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NIELSEN v. DENMARK - 44034/07 [2009] ECHR 1029 (2 July 2009)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2009/1029.html
Cite as:
[2009] ECHR 1029
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF NIELSEN v. DENMARK
(Application
no. 44034/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2 July
2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Nielsen v. Denmark,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Rait Maruste, President,
Peer
Lorenzen,
Karel Jungwiert,
Renate Jaeger,
Mark
Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana
Lazarova Trajkovska, judges,
and Claudia
Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 June 2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 44034/07) against the
Kingdom of Denmark lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Danish national, Mr Rolf Nielsen
(“the applicant”), on 12 September 2007.
The
applicant was represented by Mr K.L. Németh, a
lawyer practising in Copenhagen. The Danish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Nina
Holst-Christensen of the Ministry of Justice.
On
28 March 2008 the
President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1955 and lives on the island of Samsø.
In the beginning of the 1990s a new concept called “tax
asset stripping” (selskabstømmersager) came into
existence in Denmark. It related mainly
to a criminal activity whereby the persons involved committed
aggravated debtor fraud by buying up and selling numerous inactive
solvent private limited companies within a short period and, for
their own profit, “stripped” the companies of assets
including deposits earmarked for payment of corporation tax. The
persons involved were usually closely interconnected and collaborated
on their criminal activities, which involved very large amounts of
money. According to a survey conducted by the customs and tax
authorities, approximately one thousand six hundred companies with a
total tax debt exceeding two billion Danish kroner (DKK) were
stripped in the period from the late 1980s until 1994. In addition to
the criminal cases, tax asset stripping gave rise to a large number
of cases for damages relating to the sellers' and the buyer banks'
liability for the loss arising when the companies were stripped of
their funds in connection with the sale. Following a number of
legislative amendments, the trade in inactive solvent companies
largely ceased in the summer of 1993.
On
27 November 1992, in his role as owner and managing director, the
applicant sold a private limited company originally called Soft
TUX Aps, the name later being changed to HOP no. 49.
On
30 March 1995 HOP no. 49 went bankrupt. A trustee in
bankruptcy was appointed to manage the estate and settle the
accounts.
On
6 October 1997 the trustee, on behalf of the bankrupt HOP no. 49,
initiated civil proceedings before the High Court of Eastern Denmark
(Østre Landsret), the High Court, against the applicant
and a bank (BG Bank A/S), requesting that the defendants be
ordered jointly and severally to pay approximately 4.4 million Danish
kroner (DKK), equivalent to approximately 594,000 euros (EUR). The
trustee alleged that the defendants had been responsible for
stripping the company of assets in connection with the
above-mentioned sale in 1992.
On
18 November 1997 the defendant BG Bank A/S joined the
proceedings and raised an individual claim against the applicant, an
accountancy firm (Revisorhuset A/S) and two lawyers, HAV and
PF, as defendants in the main proceedings.
On
20 November 1997, maintaining that he had been misled by his
advisers, the applicant brought proceedings against a lawyer CH, a
law firm G & N, an accountant JOL, Revisorhuset A/S and BG
Bank A/S as defendants in the main proceedings.
Formally
the proceedings included twelve parties. However, since the applicant
and BG Bank A/S acted both as defendants and third-party
defendants, and Revisorhuset A/S had been joined to the
proceedings by both the applicant and BG Bank A/S, the
proceedings included nine different parties. Subsequently,
in 2002 the proceedings against Revisorhuset A/S were
abandoned because it ceased to exist. Six of the remaining
eight parties were represented by five different counsels and
two of them had no legal representation.
Seven
hearings were held and several written pleadings exchanged between
October 1997 and 17 September 1999.
On
the latter day all parties, including the applicant, agreed to
adjourn the proceedings until 14 January 2000 pending a Supreme Court
judgment in a similar case, hereafter called the Else Thrane
case. In that case, as in the present case, an estate in bankruptcy
had sued the seller of the company for damages as the company had
been stripped of its assets in connection with the sale and was
therefore unable to pay corporation taxes. Thus, the crucial matter
concerned the question of liability of the buyer's bank and the
buyer's attorney and accountant for the advice provided by them.
The
judgment in the Else Thrane case was passed by the Supreme
Court on 24 November 1999 (published in the Danish Weekly Law Reports
(Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2000, page 365/2), in the light
of which the proceedings in the present case were adjourned awaiting
the parties' settlement negotiations. The proceedings and the
settlement negotiations were adjourned on 7 April 2000 and several
times thereafter because the applicant's first counsel (L) resigned
and the applicant had to appoint a new one.
In
October 2000 new counsel (D) submitted a pleading and the exchange of
pleadings and settlement negotiations were therefore resumed until
the end of April 2001, when the applicant stated that he did not wish
to enter into a settlement. Immediately thereafter, the High Court
summoned the parties for a hearing to take place on 15 June 2001,
during which the applicant mentioned that it might be possible to
reach a settlement if various requests were met. The parties,
including the applicant, thus agreed to adjourn the proceedings anew
in order to reach a settlement.
In
November 2001, the applicant informed the High Court that his counsel
had resigned and that he did not wish to enter into a settlement.
A
hearing was held on 22 February 2002, in agreement with the applicant
the High Court requested that a new counsel be retained, inter
alia to submit a pleading stating on which points, in the
applicant's opinion, the present case differed so much from the Else
Thrane case that the Supreme Court' judgment in that case could
not guide the outcome of the present case. A hearing was scheduled
for 12 April 2002, at which new counsel (B) appeared for the
applicant. However, he informed the High Court on 22 August 2002
that he was no longer handling the applicant's interests. At a
hearing the following day, the applicant was represented by another
counsel (S), who although given until 27 September 2002, submitted
the awaited pleading on 10 January 2003. Thereafter, pleadings
were exchanged regularly and several hearings held.
At
a pre-trial review held on 2 February 2004 only counsel for BG Bank
A/S was present. He was requested to investigate whether
the applicant was represented by counsel, since the case seemed ready
for trial.
In
March 2004, upon request the High Court adjourned the proceedings
until 19 January 2005 awaiting the Supreme Court's decision regarding
a claim from BG Bank A/S that it was entitled to a
contribution from one of the third party defendants.
On
4 March 2005 the applicant complained about the adjournment and
invited the High Court to schedule the trial and accordingly a
hearing was held on 22 March 2005. In order to discuss how to
schedule the main proceedings and/or the third party cases, a
pre-trial review was scheduled to take place on 23 November 2005.
In
a letter of 9 November 2005 to the High Court, the applicant
complained about the length of the proceedings and at the same time
requested an adjournment of the forthcoming pre-trial review since he
wanted a new counsel. He also stated that he would not be in Denmark
until Christmas.
On
22 November 2005 the High Court refused the applicant's request
since, according to the information available, the applicant had not
been legally represented since 2 February 2004, and the pre-trial
review had been scheduled since 22 March 2005.
The
pre-trial review was held on 23 November 2005 without the applicant's
presence.
By
letter of 8 December 2005, a new counsel, namely the lawyer
representing the applicant in the proceedings before the Court,
informed the High Court that he was representing the applicant in the
domestic proceedings.
Accordingly,
and since the applicant alleged that he had not been summoned to the
pre-trial review on 23 November 2005, the High Court summoned the
parties to another pre-trial review to take place on 4 May 2006.
During that review the trial was fixed for five days in August 2007.
On
23 August 2006, the High Court rescheduled the trial at the request
of one of the parties and suggested three alternative periods during
the autumn and winter of 2007 which were submitted to the respective
parties for comments. The trial was thereafter postponed to take
place in September 2007.
Court
sessions were held on 20 August and on 14, 24 and 26 September
2007. A new legal issue arose between the BG Bank A/S and
a third-party defendant and the High Court therefore chose to use
some of the days reserved for the trial to clarify the matter and for
settlement negotiations. At the last session, the trial was scheduled
to take place “possibly” from 9 to 11 April 2008, in case
the negotiations proved fruitless.
At
the beginning of the trial on 9 April 2008, the applicant claimed
that one of the High Court judges had to vacate his seat due to
disqualification. Although indicating that it did not find the
relevant judge disqualified, the High Court did not want to conduct
the trial without the requisite respect for the court's impartiality.
Thus it re-scheduled the trial for October 2008.
The
trial was held in October 2008. On 10 December 2008 the High Court
passed judgment finding against the applicant.
The
applicant appealed against the High Court judgment to the Supreme
Court (Højesteret) on 19 December 2008.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings before the
High Court had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
In
the Government's view the application should be declared inadmissible
as being manifestly ill-founded.
The
applicant disagreed.
The
Court considers that the application is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to take into consideration
It
is common ground that the proceedings complained about commenced on
6 October 1997, when the company HOP nr. 49 APS
issued a writ against the applicant and BG Bank A/S, and ended
on 10 December 2008, when the High Court passed its judgment. The
proceedings thus lasted eleven years and two months. The subsequent
appeal proceedings do not come within the scope of the case as
submitted by the applicant.
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
a. Complexity of the case
The
applicant submitted that the proceedings were by no means more
complex than other tax asset stripping cases brought before the
Danish courts.
In the Government's view the case was very complex
as regards the facts, which contributed greatly to the length of the
proceedings.
The
Court observes that the case concerned so-called tax asset stripping
with complicated financial transactions and several persons involved,
who were intricately interconnected, which usually renders such
proceedings of extraordinary scope and of particular complexity (see,
mutatis mutandis, Petersen. v. Denmark (dec.) 6315/02,
Frederiksen v. Denmark, (dec.), application no.
23012/02, and Wallin Karlsen v. Denmark (dec.), 23523/02). In
the present case, originally nine different parties were involved,
and although the proceedings were civil in nature, the Court
considers that the proceedings were time-consuming and difficult, and
for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention, of a complex nature.
b. The applicant's conduct
The
applicant maintained that the length of the proceedings could not be
attributed to him.
The
Government considered that the applicant's conduct contributed
considerably to the length of the proceedings.
At
the outset, the Court points out that the first time the applicant
objected to the length of the proceedings was in March 2005, when the
proceedings had lasted almost seven years and six months.
Accordingly, a hearing was held on 22 March 2005 during which a
pre-trial review was scheduled to take place on 23 November 2005.
Nevertheless on 9 November 2005, although repeating his
complaint about the length of the proceedings, the applicant himself
requested an adjournment of the proceedings, inter alia to
find a new counsel. Subsequently, whether in 2006, 2007 or 2008,
there is no indication that the applicant before the High Court
objected to the adjournments, the scheduling of the trial, or in
general complained about the length of the proceedings.
More
importantly, during the proceedings the applicant changed counsel
five times, and during some periods was not legally represented,
which unavoidably had a detrimental impact on the length of the
proceedings, see for example the periods from April to October 2000,
November 2001 to April 2002, August 2002 to January 2003 and
February 2004 to December 2005.
In
these circumstances the Court considers that the conduct of the
applicant and his lawyers caused delay in the examination of the
case.
c. Conduct of the national authorities
The
applicant contended that the High Court did not show due diligence in
dealing with the matter, notably due to its delays in fixing court
hearings and its fruitless attempts to reach a settlement.
The
Government maintained that there were no inactive periods
attributable to the State before the High Court and that based on an
overall assessment, and in the light of the special circumstances,
the proceedings were accomplished within a reasonable time.
As
to the conduct of the relevant authorities, the Court points out that
the case was pending before the High Court from 6 October 1997 to
10 December 2008 and accordingly lasted eleven years and two
months, which does appear excessive for one judicial instance in such
a case.
The
applicant submitted that the High Court delayed the proceedings by
its fruitless attempts to obtain a settlement in the case. The Court
notes in this respect that settlement negotiations took place: from
24 November 1999, when the Supreme Court passed its
judgment in the Else Thrane case to 7 April 2000, when the
applicant's first counsel resigned; from October 2000 to the end
of April 2001, when the applicant stated that he did not wish to
enter into a settlement; from 15 June 2001, when the applicant
mentioned that it might be possible to reach a settlement, to
November 2001, when he informed the High Court that he did not wish
to enter into a settlement; and finally in the period from September
2007 until April 2008, but during the latter period the trial was
already scheduled. Thus, it may be argued that in total approximately
sixteen months passed with a view to entering a settlement between,
at the relevant time, nine different parties. The Court does not find
such a period excessive, notably since pleadings were also exchanged
during this time and all parties at the relevant time agreed to enter
into settlement negotiations.
The
applicant also submitted that there were scheduling problems before
the High Court. The Court notes in this respect that subsequent to
the applicant's complaint about the length of the proceedings, on
22 March 2005 the High Court scheduled a pre-trial review
to take place on 23 November 2005, thus eight months thereafter.
Moreover, during the pre trial review on 4 May 2006,
the trial was fixed for five days to take place in August 2007,
thus fifteen months thereafter. Finally, on 23 August 2006
the trial was re-scheduled to take place in September 2007, thus
thirteen months thereafter. In the Court's view, although those
scheduling periods are not in themselves sufficiently long to raise
an issue in respect of the length of the proceedings, they did
contribute thereto.
Finally,
the Court notes that the High Court adjourned the proceedings for
other reasons, for example from March 2004 until January 2005
awaiting the Supreme Court's decision as to a claim from BG Bank
A/S, and from September 2007 to April 2008 because a legal issue
concerning BG Bank A/S and a third-party defendant had to
be solved on the dates already reserved for the trial. Although those
periods, which lasted almost seventeen months, may not as such be
imputable to the High Court, nevertheless the latter had authority
and the obligation to monitor the progress of the proceedings and to
ensure that they were not delayed.
d. Overall assessment
Consequently, having regard to the circumstances of
the case and taking into account the overall duration of the
proceedings before the High Court, the Court concludes that the
requirement of a “reasonable time” laid down in
Article 6 §
1 of the Convention was not
complied with in the present case. There has accordingly
been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
53. A. Damage
It
appears that the applicant claimed DKK 50,000 (approximately
EUR 6,705)
in compensation for the violation of his right to a fair trial within
a reasonable time.
Subject
to the Court finding a violation, the Government agreed that
generally compensation should be awarded. They found, however, that
the applicant's claim was excessive and disproportionate.
The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non pecuniary
damage. Having regard to its finding above, notably as to the
complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant (see, for
example, Kyriakidis and Kyriakidou v. Cyprus, no. 2669/02,
§§ 29 and 38, 19 January 2006, Iversen v.
Denmark, no. 5989/03, § 80, 28 September 2006,
and Christensen v. Denmark,
no. 247/07, § 108, 22 January 2009), and ruling on
an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 6,000.
B. Costs and expenses before the Court
The
applicant has not claimed any compensation for the costs and expenses
incurred before the domestic courts or for those incurred before the
Court.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the length of the proceedings
before the High Court;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 6,000 (six
thousand euros), in respect of non-pecuniary damage plus any tax that
may be chargeable on this amount, which is to be converted into the
national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 July 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Rait Maruste
Registrar President