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MARKOVTSI AND SELIVANOV v. RUSSIA - 756/05 [2009] ECHR 1177 (23 July 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1177.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1177
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF MARKOVTSI AND SELIVANOV v. RUSSIA
(Applications
nos. 756/05 and 25761/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
23
July 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Markovtsi and
Selivanov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik
Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 2 July 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in two applications (nos. 756/05 and 25761/05)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”). Application no. 756/05 was
lodged by a Ukrainian national, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Markovtsi
(“the first applicant”), on 6 December 2004. Application
no. 25761/05 was introduced by a Russian national, Mr Yevgeniy
Fedorovich Selivanov (“the second applicant”) on 20 April
2005.
The first applicant was not represented by a lawyer before the Court.
The second applicant was represented by Ms V.L. Demidova, a lawyer
practicing in Mirnyy, the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic. The Russian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by Ms V.
Milinchuk, the former Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
On
various dates the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the applications to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the applications at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
As
regards the application no. 756/05, the Ukrainian Government did not
exercise their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 36 §
1 of the Convention).
The
Government objected to the joint examination of the admissibility and
merits of the application no. 25761/05, but the Court rejected this
objection.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASES
The first applicant was born in 1970 and lives in
Ilnitsa, Ukraine. The second applicant was born in 1955 and lives in
Lensk, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya).
In
the 1990s the applicants subscribed to a State savings scheme for
buying Russian-made cars. The State failed to fulfil its obligation
to provide them with cars. The applicants
brought court actions against the authorities, seeking to recover the
monetary value of the State promissory notes for purchasing of a
Russian-made car.
On
the dates listed in the Appendix the domestic courts of the Sakha
(Yakutiya) Republic upheld their actions and awarded them
compensation in the amounts specified below, payable by the Ministry
of Finance. On the dates listed in the Appendix the judgments were
upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya)
Republic and became final. The enforcement proceedings were opened.
The
awards remained unenforced.
On
the dates cited in the Appendix the Presidium of the Supreme Court of
the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic, upon an application from the Ministry
of Finance and by way of supervisory-review proceedings, quashed the
judgments in the applicants' favour, re-examined the cases and
dismissed the applicants' actions, having found that the lower courts
had incorrectly interpreted and applied the domestic law.
The
first applicant submitted that he had not been
timeously notified of the session of the Presidium of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) and therefore could not
attend it. He received a copy of the judgment several months after
the hearing at the Presidium.
On
26 November 2004 the first applicant received 49,259.70 Russian
roubles (RUB) of compensation in respect of a part of the promissory
note value.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Under
section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July
1997, a bailiff must enforce a judgment within two months. Under
section 242.2.6 of the Budget Code of 31 July 1998, the Ministry of
Finance must enforce a judgment within three months.
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
Given that the two applications at hand concern
similar facts and complaints and raise identical issues under the
Convention, the Court decides to consider them in a single judgment.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERVISORY REVIEW
The applicants complained, notably, under Article 6 of
the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the supervisory
review of the judgments. The first applicant
complained under Article 6 that he was deprived of his right to
effectively participate at the supervisory review hearing. These
Articles, insofar as relevant, provide as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
[a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law...”
The
Government argued that the supervisory review had not breached the
principle of legal certainty: it had been preceded by an ordinary
appeal, only one supervisory-review instance had been engaged, the
request for the quashing had been lodged within six months, it had
been initiated by a party to the proceedings and it had been meant to
correct a misapplication of material law. The applicants' rights
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had not been prejudiced: the first
applicant had received compensation for the car before the
litigation, while the second applicant had
failed to apply for redemption of the promissory notes.
The
first applicant argued in reply that the supervisory review had
deprived him of the final award in his favour and had been unfair.
The only ground for quashing was the alleged misapplication of the
domestic law by the lower courts. The compensation he received had
been smaller than the initial award. The second applicant maintained
his claims.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Article 6 of the Convention
(a) Supervisory review procedure: legal
certainty
The Court reiterates that the
quashing by way of supervisory review of a judicial decision which
has become final and binding may render the litigant's right to a
court illusory and infringe the principle of legal certainty (see,
among many other authorities, Brumărescu
v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95,
§ 62, ECHR 1999-VII; Ryabykh v.
Russia, no. 52854/99, §§ 56-58,
24 July 2003). Departures from that principle are justified only when
made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling
character (see Kot v. Russia,
no. 20887/03, § 24, 18 January 2007, and Protsenko
v. Russia, no. 13151/04, §§
25-34, 31 July 2008).
The Court observes that in the
cases at hand the judgments were set aside by way of a supervisory
review solely on the ground that the lower courts had incorrectly
applied the substantive law. The Court reiterates its constant
approach that in the absence of a fundamental defect in the previous
proceedings a party's disagreement with the assessment made by the
first-instance and appeal courts is not a circumstance of a
substantial and compelling character warranting the quashing of a
binding and enforceable judgment and re-opening of the proceedings on
the applicant's claim (see Dovguchits
v. Russia, no. 2999/03, § 30, 7
June 2007; and Kot v. Russia,
cited above, § 29). The Government did not put forward any
arguments which would enable the Court to reach a different
conclusion in the present two cases. There has been, accordingly, a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(b) Supervisory
review procedure: procedural issues
With
regard to the complaint about the procedural defects of the hearing
before the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Sakha
(Yakutiya), the Court finds that, having concluded that there had
been an infringement of the applicant's “right to a court”
by the very use of the supervisory review procedure, it is not
necessary to consider whether the procedural guarantees of Article 6
of the Convention were available in those proceedings (cf. Volkova
v. Russia, no. 48758/99, § 39, 5 April 2005).
2. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
The Court reiterates that the
existence of a debt confirmed by a binding and enforceable judgment
constitutes the beneficiary's “possession” within the
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (see, among other
authorities, Androsov v. Russia,
no. 63973/00, § 69, 6 October 2005).
The
Court has found in many cases that the quashing of the enforceable
judgments frustrated the applicants' reliance on the binding judicial
decision and deprived them of an opportunity to receive the money
they had legitimately expected to receive (see, among others, Ivanova
v. Russia, no. 11697/05, §
23, 24 April 2008, Dmitriyeva v.
Russia, no. 27101/04, §
32, 3 April 2008). In these circumstances, even assuming that the
interference was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, the Court
considers that the quashing of the enforceable judgment in the
applicants' favour by way of supervisory review placed an excessive
burden on them and was incompatible with Article 1 of the Protocol
No. 1. There has therefore been a violation of that Article in the
present two cases.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 ON ACCOUNT OF NON-ENFORCEMENT
The
applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 about the non-enforcement of the judgments.
The
Government argued that the first applicant's complaint was
inadmissible. First, the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic
remedies, such as a claim for damages, an adjustment for the cost of
living, and a negligence action. Second, he had submitted enforcement
papers to bailiffs instead of the Ministry of Finance, received the
writ of execution from the first instance court with a three months'
delay and recalled the writ from the Ministry one month before
quashing. The Government did not make submissions on the second
applicant's non-enforcement complaint.
The
applicants maintained their claims. In particular, the first
applicant submitted that the authorities had
taken no steps to execute the judgment and that he had unsuccessfully
complained about the non-enforcement to various authorities, in
particular to the Ministry of Finance.
A. Admissibility
As
regards exhaustion, the Court has already found that the suggested
remedies were ineffective (see, among others, Burdov
v. Russia (no. 2), no. 33509/04, §§
103 and 106-116, 15 January 2009, and Moroko v. Russia,
no. 20937/07, §§ 25-30, 12 June 2008).
The
Court further notes that the applicants' non-enforcement complaint is
not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that an unreasonably long delay in the enforcement
of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v.
Russia, no. 59498/00, ECHR 2002-III). The Court
further reiterates that the quashing of a judgment in a manner which
has been found to have been incompatible with the principle of legal
certainty and the applicant's “right to a court” cannot
be accepted as justification for the failure to enforce that judgment
(see Sukhobokov v. Russia,
no. 75470/01, § 26, 13 April 2006). In the present
cases the judgments in the applicants' favour were enforceable until
at least the respective dates of quashing and it was incumbent on the
State to abide by their terms (see Velskaya v. Russia, no.
21769/03, § 18, 5 October 2006). However, in each
case the State avoided paying the judgment debt for more than one
year.
As
regards the objection concerning the first applicant's failure to
submit the enforcement papers in good time, the Court reiterates that
where a judgment is against the State, the State must take the
initiative to enforce it (see Akashev v. Russia, no. 30616/05,
§§ 21–23, 12 June 2008). The complexity of the
domestic enforcement procedure cannot relieve the State of its
obligation to enforce a binding judicial decision within a reasonable
time (see Burdov (no. 2),
cited above, § 70).
There
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE
CONVENTION
The
first applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he
had no effective domestic remedy in respect of the decision of the
Presidium to quash on supervisory review the final judgment in his
favour.
The
Court notes that Article 13 of the Convention does not, as such,
guarantee the right to appellate remedies in respect of a decision
taken by way of supervisory review, and the mere fact that the
judgment of the highest judicial body is not subject to further
judicial review does not infringe in itself the said provision (see
Sitkov v. Russia (dec.), no. 55531/00, 9 November 2004).
It follows that the complaint is incompatible ratione materiae
with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article
35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §
4 thereof.
The
applicants also complained under Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the domestic courts' findings
and overall unfairness of the State bonds redemption program.
However,
in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as
the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows
that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
first applicant claimed the amount awarded to
him by the final judgment in his favour, i.e. 102,056 Russian
roubles (RUB), in respect of pecuniary
damage and 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The
second applicant claimed RUB 194,553.80 representing
the present-day value of a Russian-made passenger car in
respect of pecuniary damage. He further stated that he had suffered
non-pecuniary damage without specifying the amount claimed under this
head.
The
Government argued that the applicants' claims for pecuniary damage
were unreasonable, since the applicants had no right to receive a
full value of the car under the domestic law. They pointed out that
in November 2004 the first applicant received compensation in
extra-judicial proceedings. The claim for non-pecuniary damage was
unsubstantiated.
The
Court reiterates that the best redress of a violation of Article 6 is
to put the applicant as far as possible in the position he would have
been if Article 6 had been respected (see Piersack
v. Belgium (Article
50), judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 85, § 12).
The Court finds that in the present case this principle applies as
well, having regard to the violations found (cf.
Abdulmanova v. Russia, no. 41564/05, § 25, 16 October
2008).
Applied
to the second applicant's case, this principle would mean that the
State must pay to the applicant the amount he should have received
under the initial judgment in his favour. As regards the remainder of
his claims, the Court notes that the applicant
did not explain his method of calculation of the present-day car
value or produce any documents he had used for calculations.
Accordingly, the Court awards to Mr Selivanov EUR 3,978
under this head and dismisses the remainder of his claims in respect
of pecuniary damage.
As
regards the first applicant, the Court notes that in November 2004 he
received the partial compensation of the promissory note value,
although in a lower amount than provided for by the initial judgment.
Deducting the sum which the Ministry of Finance has already
paid to the applicant on 26 November 2004, the Court considers
that the Government should pay the remaining part of the judgment
award made by the domestic courts under the judgment of 18 March
2003, (see, mutatis
mutandis, Almayeva
v. Russia, no. 966/03, § 42, 25 October 2007, and
Kudrina v. Russia, no. 27790/03, § 37, 21 June 2007)
which was equivalent to approximately EUR 1,460 on
the date when the applicant submitted his claims. The
remainder of his claims in respect of pecuniary damage should be
dismissed.
The
Court further considers that the applicants must have suffered
distress from the non-enforcement and quashing of the judgments.
Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards each of
the applicants EUR 3,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, an applicant is
entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as
it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum.
1. The first applicant
The
first applicant claimed RUB 187 of postal expenses. The Government
argued that the applicant only substantiated his claim in respect of
RUB 107.
In the present case, regard being had to the information in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable
to award the sum of EUR 5 in respect of costs and expenses.
2. The second applicant
The
second applicant claimed reimbursement of costs and expenses without
specifying the amount and or submitting any evidence in support of
the claim. The Government argued that the claim was unsubstantiated.
The Court points out that under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court any
claim for just satisfaction must be itemised and submitted in writing
together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, “failing
which the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part”.
The applicant did not submit a detailed claim in respect of costs and
expenses. Accordingly, the Court makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the complaints concerning
non-enforcement and supervisory review admissible and the remainder
of the applications inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in each case on
account of non-enforcement and quashing by way of supervisory review;
Holds in respect of all applications,
(a)
that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
sums plus any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts, to be
converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
the settlement:
(i) in
respect of pecuniary damage:
EUR
3,978 (three thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight euros) to Mr
Markovtsi;
EUR 1,460 (one
thousand four hundred and sixty euros) to Mr Selivanov;
(ii) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage:
EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros) to Mr Markovtsi;
EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros) to Mr Selivanov;
(iii) in
respect of costs and expenses, EUR 5 (five euros) to Mr Markovtsi;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants'
claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 July 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren
Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
APPENDIX
application
number, date of lodging
|
applicant's
name
|
judgment
in the applicant's favour (date, court)
|
Award
upheld on appeal (date)
|
award
(rub)
|
quashing
on supervisory review (date)
|
756/05
6
December 2004
|
MARKOVTSI Aleksandr
Aleksandrovich
|
18
March 2003, the Ust-Yanskiy District Court
|
23
April 2003
|
102,056.00
|
14
October 2004
|
25761/05
20
April 2005
|
SELIVANOV
Yevgeniy
Fedorovich
|
17 February 2003,
the
Mirninskiy District Court
|
26
March 2003
|
138,967.00
|
16
December 2004
|