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KRNIC v. CROATIA - 8854/04 [2008] ECHR 754 (31 July 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/754.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 754
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF KRNIĆ v. CROATIA
(Application
no. 8854/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
31
July 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Krnić v. Croatia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 8 July 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 8854/04) against the
Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Croatian national, Mr Josip
Krnić (“the applicant”), on 18 December 2003.
The
Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mrs Š. StaZnik.
On
11 December 2007 the
Court declared the application partly inadmissible and decided to
communicate the complaints concerning the length of the proceedings
and the lack of remedies for those complaints to the Government. It
also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Samobor.
On
8 October 1990 the applicant brought a civil action against his
former employer, the company F., challenging his dismissal and
seeking his reinstatement and payment of salary arrears for the
period of his unemployment.
The
Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) granted
the claim in part in a judgment of 6 December 1991, which was upheld
by the Zagreb County Court (Zupanijski sud u Zagrebu) on 13
April 1993.
In
a decision of 2 September 1998 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud
Republike Hrvatske) quashed the lower courts’ judgments and
remitted the case for retrial, upon an appeal lodged by the
defendant.
In
the fresh proceedings the Zagreb Municipal Court ordered the
applicant’s reinstatement and dismissed his claim for payment
of salary arrears on 11 May 2000. The applicant lodged an appeal.
On
29 April 2003 the Zagreb County Court upheld the part of the first
instance judgment dismissing the claim for payment and quashed it in
the part granting the applicant’s claim for reinstatement and
in that part remitted the case for a fresh trial.
The
applicant did not attend a hearing scheduled for 21 October 2003
before the Zagreb Municipal Court and the proceedings were stayed. On
24 October 2003 the applicant asked that the proceedings be resumed
and further hearings were held on 12 February and 6 April 2004. On 2
June 2004 the trial was concluded but the applicant then submitted
further evidence and the trial was reopened on 17 June 2004. Further
hearings were held on 3 May 2005 and 7 November 2007 when the
applicant asked for the exemption of the presiding judge. Hearings
were held on 6 February and 10 April 2008 and the proceedings
are still pending.
Meanwhile,
on 24 January 2003 the applicant also lodged a constitutional
complaint about the length of the proceedings. On 27 November
2003 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske)
declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible
because the Zagreb County Court had in the meantime, on 29 April
2003, decided on his appeal.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began only on 6 November 1997,
when the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia.
However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed
after that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at
the time. The period in question has not yet ended. It has thus
lasted about ten years and eight months after the ratification of the
Convention, for three levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Government invited the Court to reject the applicant’s
complaint for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It maintained that
the applicant could have filed another constitutional complaint,
after the Constitutional Court had dismissed his first one. Bearing
in mind that the Constitutional Court has changed its practice in
this respect, so as to comply with the Court’s case-law, the
Government claimed that a complaint under section 63 of the
Constitutional Court Act would have been an effective remedy for the
applicant’s length complaint.
Furthermore,
the Government maintained that, in view of the change in the
Constitutional Court’s case-law, the Court should make an
exception from the general rule of non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies and declare this complaint inadmissible even though the
change occurred only after the lodging of the application with the
Court.
The
applicant disagreed with the Government and contested the
effectiveness of a constitutional complaint with respect to his
length complaint.
The
Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted. The purpose of the exhaustion rule is to afford
the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right
the violations alleged against them before those allegations are
submitted to it (see, among many other authorities,
Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74,
ECHR 1999-IV). The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires
that an applicant make normal use of remedies which are effective,
sufficient and accessible in respect of his Convention grievances.
The
Court further reiterates that the issue whether domestic remedies
have been exhausted is normally determined by reference to the date
when the application was lodged with the Court (see Baumann
v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, ECHR 2001 V
(extracts)). This rule is subject to exceptions which may be
justified by the specific circumstances of each case (see Nogolica
v. Croatia (dec.), no. 77784/01, ECHR 2002 VIII).
Turning
to the present case, the Court observes that, in lodging a
constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court
Act, the applicant made normal use of the remedy which was declared
to be an effective one in respect of his length complaint (see
Slaviček v. Croatia (dec.), no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002 VII).
He therefore offered the domestic bodies the opportunity of
preventing or putting right the violation alleged. However, it is
understandable that the applicant, seeing that his constitutional
complaint had failed, did not lodge a second constitutional
complaint. For the Court, this would overstretch the duties incumbent
on an applicant pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Unión Alimentaria
Sanders S.A. v. Spain, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 157,
p. 14, § 35, and Ullrich v. Austria, no. 66956/01, §
29, 21 October 2004).
As
regards the Government’s request to depart from the general
rule of exhaustion and to declare the applicant’s complaint
inadmissible even though the alleged change in the case-law of the
Constitutional Court occurred only after the lodging of his
application, the Court points out that, unlike in the Nogolica
case, the Government have not shown that there are any specific
circumstances which would justify such a departure (see, mutatis
mutandis, Pikić v. Croatia, no. 16552/02, § 32,
18 January 2005).
In
these circumstances, the Government’s objection must be
dismissed.
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
As
to the conduct of the parties, the Government claimed that the
applicant had contributed to the protraction of the proceedings in
asking that his case be decided by a judicial panel instead of a
single judge, submitting further evidence after the hearing had been
concluded and causing adjournment of one hearing. The applicant
contended those arguments and claimed that the prolongation of the
proceedings was entirely attributable to the domestic authorities.
The Court does not consider that the arguments of the Government can
justify the length of proceedings in the present case.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above). Having examined all the
material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government
have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to
reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to
its case-law on the subject as well as the overall length of the
proceedings, the Court considers that in the instant case the length
of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that the constitutional complaint under
section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act had not been an effective
remedy in respect of his length complaint. He relied on Article 13 of
the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The
Government contested that argument. They submitted that, at the time
when the applicant lodged his complaint the case-law of the
Constitutional Court did not allow the examination of the entire
length of the proceedings in a situation where they had been pending
for a very short time before a higher level of jurisdiction. However,
the Constitutional Court had changed its practice so as to harmonise
it with the Court’s case-law.
A. Admissibility
The
Court considers that this complaint is linked to the one examined
above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy
before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement
under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR
2000-XI). A constitutional complaint under section 63 of the
Constitutional Court Act was recognised to be an effective remedy for
the length of proceedings still pending in Croatia (see Slaviček
v. Croatia (dec.), no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002 VII).
However, the Court has already found a violation of Article 13 due to
the fact that a certain practice of the Constitutional Court was not
compatible with the Court’s case-law (see Debelić v.
Croatia, no. 2448/03, § 47, 26 May 2005).
In
the area of remedies concerning the length of proceedings, the Court
has to satisfy itself that the Constitutional Court’s decision
is capable of covering all stages of the proceedings complained of
and thus, in the same way as decisions given by the Court, of taking
into account the overall length (see, mutatis mutandis, Bako
v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 60227/00, 15 March 2005). In the
present case, when deciding on the applicant’s complaint, the
Constitutional Court only took into consideration the length of the
proceedings before one level of jurisdiction, that is, the court
before which the proceedings had been pending at the time of the
lodging of the constitutional complaint, but failed to examine the
previous period, namely, the time during which the applicant’s
case was pending at first instance. This approach of the
Constitutional Court is different from that of the Court and is not
capable of covering all stages of the proceedings. It is therefore
incompatible with the protection of rights in this respect offered by
the Court (cf., a contrario, Bako v. Slovakia,
cited above).
Whilst it is true that the fact that a remedy does not
lead to an outcome favourable to the applicant does not render it
ineffective (see Kudła, cited above, § 157), the
Court concludes that the practice of the Constitutional Court in the
circumstances of the present case rendered an otherwise effective
remedy ineffective. This conclusion does not, however, call into
question the effectiveness of the remedy as such or the obligation to
lodge a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the
Constitutional Court Act in order to exhaust domestic remedies
concerning complaints about the length of proceedings still pending
(see RaguZ v. Croatia, no. 43709/02, § 37, 10
November 2005).
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in the
present case.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government contested the claim.
The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR 5,400 under
that head plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed 1,878.98 Croatian kunas (HRK) for the costs
and expenses incurred before the Court.
The
Government left the matter to the Court’s discretion.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 270 for the
proceedings before it plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts which are to be converted into the national currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i)
EUR 5,400 (five thousand four hundred euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant;
(ii) EUR
270 (two hundred seventy euros) in respect of costs and expenses plus
any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 July 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President