British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
SHULEPOV v. RUSSIA - 15435/03 [2008] ECHR 559 (26 June 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/559.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 559
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF SHULEPOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 15435/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26
June 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Shulepov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Rait
Maruste,
Karel Jungwiert,
Volodymyr
Butkevych,
Anatoly Kovler,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 June 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 15435/03) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Arkadiy Anatolievich
Shulepov (“the applicant”), on 14 April 2003.
The
applicant was represented before the Court by Mr A. Manov, a lawyer
practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were initially represented by Mr P. Laptev, the former Representative
of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and
subsequently by their Representative, Mrs V. Milinchuk.
On
28 November 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
The
Government objected to the joint examination of the admissibility and
merits of the application. Having examined the Government’s
objection, the Court dismissed it.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1963. He is currently
serving a sentence in a correction facility in Nizhniy Tagil,
Sverdlovsk Region.
On
19 August 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder.
On
20 August 1999 the local prosecutor remanded him in custody. The
duration of the applicant’s detention was extended on several
occasions; the applicant unsuccessfully challenged those orders.
On
30 June 2000 the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court convicted the applicant
of aggravated murder and robbery and sentenced him to nineteen years’
imprisonment.
On
29 March 2001 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed this judgment and
remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh
consideration.
On
23 August 2001 the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court remitted the case for
an additional investigation to the Prosecutor’s Office of the
Sverdlovsk Region. The case was then twice more sent to the court and
remitted for an additional investigation, being finally referred to
the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil for examination in
August 2002.
On
27 September 2002 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court, following
adversarial proceedings in the course of which several witnesses,
including co-defendants, gave evidence and forensic expert reports
were examined, convicted the applicant of murder and theft and
imposed a sentence of thirteen years’ imprisonment for murder
and five years’ imprisonment for theft, the final sentence
being determined by way of partial accumulation as fifteen years’
imprisonment. During the proceedings before the first-instance court
the applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer.
On
an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the judgment of 27
September 2002.
On
20 December 2002 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment.
The applicant appeared before the appeal court via videoconference
from the detention facility. He was not represented by a legal-aid
lawyer. According to the case file, the prosecutor was present in the
courtroom but did not make any submissions. The court put only one
question to the applicant during the hearing: it asked whether the
applicant wished to amend his appeal.
In
July 2003 the applicant lodged a request for supervisory review
proceedings. On 5 December 2003 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court left
this request without consideration, for the applicant’s failure
to respect procedural formalities stipulated by law.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
According to Article 69 of the Code, in cases of
cumulative crimes, sentences shall be imposed separately for each
crime. A final sentence shall be determined by partial or full
accumulation of these sentences.
Article
105 § 1 of the Code sets out that murder shall be punishable by
imprisonment for a term of six to fifteen years. Article 158 §
2 of the Code provides for penalties for theft including, inter
alia, imprisonment for a term of two
to six years.
B. The Code of Criminal Procedure
Article
51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that counsel is
appointed by the investigator, prosecutor or the court if, inter
alia, the accused faces serious charges, carrying a term of
imprisonment exceeding fifteen years, life imprisonment or the death
penalty. Counsel is appointed by the investigator or court if the
accused has not retained a lawyer.
Article
373 of the Code provides that
an appeal court examines appeals with a view to verifying
the lawfulness, validity and fairness of judgments. Under Article 377
§§ 4 and 5 of the Code, an appeal court can directly
examine evidence, including additional material submitted by parties.
C. Case-law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation
Examining
the compatibility of Article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court ruled as follows
(decision no. 497-O of 18 December 2003):
“Article
51 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which describes the
circumstances in which the participation of defence counsel is
mandatory, does not contain any indication that its requirements are
not applicable in appeal proceedings or that the convict’s
right to legal assistance in such proceedings may be restricted.”
That
position was subsequently confirmed and developed in seven decisions
delivered by the Constitutional Court on 8 February 2007. It found
that free legal assistance for the purpose of appellate proceedings
should be provided on the same conditions as during the earlier
stages in the proceedings and is mandatory in situations listed in
Article 51. It further underlined the obligation of courts to secure
participation of defence counsel in appeal proceedings.
D. Case-law of the Supreme Court
In
a number of cases (decisions of 13 October 2004 and 26 January, 6
April, 15 June and 21 December 2005) the Presidium of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation quashed judgments of appeal courts
and remitted the cases for fresh considerations on the ground that
the courts had failed to secure the presence of defence counsel in
the appeal proceedings, although it was obligatory for the accused to
be legally represented.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that he had not been provided with a legal-aid
lawyer during the appeal hearing of 20 December 2002. He relied on
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which read as
follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing ... by a ... tribunal....
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence
has the following minimum rights:
... (c) to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing...”
A. Admissibility
The
Government contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic
remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They
submitted that he had not lodged an application for supervisory
review of his conviction after the relevant changes in domestic
practice (see paragraphs 19-20 above). They maintained that the
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the relevant law had
adjusted to prevent similar breaches in future and influenced the
subsequent practice of the domestic courts.
The Court reiterates that an application for
supervisory review is not a remedy to be exhausted under Article 35
§ 1 of the Convention (see Berdzenishvili v. Russia
(dec.), no. 31697/03, 29 January 2004). Therefore, the
Government’s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies must be dismissed.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Parties’ submissions
(a) The Government
The
Government submitted that the applicant had not informed the court
that he wished to be represented by court-appointed counsel at the
appeal hearing. No request had been made either in his appeal or
separately in writing.
They
further underlined that the applicant had been represented by
court-appointed counsel in the first-instance court, and thus the
criminal proceedings against him had been in conformity with the
requirements of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention.
It was for the applicant to secure his own rights to defence:
moreover, having previously been charged with a number of criminal
offences, the applicant could be expected to know all the features of
the court proceedings.
Finally
the Government stated that the court had a duty to provide an accused
with counsel if he or she faced charges carrying a term of
imprisonment exceeding fifteen years, whereas the charges against the
applicant, taken separately, did not presuppose such a punishment.
(b) The applicant
The
applicant argued that while he did not remember if he had made a
relevant request for participation of a court-appointed lawyer in
appeal proceedings, he had never waived his right to have such a
lawyer, whose participation in the applicant’s case was
obligatory according to Article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(see paragraph 17 above).
The
applicant thus protested against the Government’s finding that
the charges against him had not required obligatory legal
representation. He pointed out that the most severe sentence for
murder was fifteen years’ imprisonment and for theft was six
years’ imprisonment, whereas Article 69 of the Criminal Code
provided for cumulative sentencing by way of partial or full
accumulation of penalties (see
paragraphs 15 -16 above).
Furthermore,
the appeal proceedings had been conducted by videoconference, which,
in the applicant’s point of view, limited his capacity to state
his case without the assistance of a lawyer who could be present in
the courtroom. In sum, the applicant considered that the interests of
justice in his case had required the appeal court not to remain
passive and to enable him to be represented by counsel.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
The
Court notes at the outset that the requirements of Article 6 § 3
are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial
guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, and therefore the applicant’s
complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 should be examined
together (see Vacher v. France, judgment of 17 December
1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2147,
§ 22).
The
Court reiterates that the manner in which paragraph 1, as well
as paragraph 3 (c), of Article 6 is to be applied in
relation to appellate or cassation courts depends upon the particular
features of the proceedings involved; account must be taken of the
entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order and
the role of the appellate or cassation court therein (see Twalib
v. Greece, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1998 IV, § 46, and Granger v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 174,
p. 17, § 44). The Court has already held that the
situation in a case involving a heavy penalty where an appellant was
left to present his own defence unassisted before the highest
instance of appeal was not in conformity with the requirements of
Article 6 (see Maxwell v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28
October 1994, Series A no. 300 C, § 40).
Finally,
neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention
prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly
or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial (see
Talat Tunç v. Turkey, no. 32432/96, § 59,
27 March 2007). Such a waiver, however, must be established
unequivocally and must not run counter to any important public
interest (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 86,
ECHR 2006 ...).
(b) Application of the above principles to
the instant case
The Court observes that, in Russia, the jurisdiction
of appeal courts extends both to legal and factual issues. The
Sverdlovsk Regional Court thus had the power to fully review the case
and to consider additional arguments which had not been examined in
the first-instance proceedings. Given the seriousness of the charges
against the applicant and severity of the sentence to which he had
been liable, the Court considers that the assistance of a legal-aid
lawyer at this stage was essential for the applicant, as the former
could effectively draw the appeal court’s attention to any
substantial argument in the applicant’s favour, which might
influence the court’s decision.
Moreover,
the applicant appeared before the appeal court by videoconference
from the prison facility and the prosecutor appeared in the courtroom
in person, hence the applicant’s communication with the court
without any representation in the courtroom was at a certain
disadvantage (see, a contrario, Marcello Viola v. Italy,
no. 45106/04, § 75, ECHR 2006 ... (extracts), and
Golubev v. Russia (dec.), no. 26260/02, 9 November 2006).
Therefore,
in the Court’s point of view, the interests of justice demanded
that, in order to receive a fair hearing, the applicant should have
benefited from legal representation at the appeal hearing.
The Court further notes that according to the Russian
Code of Criminal Proceedings, as interpreted by the Russian
Constitutional Court, the onus of appointing a legal aid lawyer
rested upon the relevant authority at each stage of the proceedings
(see paragraphs 17 and 19 above).
Thus it was incumbent on the judicial authorities to
appoint a lawyer for the applicant to ensure that the latter received
the effective benefit of his rights, notwithstanding the fact that he
had failed to request this explicitly. In this respect the Court
notes that the applicant never unequivocally waived his defence
rights. However, no attempt whatsoever had been made to appoint a
lawyer or to adjourn the appeal hearing in order to secure the
presence of a lawyer later.
In
view of the above considerations the Court finds that the proceedings
before the Sverdlovsk Regional Court did not comply with the
requirements of fairness. There has, therefore, been a breach of
Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 6 § 3
(c) of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further relied on Article 5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4,
Article 6 §§ 1 and 2, Articles 13, 14 and 17 of the
Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, complaining of unlawful
pre-trial detention, alleged errors of fact and
law committed by the domestic courts, and failure of the
authorities to amnesty him.
The
Court has examined the remainder of the applicant’s complaints
and considers that, in the light of all the material in its
possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its
competence, they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It
follows that this part of the application should be declared
inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB)
in respect of pecuniary damage and RUB 2,000,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government considered the claim completely unsubstantiated and
excessive. In the Government’s view, the finding of a violation
would constitute sufficient just satisfaction in the present case.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, it finds that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage,
which would not be adequately compensated by the finding of a
violation alone. However, the amount claimed by the applicant appears
to be excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it
awards the applicant EUR 1,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on that amount.
The
Court further reiterates that when an applicant has been convicted
despite a potential infringement of his rights as guaranteed by
Article 6 of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in
the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that
provision not been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of
redress would, in principle, be trial de novo or the reopening
of the proceedings, if requested (see Somogyi v. Italy,
no. 67972/01, § 86, ECHR
2004 IV). The Court notes, in this connection,
that Article 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the
Russian Federation provides that criminal proceedings may be reopened
if the Court finds a violation of the Convention.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant claimed a symbolic sum of 1 RUB
for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts.
The
Government maintained that the applicant had not submitted any
documents in support of this claim.
The
Court notes that the applicant underlined that the sum he claimed
under this head was a symbolic one. However, according to the Court’s
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and
expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been
actually and necessarily incurred. Therefore, the Court rejects this
claim.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning lack of legal
assistance in the appeal proceedings admissible and the remainder of
the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of
the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 June 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President