that he had been taken ill with a skin
problem during his detention in Tbilisi No. 5 Prison, Rustavi
No. 6 Prison and Rustavi No. 2 Prison. Upon his release from
prison on 27 May 2007 (see paragraph 66 above), he visited a
dermatologist who diagnosed him, in June 2007, with neurodermatosis,
an allegedly incurable and chronic disease.
In
support of his medical complaint, the second applicant submitted a
medical opinion. Having examined that opinion, the Court notes that,
apart from reiterating the applicant's own allegation, it did not
independently establish at least an approximate cause and date of the
origin of the disease. The opinion also stated that, together with a
particular kind of medication, the second applicant required
sanatorium-type treatment at a resort with a dry climate (i.e. the
Dead Sea).
Relying
on this medical opinion, the second applicant asserted that, in order
to avoid any further complication of his skin condition, he would
need to spend EUR 10,000 per year, to cover medical
consultations, medication and resort treatment. He asked for the
respondent Government to be required to pay him the above-mentioned
sum, annually, for the next fifteen years.
The
Court recalls that there must be a clear causal connection between
the pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant and the violation of
the Convention. A precise calculation of the sums necessary to
make complete reparation (restitutio in integrum) in respect
of pecuniary losses suffered by applicants may be prevented by the
inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the
violation. The question to be decided in such cases is the level of
just satisfaction in respect of both past and future pecuniary
losses. The determination of this matter lies within the Court's
discretion, and should be equitable (see Z and Others v. the
United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 120, ECHR
2001 V).
Returning
to the circumstances of the present case, the Court first notes that
it has found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention not with
respect to the total period of the second applicant's detention,
covering all possible aspects of poor conditions in all the prisons
where he had been kept, but only with respect to the specific fact of
his placement in an overcrowded cell at Tbilisi Prison No. 5 between
19 January and 29 March 2006 (see paragraph 92 above). However,
the second applicant's submissions did not establish with the
requisite degree of certainty that the overcrowding there was the
direct cause of his skin condition.
Consequently,
the Court considers that no clear causal link has been established by
the second applicant between the alleged pecuniary damage and the
violation it has found. Furthermore, as regards the claim for
compensation for the medical costs that might be incurred by the
second applicant within the next fifteen years, the Court reiterates
that the greater the lapse of time involved, the more uncertain the
link becomes between the breach and the damage (see Sunday
Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (Article 50), 6 November
1980, § 15, Series A no. 38, and Smith and
Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction),
nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, §§ 18-19, ECHR
2000-IX). This uncertainty is aggravated by the second applicant's
failure to show the necessity of the claimed amount, in that he did
not itemise the approximate prices of the required medication and
treatment.
In
view of the above, the Court rejects the second applicant's claim in
respect of pecuniary damage.
2. Non-pecuniary damage
The
applicants submitted that, as a result of the violations of their
Convention rights, they had been subjected to feelings of anguish and
anxiety. Pointing out that they were well-known public figures who
had been held in high social esteem, they submitted that their good
reputation had been significantly damaged by the authorities'
arbitrary and debasing actions in the course of the criminal
proceedings against them. Each of them claimed EUR 80,000
in non-pecuniary damages.
The
Court has no doubt that the applicants must have suffered distress on
account of the violations found above. Taking into account the
various relevant factors and making its assessment on an equitable
basis, the Court awards each of the applicants EUR 6,000 under this
head.
B. Costs and expenses
1. Domestic proceedings
In
the domestic proceedings the applicants were represented by the
advocates from two separate law firms – Andronikashvili,
Sachsen-Alternburg, Baramidze & Partners and Svanidze &
Partners.
Relying
on a legal services contract of 30 August 2005 and an invoice dated
30 September 2005, the applicants claimed USD 1,062 (EUR 830),
which sum included 18% VAT in accordance with Georgian tax law, as
reimbursement for the legal costs paid to Andronikashvili,
Sachsen Alternburg, Baramidze & Partners for the
representation of their interests during the judicial review of 2
September 2005.
The
applicants also submitted a legal services contract of 6 July 2006,
according to which they were to pay Svanidze & Partners
GEL 3,600 (EUR 1,987), to which sum should be added
18% VAT, for their representation in all criminal and
administrative-legal proceedings against them.
Lastly,
the applicants claimed that their relatives had spent around EUR
10,000 on supplying them with adequate food in prison. No document or
other material evidence in support of the latter claim was submitted.
The
Court reiterates that, where a violation of the Convention has been
found, it may award the applicant the costs and the expenses incurred
before the national authorities for the prevention or redress of the
violation (see, among other authorities, Papon v. France,
no. 54210/00, § 115, ECHR 2002-VII, and Patsuria v.
Georgia, no. 30779/04, § 158, 6 November
2007). Such a claim must always be itemised and submitted in
writing together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers,
failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part.
In
view of its findings with respect to the judicial review of
2 September 2005 (see paragraphs 102 and 136 above), the Court
awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 830 in respect of their
representation by the law firm Andronikashvili,
Sachsen-Alternburg, Baramidze & Partners on the basis of the
legal services contract of 30 September 2005.
As
to the claim in respect of the applicants' representation by the
second law firm, Svanidze & Partners, the Court notes that
the underlying legal services contract was signed only on 6 July
2006, i.e. well after the relevant domestic remedies aimed at
preventing or putting an end to the violations of Article 3 and
Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 4 of the Convention had been used by
the applicants. The case file shows that, subsequent to the emergence
of that second legal contract, there was only one domestic complaint,
dated 18 July 2006, aimed at asserting the first applicant's rights
under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 49 above). However,
having duly examined the complaint of 18 July 2006, the Court notes
that it was drafted and filed by a lawyer from the first law firm,
Andronikashvili, Sachsen-Alternburg, Baramidze & Partners.
In the light of the above considerations, the Court rejects the claim
made on the basis of the legal services contract of 6 July 2006 as
unjustified.
Since
no documents in support of the food related expenses in prison were
submitted, i.e. records from the prison log confirming the fact of
receipt of “food parcels” by the applicants, the Court
rejects the applicants' claim of EUR 10,000 as unsubstantiated.
2. Proceedings before the Court
(a) The representation by Mr Aleksandre
Baramidze and Mr Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg
The
applicants claimed GEL 25,007 (EUR 13,803) in respect of their
representation before the Court by Mr Aleksandre
Baramidze and Mr Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg in 2006. In support
of this claim, they submitted an invoice dated 31 December 2006
breaking down the services provided into hours and fees, and showing
that the payment of the above sum, which included 18% VAT in
accordance with Georgian tax law. The applicants submitted another
invoice dated 26 September 2006, according to which they had
paid these representatives GEL 110 (EUR 61) in additional telephone
and postal expenses.
With
due regard to the above financial documents, the Court considers the
claims to be justified and awards the applicants EUR 13,864,
jointly, in respect of their representation before the Court by
Mr Aleksandre Baramidze and Mr Hans von
Sachsen-Altenburg.
(b) The representation by Ms
Lia Mukhashavria and Mr Vakhtang Vakhtangidze
161. The
applicants' two other representatives, Ms Lia
Mukhashavria and Mr Vakhtang Vakhtangidze, also claimed EUR
4,600 for the services they had provided. The representatives
asserted that they had spent 92 hours on the Court proceedings at the
rate of EUR 50. No invoices, vouchers, contracts or other documents
were submitted in support of the above claim.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the absence of any legal or financial documents in support of the
applicants' agreement to pay the above mentioned sum to
Ms Lia Mukhashavria and Mr Vakhtang Vakhtangidze
and the fact that, except for filing the just satisfaction claims,
all the major representative work – the filing of the initial
application and two sets of observations on admissibility and merits
– was done by the applicants' initial representatives, the
Court dismisses this claim.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention on account of the first applicant's confinement
in a punishment cell at Tbilisi No. 5 Prison;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention on account of the second applicant's detention in
an overcrowded cell at Tbilisi No. 5 Prison;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention on account of the applicants' treatment in the
courthouse on 2 September 2005;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention on account of
the absence of a valid court order authorising the applicants'
detention between 27 November 2005 and 13 January 2006;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the
applicants' inability to have early access to the video recording of
27 August 2005;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of the
manner in which the judicial review of 2 September 2005 was
conducted and the absence of a
speedy reply to the applicants' complaint of 6 December 2005;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on
which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the
national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
6,000 (six thousand euros) to each applicant, plus any tax that may
be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damages;
(ii) EUR
14,694 (fourteen thousand six hundred and ninety-four euros) to the
applicants, jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in
respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 January 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sally Dollé Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President