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MACIEJEWSKI v. POLAND - 23755/03 [2009] ECHR 1067 (7 July 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1067.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1067
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF MACIEJEWSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 23755/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 July
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Maciejewski v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Lech
Garlicki,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
judges,
and Lawrence
Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 June 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 23755/03) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Maksymilian Maciejewski
(“the applicant”), on 11 July 2003.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
18 October 2005 the Court declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate the complaint concerning the
length of the applicant's detention to the Government. Under the
provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Gdańsk.
On
31 March 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of armed
robbery. On 1 April 1999 the Gdańsk District Court remanded him
in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed
armed robbery and had unlawfully possessed a firearm. It also found
that there was a risk that the applicant might go into hiding, tamper
with evidence or obstruct the proceedings by other unlawful means.
Later,
several other persons were detained and charged in connection with
the same investigation conducted by the Department of Organised Crime
of the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor's Office.
On
24 June 1999 the Gdańsk Regional Court prolonged the applicant's
detention until 30 September 1999. It relied on the need to obtain
and secure further evidence. On 15 September 1999 the Gdańsk
Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 December
1999, reiterating the grounds previously given for his detention and
adding that the measure was also justified by the severity of the
anticipated penalty.
On
8 December 1999 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal extended his
detention until 30 March 2000, relying on the grounds previously
given for his detention. It underlined the serious nature of the
offences with which the applicant had been charged and the need to
obtain further expert evidence.
On
30 March 2000 the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention
until 30 June 2000. It found that the strong suspicion that he had
committed the serious offences with which he had been charged, the
severity of the anticipated penalty and the risk of his tampering
with evidence justified holding him in custody. It also relied on the
complexity of the case.
On
24 May 2000 the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention
until 15 December 2000, invoking the same grounds as given in its
earlier decision. In addition, it found that the present case was
“particularly complex” within the meaning of Article 263
§ 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure due to, inter
alia, the nature of the offences and the number of suspects
involved.
On
13 December 2000 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal extended the
applicant's and his eight co-accused's detention until 31 March
2001.
On
7 March 2001 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant's detention until 31 May 2001. It relied on the reasonable
suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he
had been charged and the severity of the anticipated penalty. The
Court of Appeal further held that detention on remand was the only
measure which could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings
given the nature of the charges and the relations between the
accused, all members of an organised criminal gang. It also
considered that the prolongation of detention was justified by the
need to obtain DNA evidence in order to corroborate evidence
previously obtained.
Since
on 30 March 2001 the applicant' s detention had reached the statutory
time limit of two years laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, further prolongation of his detention was
ordered by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal. The Gdańsk Court of
Appeal gave decisions on the applicant's detention on 23 May 2001 and
24 October 2001, prolonging it respectively until 31 October 2001 and
31 March 2002.
On
15 May 2001 the prosecution filed a
bill of indictment with the Gdańsk Regional Court.
The applicant was charged with several dozen counts of armed robbery
which had been committed while acting in an organised armed criminal
group. The bill of indictment listed 120 charges brought against 19
defendants, who all were detained on remand. The case file
comprised 114 volumes. The prosecution asked the court to hear
evidence from 366 witnesses.
The
trial began on 28 December 2001. However, as of 22 April 2002 the
reading out of the bill of indictment by the prosecution had still
not been concluded. Initially, the trial court held three hearings
per month.
On
13 March 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant and his
seven co-defendants be held in custody until 30 September 2002. It
considered that the trial could be terminated by the last-mentioned
date. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, the Court of
Appeal found that the prolongation of detention was justified under
Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the
particular complexity of the case. It further observed that the
delays in the trial were partly attributable to some of the
defendants who had attempted to disrupt the proceedings and,
consequently, had to be removed from the court room during a hearing
on 30 January 2002. The Court of Appeal instructed the trial court to
hold more than 3 hearings per month. Furthermore, it held that no
other preventive measure could secure the proper conduct of the
trial. In that respect, the Court of Appeal observed that there was a
reasonable risk that the applicant and other defendants might
interfere with the proceedings, given the nature of the charges, the
severity of the anticipated penalty and the fact that such attempts
had been made in the course of the investigation.
On
11 September 2002 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's and
his nine co-defendants' detention until 31 December 2002. In addition
to the grounds previously relied on, it considered that the
applicant's detention was justified under Article 258 § 2
of the Code of Criminal Procedure since that provision established a
presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty
being imposed on the applicant might induce him to obstruct the
proceedings. It also noted that the prolongation of his detention was
justified by the volume of evidence to be heard in the trial.
On
18 December 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant and
his 17 co-defendants be kept in custody until 30 June 2003. It held
that the grounds invoked in its previous decisions were still valid.
On
25 June 2003 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's and
eighteen of his co-defendant's detention until 31 December 2003,
relying on the same grounds as given previously. In addition, it
observed that the trial could not have been terminated due to
obstructiveness on the part of the defendants who had filed numerous
requests challenging the trial court. It also noted that the trial
court had taken various procedural steps in order to accelerate the
proceedings.
Subsequently,
the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention on several
occasions. The relevant decisions were given on 17 December 2003
(prolonging his detention until 30 June 2004), 23 June 2004
(extending his detention until 31 December 2004), 15 December 2004
(ordering his continued detention until 31 March 2005), 30 March 2005
(prolonging his detention until 30 June 2005) and 22 June 2005
(extending his detention until 30 September 2005). In all those
decisions the Court of Appeal stated that the grounds previously
given for the applicant's detention were still valid. It also
stressed the exceptionally complex nature of the case.
In its decision on the applicant's detention of 23
June 2004, the Court of Appeal observed that up to April 2003 the
main reason for the delays during the trial was the obstructiveness
of the defendants and the abuse of the rights of the defence. It also
observed that the trial could be concluded by the end of 2004
provided that the Regional Court endeavoured to organise the trial
efficiently.
In
its decision of 27 July 2005 dismissing the applicant's appeal
against the decision of 22 June 2005 prolonging his detention, the
Court of Appeal referred, inter alia, to the presumption
established under Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and held that that presumption alone justified the
applicant's continued detention. It also held that keeping the
applicant in custody was necessary in order to prevent him from
interfering with the trial, given the reasonable risk of such
interference which flowed from the fact that he had been charged with
commission of offences as a member of an organised criminal group.
By
March 2006 the trial court had held some 135 hearings of the 162
which had been scheduled. It heard more than 400 witnesses.
During
the proceedings the applicant filed numerous but unsuccessful
applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully,
against the decisions prolonging his detention.
On
21 March 2005 the Gdańsk Regional Court made a severance order
with a view to expediting the proceedings, and thereafter four
defendants (J.N., G.P., Z.S. and Z.C.), who in the meantime had been
released from detention, were to be tried separately.
After
20 June 2005 no hearing was held due to the serious illness of the
judge rapporteur. On 21 September 2005 the President of the IV
Criminal Section of the Gdańsk Regional Court assigned a new
judge rapporteur. Consequently, the trial had to commence de novo.
On 20 September 2005 the Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant's detention until 31 January 2006. The applicant appealed
against that decision. On 18 October 2005 a different panel of the
Court of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and ordered the
applicant's release under police supervision. It also imposed on him
a prohibition on leaving the country. The Court of Appeal had regard
to the fact that the trial had to commence de novo and that
the applicant had already spent a few years in pre-trial detention.
The
applicant was released on 19 October 2005.
On
24 November 2005 the trial court made a further severance order and
divided the case into eleven separate cases.
It
appears that the proceedings are still pending before the
first instance court.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the
imposition of detention on remand (tymczasowe aresztowanie),
the grounds for its prolongation, release from detention and rules
governing other, so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) at the material time are stated in the Court's
judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02,
§§ 27-33, 25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland,
no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
The
relevant statistical data, recent amendments to the Code of Criminal
Procedure designed to streamline criminal proceedings and references
to relevant Council of Europe materials including the Committee of
Ministers' Interim Resolution of 6 June 2007 can be found in the
Court's judgment in the case of Kauczor (see Kauczor
v. Poland, no. 45219/06, §§ 27-28 and 30-35,
3 February 2009).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The
Government, having regard to the Court's case-law concerning the
length of pre-trial detention, refrained from taking a position on
the admissibility of the complaint.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
applicant's detention started on 31 March 1999, when he was arrested
on suspicion of armed robbery. It continued until 19 October 2005
when the applicant was released. Accordingly, the period to be taken
into consideration amounts to 6 years, 7 months and 2 days.
2. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant argued that the length of his pre-trial detention had been
unreasonable and contested the reasons given therefor. He submitted
that his prolonged detention on remand had amounted to serving a
prison sentence. Furthermore, he had not contributed to any delays in
the proceedings.
(b) The Government
The
Government firstly presented some statistical data, indicating that
in the years 2000-2005 the number of indictments and convictions in
cases concerning organised crime increased both in absolute terms and
in relation to other crimes. In 2004 there were 617 indictments in
such cases and 220 persons were convicted. They argued that in
organised crime cases the authorities were faced with particular
problems, relating to the taking and assessment of evidence and
various logistical issues.
With
reference to the present case, the Government submitted that the
applicant's pre-trial detention had been justified by the existence
of substantial evidence of his guilt, the nature of the offences with
which he had been charged and the severity of the anticipated
penalty. They underlined that the length of the applicant's detention
should be assessed with reference to the fact that he and his
co-defendants had acted in an organised criminal gang. The risk that
the defendants might obstruct the proceedings or tamper with evidence
was aggravated by the fact they were members of a tightly-knit
organised criminal group. Thus, the domestic courts had considered it
necessary to remand the applicant and his co defendants in
custody until all relevant witnesses had been heard.
The
Government emphasised that the serious nature of the charges as well
as the fact that there had been nineteen defendants charged with
numerous offences required that the proper conduct of the proceedings
be secured with particular diligence. The necessity of the
applicant's continued detention had been thoroughly examined by the
courts which on each occasion had given sufficient reasons for their
decisions. The applicant's case had been extremely complex on account
of the number of charges and defendants, and by reason of the volume
of evidence.
Furthermore,
the Government maintained that the defendants bore the main
responsibility for the length of the trial. They had lodged hundreds
of applications and appealed against every decision, even when they
had been informed that the appeal had been inadmissible. The
Government referred in that respect to the decision of the Court of
Appeal of 23 June 2004 which had observed that the main reason for
the delays in the proceedings until April 2003 had been the
obstructiveness of the defendants and the abuse of the rights of the
defence. They further submitted that during the hearing held on 30
January 2002 the applicant and other co accused had refused to
participate in the hearing and tried to leave the courtroom.
Consequently the judge had ordered that they be expelled. In their
view the defendants' behaviour justified the conclusion that they had
resorted to delaying tactics. Lastly, they maintained that the
authorities had displayed special diligence in dealing with the
applicant's case.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
The
Court recalls that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention were stated in a
number of its previous judgements (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110 et
seq, ECHR 2000 XI; and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further
references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on
four grounds, namely (1) the serious nature of the charges against
him, (2) the severity of the penalty to which he was liable, (3) the
risk that he might abscond, tamper with evidence or obstruct the
proceedings by other unlawful means, and (4) the complexity of the
case related to the number of defendants and volume of evidence to be
heard. The domestic courts also referred to the obstructive behaviour
of the defendants aimed at delaying the trial.
The
applicant was charged with numerous counts of armed robbery committed
in an organised and armed criminal group (see paragraph 14 above). In
the Court's view, the fact that the case concerned a member of a such
criminal group should be taken into account in assessing compliance
with Article 5 § 3 (see Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04,
§ 57, 16 January 2007).
The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion against the applicant of
having committed the serious offences could initially warrant his
detention. In addition, it notes that the authorities were faced with
the difficult task of determining the facts and the degree of alleged
responsibility of each of the defendants. In these circumstances, the
Court also accepts that the need to obtain voluminous evidence from
many sources, coupled with the fact that in the course of the
investigation new suspects had been identified, constituted relevant
and sufficient grounds for the applicant's initial detention.
However,
with the passage of time, those grounds became less and less
relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds
adduced by the courts were “relevant” and “sufficient”
(see, Kudła v. Poland, cited above, §
111).
According
to the authorities, the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed
on the applicant created a presumption that the applicant would
obstruct the proceedings. However, the Court would reiterate that,
while the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the
assessment of the risk of absconding or re-offending, the gravity of
the charges cannot by itself justify long periods of detention on
remand (see, for instance, Kąkol v. Poland, no. 3994/03,
§ 51, 6 September 2007).
Furthermore,
the judicial authorities relied on the fact that the applicant had
been charged with being a member of an organised criminal gang. In
this regard, the Court reiterates that the existence of a general
risk flowing from the organised nature of the alleged criminal
activities of the applicant may be accepted as the basis for his
detention at the initial stages of the proceedings (see, Górski
v. Poland, no. 28904/02, § 58, 4 October 2005) and
in some circumstances also for subsequent prolongations of the
detention (see, Celejewski, cited above, § 37). It is
also accepted that in such cases, involving numerous accused, the
process of gathering and hearing evidence is often a difficult task.
Moreover, the Court considers that in cases such as the present
concerning organised criminal gangs, the risk that a detainee, if
released, might bring pressure to bear on witnesses or other
co accused, or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings, is by
the nature of things often particularly high. In this respect, the
Court notes that although the authorities invoked the risk of
absconding and tampering with evidence, they did not specify any
concrete grounds justifying their opinion. On the other hand, the
Court observes that the applicant and some of his co defendants
had made attempts to disrupt the trial in its early stages (see
paragraphs 16 and 41 above). Furthermore, it accepts that certain
delays during the trial were caused by the defendants'
obstructiveness (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above).
While
all those above factors could justify even a relatively long period
of detention, they did not give the domestic courts an unlimited
power to prolong this measure. Even if the particular circumstances
of the case required detention on remand to be extended beyond the
period generally accepted under the Court's case-law, particularly
strong reasons would be needed to justify this (Wolf v. Poland,
nos. 15667/03 and 2929/04, § 90, 16 January 2007). In
this respect the Court observes that the applicant had spent 6 years
and 7 months in pre-trial detention which is a particularly long
period.
Having
regard to the foregoing, even taking into account the fact that the
courts were faced with the particularly difficult task of trying a
case involving members of an organised criminal group, the Court
concludes that the grounds given by the domestic authorities could
not justify the overall period of the applicant's detention. In these
circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings
were conducted with special diligence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
46 of the Convention provides:
“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they
are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its
execution.”
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicant
The
applicant did not submit any observations concerning this provision.
2. The Government
The Government submitted that
the proceedings in the applicant's case had exceptional features that
distinguished it from other cases of detention on remand and that the
length of the applicant's detention could be explained by the extreme
complexity of the proceedings and the fact that they involved an
organised criminal group. They emphasised that from the very
beginning of the trial the behaviour of the accused, including the
applicant, had impeded the swift conduct of the proceedings.
Consequently, the length of the applicant's pre-trial detention did
not reveal the existence of a structural problem. They further
stressed that Polish law was compatible with the standards of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention.
Maintaining
that the number of cases in which the domestic courts had ordered
detention on remand lasting from twelve months to two years or longer
was decreasing, the Government made reference to the statistical data
for 2005-2007 which they had submitted to the Court. They further
stressed that the awareness of courts of the standards concerning the
length of the detention on remand was growing.
The
Government concluded that, bearing in mind the efforts of the Polish
authorities and the legislative reforms which were and had been
undertaken by them to solve the problem of the length of detention on
remand, Poland could not be said to have failed to comply with its
obligations under Article 46 of the Convention to abide by the
Court's judgments.
B. The Court's assessment
Recently,
in the case of Kauczor v. Poland (see Kauczor, cited
above, § 58 et seq. with further references) the Court held that
the Interim Resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6
June 2007 taken together with the number of judgments already
delivered and of the pending cases raising an issue of excessive
detention incompatible with Article 5 § 3 demonstrated that the
violation of the applicant's right under Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention had originated in a widespread problem arising out of the
malfunctioning of the Polish criminal justice system which had
affected, and may still affect in the future, an as yet unidentified,
but potentially considerable number of persons charged in criminal
proceedings.
It
is true that the present case concerns a person involved in an
organised criminal group. However, as stated above, while this
element is to be taken into account in assessing compliance with
Article 5 § 3 and may justify a longer period of detention than
in a case concerning an individual offender, a member of an organised
criminal group is entitled to the protection against unreasonably
lengthy detention afforded by this provision (see paragraphs 44 and
48-50 above). As in other numerous similar detention cases, the
authorities did not justify the applicant's continued detention by
relevant and sufficient reasons (see paragraphs 45-50 above).
Moreover, as demonstrated by the ever increasing number of judgments
in which the Court has found Poland to be in breach of Article 5 §
3 in respect of applicants involved in organised crime, the present
case is by no means an isolated example of the imposition of
unjustifiably lengthy detention but a confirmation of a practice
found to be contrary to the Convention (see, among many other
examples, Celejewski v. Poland, cited above; Kąkol
v. Poland, cited above; Malikowski v. Poland,
no. 15154/03, 16 October 2007 and also Hilgartner
v. Poland, no. 37976/06, §§ 46-48,
3 March 2009; not final). Consequently, the Court sees no reason
to diverge from its findings made in Kauczor as to the
existence of a structural problem and the need for the Polish State
to adopt measures to remedy the situation (see Kauczor, cited
above, §§ 60-62 ).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction within the
time-limit (13 September 2006) fixed by the President of the Chamber
under Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court. On 2 October 2007, when
submitting his comments on the additional question put to the parties
on the application of Article 46 of the Convention, he claimed 20,000
euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Having regard to the above,
the Court finds that the applicant failed to comply with the relevant
time-limit and rejects his claims for just satisfaction (Rule 60 §
3 of the Rules of Court).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 July 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President