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LIMASOVY v. RUSSIA - 37354/03 [2008] ECHR 659 (22 July 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/659.html
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[2008] ECHR 659
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THIRD SECTION
CASE OF LIMASOVY v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 37354/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 July 2008
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to
editorial revision.
In the case of Limasovy v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet Fura-Sandström,
Corneliu
Bîrsan,
Anatoly Kovler,
Alvina
Gyulumyan,
Egbert Myjer,
Ineta Ziemele,
judges,
and Santiago
Quesada,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 July 2008,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no. 37354/03)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Russian nationals, Mr
Mikhail Anatolyevich Limasov and Ms Yelena Aleksandrovna Limasova
(“the applicants”), on 29 October 2003.
The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mr P. Laptev and Mrs V. Milinchuk, the
Representatives of the Russian Federation at the European Court of
Human Rights.
On 15 November 2005 and 17 October 2006 the Court
decided to communicate the complaints concerning non-enforcement and
supervisory review of binding judgments to the Government. Under the
provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided
to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicants are husband and wife. They were born in
1965 and live in Novokuznetsk.
In 1993 both applicants subscribed to
a State savings scheme for buying cars. The State failed to provide
the cars, and the applicants had to sue the Government.
On 1 April 2003 the Ust-Yansk District Court of Yakutia
gave two judgments and awarded the first applicant 90,610.72
Russian roubles (“RUB”), and the second applicant RUB
108,654.15. These judgments became binding on 30 April 2003, but were
not enforced immediately. On the Government's request, on 14 October
2004 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Yakutia quashed the
judgments and dismissed the applicants' claims on the ground that the
district court had misinterpreted material laws.
In 2005 the first applicant again sued the
Government for the undelivered car's price.
On 13 May 2005 the district court awarded the first
applicant RUB 108,757.91. This judgment became binding on 24 May
2005. On the Government's request, on 18 May 2006 the presidium
quashed the judgment and dismissed the first applicant's claims
on the ground that the district court had misinterpreted material
laws.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Under section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement
Proceedings of 21 July 1997, a bailiff must enforce a judgment
within two months. Under section 242.2.6 of the Budget Code of 31
July 1998, the Ministry of Finance must enforce a judgment within
three months.
The
Code of Civil Procedure of 14 November 2002 defines the
supervisory-review procedure as follows:
Article 376. Right to apply to a court exercising
supervisory review
“1. Judicial decisions that have become
legally binding, with the exception of judicial decisions by the
Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, may be
appealed against... to a court exercising supervisory review, by
parties to the case and by other persons whose rights or legal
interests have been adversely affected by these judicial decisions.
2. Judicial decisions may be appealed against
to a court exercising supervisory review within one year after they
became legally binding...”
Article 387. Grounds for quashing or altering
judicial decisions
by way of supervisory review
“Judicial decisions of lower courts may be quashed
or altered by way of supervisory review on the grounds of substantial
violations of substantive or procedural legal provisions.”
Article 390. Competence of the supervisory-review
court
“1. Having examined the case by way of
supervisory review, the court may...
(2) quash the judicial decision issued by a
court of first, second or supervisory-review instance in whole or in
part and remit the matter for a fresh examination...
(5) quash or alter the judicial decision
issued by a court of first, second or supervisory-review instance and
issue a new judicial decision, without remitting the matter for a
fresh examination, if the substantive law has been erroneously
applied or interpreted.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The applicants complained about the non-enforcement
and supervisory review of the judgments. The Court will examine these
complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As far as relevant, these Articles read
as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
The Government argued that this complaint was
inadmissible. The complaint about the supervisory review of 14
October 2004 had been submitted outside the six-month time-limit laid
down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, because the applicants
had first mentioned this issue in their application form of 26
August 2005. Their earlier letter should not have been taken
into consideration, because it had been unsigned. Besides, the
applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, because they had
not appealed against the bailiffs' negligence.
The applicants argued that this complaint was
admissible. Their complaint about the supervisory review of 14
October 2004 had been made in time.
The Court finds that the complaint about the
supervisory review of 14 October 2004 was submitted in time. It
was included in the applicants' letter that reached the Court on 2
February 2005, and the Court does not doubt the letter's
authenticity.
The Court also finds that a complaint against
bailiffs would not have been an effective remedy (see Jasiūnienė
v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 41510/98, 24 October 2000;
Plotnikovy v. Russia, no. 43883/02, § 16,
24 February 2005).
The Court notes that these complaints are not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on
any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Government argued that the judgments had not been
enforced because they had been quashed on supervisory review. The
supervisory review had been justified because it had been meant
to correct a misinterpretation of material laws.
The applicants argued that the authorities had not
intended to enforce the judgments, and that the supervisory review
had upset the stability of the judgment.
The Court reiterates that Article 6
of the Convention includes the “right to a court” (see
Golder v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, § 36). To honour
this right, the State must obey a binding judgment (see Burdov
v. Russia, no. 59498/00, ECHR
2002 III) and avoid quashing it, save for correcting a judicial
error or miscarriage of justice (see
Ryabykh v. Russia,
no. 52854/99, §§ 51–58,
ECHR 2003 IX). Besides, an enforceable judgment constitutes a
“possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
20. The
Court considers that in the case at hand the State has breached the
applicants' “right to a court” and prevented them from
peacefully enjoying their possessions.
First, the State avoided
paying the judgment debts
for one year and five months, and for over eleven months,
respectively. These periods cannot be considered reasonable.
Then the State quashed the
judgments on
supervisory review due to a misinterpretation of material laws. It is
unavoidable that in civil proceedings the parties would have
conflicting views on application of material laws. The courts are
called upon to examine their arguments in a fair and adversarial
manner and make their assessment of the claim. Before the
applications for supervisory review were lodged, the merits of the
applicants' claims had been examined by the courts
below. Nothing
suggests that the courts had acted outside their competences or that
there had been a fundamental defect in the proceedings before them.
The fact that the Presidium disagreed with the assessment made by the
courts below was not, in itself, a judicial error or miscarriage of
justice warranting the quashing of binding and enforceable judgments
and reopening of the proceedings (see Kot v. Russia,
no. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
21. There
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicants also complained under Articles 13, 14,
and 17 of the Convention, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the
domestic courts' findings.
However, in the light of all the material in its
possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its
competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention or its Protocols.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
In respect of pecuniary damage, the first
applicant claimed RUB 108,757.91, the second applicant claimed
RUB 108,654.15. In addition, the applicants jointly claimed 3,000
euros (“EUR”) as interest and an unspecified sum as
inationary loss.
The Government argued that this claim was unjustified
and had no causal link with any violation the Court may find.
The Court
considers that the violation found is best redressed by putting the
applicants in the position they would have been if the Convention had
been respected. It is therefore appropriate to award the applicants
the equivalent in euros of the sums that they would have received if
the judgments had not been quashed (see Bolyukh
v. Russia,
no. 19134/05, § 39, 31 July 2007). Under this head the
Court awards each applicant EUR 3,200.
28. In
respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicants jointly claimed EUR
10,000.
29. The
Government argued that this claim was excessive.
30. The
Court considers that the applicants suffered distress and frustration
because of the non-enforcement and supervisory review of the
judgments. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the
first applicant EUR 3,100 and the second applicant EUR 1,900.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicants also jointly claimed RUB 3,624.80 for
the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the
Court.
The Government noted that the costs and expenses
should be awarded only if necessarily incurred and reasonable as to
quantum.
According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is
entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as
it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the information in its possession and the above
criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award each applicant
the sum of EUR 50 covering costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the
non-enforcement and supervisory review admissible and the remainder
of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
Holds
(a) that the
respondent State is to pay to
each applicant, within three months from the date on which the
judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into
Russian roubles
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 3,200
(three thousand two hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 50
(fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to each
applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
EUR 3,100 (three thousand one hundred euros), plus any tax that may
be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(c) that
the respondent State is to pay the second applicant, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
EUR 1,900 (one thousand nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into
Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(d) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 July 2008,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall
Registrar President