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PUCHALSKA v. POLAND - 10392/04 [2009] ECHR 1458 (6 October 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1458.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1458
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF PUCHALSKA v. POLAND
(Application
no. 10392/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6 October 2009
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision
In the case of Puchalska v.
Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 15 September 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 10392/04) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mrs Barbara Puchalska
(“the applicant”), on 12 March 2004.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
The
applicant alleged that the length of the proceedings in her case
exceeded a “reasonable time”.
On
16 January 2008 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Sandomierz.
A. Facts
prior to 1 May 1993
In
1974 the applicant's parents agreed to the expropriation of their
property in Sandomierz for the purpose of building a pedestrian
access and a driveway to a clinic.
On
21 September 1990 the applicant and her parents lodged an application
for restitution of the expropriated land with the Sandomierz
Municipality (Urząd Miejski) under section 69 of the Law
of 29 April 1985 on Land Administration and Expropriation (Ustawa
o gospodarce gruntami i wywłaszczaniu nieruchomości).
This section stipulated that the former owner of the expropriated
property (or his legal successor) could lodge an application for
restitution provided that the property no longer served the purpose
specified in the expropriation decision. According to the applicant,
their application was left unanswered.
Subsequently,
the applicant's parents transferred their claim to the property to
the applicant.
On
17 November 1992 the applicant and her parents made another
application for restitution of the property.
On
15 March 1993 the head of the Sandomierz District Office (Kierownik
Urzędu Rejonowego) refused the application.
The
applicant appealed.
B. Facts after 1 May 1993
On
7 June 1993 the Tarnobrzeg Governor (Wojewoda) upheld the
first instance decision.
The
applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny
Sąd Administracyjny).
On
14 June 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed both decisions.
On
14 March 1995 the applicant complained of inactivity on the part of
the administrative authorities.
On
21 April 1995 the Tarnobrzeg Governor explained that the case was
particularly complex and acknowledged that the proceedings had indeed
been lengthy. He also ordered the head of the Sandomierz District
Office to give a decision by 20 May 1995.
On
18 May 1995 the head of the Sandomierz District Office gave
a decision and ordered the restitution of the property. He also
ordered the applicant to pay the Sandomierz Municipality the indexed
sum of 81,931 Polish zlotys (PLN) in return for the compensation
awarded to her parents in 1974.
The
applicant appealed, arguing that the indexed sum had been wrongly
calculated and did not reflect the real value of the property.
On
20 September 1995 the applicant complained to the Supreme
Administrative Court about the inactivity of the administrative
authority.
On
30 November 1995 the Tarnobrzeg Governor quashed the challenged
decision and ordered that the property be returned to the applicant
for a payment of PLN 49,338.
The
applicant and the Sandomierz Municipality lodged appeals with the
Supreme Administrative Court.
On
27 June 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court declared the challenged
decision null and void.
On
14 July 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court examined the
applicant's complaint of 20 September 1995 about the inactivity of
the administrative authorities and discontinued the proceedings,
finding that a decision had already been given by the relevant
authority.
On
12 February 1997 the Tarnobrzeg Governor quashed the decision of the
head of the Sandomierz District Office of 18 May 1995.
On
30 June 1997 the head of the Sandomierz District Office gave
a decision and ordered that part of the property, which had not
been developed, be returned to the applicant.
Both
parties lodged appeals: the applicant on 18 July 1997 and the
Sandomierz Municipality on 15 July 1997.
On
9 August 1997 the Tarnobrzeg Governor upheld the challenged decision.
On
30 August 1997 the applicant again appealed to the Supreme
Administrative Court.
On
7 May 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the first and
second-instance decisions.
On
31 May 2000 the Mayor of the Sandomierz District (Starosta
Powiatu) gave a decision and ordered the restitution of the
property.
On
30 June 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal, contending that the
Mayor's decision had been based on an incorrect measuring of the
buildings constructed on the property in question.
On
27 June 2000 the Sandomierz Municipality (Zarząd Gminy)
also appealed against that decision, maintaining that the restitution
of the property together with the buildings on it was impossible. It
requested that the decision be quashed.
On
28 September 2000 the Świętokrzyski Governor, who took over
the competences of the Tarnobrzeg Governor, amended the
first-instance decision in the part which concerned the indexed sum
to be paid by the applicant.
On
27 October 2000 the Sandomierz Municipality lodged a complaint
with the Supreme Administrative Court.
Subsequently,
owing to the reform of the administrative courts which took effect on
1 January 2003, the case was transmitted to the Kraków
Regional Administrative Court (Wojewódzki Sąd
Administracyjny).
On
30 April 2004 the applicant's father died.
On
8 October 2004 the Sandomierz Municipality applied to the Regional
Administrative Court for the proceedings to be stayed.
On
20 October 2004 the proceedings were stayed.
On
30 May 2005 the Regional Administrative Court resumed the
proceedings.
On
28 September 2005 the Kraków Regional Administrative Court
gave judgment and dismissed the appeal.
On
30 January 2006 the Sandomierz Municipality lodged a cassation appeal
with the Supreme Administrative Court.
On
13 March 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the
cassation appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
relevant domestic law concerning inactivity on the part of
administrative authorities is set out in the Court's judgment in the
case of Grabiński v. Poland,
no. 43702/02, §§ 60-65, 17 October 2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of proceedings in her case
exceeded a “reasonable time”. She alleged a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in its
relevant part, reads:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
Court observes that the proceedings in question began on 21 September
1990 and terminated on 13 March 2007 when the Supreme Administrative
Court dismissed the cassation appeal. However, since the Court's
jurisdiction ratione temporis in respect of Poland covers only
the facts and decisions subsequent to 1 May 1993, the Court may
take into consideration only the period of 13 years, 10 months and 15
days following that date. It may, however, have regard to the stage
reached in the proceedings on that date (see, for instance, Humen
v. Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, 15 October 1999, § 59).
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic
remedies since she had not availed herself of the complaint provided
for by the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints
about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time
(Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa
strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez
nieuzasadnionej zwłoki –
“the 2004 Act”).
The
Court notes that the 2004 Act provides for a complaint about the
unreasonable length of judicial proceedings and that proceedings
before administrative authorities are not covered by its provisions.
It further observes that the proceedings complained of lasted 16
years, 5 months and 25 days, out of which 13 years, 10 months and 15
days fall within the Court's competence ratione temporis. The
proceedings before the administrative authorities lasted from 1 May
1993 until 27 October 2000, that is 7 years, 5 months and 27 days.
Before the courts the proceedings lasted from 27 October 2000 until
13 March 2007, that is 6 years, 4 months and 16 days. Thus the length
of proceedings before the courts constituted almost half of the
entire period. The Court admits that the time the proceedings lasted
before the courts was considerable and that it cannot be excluded
that the applicant, if she had lodged a complaint under the 2004 Act,
would have been granted just satisfaction. At the same time, however,
the Court notes that the domestic courts would not have been able to
examine the long period of almost 7.5 years when the proceedings were
pending before the administrative authorities. Thus, in any event,
the overall period of the domestic proceedings would not have been
taken into account. It follows that in the particular circumstances
of the present case a complaint under the 2004 Act cannot be
regarded as an effective remedy with a sufficient degree of
certainty.
The
Government further submitted that the applicant had a possibility,
under Article 417 of the Civil Code, of lodging a claim with the
Polish civil courts for compensation for damage caused by the
excessive length of the administrative proceedings.
The Court first notes that it has already examined
whether after 18 December 2001 a compensation claim in tort as
provided for by Polish civil law was an effective remedy in respect
of complaints about the length of proceedings. It held that no
persuasive arguments had been adduced to show that Article 417 of the
Civil Code could at that time be relied on for the purpose of seeking
compensation for excessive length of proceedings or that such action
offered reasonable prospects of success (see, Małasiewicz
v. Poland, no. 22072/02, §§ 32-34, 14
October 2003, and for administrative proceedings, Boszko v.
Poland, no. 4054/03, § 35, 5 December
2006). The Court sees no grounds on which to depart from these
findings in the present case.
Secondly, the Court notes that the applicant lodged a
complaint about the inactivity of the administrative authorities in
accordance with the domestic law (see paragraph 15 above). The
complaint was allowed by the Tarnobrzeg Governor on 14 March 1995,
but proved ineffective because the Sandomierz District Office failed
to give the relevant decision within the set time-limit.
Subsequently, the applicant made use of the direct complaint to the
Supreme Administrative Court concerning inactivity on the part of the
administrative authorities (see paragraph 19 above). The Court
considers that the combination of these remedies was designed to
accelerate the process of obtaining an administrative decision
enabling the applicant to put the issue of the length of the
proceedings before the national authorities and to seek a decision
terminating those proceedings “within a reasonable time”
(see Bukowski v. Poland (dec.),
no. 38665/97, 11 June 2002; Mazurek
v. Poland (dec), no. 57464/00, 7
September 2004; and Kołodziej v. Poland
(dec), no 47995/99, 18 October 2005).
The
Court concludes that, having exhausted the available remedies
provided by domestic law, the applicant was not required to embark on
another attempt to obtain redress by bringing a civil action for
compensation. Accordingly, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1
of the Convention, the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies.
For
these reasons, the Government's pleas of inadmissibility on the
ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Nor is
it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court will assess the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to
the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity
of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant
authorities (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII,
and Humen v. Poland, cited above, § 60).
In
the present case the Government first relied on the complexity of the
case and, especially, the need to establish the factual circumstances
dating back to 1974. The Government further submitted that, since the
present case did not concern issues of employment or pensions,
“special diligence” was not required in its examination.
They also pointed to the fact that the national authorities had taken
all necessary steps to clarify the circumstances of the case and that
the applicant herself could be held partly responsible for the delay
in the proceedings because she had lodged “countless motions,
requests and complaints about different aspects of the proceedings”.
The
Court accepts that the present case was of a certain complexity. It
also accepts that the applicant indeed lodged numerous appeals.
However, appeals were also lodged by the administrative authorities
and the decisions given in the present case were quashed by the
Supreme Administrative Courts on three occasions (see paragraphs 14,
22 and 29 above), which means that the administrative court found the
appeals well-founded. The applicant does not seem to have abused her
procedural rights by lodging manifestly ill-founded or completely
irrelevant complaints or requests (see, by contrast, the case of
Malicka-Wąsowska v. Poland, 41413/98 (dec.)). The
fact that the proceedings were not the type that required “special
diligence” on the part of domestic authorities does not mean
that they were allowed to be unreasonably lengthy.
The
Court considers that those factors cannot justify the significant
total length of the proceedings. On the basis of the material before
it, the Court finds no convincing justification for such a delay.
In
view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the relevant
authorities have failed to respect the applicant's right to a hearing
within a “reasonable time”.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 349,253.73 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and
EUR 30,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government submitted that the applicant's claims should be rejected
as exorbitant, unfounded and irrelevant.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 11,000 in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant made no claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 11,000
(eleven thousand euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 October 2009, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas
Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
