British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
NADROSOV v. RUSSIA - 9297/02 [2008] ECHR 751 (31 July 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/751.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 751
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF NADROSOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 9297/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
31
July 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Nadrosov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 July 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 9297/02) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Andrey Yuryevich
Nadrosov (“the applicant”), on 18 December 2001.
The
applicant was represented by Ms K. Kastromina, a lawyer in the
International Protection Centre in Moscow. The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev, the former Representative of the Russian Federation at
the European Court of Human Rights.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that he had
been severely beaten up by police officers and that there had been no
effective investigation of his complaints of ill-treatment.
On
22 June 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
The
Government objected to the joint examination of the admissibility and
merits of the application. Having examined the Government’s
objection, the Court dismissed it.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1976 and lived until his arrest in
Rostov-on-Don. He is now serving his sentence in a correctional
colony in the town of Bataysk.
On 29 October 2000 two police officers accompanied by a
person in civilian clothes approached the applicant at a bus stop.
According to the applicant, the civilian punched him and the police
officers held his hands behind his back in an armlock, hit him with a
rubber truncheon on his head and back, body searched him and pushed
him into a police car. They took the applicant to the Proletarskiy
District police station. The applicant submitted that the beatings
had continued at the station with a view to forcing him to confess to
a theft.
The Government, relying on similar written statements
made on 2 and 8 August 2005 by police officers A. and Av. and a
written statement drawn up by the applicant’s co-defendant, Mr
P., disputed the applicant’s description of events. They
alleged that on 29 October 2000 he had been arrested on
suspicion of having robbed truck drivers and had been taken to a
police station. The relevant part of the statements read as follows:
Statement by police officer A.
“On 29 October 2000, after midnight, on an order
of an officer on duty, I drove to the following address:... due to a
call about a robbery in progress. As a result of the operation, data
was gathered, victims’ statements and explanations were
recorded, and a certain police officer arrested Mr Nadrosov and Mr P.
on suspicion of the crime and brought [them] to the police station.
At present, due to the remoteness of the events, I cannot recall
whether I questioned them and what they stated. I would like to add
that on 29 October 2000, at 8.00 a.m., my shift ended and I left the
police station. I took no further part in that police case. I
strongly object to Mr Nadrosov’s statements that police
officers injured him in the police station; at present I cannot
recall whether Mr Nadrosov raised any complaints about the
actions of the police officers.”
Statement by Mr P.
“... after that, police officers arrived at the
[bus] stop and arrested certain participants in that brawl; I was
among them. After I had been taken to the Proletarskiy District
police station, Rostov-on-Don, the police officers informed me that I
was suspected of having committed a robbery. Of course, I denied my
guilt, stating that at night I was with my friends and that I had not
committed any crime... After that, the police officers placed Mr
Nadrosov, whom I did not know and who was also arrested by policemen
on suspicion of the robbery, in my cell. I was not present when Mr
Nadrosov was searched. I would also like to note that the police
officers did not beat Mr Nadrosov in my presence... As I am aware, on
29 October 2000 Mr Nadrosov complained that he did not feel
well, due to which he was sent from the Proletarskiy District Police
Department to a hospital. Subsequently, I saw Mr Nadrosov in a
courtroom...”
On 30 October 2000 an ambulance was called for the
applicant. Emergency doctors drew up a report noting that he had an
injury to the left kidney and a closed injury on the left side of the
chest. The applicant was taken to a hospital.
At the hospital doctors again examined the applicant
and diagnosed him with “an injury to the lumbar region and a
closed chest injury”. The applicant explained that he had
sustained the injuries when he had fallen from “the height of
his own stature” on 29 October 2000. The medical report
issued in the hospital also indicated that the applicant had had
numerous subdermal haematomas measuring up to 2 centimetres in
diameter in the left subcostal area.
On
the same day the applicant underwent a laparocentesis, a surgical
puncture to diagnose injuries to and remove fluid from internal
organs, as a result of which his diagnosis was confirmed.
On the morning of 31 October 2000 the applicant was
discharged from the hospital and taken back to the detention unit at
the police station. On his admittance to the unit the applicant was
examined and the following injuries were recorded on him: “an
injury to the soft tissues of the left side of the chest and stomach,
an injury behind the right ear, an injury to the right leg”.
On 2 November 2000 the applicant’s mother
complained to the Proletarskiy District Prosecutor that the applicant
had been severely beaten up by the police. She also alleged that her
requests for a forensic medical examination of the applicant had been
futile. She applied for an examination which would establish the
nature and cause of the applicant’s injuries.
On 10 November 2000 an assistant of the Proletarskiy
District Prosecutor issued a decision not to institute criminal
proceedings in connection with the applicant’s claim of
ill-treatment. The reasoning of the one-page decision, in full, read
as follows:
“According to explanations by Mr Ya., on 29
October 2000 he was an investigator on duty in the police department.
On an order of the head of the task unit of the Proletarskiy District
Police Department of Rostov-on-Don, he received materials of a case
pertaining to a robbery of truck drivers... The materials contained
information requiring institution of criminal proceedings under
Article 162 § 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
He instituted criminal proceedings and began the pre-trial
investigation. Mr Nadrosov... was among the suspects.
[Mr Ya.] drew up an arrest record in respect of Mr
Nadrosov at 7.00 p.m., when he was brought to his office. Before that
[Mr Ya.] performed other investigating actions, such as questioning
victims. Mr Nadrosov committed the crime on 29 October 2000, thus his
arrest was carried out in timely fashion.
He questioned Mr Nadrosov as a suspect and as an
accused. During all their interviews the investigator used no
physical or psychological pressure. Mr Nadrosov testified willingly.
[Mr Nadrosov] did not make any complaints or requests in the course
of the interviews. [Mr Ya.] did not see injuries on him. [Mr Ya.] did
not see the police officers beat [Mr Nadrosov] up. Nor did [Mr
Nadrosov] make any requests when he was served with the bill of
indictment. Moreover, during the robbery Mr Nadrosov had had a
fight with the truck drivers, who had actively defended themselves,
and he could have sustained injuries then.
No physical or moral pressure was applied to Mr Nadrosov
during the pre-trial investigation. His guilt was completely proven.
A policeman, Mr K., also totally denied that he had used
any physical or psychological pressure on Mr Nadrosov.
In connection with the above-mentioned, there is no
objective evidence, save for... a complaint about Mr Nadrosov’s
beatings. The actions of the police officers of the Proletarskiy
District Police Department do not contain any elements of a crime as
prescribed by Articles 285, 288 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation.”
On
the same day the assistant prosecutor sent a letter to the
applicant’s mother informing her that her request for
institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers had
been refused. He also noted that the decision could be appealed
against to a higher-ranking prosecutor.
On
an unspecified date the applicant’s mother complained to the
Rostov-on-Don Town Prosecutor that the applicant had been ill-treated
and about the refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the
police officers. She once again asked for a forensic medical
examination of the applicant. According to the applicant, no response
followed.
The
applicant was committed to stand trial before the Proletarskiy
District Court of Rostov-on-Don.
The
applicant’s lawyer complained to the District Court that the
police officers had severely beaten the applicant up and asked it to
examine the applicant’s medical records. He insisted that the
statement which the applicant had originally made to the police about
the nature of his injuries had been given in fear of reprisals and
did not reflect the truth of what had happened to him.
On 13 April 2001 the Proletarskiy District Court of
Rostov-on-Don found the applicant guilty of aggravated robbery and
sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. As to the
applicant’s ill-treatment complaint, the District Court refused
to call for or examine medical documents pertaining to the
applicant’s beatings. However, it heard the truck drivers, an
emergency doctor who had been called to the applicant on 30 October
2000, and the police officer who had investigated the applicant’s
criminal case. The truck drivers confirmed that they had been
attacked by several men, including the applicant, but they did not
recall hitting the applicant in defence. The emergency doctor stated
that she had been called to the applicant who had been complaining of
severe pain in the back as a result of a fall from a bench. She had
examined the applicant and had not discovered any visible injuries.
The applicant had not complained to her of beatings by the police.
The investigator testified that the applicant had complained of
ill-treatment by the police and that she had examined “necessary
documents” pertaining to his complaint. Relying on the
witnesses’ testimony, the District Court dismissed the
applicant’s complaint of beatings as unfounded.
The applicant appealed against the judgment. In his
statement of appeal he alleged, inter
alia, that he had been severely beaten up by the police
officers. He also complained that the District Court had refused to
examine the medical evidence corroborating his allegations of
ill-treatment.
On 21 August 2001 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the
conviction, endorsing the reasons given by the District Court. The
Regional Court also found that the applicant’s allegations of
ill-treatment were “not convincing” because they had been
refuted by the statements of the emergency doctor and the fact that
the applicant had initially stated that he had sustained an injury as
a result of a fall from a height.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Investigation of criminal offences
The RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (in force until 1
July 2002, “the CCrP”) established that a criminal
investigation could be initiated by an investigator upon the
complaint of an individual or on the investigative authorities’
own initiative when there were reasons to believe that a crime had
been committed (Articles 108 and 125). A prosecutor was responsible
for general supervision of the investigation (Articles 210 and 211).
He could order a specific investigative action, transfer the case
from one investigator to another or order an additional
investigation. If there were no grounds to initiate a criminal
investigation, the prosecutor or investigator issued a reasoned
decision to that effect which had to be notified to the interested
party.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that on 29 October 2000 he had been subjected to
treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention and that the
authorities had not carried out an effective investigation of that
incident. The Court will examine this complaint from the standpoint
of the State’s negative and positive obligations flowing from
Article 3, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Submissions by the parties
The
Government argued that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded. The
police officers had not subjected the applicant to inhuman or
degrading treatment. The applicant had not initially linked his
injuries to the police actions alleging that those injuries had
resulted from a fall from “his own height”. He did not
complain of ill-treatment to the police officers of the Proletarskiy
District Police Department or to the emergency doctors. Furthermore,
his allegations of ill-treatment were thoroughly examined by the
prosecution authority and domestic courts. Following questioning of
the police officers, the applicant’s allegations were found to
be unsubstantiated.
The
applicant insisted on his description of events on 29 October 2000.
He pointed out that medical records drawn up in the hospital on
30 October 2000 indicated that he had had multiple subdermal
hematomas and severe injuries to his chest and left kidney. He
further submitted that the statements by the police officers A. and
Av. and his co-defendant Mr P. had no evidential value. The police
officers had not taken part in his arrest and had already gone off
duty by the time the beatings started at the police station. As to Mr
P., he merely testified that no beatings had taken place “in
his presence”. Moreover, those statements had been taken almost
five years after the events under consideration. The applicant
further noted that his complaints of ill-treatment to the domestic
authorities were futile and his requests for a forensic medical
examination had gone unanswered.
B. The Court’s assessment
1. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant
i. General principles
As
the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 enshrines one of
the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most
difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the
victim’s conduct (see Labita v. Italy [GC],
no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000 IV, and Chahal
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports
1996-V, p. 1855, § 79). Article 3 makes no provision for
exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15
§ 2 of the Convention even in the event of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France
[GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V, and Assenov and
Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 93).
The
Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation
involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of
suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate
treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his liberty
may often involve such an element. In accordance with Article 3 of
the Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained under
conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity
and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not
subject him to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level
of suffering inherent in detention (see Kudla
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§
92-94, ECHR 2000-XI).
In
the context of detainees, the Court has emphasised that persons in
custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are
under a duty to protect their physical well-being (see Tarariyeva
v. Russia, no. 4353/03, § 73,
ECHR 2006 ... (extracts); Sarban
v. Moldova, no. 3456/05, § 77,
4 October 2005; and Mouisel v.
France, no. 67263/01, § 40,
ECHR 2002 IX). In respect of a person deprived of his liberty,
any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly
necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in
principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the
Convention (see Sheydayev
v. Russia, no. 65859/01, § 59,
7 December 2006; Ribitsch v. Austria,
judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, §
38; and Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222/99, § 53,
30 September 2004).
ii. Application of the above principles in
the present case
The
Court reiterates that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported
by appropriate evidence. In assessing evidence, the Court has
generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable
doubt” (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp. 64-65, § 161). However,
such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong,
clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions
of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part,
within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of
persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact
will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention.
Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the
authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see
Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR
2000-VII).
Where
domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court’s
task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the
domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to
assess the evidence before them (see Klaas v. Germany,
judgment of 22 September 1993, Series A no. 269, p. 17, §
29). Although the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic
courts, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead
it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see
Matko v. Slovenia, no. 43393/98, § 100, 2 November
2006). Where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention,
however, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (see,
mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch, cited above, p. 24, §
32).
Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court
notes with regret that the applicant was not medically examined
before his admission to the unit at the police station on 29 October
2000. On the following day emergency doctors were called to him in
view of his complaints of severe pain in the back. The doctors
recorded an injury to the left kidney and a closed injury to the left
side of the chest (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant was
transferred to the hospital where the preliminary diagnosis was
confirmed. According to the medical record drawn up in the hospital,
the applicant had also sustained multiple subdermal haematomas
measuring up to two centimetres in diameter in the left
subcostal area (see paragraph 10 above). Another medical report,
which was issued on the applicant’s return to the detention
unit on 31 October 2000, indicated that, in addition, he had
injuries behind his right ear and on the right leg (see paragraph 12
above).
In
the first place, the Court observes that the Government did not claim
that the injuries sustained by the applicant could have dated from a
period prior to his being arrested. In response to the findings in
the medical reports, the Government claimed that the applicant had
been injured as a result of a fall either from a bench or from “his
own height”. The Court considers that the Government’s
explanation sits ill with the nature of the applicant’s
injuries as recorded in the medical reports. While the Court does not
exclude the possibility of accidents occurring in detention, it does
not find it convincing that the applicant could have sustained
multiple haematomas and injuries on the left side of the chest and
back and at the same time received injuries of the right leg and
behind the right ear through a single accidental fall from a bench or
from another height. The Court notes the Government’s argument
that the applicant himself had cited a fall as a cause of his
injuries. However, the Court has doubts about the credibility of the
applicant’s statements. It is not surprising that the applicant
did not disclose the real cause of his injuries to the emergency
doctors while still in the presence of the alleged offenders. The
Court cannot rule out the possibility that the applicant felt
intimidated by the persons he had accused of having ill-treated him
(see Colibaba v. Moldova, no. 29089/06, § 49,
23 October 2007, and Batı and Others v. Turkey,
nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, § 100, ECHR 2004 IV
(extracts)). The Court must also have regard to the fact that the
applicant, in his complaints to the prosecution authorities and later
to the district and regional courts, was unequivocal in his account
that he had been ill-treated by police officers during the arrest and
while in custody. The applicant consistently denied the accuracy of
the statement which he had made to the police and emergency doctors
(see paragraphs 13 and 20 above).
The
Court further observes that in their submissions the Government
relied on the statements by the two police officers and the
applicant’s co-defendant (see paragraph 8 above). In this
connection the Court accepts the applicant’s argument that
those statements are of little evidential value in view of the period
of time which elapsed between the events under consideration and the
time when those statements were made and the fact that those persons
were not eyewitnesses to the applicant’s arrest or his
subsequent questioning in the police station.
Bearing in mind the authorities’ obligation to
account for injuries caused to persons within their control in
custody and in the absence of a convincing and plausible explanation
by the Government in the instant case, the Court finds it established
to the standard of proof required in the Convention proceedings that
the injuries as recorded in the medical reports drawn up in the
detention unit and the hospital (see paragraph 32 above) were the
result of the treatment of which the applicant complained and for
which the Government bore responsibility (see Mehmet Emin Yüksel
v. Turkey, no. 40154/98, § 30, 20 July 2004).
The
Court reiterates the applicant’s allegation that the police
officers beat him up during the arrest and subsequently at the police
station. However, the conclusion that the applicant’s injuries
were caused by the treatment he underwent under the control of the
authorities and the fact that the Government have not furnished any
arguments which would provide a basis to explain or justify the force
used make it unnecessary for the Court to inquire into the specific
circumstances surrounding the use of violence against the applicant.
The Court, nevertheless, considers it necessary to stress that it has
never been argued that the applicant resisted arrest, attempted to
escape or did not comply with lawful orders of the police officers.
Furthermore, there is no indication that at any point during his
arrest or subsequent detention at the police station he threatened
the police officers, for example, by openly carrying a weapon or by
attacking them (see, by contrast, Necdet Bulut v. Turkey,
no. 77092/01, § 25, 20 November 2007, and
Berliński v. Poland, nos. 27715/95 and 30209/96,
§ 62, 20 June 2002). The Court therefore does not discern
any necessity which might have prompted the use of violence against
the applicant. It appears that the use of force was retaliatory in
nature and was aimed at debasing the applicant and driving him into
submission. In addition, the treatment to which the applicant was
subjected must have caused him mental and physical suffering, even
though it did not apparently result in any long-term damage to
health.
Accordingly, having regard to the nature and the
extent of the applicant’s injuries, the Court concludes that
the State is responsible under Article 3 on account of the inhuman
and degrading treatment to which the applicant was subjected by the
police and that there has thus been a violation of that provision.
(b) Alleged inadequacy of the
investigation
The Court reiterates that where an individual raises
an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated in breach of
Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s
general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there
should be an effective official investigation. An obligation to
investigate “is not an obligation of result, but of means”:
not every investigation should necessarily be successful or come to a
conclusion which coincides with the claimant’s account of
events; however, it should in principle be capable of leading to the
establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove
to be true, to the identification and punishment of those
responsible. Thus, the investigation of serious allegations of
ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must
always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should
not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their
investigation or as the basis of their decisions. They must take all
reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning
the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony,
forensic evidence, and so on. Any deficiency in the investigation
which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or
the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of
this standard (see, among many authorities, Mikheyev v. Russia,
no. 77617/01, § 107 et seq., 26 January 2006, and
Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998,
Reports 1998 VIII, § 102 et seq.).
On
the basis of the evidence adduced in the present case, the Court has
found that the respondent State is responsible under Article 3 for
the ill-treatment of the applicant (see paragraph 37 above). The
applicant’s complaint in this regard is therefore “arguable”.
The authorities thus had an obligation to carry out an effective
investigation into the circumstances in which the applicant sustained
his injuries (see Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222/99,
§ 58, 30 September 2004).
In
this connection, the Court notes that the prosecution authorities who
were made aware of the applicant’s beating carried out a
preliminary inquiry which did not result in criminal prosecutions
against the perpetrators of the beating. The applicant’s
ill-treatment complaints were also a subject of the examination by
the domestic courts at the two levels of jurisdiction. In the Court’s
opinion, the issue is consequently not so much whether there was an
inquiry, since the parties did not dispute that there was one, as
whether it was conducted diligently, whether the authorities were
determined to identify and prosecute those responsible and,
accordingly, whether the inquiry was “effective”.
The
Court reiterates that the applicant was entirely reliant on the
prosecutor to assemble the evidence necessary to corroborate his
complaint. The prosecutor had the legal powers to interview the
police officers, summon witnesses, visit the scene of the incident,
collect forensic evidence and take all other crucial steps for
establishing the truth of the applicant’s account. His role was
critical not only to the pursuit of criminal proceedings against the
perpetrators of the offences but also to the pursuit by the applicant
of other remedies to redress the harm he had suffered (see paragraph
22 above).
The
Court will therefore first assess the promptness of the prosecutor’s
investigation, viewed as a gauge of the authorities’
determination to prosecute those responsible for the applicant’s
ill-treatment (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94,
§§ 78 and 79, ECHR 1999-V). In the present case the
applicant’s mother brought the applicant’s allegations of
ill-treatment to the attention of the authorities by filing a
complaint with the Proletarskiy District Prosecutor on 2 November
2000 (see paragraph 13 above). It appears that the Proletarskiy
District Prosecutor’s office launched its inquiry immediately
after being notified of the alleged beatings.
However,
with regard to the thoroughness of the inquiry, the Court notes some
discrepancies capable of undermining its reliability and
effectiveness. Firstly, no evaluation was carried out with respect to
the quantity and nature of the applicant’s injuries. The
Court observes that the applicant’s mother asked for the
applicant to be examined by a forensic doctor. The Court reiterates
in this connection that proper medical examinations are an essential
safeguard against ill-treatment. The forensic doctor must enjoy
formal and de facto
independence, have been provided with specialised training and been
allocated a mandate which is broad in scope (see Akkoç v.
Turkey, nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, § 55 and §
118, ECHR 2000 X). In the instant case, the Court notes with
regret that the assistant prosecutor omitted to request a medical
examination of the applicant or at least to take statements from the
emergency and hospital doctors attending the applicant. In delivering
his decision of 10 November 2000, the assistant prosecutor did
not even mention the medical reports which listed injuries sustained
by the applicant. In this connection the Court is concerned that the
lack of any “objective” evidence - which medical reports
could have been – was subsequently relied on by the assistant
prosecutor as a ground for his decision not to institute criminal
proceedings against the police officers (see paragraph 14 above).
Further,
the Court finds that the applicant’s right to participate
effectively in the investigation was not secured. It transpires from
the assistant prosecutor’s decision of 10 November 2000 that
the investigator did not hear the applicant in person and that he did
not even consider mentioning his version of events in the decision.
In fact, it is apparent from the decision of 10 November 2000 that
the assistant prosecutor based his conclusions solely on the
testimonies given by the police investigator who had been assigned to
the applicant’s criminal case and a police officer who had
taken part in the applicant’s arrest. The assistant prosecutor
accepted too readily their denial that force had been used against
the applicant. The Court also cannot but note the glaring
contradictions in the assistant prosecutor’s findings and his
selective and somewhat inconsistent approach to the assessment of
evidence. Without statements from the truck drivers or the applicant
or any evidence from independent sources the assistant prosecutor,
nevertheless, assumed that the applicant
could have sustained
injuries in the fight with the truck drivers. The Court notes
that while the assistant prosecutor may not have been provided with
the names of individuals who may have witnessed the applicant’s
arrest at the bus stop on 29 October 2000 or who could have seen the
applicant at the police station, he could have been expected to take
steps of his own initiative to ascertain possible eyewitnesses.
Furthermore, he took no meaningful measures to determine the identity
of other police officers who had taken part in the applicant’s
arrest and his subsequent interrogation in the police station. The
Court therefore finds that the assistant prosecutor’s failure
to look for corroborating evidence and his deferential attitude to
the police officers must be considered to be a particularly serious
shortcoming in the investigation (see Aydın v. Turkey,
judgment of 25 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997 VI, § 106).
Finally,
the Court notes that the applicant’s complaints to a
higher-ranking prosecutor produced no result. As regards the judicial
proceedings, the Court finds it striking that while dealing with the
applicant’s ill-treatment complaints the domestic courts
considered it unnecessary to call on and take into account the
medical reports pertaining to the applicant’s injuries (see
paragraphs 19-21 above). They concluded that the applicant’s
allegations were “not convincing” by endorsing
testimonies given by the police investigator and an emergency doctor.
Neither the District nor Regional courts manifested interest in
identifying and personally questioning eyewitnesses to the
applicant’s arrest and hearing the police officers involved in
the incident (see Zelilof v. Greece, no. 17060/03, § 62,
24 May 2007 and Osman v. Bulgaria, no. 43233/98,
§ 75, 16 February 2006). For the Court, this unexplained
shortcoming in the proceedings deprived the applicant of an
opportunity to challenge effectively the alleged perpetrators’
version of the events (see Kmetty v. Hungary, no. 57967/00,
§ 42, 16 December 2003). The Court also observes that the
domestic courts paid no attention to the applicant’s submission
that he had had no choice but to cite a fall as a cause of his
injuries while still in the hands of the persons who had ill-treated
him. Both the District and Regional courts relied heavily on the
assistant prosecutor’s decision of 10 November 2000. In fact,
it appears that the domestic authorities did not make any meaningful
attempt to bring those responsible for the ill-treatment to account.
Having
regard to the above failings of the Russian authorities, the Court
finds that the investigation carried out into the applicant’s
allegations of ill-treatment was not thorough, adequate or effective.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
under its procedural limb.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of
the Convention that there had been no grounds for his arrest and
subsequent detention and that his arrest had not been authorised by a
court. Article 5, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The Court observes that it is not required to decide
whether or not the applicant’s complaints concerning his
detention disclose an appearance of a violation of Article 5 of the
Convention. It reiterates that, according to Article 35 of the
Convention, the Court may only deal with the matter within a period
of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken. It
observes that the applicant’s pre-trial detention ended on 13
April 2001 when the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don
convicted him (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95,
§ 147, ECHR 2000 IV). After that date his detention no
longer fell within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c), but within
the scope of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention (see, for
instance, B. v. Austria, judgment of 28 March 1990,
Series A no. 175, pp. 14-16, §§ 36-39). The
applicant lodged his application with the Court on 18 December
2001, which is more than six months after his pre-trial detention had
ended.
It
follows that this part of the application was lodged out of time and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4
of the Convention.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the
investigating authorities had attempted to force him to confess to
the robbery, that the domestic courts had not assessed evidence
correctly, had misapplied the law and misinterpreted the facts and
that the trial judge had been partial and had sided with the
prosecutor.
However,
having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows
that this part of the application must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
On
19 October 2005 the Court invited the applicant to submit his claims
for just satisfaction. He did not submit any such claims within the
required time-limits.
In
such circumstances the Court would usually make no award. In the
present case, however, the Court has found a violation of the
applicant’s right not to be subjected to the inhuman and
degrading treatment. Since this right is of absolute character, the
Court finds it possible to award the applicant 10,000 euros (EUR) by
way of non-pecuniary damage (compare Mayzit v. Russia,
no. 63378/00, §§ 87-88, 20 January 2005 and Igor
Ivanov v. Russia, no. 34000/02, §§ 48-50, 7 June
2007), plus any tax that may be chargeable.
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the
ill-treatment of the applicant by the police officers and the
ineffectiveness of the investigation into the incident admissible and
the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 July 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President