(Application no. 41355/98)
20 January 2009
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Gavriel v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Işıl Karakaş, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 16 December 2008,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
(a) Nicosia/Kapouti, plot no. 576, sheet/plan 19/16, field, area: 5,017 sq. m;
(b) Kyrenia/Livera, plot no. 39/1, sheet/plan 5/62W1, field, area: 112,149 sq. m;
(c) Kyrenia/Livera, plot no. 14, sheet/plan 5/62W2, field, area: 171,549 sq. m;
(d) Kyrenia/Livera, plot no. 34, sheet/plan 5/63W1, field, area: 22,074 sq. m;
(e) Kyrenia/Livera, plot no. 45, sheet/plan 5/63W1, field, area: 11,582 sq. m.
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
A. The Government's objections
1. Objections of inadmissibility ratione materiae and ratione temporis
2. Objection of inadmissibility on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of victim status
B. The applicant's arguments
C. Third-party intervener's arguments
D. The Court's assessment
29. It follows that the Government's preliminary objection of incompatibility ratione materiae should be upheld with regard to the applicant's claim under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as far as the properties described in paragraph 8 and paragraph 9 (c), (d) and (e) above are concerned.
30. The reminder of the Government's preliminary objections should be dismissed.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
He invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
A. The arguments of the parties
1. The Government
2. The applicant
B. The third-party intervener's arguments
C. The Court's assessment
“63. ... as a consequence of the fact that the applicant has been refused access to the land since 1974, she has effectively lost all control over, as well as all possibilities to use and enjoy, her property. The continuous denial of access must therefore be regarded as an interference with her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Such an interference cannot, in the exceptional circumstances of the present case to which the applicant and the Cypriot Government have referred, be regarded as either a deprivation of property or a control of use within the meaning of the first and second paragraphs of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, it clearly falls within the meaning of the first sentence of that provision as an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. In this respect the Court observes that hindrance can amount to a violation of the Convention just like a legal impediment.
64. Apart from a passing reference to the doctrine of necessity as a justification for the acts of the 'TRNC' and to the fact that property rights were the subject of intercommunal talks, the Turkish Government have not sought to make submissions justifying the above interference with the applicant's property rights which is imputable to Turkey.
It has not, however, been explained how the need to rehouse displaced Turkish Cypriot refugees in the years following the Turkish intervention in the island in 1974 could justify the complete negation of the applicant's property rights in the form of a total and continuous denial of access and a purported expropriation without compensation.
Nor can the fact that property rights were the subject of intercommunal talks involving both communities in Cyprus provide a justification for this situation under the Convention. In such circumstances, the Court concludes that there has been and continues to be a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”
“187. The Court is persuaded that both its reasoning and its conclusion in the Loizidou judgment (merits) apply with equal force to displaced Greek Cypriots who, like Mrs Loizidou, are unable to have access to their property in northern Cyprus by reason of the restrictions placed by the 'TRNC' authorities on their physical access to that property. The continuing and total denial of access to their property is a clear interference with the right of the displaced Greek Cypriots to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
189. .. there has been a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the fact that Greek-Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus are being denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of their property as well as any compensation for the interference with their property rights.”
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
This provision reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
“172. The Court observes that the official policy of the 'TRNC' authorities to deny the right of the displaced persons to return to their homes is reinforced by the very tight restrictions operated by the same authorities on visits to the north by Greek Cypriots living in the south. Accordingly, not only are displaced persons unable to apply to the authorities to reoccupy the homes which they left behind, they are physically prevented from even visiting them.
173. The Court further notes that the situation impugned by the applicant Government has obtained since the events of 1974 in northern Cyprus. It would appear that it has never been reflected in 'legislation' and is enforced as a matter of policy in furtherance of a bi-zonal arrangement designed, it is claimed, to minimise the risk of conflict which the intermingling of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities in the north might engender. That bi-zonal arrangement is being pursued within the framework of the inter-communal talks sponsored by the United Nations Secretary-General ...
174. The Court would make the following observations in this connection: firstly, the complete denial of the right of displaced persons to respect for their homes has no basis in law within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (see paragraph 173 above); secondly, the inter-communal talks cannot be invoked in order to legitimate a violation of the Convention; thirdly, the violation at issue has endured as a matter of policy since 1974 and must be considered continuing.
175. In view of these considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article 8 of the Convention by reason of the refusal to allow the return of any Greek-Cypriot displaced persons to their homes in northern Cyprus.”
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
Article 14 of the Convention reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
Property listed under (a): rental value CYP 25 (approximately EUR 42.7);
Property listed under (b): rental value CYP 336 (approximately EUR 574);
Property listed under (c): rental value CYP 515 (approximately EUR 880);
Property listed under (d): market value CYP 11,037 (approximately EUR 18,857); rental value CYP 60 (approximately EUR 102.5);
Property listed under (e): market value CYP 7,528 (approximately EUR 12,862); rental value CYP 60 (approximately EUR 102.5).
(b) The Government
64. Finally, the Government did not comment on the applicant's submissions under the head of non-pecuniary damage.
2. The third-party intervener
3. The Court's assessment
67. The Court further notes that the Government's submission that the damage suffered by the applicant should be determined by the Immovable Property Determination, Evaluation and Compensation Commission and not by the Strasbourg organs is, in substance, a repetition of the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Such an objection has been rejected by the Court for the reasons indicated in paragraph 28 of the present judgment. The Court does not see any reason to depart from its conclusions on this issue.
B. Costs and expenses
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Upholds unanimously the Government's preliminary objection that the applicant's claim under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention as far as the properties described in paragraph 8 and in paragraph 9 (c), (d) and (e) of the present judgment are concerned;
(a) reserves the said question in whole;
(b) invites the Government and the applicant to submit, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement that they may reach;
(c) reserves the further procedure and delegates to the President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 January 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the dissenting opinion of Judge Karakaş is annexed to this judgment.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KARAKAŞ
Unlike the majority, I consider that the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies raised by the Government should not have been rejected. Consequently, I cannot agree with the finding of violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and of Article 8 of the Convention.
The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is intended to give Contracting States the opportunity to prevent or provide redress for violations alleged against them before such allegations are referred to the Court. That reflects the subsidiary nature of the Convention system.
Faced with the scale of the problem of deprivations of title to property alleged by Greek Cypriots (approximately 1,400 applications of this type lodged against Turkey), the Court, in the operative part of its Xenides Arestis v. Turkey judgment of 22 December 2005, required the respondent State to provide a remedy guaranteeing the effective protection of the rights set forth in Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the context of all the similar cases pending before it. The State has a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention, but also to select the general or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects. The Government submitted that by enacting the Law on Compensation for Immovable Properties (Law no. 67/2005) and setting up a Commission to deal with compensation claims it had discharged that obligation (see also Xenides Arestis v. Turkey (just satisfaction), no. 46347/99, § 37, 7 December 2006). It is that domestic remedy which, in their submission, the applicant failed to exercise in the present case.
The exhaustion of domestic remedies is normally assessed at the time when an application is lodged with the Court. However, there are exceptions to the rule which may be justified by the particular circumstances of each case (see Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, 22 May 2001).
Examples of such exceptions are to be found in the cases against Italy which raised similar questions and in which the Court found that certain specific facts justified departing from the general principle (see Brusco v. Italy, (dec.) no. 69789/01, 6 September 2001).
In other examples the Court also took the view, in the light of the specific facts of the cases concerned, and having regard to the subsidiary nature of the Convention mechanism, that new domestic remedies had not been exhausted (see the following decisions: Nogolica v. Croatia, no. 77784/01, 5 September 2002; Slaviček v. Croatia, no. 20862/02, 4 July 2002; Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia, nos. 57984/00, 60226/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00 and 68563/01; and Içyer v. Turkey, no. 18888/02, 29 January 2002).
In situations where there is no effective remedy affording the opportunity to complain of alleged violations, individuals are systematically compelled to submit to the European Court of Human Rights applications which could have been investigated first of all within the domestic legal order. In that way, the functioning of the Convention system risks losing its effectiveness in the long term (the most pertinent example is the Broniowski case, no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004).
In my opinion the above examples provide an opportunity to review the conditions for admissibility in the event of a major change in the circumstances of the case. For the similar post-Loizidou cases, the Court can always reconsider its admissibility decision and examine the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
Since the Court may reject “at any stage of the proceedings” (Article 35 § 4 of the Convention) an application which it considers inadmissible, new facts brought to its attention may lead it, even when examining the case on the merits, to reconsider the decision in which the application was declared admissible and ultimately declare it inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention, taking due account of the context (see, for example, Medeanu v. Romania (dec.), no. 29958/96, 8 April 2003, and Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, §§ 37-43, 28 April 2004).
The existence of a “new fact” which has come to light after the admissibility decision may prompt the Court to reconsider that decision.
I consider that the Law on Compensation for Immovable Properties (Law no. 67/2005) and the Commission set up to deal with compensation claims, which are based on the guiding principles laid down by the Court in the Xenides-Arestis case, are capable of providing an opportunity for the State authorities to provide redress for breaches of the Convention's provisions, including breaches alleged in applications already lodged with the Court before the Act's entry into force (see Içyer v. Turkey, cited above, § 72). That consideration also applies to applications already declared admissible by the Court (see Azinas, cited above).
In order to conclude whether there has or has not been a breach of the Convention, complainants must first exercise the new domestic remedy and then, if necessary, lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights, the international court. Following that logic, I cannot in this case find any violation of the Convention's provisions.