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YEFANOV AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE - 13404/02 [2009] ECHR 1245 (30 July 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1245.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1245
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF YEFANOV AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 13404/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30 July
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Yefanov and Others v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Renate
Jaeger,
Karel Jungwiert,
Rait Maruste,
Mark
Villiger,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
judges,
Stanislav Shevchuk, ad hoc judge,
and
Stephen Phillips, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 7 July 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 13404/02) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by four Ukrainian nationals, Mr Oleksandr
Petrovich Yefanov (“the first applicant”), Mrs Irina
Ivanovna Yefanova (“the second applicant”), Mr Yuriy
Ivanovich Boyev (“the third applicant”), and Mrs Svitlana
Petrivna Boyeva (“the fourth applicant”), on 30 March
2001.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Yuriy Zaytsev. The second, third and fourth
applicants were represented by the first applicant.
On
28 August 2007 the Court declared the application partly inadmissible
and decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of the
criminal proceedings to the Government. It also decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
The
applicants were born in 1951, 1959, 1952 and 1953 respectively. All
four are Ukrainian nationals and reside in the town of Smila, in the
Cherkassy region, Ukraine.
On
8 February 1999 the third and fourth applicants were arrested. They
were remanded in custody and charged with smuggling.
On
30 March 1999 criminal proceedings were instituted against the first
applicant for tax evasion. On 8 May 1999 new charges of smuggling
were brought against him. On 10 May 1999 he was arrested and remanded
in custody.
On
14 July 1999 criminal proceedings were instituted against the second
applicant for forging documents and tax evasion. The second applicant
gave an undertaking not to abscond.
Later,
given the common factual and legal background
of the above criminal cases, they were joined.
The
first, third and fourth applicants remained in pre-trial detention
until 14 July 2000, 7 June 1999 and 5 July 2000 respectively.
On
30 September pre-trial investigation was terminated and the criminal
case was sent to the Smila Court.
On
12 October 1999 the court started considering the case.
On
21 April 2000 it remitted the case for additional investigation.
On
16 May 2000 the Cherkassy Regional Court quashed that decision and
remitted the case to the first-instance court.
On
11 September 2000 the Smila Court acquitted the applicants.
On
17 October 2000 the Cherkassy Regional Court, following an appeal by
a local prosecutor's office, quashed that judgment and remitted the
case for fresh consideration by the Cherkassy District Court. The
applicants were ordered not to leave their place of permanent
residence.
Between
14 December 2000 and 22 February 2001 the Cherkassy District Court
held six hearings. No hearings were scheduled between 22 February
and 2 August 2001.
On
2 August 2001 the Cherkassy District Court suspended the proceedings
as the fourth applicant had absconded. It ordered the prosecutor's
office to put the fourth applicant on the list of wanted persons.
During
this period, the first and second applicants submitted repeated
requests to the Cherkassy District Court and the Cherkassy Regional
Court of Appeal for their case to be examined separately from that of
the fourth applicant.
In
a letter of 3 March 2003, the Cherkassy District Court indicated, in
particular, that the authorities had failed to take necessary
measures to find the fourth applicant. It ordered the Prosecutor of
Smila, the Prosecutor of the Cherkassy Region and the officials of
the Cherkassy Department of the Interior to issue a separate
indictment concerning the first and the second applicants and to take
measures to find the fourth applicant.
On
23 April 2003, in the course of the court hearing, the prosecutor's
office submitted an amended indictment in respect of the first
applicant and discontinued the tax evasion proceedings against him.
On
14 May 2003 the fourth applicant appeared before the court.
On
11 November 2003 the Cherkassy District Court acquitted the second
applicant. It convicted the other applicants and gave them a
three-year suspended prison sentence. The applicants were ordered not
to leave their place of permanent residence.
The
judgment was appealed against by the third and fourth applicants and
by the prosecutor.
On
28 November 2003 the same court declared an appeal by the third and
fourth applicants inadmissible as it had been lodged out of time.
On
13 April 2004 the Cherkassy Regional Court of Appeal allowed in part
the appeal by the prosecutor and rejected the objections of the first
and second applicants. It slightly amended the judgment of
11 November 2003.
On
22 March 2005 the Supreme Court quashed the ruling of 28 November
2003.
On
6 September 2005 the Cherkassy Regional Court of Appeal dismissed
appeals by the third and fourth applicants and upheld the judgment of
11 November 2003.
On
17 November 2005 the first, third and fourth applicants withdrew
their cassation appeals against the judgment of 11 November 2003, and
on 24 January 2006 the Supreme Court terminated the cassation
proceedings.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable-time” requirement laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period in question in respect of the first applicant began on
30 March 1999 and ended on 24 January 2006. The proceedings thus
lasted six years and almost ten months for the pre-trial
investigation and three levels of jurisdiction.
The criminal proceedings against the second applicant began on
14 July 1999 and ended on 13 April 2004. They thus lasted four
years and nine months for the pre-trial investigation and two levels
of jurisdiction.
The
period to be taken into consideration in respect of the third
applicant started on 8 February 1999 and ended on 24 January 2006.
The proceedings thus lasted about six years and eleven months for the
pre-trial investigation and three levels of jurisdiction.
The proceedings in respect of the fourth applicant
began on 8 February 1999 and ended on 24 January 2006. The
period during which the fourth applicant was on the run (2 August
2001 – 14 May 2003) must be excluded from the overall length of
the proceedings (see Girolami v. Italy, 19 February 1991, §
13, Series A no. 196-E, and Smirnova v. Russia,
nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 81, ECHR 2003-IX).
The proceedings in question thus lasted about five years and two
months for the investigation and three levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that the domestic courts had considered the case
without substantial delays, and that the protracted length of the
proceedings had been due to the complexity of the case and to the
applicants' behaviour. They further noted that the applicants had
appealed against the decisions of the domestic courts. The Government
also maintained that the proceedings had been suspended since the
fourth applicant had absconded.
The
second applicant disagreed. In particular, she submitted that the
domestic authorities had been informed that the fourth applicant had
gone to Israel for the breast-cancer treatment. The first, third and
fourth applicants did not submit any comments.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities (see,
among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France
[GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II). What is at stake for
the applicants has also to be taken into consideration. In this
respect the Court notes that the first applicant was kept in custody
between 10 May 1999 and 14 July 2000. The third and fourth applicants
were kept in custody in the period from 8 February 1999 till 7 June
1999 and 5 July 2000 respectively. These facts required particular
diligence on the part of the authorities and courts dealing with the
case to administer justice expeditiously (see Abdoella v. the
Netherlands, 25 November 1992, § 24, Series A
no. 248 A).
The
Court considers that the case was not particularly complex, either
factually or legally. Moreover, in view in particular of the fact
that the Smila Court had acquitted them at first instance, it is not
persuaded by the Government's argument that the applicants were to
blame for appealing against unfavourable judgments. As to the
argument that the proceedings had had to be suspended as the fourth
applicant had absconded, the Court notes that the Government have not
put forward any reason to explain why this should have been
necessary. In any event, the domestic court did not order the
prosecutor's office to issue a separate indictment and to take
measures to find the fourth applicant until nineteen months after the
proceedings were suspended.
Furthermore,
other significant delays in the proceedings are attributable to the
domestic authorities. In particular, between February and August 2001
no hearings were held before the domestic courts, and the examination
of the case at second instance was protracted due to the
first-instance court's failure to reach a proper decision on the
admissibility of the third and fourth applicants' appeal against the
judgment of 11 November 2003.
The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one
in the present case (see Pélissier and Sassi, cited
above, § 75; and Aybabin v. Ukraine, no. 23194/02,
§ 44, 18 December 2008).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court finds that
the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable-time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
second applicant claimed EUR 1,821,969 in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested that claim.
The Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim. As to the non-pecuniary damage claimed by the
second applicant, it considers that in the circumstances of the case
a mere finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just
satisfaction.
The
first, third and fourth applicants did not submit any claim for just
satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call
to award them any sum on that account.
B. Costs and expenses
In the present case the applicants failed to submit
any claim; the Court therefore makes no award.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the length of the criminal
proceedings against the first, second, third and fourth applicants;
Holds that the finding of a violation
constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage
which the second applicant may have suffered;
Dismisses the remainder of the second
applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 July 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Peer Lorenzen
Deputy Registrar President