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RYGALSKI v. POLAND - 11101/04 [2008] ECHR 56 (22 January 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/56.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 56
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF RYGALSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 11101/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22
January 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Rygalski v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Josep
Casadevall,
Giovanni Bonello,
Stanislav
Pavlovschi,
Lech Garlicki,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi Hirvelä, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 4 January 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 11101/04) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Wojciech
Rygalski (“the applicant”), on 19 March 2004.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr Jakub Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
On
7 December 2006 the
Court declared the application partly inadmissible and decided to
communicate the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings to
the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Częstochowa.
On
29 July 1999 the applicant lodged a complaint with the City Council.
He claimed that his neighbour, who lived upstairs, had carried out
illegal construction work as a result of which the walls of the
applicant's flat had begun to crack.
On
16 November 1999 an on-site inspection was conducted by the
authorities.
On
27 November 1999 the applicant lodged a complaint about the
inactivity of the authorities with the Principal Construction
Inspector (Główny Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego).
On
1 December 1999 the District Construction Inspector discontinued the
proceedings. It was found that the work had been carried out in
conformity with the law. The applicant appealed to the Regional
Construction Inspector.
On
16 December 1999 the applicant's complaint about inactivity was
transferred to the Regional Construction Inspector. It appears that
the proceedings concerning this complaint remained dormant until 19
February 2002.
On
25 February 2000 the Regional Construction Inspector quashed the
decision of 1 December 1999 and remitted the case.
On
1 August 2000 the applicant lodged a complaint about inactivity with
the Minister of the Interior.
On
7 August 2000 his complaint of 1 August 2000 was transferred to the
Principal Construction Inspector.
On
1 September 2000 his complaint was transferred to the Regional
Construction Inspector.
On
19 February 2002 the Regional Construction Inspector found the
complaint about inactivity, not specifying which one, well-founded
and fixed a new time-limit for the authorities to take all necessary
action.
On
15 May 2002 the District Construction Inspector issued a decision. It
found that the work had been brought into conformity with the law.
The applicant appealed.
On
17 June 2002 the applicant again lodged a complaint about inactivity.
On
24 June 2003 the Regional Construction Inspector quashed the decision
of 15 May 2002 and remitted the case. The applicant appealed to the
Supreme Administrative Court.
On
8 July 2003 the Principal Construction Inspector found the
applicant's complaint about inactivity of 17 June 2002 well-founded
and fixed a new 30 days' time-limit for the
authorities. However the administrative authorities do not appear to
have complied with the time limit.
19. Eventually,
as it transpires from the submissions of the applicant as well as
from the observations submitted by the Government, on 21 September
2005 the Regional Administrative Court gave a judgment on the merits
of the applicant's case. It
further transpires that the applicant failed to lodge a
cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Hence, the
judgment of 21 September 2005 became final.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
1. Inactivity of administrative authorities
For
a presentation of domestic law, see: Kaniewski v. Poland, no.
38049/02, 8 February 2006; Koss v. Poland, no. 52495/99, 28
March 2006.
2. Length of proceedings
The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings, in particular the
applicable provisions of the Law of 17 June
2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a
reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na
naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu
sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki)
(“the 2004 Act”), are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland no.
15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V and Ratajczyk v.
Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005-VIII and the judgment in
the case of Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§
34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 29 July 1999 and ended
on 21 September 2005. It has thus lasted 6 years, 1 month and 25 days
for 2 levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
1. The Government's plea on inadmissibility on the
ground of non exhaustion of domestic remedies
The
Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant had not
exhausted domestic remedies available to him under Polish law, as
required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They maintained
that from 17 September 2004, the date of entry into force of the
2004 Act, the applicant had a possibility of seeking compensation for
the damage resulting from the excessive length of proceedings before
Polish courts, under section 16 of the 2004 Act read in conjunction
with Article 417 of the Civil Code. The Government noted that
section 3 (6) of the 2004 Act explicitly provided for such a
possibility in the context of judicial administrative proceedings.
The
applicant contested the Government's argument.
The
Court recalls that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires
applicants first to use the remedies provided by the national legal
system. The rule is based on the assumption that the domestic system
provides an effective remedy in respect of the alleged breach.
The
Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those
seeking to bring their case against the State before an international
judicial or arbitral organ to use first the remedies provided by the
national legal system, thus dispensing States from answering before
an international body for their acts before they have had an
opportunity to put matters right through their own legal systems. In
order to comply with the rule, normal recourse should be had by an
applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford
redress in respect of the breaches alleged (see the Aksoy
v. Turkey judgment of 18 December
1996, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996 VI, pp. 2275–76,
§§ 51–52).
The
Court notes that the applicant several times lodged complaints
alleging inactivity on the part of the administrative authorities
with the respective higher authority, as provided by Article 37 §
1 of the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure of 1960.
His complaints were twice found to be well-founded by the Regional as
well as by the Principal Construction Inspector. Both these officials
fixed time-limits for dealing with the applicant's case (see
paragraphs 14 and 18 above). The remedy the applicant used was
therefore adequate and sufficient to afford him redress in respect of
the alleged breach.
The
Court also reiterates that, although Article 35 § 1 requires
that the complaints intended to be brought subsequently before the
Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, it does
not require that, in cases where the national law provides for
several parallel remedies in various branches of law, the person
concerned, after an attempt to obtain redress through one such
remedy, must necessarily try all other means (see, Kaniewski,
cited above, § 37). In any event,
the provisions of the 2004 Act relied on by the Government could not
be invoked in respect of delays attributable to the administrative
authorities since that Act only addresses complaints about length of
proceedings before the domestic courts .
The
Court considers therefore that, having exhausted the possibilities
available to him within the administrative procedure system, the
applicant was not required to embark on another attempt to obtain
redress by bringing a civil action for compensation.
Accordingly,
the Court concludes that, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1
of the Convention, the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies.
For
these reasons, the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
2. Substance of the complaint
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
Lastly,
the applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings complained of had infringed her right to the peaceful
enjoyment of her possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1.
The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
Having
regard to its finding under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph
37 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to
examine separately whether, in this case, there has also been a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see
Kroenitz v. Poland,
no. 77746/01, §§ 36 and
37, 25 February 2003).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 2,268 euros (EUR) without
specifying whether this amount related to pecuniary or non-pecuniary
damage and further claimed a sum of between EUR 2,500 –
3,000 in compensation for damage to his property.
The Government contested these claims.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects these claims.
On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that it is not
necessary to examine separately the complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No.1 to the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000
(three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be
converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
