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EPIPHANIOU AND OTHERS v. TURKEY - 19900/92 [2009] ECHR 1324 (22 September 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1324.html
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[2009] ECHR 1324
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF EPIPHANIOU AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 19900/92)
JUDGMENT
(merits)
STRASBOURG
22
September 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Epiphaniou and Others v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Işıl Karakaş, judges,
and
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 1 September 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 19900/92) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the
Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by six Cypriot nationals, Mr Phanos Epiphaniou,
Mrs Sofi Phitidou, Mr Kleanthis Stavri, Mr Christodoulos Demetriades,
Mr Theodoros Economou and Mr Anastassis Georghiou (“the
applicants”), on 26 January 1990.
The
applicants were represented by Mr A. Adamides, a lawyer practising in
Limassol. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr Z.M. Necatigil.
The
applicants alleged, in particular, that the Turkish occupation of the
northern part of Cyprus had deprived them of their home and
properties.
The
application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2
of Protocol No. 11).
By
a decision of 26 September 2002 the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
The
applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits
(Rule 59 § 1).
Applicant
no. 5 (Mr Theodoros Economou) died on 24 February 2005. His
heirs (Mr Phivos Economou and Mrs Elli Economou) stated that
they wished to continue the examination of the case on behalf of the
deceased. On 12 August 2005 applicant no. 4 (Mr Christodoulos
Demetriades) passed away. His heirs (his wife, Mrs Androulla
Demetriades, his daughter, Mrs Marina Demetriades, and his son, Mr
Angelos Demetriades) stated that they wished to continue the
examination of the case on his behalf.
THE FACTS
The
applicants were born in 1934, 1947, 1936, 1925, 1924 and 1933
respectively. The first three applicants live in Nicosia, the fourth
applicant lived in Limassol and the fifth and sixth applicants live
in Larnaca.
The
applicants had been permanent residents of Famagusta (northern
Cyprus), where some of their properties were located.
Applicant
no. 1 (Mr Phanos Epiphaniou) claimed to be the owner of the following
immovable properties:
(a) Famagusta,
Ayios Ioannis, plot no. 370, sheet/plan 33/12.3.1, block B; use:
residence on 1st floor and shops on ground floor; share: ½
(other ½ in the name of his wife);
(b) Famagusta,
Ayios Loukas, plot no. 974, sheet/plan 33/11.E.1, block C; use:
building site for investment; share: whole;
(c) Famagusta,
Milia, Haragkas, plot no. 214/4/3, sheet/plan 23/14; use: land to be
divided into building sites; share: whole.
Applicant
no. 2 (Mrs Sofi Phitidou) claimed to be the owner of the following
immovable properties:
(a) Famagusta,
Ayios Nicolaos, plot no. 200, sheet/plan 33/12.6.2, block E;
use: land for development; share: whole;
(b) Famagusta,
Kantara-Davlos, plot no. 68.9/1, sheet/plan 7/50.6.1; use: house with
yard used as holiday house; share: whole.
Applicant's
no. 2 home in Famagusta was registered in the name of a family
company established by her father.
Applicant
no. 3 (Mr Kleanthis Stavri) claimed to be the owner of the following
immovable property:
Famagusta,
Ayias Zonis, plot no. 105, sheet/plan: 33/12.6.IV, block F; use:
house with yard; share: ½ (other ½ in the name of his
wife).
Applicant
no. 4 (Mr Christodoulos Demetriades) claimed to be the owner of the
following immovable properties:
(a) Famagusta,
Ayios Loucas, plot no. 752, sheet/plan 24/59.E.2, Block D; use:
building site; share: whole;
(b) Famagusta,
Ayios Loucas, plot no. 753, sheet/plan 24/59.E.2, block D; use:
building site; share: whole;
(c) Famagusta,
Ayios Loucas, plot no. 754, sheet/plan 24/59.E.2, block D; use:
building site; share: whole;
(d)
Famagusta, Ayios Loucas, plot no. 755, sheet/plan 24/59.E.2, block D;
use: building site; share: whole;
(e) Famagusta,
Ayios Loucas, plot no. 948, sheet/plan 24/59.E.2, block D; use:
land; share: whole;
(f) Famagusta,
Spathariko, plot no. 270, sheet/plan 24/2.E.2, block D; use: land;
share: ½.
Applicant
no. 4's home in Famagusta was registered in his wife's name. He was
informed that some of his plots of land were used or permitted to be
used by the respondent Government for building part of a university
or other structures.
Applicant
no. 5 (Mr Theodoros Economou) claimed to be the owner of the
following immovable property:
Famagusta,
Chrysospiliotissa, plot no. 371, sheet/plan 33/19.3.IV, block D;
use: land with two houses, one used by the applicant as his residence
and the other one for renting; share: whole.
Applicant
no. 6 (Mr Anastassis Georghiou) claimed to be the owner of the
following immovable properties:
(a) Famagusta,
Latsia, Trikomo, plot no. 137/1/6/2, sheet/plan 15/43; use: land with
trees for agriculture; share: 1/6;
(b) Famagusta,
Pervolia Trikomou, Kokkines, plot no. 127/2/2, sheet/plan 15/43; use:
land for agriculture; share: whole;
(c) Famagusta,
Pervolia Trikomou, Kokkines, plot no. 141, sheet/plan 15/43; use:
land for agriculture; share: whole.
Applicant
no. 6's home in Famagusta was registered in his wife's name.
In
support of their claims to ownership the applicants submitted
cadastral plans (on which their properties were marked) as well as
affidavits in verification of their personal status and immovable
property rights. Moreover, applicants nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 produced
certificates of affirmation of ownership of Turkish-occupied
immovable properties issued by the Republic of Cyprus for all the
properties claimed by them. Applicant no. 4 produced copies of the
certificates of registration of the plots of land described in
paragraph 13 above.
Upon
the 1974 Turkish intervention, the applicants left for southern
Cyprus. They claimed that they had been deprived of their property
rights, all their property being located in the area which was under
the occupation and control of the Turkish military authorities. They
had made several attempts to return to their homes and properties in
Famagusta (the last occasion being on 23 December 1989),
but they had not been allowed to do so by the Turkish military
authorities. The latter had prevented them from having access to and
from using their houses and properties.
THE LAW
I. PRELIMINARY ISSUE
The
Court notes at the outset that applicants nos. 4 and 5 died on
12 August and 24 February 2005, after the lodging of their
application, while the case was pending before the Court. Their heirs
informed the Court that they wished to pursue the application lodged
by them (see paragraph 7 above). Although the heirs of a deceased
applicant cannot claim a general right for the examination of the
application brought by the latter to be continued by the Court (see
Scherer v. Switzerland, 25 March 1994, Series A no.
287), the Court has accepted on a number of occasions that close
relatives of a deceased applicant are entitled to take his or her
place (see Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, §
37, Series A no. 35, and Raimondo v. Italy, 22 February
1994, § 2, Series A no. 281-A).
For
the purposes of the instant case, the Court is prepared to accept
that the heirs of applicants nos. 4 and 5 can pursue the application
initially brought by Mr Christodoulos Demetriades and Mr Theodoros
Economou (see, mutatis mutandis, Kirilova and Others v.
Bulgaria, nos. 42908/98, 44038/98, 44816/98 and 7319/02, §
85, 9 June 2005, and Nerva and Others v. the United Kingdom,
no. 42295/98, § 33, ECHR 2002 VIII).
II. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
The
Government raised preliminary objections of inadmissibility for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of victim status. The
Court observes that these objections are identical to those raised in
the case of Alexandrou v. Turkey (no. 16162/90, §§
11-22, 20 January 2009), and should be dismissed for the same
reasons.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO
THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that since 1974, Turkey had prevented them from
exercising their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions.
They invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
The
Government disputed this claim.
The
Court first notes that the documents submitted by the applicants (see
paragraph 16 above) provide prima facie evidence that they had
a title of ownership over the properties at issue. As the respondent
Government failed to produce convincing evidence in rebuttal, the
Court considers that the applicants had a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The
Court recalls that in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey
((merits), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, §§
63-64, 18 December 1996), it reasoned as follows:
“63. ... as a consequence of the fact
that the applicant has been refused access to the land since 1974,
she has effectively lost all control over, as well as all
possibilities to use and enjoy, her property. The continuous denial
of access must therefore be regarded as an interference with her
rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Such an interference
cannot, in the exceptional circumstances of the present case to which
the applicant and the Cypriot Government have referred, be regarded
as either a deprivation of property or a control of use within the
meaning of the first and second paragraphs of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. However, it clearly falls within the meaning of the first
sentence of that provision as an interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions. In this respect the Court observes that
hindrance can amount to a violation of the Convention just like a
legal impediment.
64. Apart from a passing reference to the
doctrine of necessity as a justification for the acts of the 'TRNC'
and to the fact that property rights were the subject of
intercommunal talks, the Turkish Government have not sought to make
submissions justifying the above interference with the applicant's
property rights which is imputable to Turkey.
It has not, however, been explained how the need to
rehouse displaced Turkish Cypriot refugees in the years following the
Turkish intervention in the island in 1974 could justify the complete
negation of the applicant's property rights in the form of a total
and continuous denial of access and a purported expropriation without
compensation.
Nor can the fact that property rights were the subject
of intercommunal talks involving both communities in Cyprus provide a
justification for this situation under the Convention. In such
circumstances, the Court concludes that there has been and continues
to be a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”
In
the case of Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], no. 25781/94,
ECHR 2001-IV) the Court confirmed the above conclusions (§§
187 and 189):
“187. The Court is persuaded that both
its reasoning and its conclusion in the Loizidou judgment (merits)
apply with equal force to displaced Greek Cypriots who, like Mrs
Loizidou, are unable to have access to their property in northern
Cyprus by reason of the restrictions placed by the 'TRNC' authorities
on their physical access to that property. The continuing and total
denial of access to their property is a clear interference with the
right of the displaced Greek Cypriots to the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
...
189. .. there has been a continuing violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the fact that
Greek-Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus are being denied
access to and control, use and enjoyment of their property as well as
any compensation for the interference with their property rights.”
The
Court sees no reason in the instant case to depart from the
conclusions which it reached in the Loizidou and Cyprus v.
Turkey cases (op. cit.; see also Demades v. Turkey
(merits), no. 16219/90, § 46, 31 July 2003).
Accordingly,
it concludes that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention by virtue of the fact that the applicants
were denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of their
properties as well as any compensation for the interference with
their property rights.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicants submitted that in
1974 they had had their homes in northern Cyprus. As they had been
unable to return there, they were the victims of a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention.
This provision reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
The
Government disputed this claim.
The
applicants submitted that, contrary to the applicant in the Loizidou
case, they all had their principal residence in the District of
Famagusta. They claimed that any interference with their Article 8
rights had not been justified under the second paragraph of this
provision.
The
Court first observes that applicants nos. 2, 4 and 6 were not the
owners of the houses where they were allegedly residing at the time
of the Turkish invasion. The house of applicant no. 2 was registered
in the name of a family company established by her father (see
paragraph 11 above), while the houses of applicants nos. 4 and 6
belonged to their wives (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). Under
these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that a separate issue
may arise under Article 8 of the Convention. It therefore considers
that it is not necessary to examine whether there has been a
continuing violation of this provision with respect to applicants
nos. 2, 4 and 6.
As
to the other applicants, the Court notes that the Government failed
to produce any evidence capable of casting doubt upon their statement
that, at the time of the Turkish invasion, they were regularly
residing in the District of Famagusta and that their houses were
treated by them and their families as homes.
Accordingly,
the Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case,
the houses of applicants nos. 1, 3 and 5 qualified as “homes”
within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention at the time when
the acts complained of took place.
The
Court observes that the present case differs from the Loizidou
case (merits, op. cit.) since, unlike Mrs Loizidou, applicants
nos. 1, 3 and 5 actually had a home in the District of
Famagusta.
The
Court notes that since 1974 applicants nos. 1, 3 and 5 have been
unable to gain access to and to use their home. In this connection
the Court recalls that, in its judgment in the case of Cyprus v.
Turkey (cited above, §§ 172-175), it concluded
that the complete denial of the right of Greek Cypriot displaced
persons to respect for their homes in northern Cyprus since 1974
constituted a continuing violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
The Court reasoned as follows:
“172. The Court observes that the
official policy of the 'TRNC' authorities to deny the right of the
displaced persons to return to their homes is reinforced by the very
tight restrictions operated by the same authorities on visits to the
north by Greek Cypriots living in the south. Accordingly, not only
are displaced persons unable to apply to the authorities to reoccupy
the homes which they left behind, they are physically prevented from
even visiting them.
173. The Court further notes that the
situation impugned by the applicant Government has obtained since the
events of 1974 in northern Cyprus. It would appear that it has never
been reflected in 'legislation' and is enforced as a matter of policy
in furtherance of a bi-zonal arrangement designed, it is claimed, to
minimise the risk of conflict which the intermingling of the Greek
and Turkish-Cypriot communities in the north might engender. That
bi-zonal arrangement is being pursued within the framework of the
inter-communal talks sponsored by the United Nations
Secretary-General ...
174. The Court would make the following
observations in this connection: firstly, the complete denial of the
right of displaced persons to respect for their homes has no basis in
law within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention
(see paragraph 173 above); secondly, the inter-communal talks cannot
be invoked in order to legitimate a violation of the Convention;
thirdly, the violation at issue has endured as a matter of policy
since 1974 and must be considered continuing.
175. In view of these considerations, the
Court concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article
8 of the Convention by reason of the refusal to allow the return of
any Greek-Cypriot displaced persons to their homes in northern
Cyprus.”
The
Court sees no reason in the instant case to depart from the above
reasoning and findings (see also Demades (merits), cited
above, §§ 36-37).
Accordingly,
it concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article 8
of the Convention by reason of the complete denial of the right of
applicants nos. 1, 3 and 5 to respect for their homes.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION,
TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1
OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
The
applicants complained of a violation under Article 14 of the
Convention on account of discriminatory treatment against them in the
enjoyment of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They alleged that this discrimination
had been based on their national origin.
Article 14 of the Convention reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The
Court recalls that in the Alexandrou case (cited above, §§
38-39) it has found that it was not necessary to carry out a separate
examination of the complaint under Article 14 of the Convention. The
Court does not see any reason to depart from that approach in the
present case (see also, mutatis mutandis, Eugenia
Michaelidou Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey, no. 16163/90,
§§ 37-38, 31 July 2003).
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants submitted that, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention,
they did not have at their disposal any effective remedy to redress
the above-mentioned grievances.
This provision reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
In
the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that it is
not necessary to examine this complaint (see, mutatis mutandis,
Demades v. Turkey (merits), cited above, § 48).
VII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicants
In
their just satisfaction claims of 22 April 2003, the applicants
requested sums for pecuniary damage. With the exception of applicant
no. 6, they relied on expert's reports assessing the value of
their losses which included the loss of annual rent collected or
expected to be collected from renting out their properties, plus
interest from the date on which such rents were due until the day of
payment. The rents claimed were for the period dating back to January
1990 until December 2003. The applicants did not claim compensation
for any purported expropriation since they were still the legal
owners of the properties. The evaluation reports contained a
description of the town of Famagusta, of its development perspectives
and of the applicants' properties.
The
starting point of the expert's reports was the open market value of
the properties in August 1974. The annual rent obtainable from them
was then calculated as a percentage (varying from 4% to 6%) of their
estimated value. The expert further took into account the trends of
rent increase on the basis of: (a) the nature of the area of
property; (b) the trends for the period 1970-1974; (c) the trends in
the unoccupied areas of Cyprus from 1974 onwards. This last trend was
based on the Consumer Price Index for rents and houses issued by the
Department of Statistics and Research of the Government of Cyprus,
increased by a percentage of 25%. For agricultural lands, the expert
proceeded on the basis of a certain annual rental value per decare
(generally between CYP 3 and CYP 5 in 1974). Moreover, compound
interest for delayed payment was applied at a rate of 8% (6% from
2001 onwards) per annum.
For
applicant no. 1, the figures given by the expert were the following:
-
property described in paragraph 10 (a) above: market value in 1974:
CYP 42,000 (approximately EUR 71,761); annual rent in 1974: CYP 2,520
(approximately EUR 4,305); estimated loss plus interest: CYP 226,081
(approximately EUR 386,281);
-
property described in paragraph 10 (b) above: market value in 1974:
CYP 3,000 (approximately EUR 5,125); annual rent in 1974:
CYP 520 (approximately EUR 888); estimated loss plus interest:
CYP 22,632 (approximately EUR 38,669);
-
property described paragraph 10 (c) above: the rent payable in
1974 calculated on the basis of CYP 5 per decare; rental value in
1974: CYP 5.25 (approximately EUR 9); estimated loss plus
interest: CYP 545 (approximately EUR 931).
Thus,
the total sum claimed by applicant no. 1 for pecuniary damage was CYP
249,258 (approximately EUR 425,882).
For
applicant no. 2, the figures given by the expert were the following:
-
property described in paragraph 11 (a) above: market value in 1974:
CYP 25,500 (approximately EUR 43,569); estimated loss plus
interest: CYP 287,255 (approximately EUR 490,803);
-
property described in paragraph 11 (b) above: market value in 1974:
CYP 15,600 (approximately EUR 26,654); annual rent in 1974:
CYP 624 (approximately EUR 1,066); estimated loss plus interest:
CYP 55,982 (approximately EUR 95,650).
Thus,
the total sum claimed by applicant no. 2 for pecuniary damage was CYP
343,237 (approximately EUR 586,454).
For
applicant no. 3, the expert considered that the 1974 market value of
the property described in paragraph 12 above was CYP 28,000
(approximately EUR 47,840), the 1974 annual rent was CYP 1,120
(approximately EUR 1,913) and the estimated loss plus interest was
CYP 100,480 (approximately EUR 171,680).
As
concerns the four building sites and the plot of land in Ayios Loucas
belonging to applicant no. 4 (see paragraph 13 (a), (b), (c), (d) and
(e) above), the expert considered that the overall 1974 market value
of these properties was CYP 53,000 (approximately EUR 90,555) and
that the estimated loss plus interest was CYP 396,935 (approximately
EUR 678,203). For the land described in paragraph 13 (f) above
the rent payable in 1974 was calculated on the basis of CYP 3 per
decare; the 1974 rental value was CYP 112.37 (approximately
EUR 192) and the estimated loss plus interest was CYP 5,741
(approximately EUR 9,809).
Thus,
the total sum claimed by applicant no. 4 for pecuniary damage was CYP
402,676 (approximately EUR 688,012).
For
applicant no. 5, the expert considered that the 1974 market value of
the property described in paragraph 14 above was CYP 24,000
(approximately EUR 41,006), the 1974 annual rent was CYP 960
(approximately EUR 1,640) and the estimated loss plus interest was
CYP 86,126 (approximately EUR 147,154).
Applicant
no. 6 did not submit any expert report. He stated that as he was
living only on his pension and had no other income, he could not
afford to pay for the valuation of his plots of land. However, to the
best of his knowledge and belief, the 1974 value of the properties
described in paragraph 15 above was not less than CYP 10,000
(approximately EUR 17,086) and the estimated loss plus interest
was at least CYP 8,500 (approximately EUR 14,523).
On
24 January 2008, following a request from the Court for an update on
the developments of the case, applicants nos. 1 and 2 and the heirs
of applicant no. 4 submitted updated claims for just satisfaction,
which were meant to cover the loss of the use of the properties from
1 January 1990 to 31 December 2007. They produced revised valuation
reports, which, on the basis of the criteria adopted in the previous
reports, concluded that the whole sum due for the loss of use was:
EUR 645,157.1 for applicant no. 1; EUR 1,006,711.4 for
applicant no. 2; EUR 1,200,290.8 for applicant no. 4.
In
their just satisfaction claims of 22 April 2003, the applicants also
claimed CYP 100,000 (approximately EUR 170,860) each in respect
of non-pecuniary damage. In their updated claims for just
satisfaction of 24 January 2008, applicants nos. 1 and 2 and the
heirs of applicant no. 4 increased their claim to CYP 140,000
(approximately EUR 239,204) each.
(b) The Government
In
reply to the applicants' just satisfaction claims of 22 April 2003,
the Government submitted that the documents provided by the
applicants in support to their claim to ownership where either
insufficient or wrong and did not truly reflect the situation of
ownership in 1974. The properties claimed by applicants nos. 1 and 5,
as well as the property described in paragraph 11 (a) above and
claimed by applicant no. 2 could not be traced in the Land Registry
Books; serious doubts might therefore arise as to the existence of a
“possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1.
According
to the Government, the issue of reciprocal compensation for
Greek-Cypriot property left in the north of the island and
Turkish-Cypriot property left in the south was very complex and
should be settled through negotiations between the two sides rather
than by adjudication by the European Court of Human Rights, acting as
a first-instance tribunal and relying on the reports produced by the
applicant side only.
Challenging
the conclusions reached by the Court in the Loizidou judgment
((just satisfaction), Reports 1998-IV, 28 July 1998),
the Government considered that in cases such as the present one, no
award should be made by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention.
They underlined that the applicants' inability to have access to
their properties depended on the political situation of the island
and, in particular, on the existence of the UN recognized cease-fire
lines. If Greek-Cypriots were allowed to go to the north and claim
their properties, chaos would explode on the island; furthermore, any
award made by the Court would undermine the negotiations between the
two parties.
The
Government filed comments on the applicants' updated claims for just
satisfaction on 30 June 2008 and 15 October 2008. They pointed out
that the present application was part of a cluster of similar cases
raising a number of problematic issues and maintained that the claims
for just satisfaction were not ready for examination. The Government
had in fact encountered serious problems in identifying the
properties and their present owners. The information provided by the
applicants in this regard was not based on reliable evidence.
Moreover, owing to the lapse of time since the lodging of the
applications, new situations might have arisen: the properties could
have been transferred, donated or inherited within the legal system
of southern Cyprus. These facts would not have been known to the
respondent Government and could be certified only by the
Greek-Cypriot authorities, who, since 1974, had reconstructed the
registers and records of all properties in northern Cyprus.
Applicants should be required to provide search certificates issued
by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus. In
cases where the original applicant had passed away or
the property had changed hands, questions might arise as to whether
the new owners had a legal interest in the property and whether they
were entitled to pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damages.
The
Government further noted that some applicants had shared properties
and that it was not proven that their co-owners had agreed to the
partition of the possessions. Nor, when claiming damages based on the
assumption that the properties had been rented after 1974, had the
applicants shown that the rights of the said co-owners under domestic
law had been respected.
The
Government submitted that as an annual increase of the value of the
properties had been applied, it would be unfair to add compound
interest for delayed payment, and that Turkey had recognised the
jurisdiction of the Court on 21 January 1990, and not in January
1987. In any event, the alleged 1974 market value of the properties
was exorbitant, highly excessive and speculative; it was not based on
any real data with which to make a comparison and made insufficient
allowance for the volatility of the property market and its
susceptibility to influences both domestic and international. The
report submitted by the applicants had instead proceeded on the
assumption that the property market would have continued to flourish
with sustained growth during the whole period under consideration.
The
Government produced a valuation report prepared by the
Turkish-Cypriot authorities, which they considered to be based on a
“realistic assessment of the 1974 market values, having regard
to the relevant land records and comparative sales in the areas where
the properties [were] situated”. This report contained two
proposals, assessing, respectively, the sum due for the loss of use
of the properties and their present value. The second proposal was
made in order to give the applicants the option to sell the property
to the State, thereby relinquishing title to and claims in respect of
it.
The
report prepared by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities specified that it
would be possible to envisage, either immediately or after the
resolution of the Cyprus problem, restitution of the properties
described in paragraphs 11 (a) and 12 above. The other immovable
properties referred to in the application were possessed by refugees;
they could not form the object of restitution but could give
entitlement to financial compensation, to be calculated on the basis
of the loss of income (by applying a 5% rent on the 1974 market
values) and increase in value of the property between 1974 and the
date of payment. Had the applicants applied to the Immovable Property
Commission, the latter would have offered CYP 720,771.63
(approximately EUR 1,231,510) to compensate the loss of use and
CYP 767,719.51 (approximately EUR 1,311,725) for the value
of the properties. According to an expert appointed by the “TRNC”
authorities, the 1974 open-market value of the applicants' properties
was the following:
-
property described in paragraph 10 (a) above: CYP 42,373
(approximately EUR 72,398);
-
property described in paragraph 10 (b) above: CYP 1,695
(approximately EUR 2,896);
-
property described in paragraph 10 (c) above: CYP 1,695
(approximately EUR 2,896);
-
property described in paragraph 11 (a) above: CYP 7,203
(approximately EUR 12,307);
-
property described in paragraph 11 (b) above: CYP 11,864
(approximately EUR 20,270);
-
property described in paragraph 12 above: CYP 5,084 (approximately
EUR 8,686);
-
properties described in paragraph 13 (a), (b), (c) and (d) above:
CYP 4,237 (approximately EUR 7,239) for each plot of land;
-
property described in paragraph 13 (e) above: CYP 5,932
(approximately EUR 10,135);
-
property described in paragraph 13 (f) above: CYP 4,745
(approximately EUR 8,107);
-
property described in paragraph 15 (a) above: CYP 2,825
(approximately EUR 4,826);
-
property described in paragraph 15 (b) above: CYP 8,983
(approximately EUR 15,348);
-
property described in paragraph 15 (c) above: CYP 11,864
(approximately EUR 20,270).
No
estimate was given for the property described in paragraph 14 above.
Upon
fulfilment of certain conditions, the Immovable Property Commission
could also have offered the applicants exchange of their properties
with Turkish-Cypriot properties located in the south of the island.
Finally,
the Government did not comment on the applicants' submissions under
the head of non-pecuniary damage.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court first notes that the Government's submission that doubts might
rise as to the applicants' title of ownership over the properties at
issue (see paragraphs 53 and 56 above) is, in substance, an objection
of incompatibility ratione materiae with the provisions of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Such an objection should have been
raised before the application was declared admissible or, at the
latest, in the context of the parties' observations on the merits. In
any event, the Court cannot but confirm its finding that the
applicants had a “possession” over the properties claimed
in the present application within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 23 above).
In
the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the question
of the application of Article 41 in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage is not ready for decision. It observes, in
particular, that the parties have failed to provide reliable and
objective data pertaining to the prices of land and real estate in
Cyprus at the date of the Turkish intervention. This failure renders
it difficult for the Court to assess whether the estimate furnished
by the applicants of the 1974 market value of their properties is
reasonable. The question must accordingly be reserved and the
subsequent procedure fixed with due regard to any agreement which
might be reached between the respondent Government and the applicants
(Rule 75 § 1 of the Rules of Court).
B. Costs and expenses
In
their just satisfaction claims of 22 April 2003, relying on bills
from their representative, the applicants sought CYP 3,310.25
(approximately EUR 5,655) each for the costs and expenses incurred
before the Court. Applicants nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 also sought the
reimbursement of the costs of the expert report assessing the value
of their properties (amounting to CYP 460, 402.5, 345, 575 and 345
respectively). In their updated claims for just satisfaction of
24 January 2008, applicants nos. 1, 2 and 4 submitted additional
bills of costs for the new valuation report and for legal fees
amounting to EUR 392.98 and EUR 982.45 for each of them.
The
Government did not comment on this point.
In
the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the question
of the application of Article 41 in respect of costs and expenses is
not ready for decision. The question must accordingly be reserved and
the subsequent procedure fixed with due regard to any agreement which
might be reached between the respondent Government and the
applicants.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds unanimously that the heirs of applicants
nos. 4 and 5 have standing to continue the present proceedings in
their stead;
Dismisses by six votes to one the Government's
preliminary objections;
Holds by six votes to one that there has been a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to
examine whether there has been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention with respect to applicants nos. 2, 4 and 6;
Holds by six votes to one that there has been a
violation of Article 8 of the Convention with respect to applicants
nos. 1, 3 and 5;
Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to
examine whether there has been a violation of Articles 13 and 14 of
the Convention;
Holds unanimously that the question of the
application of Article 41 is not ready for decision;
accordingly,
(a) reserves
the said question in whole;
(b) invites
the Government and the applicants to submit, within three months from
the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, their written
observations on the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of
any agreement that they may reach;
(c) reserves the further procedure and delegates
to the President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 September 2009,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Karakaş
is annexed to this judgment.
N.B.
F.A.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KARAKAŞ
Unlike
the majority, I consider that the objection of non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies raised by the Government should not have been
rejected. Consequently, I cannot agree with the finding of violations
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention, for
the same reasons as those mentioned in my dissenting opinion in the
case of Gavriel v. Turkey (no. 41355/98, 20
January 2009).